OpenSSL Security Advisory

2022-06-21 Thread Matt Caswell
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [21 June 2022]


The c_rehash script allows command injection (CVE-2022-2068)


Severity: Moderate

In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
CVE-2022-1292, further circumstances where the c_rehash script does not
properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection were
found by code review.

When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the shell.

This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
it is automatically executed.  On such operating systems, an attacker
could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2zf (premium support customers only)
OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1p
OpenSSL 3.0 users should upgrade to 3.0.4

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on the 20th May 2022.  It was found by
Chancen of Qingteng 73lab.  A further instance of the issue was found by
Daniel Fiala of OpenSSL during a code review of the script.  The fix for
these issues was developed by Daniel Fiala and Tomas Mraz from OpenSSL.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.0 or 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220621.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2022-05-03 Thread Matt Caswell
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [03 May 2022]
===

The c_rehash script allows command injection (CVE-2022-1292)


Severity: Moderate

The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to
prevent command injection.  This script is distributed by some operating
systems in a manner where it is automatically executed.  On such operating
systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges
of the script.

Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2ze (premium support customers only)
OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1o
OpenSSL 3.0 users should upgrade to 3.0.3

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on the 2nd April 2022.  It was found by
Elison Niven of Sophos.  The fix was developed by Tomas Mraz from OpenSSL.

OCSP_basic_verify may incorrectly verify the response signing certificate 
(CVE-2022-1343)
=

Severity: Moderate

The function `OCSP_basic_verify` verifies the signer certificate on an OCSP
response. In the case where the (non-default) flag OCSP_NOCHECKS is used then
the response will be positive (meaning a successful verification) even in the
case where the response signing certificate fails to verify.

It is anticipated that most users of `OCSP_basic_verify` will not use the
OCSP_NOCHECKS flag. In this case the `OCSP_basic_verify` function will return
a negative value (indicating a fatal error) in the case of a certificate
verification failure. The normal expected return value in this case would be 0.

This issue also impacts the command line OpenSSL "ocsp" application. When
verifying an ocsp response with the "-no_cert_checks" option the command line
application will report that the verification is successful even though it has
in fact failed. In this case the incorrect successful response will also be
accompanied by error messages showing the failure and contradicting the
apparently successful result.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 3.0.

OpenSSL 3.0 users should upgrade to 3.0.3

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on the 6th April 2022 by Raul Metsma. The fix
was developed by Matt Caswell from OpenSSL.

Incorrect MAC key used in the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite (CVE-2022-1434)
=

Severity: Low

The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the
AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable.

An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to
modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that
the modified data would still pass the MAC integrity check.

Note that data sent from an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint to a non-OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint
will always be rejected by the recipient and the connection will fail at that
point. Many application protocols require data to be sent from the client to the
server first. Therefore, in such a case, only an OpenSSL 3.0 server would be
impacted when talking to a non-OpenSSL 3.0 client.

If both endpoints are OpenSSL 3.0 then the attacker could modify data being
sent in both directions. In this case both clients and servers could be
affected, regardless of the application protocol.

Note that in the absence of an attacker this bug means that an OpenSSL 3.0
endpoint communicating with a non-OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint will fail to complete the
handshake when using this ciphersuite.

The confidentiality of data is not impacted by this issue, i.e. an attacker
cannot decrypt data that has been encrypted using this ciphersuite - they can
only modify it.

In order for this attack to work both endpoints must legitimately negotiate the
RC4-MD5 ciphersuite. This ciphersuite is not compiled by default in OpenSSL 3.0,
and is not available within the default provider or the default ciphersuite
list. This ciphersuite will never be used if TLSv1.3 has been negotiated. In
order for an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint to use this ciphersuite the following must
have occurred:

1) OpenSSL must have been compiled with the (non-default) compile time option
   enable-weak-ssl-ciphers

2) OpenSSL must have had the legacy provider explicitly loaded (either through
   application code or via configuration)

3) The ciphersuite must have been explicitly added to the ciphersuite list

4) The libssl security level must have been set to 0 (default is 1)

5) A version of SSL/TLS below TLSv1.3 must have been negotiated

6) Both endpoints must negotiate the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite in preference to any
   others that both endpoints have in common

This issue affects OpenSSL version 3.0.

