* Ali Jawad:
> When I do visit a website using a browser and check the certificate I
> can see the intermediate certificates and the info of those
> certificates.
>
> I am wondering how can I see that info using command line, i know how
> to display the certificate info and it shows the info of th
* Ali Jawad:
> For example in the below :
>
> echo "" | openssl s_client -CAfile ./mozilla-root.crt -showcerts
> -connect ssl.com:443 | openssl x509 -text
>
> will only show the issuer/dates/etc information for the first
> certificate ssl.com and not for the subsequent certificates in the
> c
* Ali Jawad:
> Thanks Florian I did go ahead and parsed them, I last question please,
> in a chain sometimes only the intermediate certificates are returned
> and at other times the intermediate chains and the root certificate is
> returned, at least based on digcerts ssl testing utility, how can
);
}
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
(Error handling is only exploratory, of course.)
With version 1.0.0j, this sends a TLS 1.0 hello, and with 1.0.1c, a TLS
1.2 hello.
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
.
If the clients are cooperative, you could enable session resumption.
With that, only the first connection from each client would have to
perform the RSA operation, the subsequent TLS handshakes are much quicker.
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
eaks DNS lookups on Linux.
2) Reconfigure openssl to get work with rather BSD Sockets directly
It already does that internally. You can create a streaming socket in
some way and pass it to BIO_new_fp.
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Florian Weimer / Red
ricky.
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On 01/10/2013 04:12 PM, Tayade, Nilesh wrote:
True. But HSM claims performance, correctness and security.
HSM is an overloaded term, used for accelerators and containers alike.
(Common tamper-evident cryptographic modules have very low signing
throughput.)
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat
SSL tries to complete the
certificate chain before sending the client certificate. OpenSSL clears
errors resulting from this, but it cannot roll back the effects of
calling the callback. Are these callback invocations expected behavior?
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security T
On 08/09/2013 01:18 PM, Peter Sylvester wrote:
On 08/09/2013 11:17 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
Qt installs a verification callback like this
|// Register a custom callback to get all verification errors.
|X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx->cert_store, q_X509Callback);
It is
enJDK package
versions change the default provider to SunPKCS11.)
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al channels for this?
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User Support Mailing Listopenssl-users@openssl.org
Au
linger time 0.
You can also get RSTs if TCP detects that there is data loss, such as
data arriving to a closed socket, or closing a socket that has unread
data in its buffer.
Karthikeyan, is you protocol half-duplex or full-duplex? How do you
negotiate closing a connection?
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.
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VE for the broken fallback behavior because it
is not a security vulnerability—it works as designed. This means that
the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV patch currently has no CVE associated with it.
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Produc
ng, and I think it shows a limitation of the CVE authority
file in the light of its current applications.
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been used to disable all
TLS versions, then SSL 3.0 will never be negotiated, and attacks on SSL
3.0 are a non-issue. Even if you do not use TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV at all,
or OpenSSL versions which do not support it.
So it does matter who you talk to.
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
library not to do this). For technical reasons, the
protocol version number had to be bumped (this is just the way you fix
broken protocols), and for non-technical reasons, we call these protocol
fixes TLS 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 instead of SSL 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product
rt protocols on handshake failures, like web
browsers do?
If not, then you cannot use SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV in any way, and
you do not need it, either.
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Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
_
). Extremely few
applications have to deal with SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV.
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. That's why I
implemented it for OpenJDK as well. Application should *never* use it
because it does not really solve anything. If you have fallback code,
your application is still insecure.
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Florian Weimer / Red
* Jakob Bohm:
>> The purpose of the option is to make totally broken applications a
>> bit less secure (when they happen to certain servers). From my
I meant “a bit less insecure”, as Bodo pointed out.
>> point of view, there is only one really good reason to have this
>> client-side option—so
* Pradeep Gudepu:
> if(server)
> //method = ::SSLv23_server_method();
> method = ::TLSv1_server_method();
> else
> //method = ::SSLv23_client_method();
> method = ::TLSv1_client_method();
This is wrong, it prevents the use of TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2.
