Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
Hi, I my opinion the only way to securely handle your keys is the usage of some kind of Hardware Security Module, e.g. www.smartcard-hsm.com www.yubico.com These lightweight HSMs provide a PKCS#11 interface which can be integrated using the PKCS#11 engine of OpenSSL. In addition the SmartCard-HSM supports key replication to build some kind of load-balancing cluster where all HSMs share the same key. Depending on the load of the server these small HSMs might be suitable. Otherwise you should spent some money for a complete and full HSM solution. Regards, Frank Am 21.07.2015 um 09:53 schrieb Mike Mohr: Securing a system against this kind of attack can be done in several ways, depending on the level of assurance you desire. You might start out with Tripwire: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Source_Tripwire http://www.tripwire.org/ You could also implement mandatory access control and ACLs using either grsecurity or SELinux: http://grsecurity.net/ http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~jcg8f/SELinux%20grsecurity%20paper.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux Personally I prefer grsecurity, but it is not supported in mainline by any major distribution that I am aware of. You'll have to patch, build, and and support your own kernel image in order to use it. SELinux is supported out of the box on CentOS 6 and 7, so it would probably be a good place to start. If your concern is solely in the realm of protecting your RSA keys, you might consider some HSM product from e.g. Yubico: https://www.yubico.com/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module These tiny USB keys store the RSA keys on a secure element which is physically tamper-resistant. The key material never leaves the hardware token. However, you'd probably have to write a custom provider for OpenSSL, and the throughput would probably only be sufficient for a very small amount of traffic. If you need something that can handle a higher load, you might consider purchasing one of Cavium's cards: http://www.cavium.com/overview.html However, they are 10 gigabit passthrough devices and will unwrap / re-wrap the SSL session in hardware. They are not cheap. Good luck! On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 11:46 PM, James james.arivazha...@gmail.com mailto:james.arivazha...@gmail.com wrote: Hi there, I have a concern regarding the private keys we use in the https (say apache) server. The https server links with openssl.so file, and uses the APIs provided by it. If some one build their own openssl and add few lines to print the keys during encrypt and decrypt and put in the library in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, may result in compromising the security of the keys. Does any of you faced this problem and if you could share the solution it would be helpful. regards, James Arivazhagan Ponnusamy ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users -- Thater Schwier Consulting GbR Frank Thater M.Sc. in Applied IT Security, Dipl.-Wirt.-Inf. Schülerweg 38 32429 Minden, Germany Phone +49 160 6316655 http://www.tscons.de Diese E-Mail enthält vertrauliche und/oder rechtlich geschützte Informationen. Wenn Sie nicht der richtige Adressat sind oder diese E-Mail irrtümlich erhalten haben, informieren Sie bitte sofort den Absender und vernichten Sie diese Mail. Das unerlaubte Kopieren sowie die unbefugte Weitergabe dieser Mail ist nicht gestattet. This e-mail may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient (or have received this e-mail in error) please notify the sender immediately and destroy this e-mail. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this e-mail is strictly forbidden. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:46 PM, Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com wrote: Actually that isn't quite right. A properly configured and tuned RBAC policy, when combined with PaX, can very effectively limit all userspace activity (including root access!). How do you know that the module is installed and actually doing things? How do you know what kernel is actually booted? Of course you're right. One might also consider attack vectors from an unsecured BMC or the IME - they probably have undetectable DMA access to the host, after all. But that isn't the point ... steps can and should be taken to lock down the host operating system. It helps if you can also use a hardware security module to protect your key material. How do you know that the operations that YOU request are actually the ones being performed? How do you know that the operating system isn't making additional requests of its own? You have to trust root. No two ways about it. The first question has no bearing on the second statement. With or without grsecurity/selinux, you have no way to guarantee that the kernel is operating the way you expect it to at any given time. I suppose it boils down to the threat model. However, limiting root's power is a good idea, and grsecurity provides an excellent framework in which to do so. Caveat emptor. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
If some one build their own openssl and add few lines to print the keys during encrypt and decrypt and put in the library in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, may result in compromising the security of the keys. Does any of you faced this problem and if you could share the solution it would be helpful. Also see http://scienceblogs.com/goodmath/2007/04/15/strange-loops-dennis-ritchie-a/. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
Actually that isn't quite right. A properly configured and tuned RBAC policy, when combined with PaX, can very effectively limit all userspace activity (including root access!). How do you know that the module is installed and actually doing things? How do you know what kernel is actually booted? It helps if you can also use a hardware security module to protect your key material. How do you know that the operations that YOU request are actually the ones being performed? How do you know that the operating system isn't making additional requests of its own? You have to trust root. No two ways about it. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
Actually that isn't quite right. A properly configured and tuned RBAC https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grsecurity#Role-based_access_control policy, when combined with PaX https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grsecurity#PaX, can very effectively limit all userspace activity (including root access!). It helps if you can also use a hardware security module https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module to protect your key material. On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 1:48 AM, Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com wrote: If some one build their own openssl and add few lines to print the keys during encrypt and decrypt and put in the library in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, may result in compromising the security of the keys. Can anyone other than root do this? You have to trust root. They could just cat your keyfile anyway. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
Securing a system against this kind of attack can be done in several ways, depending on the level of assurance you desire. You might start out with Tripwire: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Source_Tripwire http://www.tripwire.org/ You could also implement mandatory access control and ACLs using either grsecurity or SELinux: http://grsecurity.net/ http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~jcg8f/SELinux%20grsecurity%20paper.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux Personally I prefer grsecurity, but it is not supported in mainline by any major distribution that I am aware of. You'll have to patch, build, and and support your own kernel image in order to use it. SELinux is supported out of the box on CentOS 6 and 7, so it would probably be a good place to start. If your concern is solely in the realm of protecting your RSA keys, you might consider some HSM product from e.g. Yubico: https://www.yubico.com/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module These tiny USB keys store the RSA keys on a secure element which is physically tamper-resistant. The key material never leaves the hardware token. However, you'd probably have to write a custom provider for OpenSSL, and the throughput would probably only be sufficient for a very small amount of traffic. If you need something that can handle a higher load, you might consider purchasing one of Cavium's cards: http://www.cavium.com/overview.html However, they are 10 gigabit passthrough devices and will unwrap / re-wrap the SSL session in hardware. They are not cheap. Good luck! On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 11:46 PM, James james.arivazha...@gmail.com wrote: Hi there, I have a concern regarding the private keys we use in the https (say apache) server. The https server links with openssl.so file, and uses the APIs provided by it. If some one build their own openssl and add few lines to print the keys during encrypt and decrypt and put in the library in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, may result in compromising the security of the keys. Does any of you faced this problem and if you could share the solution it would be helpful. regards, James Arivazhagan Ponnusamy ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
If some one build their own openssl and add few lines to print the keys during encrypt and decrypt and put in the library in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, may result in compromising the security of the keys. Can anyone other than root do this? You have to trust root. They could just cat your keyfile anyway. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
[openssl-users] Regarding the security of the keys
Hi there, I have a concern regarding the private keys we use in the https (say apache) server. The https server links with openssl.so file, and uses the APIs provided by it. If some one build their own openssl and add few lines to print the keys during encrypt and decrypt and put in the library in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, may result in compromising the security of the keys. Does any of you faced this problem and if you could share the solution it would be helpful. regards, James Arivazhagan Ponnusamy ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