OpenSSL 3.0 

OpenSSL Security Advisory

2022-03-15 Thread Matt Caswell
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [15 March 2022]


Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates 
(CVE-2022-0778)
==

Severity: High

The BN_mod_sqrt() function, which computes a modular square root, contains
a bug that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli.

Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain
elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve
parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.

It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that
has invalid explicit curve parameters.

Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate
signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus
be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be
reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit
elliptic curve parameters.

Thus vulnerable situations include:

 - TLS clients consuming server certificates
 - TLS servers consuming client certificates
 - Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
 - Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
 - Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters

Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker
can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue.

In the OpenSSL 1.0.2 version the public key is not parsed during initial
parsing of the certificate which makes it slightly harder to trigger
the infinite loop. However any operation which requires the public key
from the certificate will trigger the infinite loop. In particular the
attacker can use a self-signed certificate to trigger the loop during
verification of the certificate signature.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0.  It was
addressed in the releases of 1.1.1n and 3.0.2 on the 15th March 2022.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2zd (premium support customers only)
OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1n
OpenSSL 3.0 users should upgrade to 3.0.2

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on the 24th February 2022 by Tavis Ormandy
from Google. The fix was developed by David Benjamin from Google and Tomáš Mráz
from OpenSSL.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
It is affected by the issue.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.0 or 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220315.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2022-01-28 Thread Matt Caswell
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [28 January 2022]
===

BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on MIPS (CVE-2021-4160)


Severity: Moderate

There is a carry propagation bug in the MIPS32 and MIPS64 squaring
procedure.  Many EC algorithms are affected, including some of the
TLS 1.3 default curves.  Impact was not analyzed in detail, because the
pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely and include reusing
private keys.  Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as
a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are
not believed likely.  Attacks against DH are considered just feasible
(although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce
information about a private key may be performed offline.  The amount of
resources required for such an attack would be significant.  However,
for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share
the DH private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option
since CVE-2016-0701.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0.0.  It was
addressed in the releases of 1.1.1m and 3.0.1 on the 15th of December 2021. For
the 1.0.2 release it is addressed in git commit 6fc1aaaf3 that is available to
premium support customers only. It will be made available in 1.0.2zc when it is
released.

The issue only affects OpenSSL on MIPS platforms. If that applies then:

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should apply git commit 6fc1aaaf3 (premium support
customers only)
OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1m
OpenSSL 3.0.0 users should upgrade to 3.0.1

This issue was found on the 10th of December 2021 and subsequently fixed
by Bernd Edlinger.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.0 or 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220128.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2021-12-14 Thread Matt Caswell
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [14 December 2021]


Invalid handling of X509_verify_cert() internal errors in libssl (CVE-2021-4044)


Severity: Moderate

Internally libssl in OpenSSL calls X509_verify_cert() on the client side to
verify a certificate supplied by a server. That function may return a negative
return value to indicate an internal error (for example out of memory). Such a
negative return value is mishandled by OpenSSL and will cause an IO function
(such as SSL_connect() or SSL_do_handshake()) to not indicate success and a
subsequent call to SSL_get_error() to return the value
SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY. This return value is only supposed to be returned
by OpenSSL if the application has previously called
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(). Since most applications do not do this the
SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY return value from SSL_get_error() will be totally
unexpected and applications may not behave correctly as a result. The exact
behaviour will depend on the application but it could result in crashes,
infinite loops or other similar incorrect responses.

This issue is made more serious in combination with a separate bug in OpenSSL
3.0 that will cause X509_verify_cert() to indicate an internal error when
processing a certificate chain. This will occur where a certificate does not
include the Subject Alternative Name extension but where a Certificate Authority
has enforced name constraints. This issue can occur even with valid chains.

By combining the two issues an attacker could induce incorrect, application
dependent behaviour.

OpenSSL 3.0.0 SSL/TLS clients are affected by this issue. Users of this version
should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.0.1.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are not affected by this issue.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 29th November 2021 by Tobias Nießen. The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell and Tobias Nießen.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.0 or 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20211214.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2021-08-24 Thread Matt Caswell
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [24 August 2021]
==

SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow (CVE-2021-3711)
==

Severity: High

In order to decrypt SM2 encrypted data an application is expected to call the
API function EVP_PKEY_decrypt(). Typically an application will call this
function twice. The first time, on entry, the "out" parameter can be NULL and,
on exit, the "outlen" parameter is populated with the buffer size required to
hold the decrypted plaintext. The application can then allocate a sufficiently
sized buffer and call EVP_PKEY_decrypt() again, but this time passing a non-NULL
value for the "out" parameter.