* Jaya Nageswar:
> We have a library which is built on top of openssl 0.9.8 (now incorporated
> the openssl 0.9.8zc related changes for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) for handling
> cryptographic and SSL functionality. By default the SSL protocol is set to
> SSLv23 at both client and Server.That means The cli
* Jaya Nageswar:
> So when SSLv23 is set as the protocol at both client and server, Does
> client automatically fall back and try with SSLV3 protocol if the
> connection with TLSv1 fails.
No, unless you have explicitly written retry code on your own.
> Does Protocol downgrade dance means the cli
* Aditya Kumar:
> Suppose, the Server is patched with the FALLBACK flag and its protocol is
> set to TLSV1/SSLV23(with TLSV1 as the highest protocol) and then client
> tries to connect to Server in TLSV1 and sets FALLBACK flag before
> initiating communication with Server. Will the client be able
* Graham Leggett:
> I have a need to parse the first incoming hello packet on an
> incoming TLS connection and based on the presence (or absence) of
> the SNI header, choose to pass the connection through to another
> server.
I think you'll need to work with BIOs to make a copy of the initial
han
* Graham Leggett:
> Is there a way to know whether the initial handshake has arrived fully?
I think you can abort the handshake from within the server name
callback with a suitable return value, so this does not really matter.
You just have to make sure the alert is never sent to the client, and
* Edson Marquezani Filho:
> We've found out that openssl shipped with CentOS 5 (old, I know) won't
> talk TLS by default.
This depends on the application using OpenSSL.
> So, once we cut off SSLv3, our Nagios scripts begin to fail, because
> they are not able to handshake with the monitored serv
* Florian Weimer:
> * Edson Marquezani Filho:
>
>> We've found out that openssl shipped with CentOS 5 (old, I know) won't
>> talk TLS by default.
>
> This depends on the application using OpenSSL.
>
>> So, once we cut off SSLv3, our Nagios scripts beg
* Paul Konen:
> Is the above window showing that is was NOT able to make a SSLv3 connection?
Yes, the output is certainly confusing, but it indicates an aborted
SSL 3.0 handshake.
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OpenSSL Project
* Bogdan Harjoc:
> Attached is the pcap. Am I missing something ?
RFC 6066 says this:
A server that receives a client hello containing the "server_name"
extension MAY use the information contained in the extension to guide
its selection of an appropriate certificate to return to the cli
On 04/03/2015 09:53 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
> If this will cause problems for you, please post on the list, ideally within
> the next week.
PostgreSQL uses OpenSSL compression by default, and it is a deliberate
feature (there is no application-layer compression support).
--
Florian Weimer
it's for plain TLS.)
An example how to establish a DTLS session with multiple peers over an
unconnected socket would help, too.
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On 04/14/2015 09:02 PM, Matt Caswell wrote:
>
>
> On 14/04/15 19:45, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> Is it possible to use DTLS with some sort of non-socket BIO?
>>
>> Basically, I have datagrams which I know belong to a specific DTLS
>> session, and I want to feed the
at's the actual implementation of
rsa_mod_exp) doesn't check for computation errors (due to MPI library
bugs or random bit flipping). It probably should, because there's a
simple attack which recovers the private key if a miscomputed
signature is published.
--
Florian Weimer
y_mod_exp() is called internally only after additional
> processing, such as block formatting is peformed.
Hmm, but the signature isn't verified, right? So that's not relevant.
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
University of Stuttgart http://cert.
ature verification failed.
Hmm, has the key signing the CSR been certified yet? I don't think
so, so the signature is meaningless.
--
Florian Weimer[EMAIL PROTECTED]
University of Stuttgart http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/
RUS-CERT +
"Patrick Li" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Ok. How about concurrent sends from 2 threads or concurrent
> receives from 2 threads? I think they are not supported either
> right?
Over the same connection? Nope, you need synchronization before you
can do
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