[openssl-users] Softhsm + engine_pkcs11 + openssl with EC keys fail.

2018-09-17 Thread Paras Shah (parashah) via openssl-users
I have softhsm-v2.5.0-rc1 which has ec keys imported in it. Now, when I try to use these keys from openssl CLI using the pkcs11 engine, it fails. 1. SoftHSM version []:~$ softhsm2-util --version 2.5.0rc1 2. SoftHSM token init []:~$ softhsm2-util --init-token --slot 0 --label "token 2.5.0-rc1"

[openssl-users] ED25519 key with openssl engine

2018-09-17 Thread Paras Shah (parashah) via openssl-users
I get the following error when I try to access the ed25519 key stored in SoftHSM via the openssl engine interface using engine_pkcs11. []:~$ openssl pkey -in

Re: [openssl-users] Softhsm + engine_pkcs11 + openssl with EC keys fail.

2018-09-17 Thread Richard Levitte
In message <4ac69fc3-bec7-46f6-882a-671196fc0...@contoso.com> on Mon, 17 Sep 2018 20:59:59 +, "Paras Shah (parashah)" said: > 4. Import the key into softhsm > > []:~$ softhsm2-util --import ~/tmp/secp256k1-key.pem.pkcs8 --label "ec key" > --id --token > "token 2.5.0-rc1" Ok, so

Re: [openssl-users] Re-enable 3DES on NGINX + OpenSSL 1.1.1

2018-09-17 Thread Neil Craig
Thanks very much Matt. I have indeed built with NGINX configure opt --with-openssl-opt=enable-weak-ssl-cipher and whilst I don¹t see an error when running NGINX with a/some 3DES cipher(s) in the ciphers list, I don¹t see any 3DES ciphers in the output of e.g. Testssl and I can¹t make a connection

Re: [openssl-users] Softhsm + engine_pkcs11 + openssl with EC keys fail.

2018-09-17 Thread Paras Shah (parashah) via openssl-users
That is not it. It results in the same error for the EC key. It is not the URL or the ID. Because for a RSA key in the softhsm with id = , it works fine with url containing id=%33%33 $ openssl pkey -in

[openssl-users] Re-enable 3DES on NGINX + OpenSSL 1.1.1

2018-09-17 Thread Neil Craig
Hi all I'm trying to re-add 3DES support (a temporary move, due to business requirements) to an NGINX (1.15.3) + OpenSSL (1.1.1) build via the NGINX build flag --with-openssl-opt=enable-weak-ssl-ciphers which i learnt from https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2016/08/24/sweet32/. Whilst I do see

Re: [openssl-users] Re-enable 3DES on NGINX + OpenSSL 1.1.1

2018-09-17 Thread Matt Caswell
On 17/09/18 16:29, Neil Craig wrote: > Hi all > > I'm trying to re-add 3DES support (a temporary move, due to business > requirements) to an NGINX (1.15.3) + OpenSSL (1.1.1) build via the NGINX > build flag --with-openssl-opt=enable-weak-ssl-ciphers which i learnt > from

Re: [openssl-users] ED25519 key with openssl engine

2018-09-17 Thread Matt Caswell
Perhaps the pkcs11 engine does not support ed25519 keys? Matt On 17/09/18 22:05, Paras Shah (parashah) via openssl-users wrote: > I get the following error when I try to access the ed25519 key stored in > SoftHSM via the openssl engine interface using engine_pkcs11. > >   > > []:~$ openssl

Re: [openssl-users] ED25519 key with openssl engine

2018-09-17 Thread Paras Shah (parashah) via openssl-users
I had the same doubt. I have x-posed this question on the opensc mailing list as well. On 9/17/18, 3:37 PM, "openssl-users on behalf of Matt Caswell" wrote: Perhaps the pkcs11 engine does not support ed25519 keys? Matt On 17/09/18 22:05, Paras Shah (parashah) via

Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL 1.1.1 Compiler Warnings

2018-09-17 Thread Matt Caswell
On 17/09/18 19:12, Jay Foster wrote: > There were many many more of these, which I omitted for brevity.  I > looked at the source and it does look like the code is trying to stuff a > 64-bit constant into a 32-bit variable.  Does OpenSSL-1.1.1 work on > 32-bit architectures? Yes. It should work

[openssl-users] OpenSSL 1.1.1 Compiler Warnings

2018-09-17 Thread Jay Foster
With the recent release of OpenSSL 1.1.1, I tried to cross compile it for a 32-bit ARM architecture.  I observe many compiler warnings similar to the following: crypto/ec/curve448/curve448.c:30: warning: integer constant is too large for 'long' type crypto/ec/curve448/curve448.c:30: warning:

Re: [openssl-users] Softhsm + engine_pkcs11 + openssl with EC keys fail.

2018-09-17 Thread Nicola
Would it be possible for you to open this as an issue on Github and include there your first email and the full logs? Thanks, Nicola Tuveri On Tue, 18 Sep 2018 at 01:15, Paras Shah (parashah) via openssl-users < openssl-users@openssl.org> wrote: > That is not it. It results in the same error

Re: [openssl-users] Building openssl-1.1.1

2018-09-17 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Sep 17, 2018, at 1:30 AM, Billy Brumley wrote: > >> openssl version >> openssl: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1: version >> `OPENSSL_1_1_1' not found (required by openssl) >> openssl: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.1: version >> `OPENSSL_1_1_1' not found (required by

[openssl-users] Why default FIPS DBRG only call the RAND_poll() once?

2018-09-17 Thread Gaofan
hi all, I set the fips mode and call the RAND_pseudo_bytes for more than 1<<24 times to trigger the reseed process, but I found RAND_Poll() still cannot be called in the reseed process. if (!initialized) { RAND_poll(); initialized = 1; } the initialized cannot be changed

Re: [openssl-users] DTLS-over-UDP client example

2018-09-17 Thread Richard Weinberger
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:51 PM wrote: > I tryed to dig inside openssl s_client source code, but it's really too > complex for me, it seems like s_client doesn't use > SSL_connect, instead, using more low-level functions. > > > So, does anybody have any simple client-side implementation of DTLS

[openssl-users] Successful testing of 1.1.1

2018-09-17 Thread Robert Moskowitz
Fedora 29 beta just provided (in testing-update repo): openssl-1.1.1-2.fc29.armv7hl.rpm Against this version, I successfully produced by ED25519 pki per: https://github.com/rgmhtt/draft-moskowitz-eddsa-pki I have some minor textual edits to make in the draft and then submit it.  Then I can

Re: [openssl-users] Limit the number of AES-GCM keys allowed in TLS

2018-09-17 Thread Kyle Hamilton
...and once again FIPS screws those who don't want to adhere to its mandates (which everyone in the know has always stated simply reduces security by requiring the use of less-secure ciphers and implementations, without allowing patches or modifications to deal with newly-discovered classes of