A bug in the implementation of the SM2 decryption code means that the
calculation of the buffer size required to hold the plaintext returned by the
first call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be smaller than the actual size required by
the second call. This can lead to a buffer overflow when EVP_PKEY_decrypt() is
called by the application a second time with a buffer that is too small.

A malicious attacker who is able present SM2 content for decryption to an
application could cause attacker chosen data to overflow the buffer by up to a
maximum of 62 bytes altering the contents of other data held after the
buffer, possibly changing application behaviour or causing the application to
crash. The location of the buffer is application dependent but is typically
heap allocated.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1k and below are affected by this issue. Users of these
versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1l.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.

OpenSSL 3.0 alpha/beta releases are also affected but this issue will be
addressed before the final release.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 12th August 2021 by John Ouyang. The fix
was developed by Matt Caswell.

Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings (CVE-2021-3712)
=

Severity: Moderate

ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING
structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding
the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as
a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte.

Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's
own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string
whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally
NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure.

However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING
structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the
"data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by
using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function.

Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that
the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not
guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application
requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure
contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application
without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur.

The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates
(for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application
instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate
contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the
X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions.

If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an
ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions
then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of
Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory
contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext).

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1k and below are affected by this issue. Users of these
versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1l.

OpenSSL versions 1.0.2y and below are affected by this issue. However OpenSSL
1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Premium support
customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2za. Other users should upgrade
to 1.1.1l.

An initial instance of this issue in the X509_aux_print() function was reported
to OpenSSL on 18th July 2021 by Ingo Schwarze. The bugfix was developed by Ingo
Schwarze and first publicly released in OpenBSD-current on 10th July 2021 and
subsequently in OpenSSL on 20th July 2021 (commit d9d838ddc). Subsequent
analysis by David Benjamin on 17th August 2021 identified more instances of 

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2021-03-25 Thread Hubert Kario

On Thursday, 25 March 2021 15:03:24 CET, OpenSSL wrote:

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OpenSSL Security Advisory [25 March 2021]
=

NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing (CVE-2021-3449)
=

Severity: High

An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation
ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation 
ClientHello omits

the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial
ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL
pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service
attack.

A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation 
enabled (which

is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this
issue.

All OpenSSL 1.1.1 versions are affected by this issue. Users of 
these versions

should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th March 2021 by Nokia. The fix was
developed by Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski from Nokia.


I've created a stand-alone reproducer for it using tlsfuzzer:

git clone https://github.com/tlsfuzzer/tlsfuzzer.git
cd tlsfuzzer
# won't be necessary after https://github.com/tlsfuzzer/tlsfuzzer/pull/748 
is merged:

git checkout sig-algs-tests

# install dependencies:
python3 -m venv py3-venv
py3-venv/bin/pip install --pre tlslite-ng

# run the reproducer:
PYTHONPATH=. py3-venv/bin/python3 
scripts/test-sig-algs-renegotiation-resumption.py -h  -p 



In case the server has renegotiation disabled, use the --no-renego option.
In case the server doesn't require presence of signature_algorithms 
extension when signature_algorithms_cert are present (like in case of 
OpenSSL 1.0.2), use the --sig-algs-drop-ok option.


If everything went fine, and the server didn't crash, the test will print
summary like this:


TOTAL: 12
SKIP: 0
PASS: 12
XFAIL: 0
FAIL: 0
XPASS: 0


It's not necessary to install dependencies to a virtual environment,
but that setup is described in the official docs:
https://tlsfuzzer.readthedocs.io/en/latest/quickstart.html
--
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic



OpenSSL Security Advisory

2021-03-25 Thread OpenSSL
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [25 March 2021]
=

CA certificate check bypass with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT (CVE-2021-3450)


Severity: High

The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the
certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default.

Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in
the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added
as an additional strict check.

An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a
previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA
certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check
that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.

If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity
for checks that the certificate is a valid CA.  All of the named "purpose"
values implemented in libcrypto perform this check.  Therefore, where
a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the
strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and
server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or
removed by an application.

In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the
X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose
for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server
applications, override the default purpose.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1h and newer are affected by this issue. Users of these
versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 18th March 2021 by Benjamin Kaduk
from Akamai and was discovered by Xiang Ding and others at Akamai. The fix was
developed by Tomáš Mráz.


NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing (CVE-2021-3449)
=

Severity: High

An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation
ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits
the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial
ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL
pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service
attack.

A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which
is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this
issue.

All OpenSSL 1.1.1 versions are affected by this issue. Users of these versions
should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th March 2021 by Nokia. The fix was
developed by Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski from Nokia.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of these issues on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2021-02-16 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 February 2021]


Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() (CVE-2021-23841)


Severity: Moderate

The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts to
create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data contained
within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly handle any errors
that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which might occur if the issuer
field is maliciously constructed). This may subsequently result in a NULL
pointer deref and a crash leading to a potential denial of service attack.

The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by OpenSSL
itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this function directly
and they use it on certificates that may have been obtained from untrusted
sources.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1i and below are affected by this issue. Users of these
versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1j.

OpenSSL versions 1.0.2x and below are affected by this issue. However OpenSSL
1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Premium support
customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2y. Other users should upgrade
to 1.1.1j.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 15th December 2020 by Tavis Ormandy from
Google. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell.

Incorrect SSLv2 rollback protection (CVE-2021-23839)


Severity: Low

OpenSSL 1.0.2 supports SSLv2. If a client attempts to negotiate SSLv2 with a
server that is configured to support both SSLv2 and more recent SSL and TLS
versions then a check is made for a version rollback attack when unpadding an
RSA signature. Clients that support SSL or TLS versions greater than SSLv2 are
supposed to use a special form of padding. A server that supports greater than
SSLv2 is supposed to reject connection attempts from a client where this special
form of padding is present, because this indicates that a version rollback has
occurred (i.e. both client and server support greater than SSLv2, and yet this
is the version that is being requested).

The implementation of this padding check inverted the logic so that the
connection attempt is accepted if the padding is present, and rejected if it
is absent. This means that such as server will accept a connection if a version
rollback attack has occurred. Further the server will erroneously reject a
connection if a normal SSLv2 connection attempt is made.

Only OpenSSL 1.0.2 servers from version 1.0.2s to 1.0.2x are affected by this
issue. In order to be vulnerable a 1.0.2 server must:

1) have configured SSLv2 support at compile time (this is off by default),
2) have configured SSLv2 support at runtime (this is off by default),
3) have configured SSLv2 ciphersuites (these are not in the default ciphersuite
   list)

OpenSSL 1.1.1 does not have SSLv2 support and therefore is not vulnerable to
this issue. The underlying error is in the implementation of the
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function. This also affects the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
padding mode used by various other functions. Although 1.1.1 does not support
SSLv2 the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function still exists, as does the
RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode. Applications that directly call that function
or use that padding mode will encounter this issue. However since there is no
support for the SSLv2 protocol in 1.1.1 this is considered a bug and not a
security issue in that version.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Premium
support customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2y. Other users should
upgrade to 1.1.1j.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 21st January 2021 by D. Katz and Joel
Luellwitz from Trustwave. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell.

Integer overflow in CipherUpdate (CVE-2021-23840)
=

Severity: Low

Calls to EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate may overflow
the output length argument in some cases where the input length is close to the
maximum permissable length for an integer on the platform. In such cases the
return value from the function call will be 1 (indicating success), but the
output length value will be negative. This could cause applications to behave
incorrectly or crash.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1i and below are affected by this issue. Users of these
versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1j.

OpenSSL versions 1.0.2x and below are affected by this issue. However OpenSSL
1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Premium support
customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2y. Other users should upgrade
to 1.1.1j.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th December 2020 by Paul Kehrer. The fix
was developed by Matt Caswell.

Note

OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-12-08 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [08 December 2020]


EDIPARTYNAME NULL pointer de-reference (CVE-2020-1971)
==

Severity: High

The X.509 GeneralName type is a generic type for representing different types
of names. One of those name types is known as EDIPartyName. OpenSSL provides a
function GENERAL_NAME_cmp which compares different instances of a GENERAL_NAME
to see if they are equal or not. This function behaves incorrectly when both
GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. A NULL pointer dereference and a crash
may occur leading to a possible denial of service attack.

OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes:
1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a CRL
   distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate
2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the timestamp
   authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response and
   TS_RESP_verify_token)

If an attacker can control both items being compared then that attacker could
trigger a crash. For example if the attacker can trick a client or server into
checking a malicious certificate against a malicious CRL then this may occur.
Note that some applications automatically download CRLs based on a URL embedded
in a certificate. This checking happens prior to the signatures on the
certificate and CRL being verified. OpenSSL's s_server, s_client and verify
tools have support for the "-crl_download" option which implements automatic
CRL downloading and this attack has been demonstrated to work against those
tools.

Note that an unrelated bug means that affected versions of OpenSSL cannot parse
or construct correct encodings of EDIPARTYNAME. However it is possible to
construct a malformed EDIPARTYNAME that OpenSSL's parser will accept and hence
trigger this attack.

All OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 versions are affected by this issue. Other OpenSSL
releases are out of support and have not been checked.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1i.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Premium
support customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2x. Other users should
upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1i.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th November 2020 by David Benjamin
(Google). Initial analysis was performed by David Benjamin with additional
analysis by Matt Caswell (OpenSSL). The fix was developed by Matt Caswell.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of this issue on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20201208.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-09-10 Thread Matt Caswell



On 10/09/2020 16:14, Jakob Bohm via openssl-users wrote:
> On 2020-09-10 09:03, Tomas Mraz wrote:
>> On Wed, 2020-09-09 at 22:26 +0200, Jakob Bohm via openssl-users wrote:
>>> Wouldn't a more reasonable response for 1.0.2 users have been to
>>> force on
>>> SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE rather than recklessly deprecating affected
>>> cipher
>>> suites
>>> and telling affected people to recompile with the fix off?
>>
>> You seem to be mixing two different affected things. One is the static
>> DH ciphersuites. There is no remediation for these except for not using
>> them. Fortunately they are not really used by anyone. This can be
>> achieved on the server side by simply not providing the DH certificate.
>> On the client side they can be dropped from the ciphers string. This is
>> the "deprecating affected cipher suites" change part.
>>
>> On the other hand the reuse of DH key for ephemeral DH can be only
>> disabled by setting SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE by the calling server
>> application. This is the part relevant for wider audience.
>>
>> So yes, both issues can be remediated by application calling the
>> OpenSSL library. On the other hand it is not always possible to change
>> the application so we also provide fix to premium support customers in
>> terms of changing the openssl code.
>>
> 
> 
> The advisory didn't include this clarification,

Isn't the text below from the advisory more-or-less what Tomas said?

"OpenSSL 1.0.2f and above will only reuse a DH secret if a "static" DH
ciphersuite is used
...
Since the vulnerability lies in the TLS specification, fixing the
affected ciphersuites is not viable. For this reason 1.0.2w moves the
affected ciphersuites into the "weak-ssl-ciphers" list."


> and didn't state if
> 1.0.2w fixes the DHE case by doing what 1.1.x does and act like
> SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is always set.

The advisory says that SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE was made the default in 1.0.2f:

"OpenSSL 1.0.2e and below would reuse the DH secret across multiple TLS
connections in server processes unless the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option
was explicitly configured. Therefore all ciphersuites that use DH in
servers (including ephemeral DH) are vulnerable in these versions. In
OpenSSL 1.0.2f SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE was made the default and it could
not be turned off as a response to CVE-2016-0701."

Matt



Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-09-10 Thread Jakob Bohm via openssl-users

On 2020-09-10 09:03, Tomas Mraz wrote:

On Wed, 2020-09-09 at 22:26 +0200, Jakob Bohm via openssl-users wrote:

Wouldn't a more reasonable response for 1.0.2 users have been to
force on
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE rather than recklessly deprecating affected
cipher
suites
and telling affected people to recompile with the fix off?


You seem to be mixing two different affected things. One is the static
DH ciphersuites. There is no remediation for these except for not using
them. Fortunately they are not really used by anyone. This can be
achieved on the server side by simply not providing the DH certificate.
On the client side they can be dropped from the ciphers string. This is
the "deprecating affected cipher suites" change part.

On the other hand the reuse of DH key for ephemeral DH can be only
disabled by setting SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE by the calling server application. 
This is the part relevant for wider audience.

So yes, both issues can be remediated by application calling the
OpenSSL library. On the other hand it is not always possible to change
the application so we also provide fix to premium support customers in
terms of changing the openssl code.




The advisory didn't include this clarification, and didn't state if 
1.0.2w fixes the DHE case by doing what 1.1.x does and act like 
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is always set.



Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-09-10 Thread Tomas Mraz
On Wed, 2020-09-09 at 22:26 +0200, Jakob Bohm via openssl-users wrote:
> Wouldn't a more reasonable response for 1.0.2 users have been to
> force on
> SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE rather than recklessly deprecating affected
> cipher 
> suites
> and telling affected people to recompile with the fix off?

You seem to be mixing two different affected things. One is the static
DH ciphersuites. There is no remediation for these except for not using
them. Fortunately they are not really used by anyone. This can be
achieved on the server side by simply not providing the DH certificate.
On the client side they can be dropped from the ciphers string. This is
the "deprecating affected cipher suites" change part.

On the other hand the reuse of DH key for ephemeral DH can be only
disabled by setting SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE by the calling server application. 
This is the part relevant for wider audience.

So yes, both issues can be remediated by application calling the
OpenSSL library. On the other hand it is not always possible to change
the application so we also provide fix to premium support customers in
terms of changing the openssl code.

-- 
Tomáš Mráz
No matter how far down the wrong road you've gone, turn back.
  Turkish proverb
[You'll know whether the road is wrong if you carefully listen to your
conscience.]




Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-09-09 Thread Jakob Bohm via openssl-users

On 2020-09-09 14:39, OpenSSL wrote:

OpenSSL Security Advisory [09 September 2020]
=

Raccoon Attack (CVE-2020-1968)
==

Severity: Low

The Raccoon attack exploits a flaw in the TLS specification which can lead to
an attacker being able to compute the pre-master secret in connections which
have used a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based ciphersuite. In such a case this would
result in the attacker being able to eavesdrop on all encrypted communications
sent over that TLS connection. The attack can only be exploited if an
implementation re-uses a DH secret across multiple TLS connections. Note that
this issue only impacts DH ciphersuites and not ECDH ciphersuites.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 is not vulnerable to this issue: it never reuses a DH secret and
does not implement any "static" DH ciphersuites.

OpenSSL 1.0.2f and above will only reuse a DH secret if a "static" DH
ciphersuite is used. These static "DH" ciphersuites are ones that start with the
text "DH-" (for example "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"). The standard IANA names for these
ciphersuites all start with "TLS_DH_" but excludes those that start with
"TLS_DH_anon_".

OpenSSL 1.0.2e and below would reuse the DH secret across multiple TLS
connections in server processes unless the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option was
explicitly configured. Therefore all ciphersuites that use DH in servers
(including ephemeral DH) are vulnerable in these versions. In OpenSSL 1.0.2f
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE was made the default and it could not be turned off as a
response to CVE-2016-0701.

Since the vulnerability lies in the TLS specification, fixing the affected
ciphersuites is not viable. For this reason 1.0.2w moves the affected
ciphersuites into the "weak-ssl-ciphers" list. Support for the
"weak-ssl-ciphers" is not compiled in by default. This is unlikely to cause
interoperability problems in most cases since use of these ciphersuites is rare.
Support for the "weak-ssl-ciphers" can be added back by configuring OpenSSL at
compile time with the "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" option. This is not recommended.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates.

Premium support customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2w.  If
upgrading is not viable then users of OpenSSL 1.0.2v or below should ensure
that affected ciphersuites are disabled through runtime configuration. Also
note that the affected ciphersuites are only available on the server side if a
DH certificate has been configured. These certificates are very rarely used and
for this reason this issue has been classified as LOW severity.

This issue was found by Robert Merget, Marcus Brinkmann, Nimrod Aviram and Juraj
Somorovsky and reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2020 under embargo in order to
allow co-ordinated disclosure with other implementations.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of this issue on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200909.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html


Wouldn't a more reasonable response for 1.0.2 users have been to force on
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE rather than recklessly deprecating affected cipher 
suites

and telling affected people to recompile with the fix off?

Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded



OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-09-09 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [09 September 2020]
=

Raccoon Attack (CVE-2020-1968)
==

Severity: Low

The Raccoon attack exploits a flaw in the TLS specification which can lead to
an attacker being able to compute the pre-master secret in connections which
have used a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based ciphersuite. In such a case this would
result in the attacker being able to eavesdrop on all encrypted communications
sent over that TLS connection. The attack can only be exploited if an
implementation re-uses a DH secret across multiple TLS connections. Note that
this issue only impacts DH ciphersuites and not ECDH ciphersuites.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 is not vulnerable to this issue: it never reuses a DH secret and
does not implement any "static" DH ciphersuites.

OpenSSL 1.0.2f and above will only reuse a DH secret if a "static" DH
ciphersuite is used. These static "DH" ciphersuites are ones that start with the
text "DH-" (for example "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"). The standard IANA names for these
ciphersuites all start with "TLS_DH_" but excludes those that start with
"TLS_DH_anon_".

OpenSSL 1.0.2e and below would reuse the DH secret across multiple TLS
connections in server processes unless the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option was
explicitly configured. Therefore all ciphersuites that use DH in servers
(including ephemeral DH) are vulnerable in these versions. In OpenSSL 1.0.2f
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE was made the default and it could not be turned off as a
response to CVE-2016-0701.

Since the vulnerability lies in the TLS specification, fixing the affected
ciphersuites is not viable. For this reason 1.0.2w moves the affected
ciphersuites into the "weak-ssl-ciphers" list. Support for the
"weak-ssl-ciphers" is not compiled in by default. This is unlikely to cause
interoperability problems in most cases since use of these ciphersuites is rare.
Support for the "weak-ssl-ciphers" can be added back by configuring OpenSSL at
compile time with the "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" option. This is not recommended.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates.

Premium support customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2w.  If
upgrading is not viable then users of OpenSSL 1.0.2v or below should ensure
that affected ciphersuites are disabled through runtime configuration. Also
note that the affected ciphersuites are only available on the server side if a
DH certificate has been configured. These certificates are very rarely used and
for this reason this issue has been classified as LOW severity.

This issue was found by Robert Merget, Marcus Brinkmann, Nimrod Aviram and Juraj
Somorovsky and reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2020 under embargo in order to
allow co-ordinated disclosure with other implementations.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any kind.
The impact of this issue on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200909.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-04-21 Thread Sam Roberts
That makes sense, thank you all.


Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-04-21 Thread Matt Caswell



On 21/04/2020 20:46, Sam Roberts wrote:
> The announcement claims that this affects SSL_check_chain().
>
> Is that an exhaustive list? If an application does NOT call that
> function, does this mean the vulnerability is not exploitable?

As Ben says - this is correct.

>
> I ask because the the fixed function tls1_check_sig_alg is called by
> tls1_check_chain, and that is called directly by SSL_check_chain, but
> it is also called by tls1_set_cert_validity, and that is called from

You will note that tls1_check_sig_alg is only affected if we go down the
TLSv1.3 codepath. However tls1_set_cert_validity() only has one caller
and it looks like this:

if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
...
} else {
tls1_set_cert_validity(s);
ssl_set_masks(s);
}

So it is only ever called in a non-TLSv1.3 handshake.

Matt


> inside the tls state machine, but with different parameters, so its a
> bit hard to see if it is affected or not.
>
> Thanks,
> Sam
>
> On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 6:26 AM OpenSSL  wrote:
>>
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [21 April 2020]
> =
> 
> Segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain (CVE-2020-1967)
> =
> 
> Severity: High
> 
> Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during 
> or
> after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a
> result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension.
> The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received
> from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of
> Service attack.
> 
> OpenSSL version 1.1.1d, 1.1.1e, and 1.1.1f are affected by this issue.  This
> issue did not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.1d.
> 
> Affected OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1g
> 
> This issue was found by Bernd Edlinger and reported to OpenSSL on 7th April
> 2020. It was found using the new static analysis pass being implemented in 
> GCC,
> -fanalyzer. Additional analysis was performed by Matt Caswell and Benjamin
> Kaduk.
> 
> Note
> =
> 
> This issue did not affect OpenSSL 1.0.2 however these versions are out of
> support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended support is available
> for premium support customers: https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html
> 
> This issue did not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0 however these versions are out of
> support and no longer receiving updates.
> 
> Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
> 
> References
> ==
> 
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200421.txt
> 
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional 
> details
> over time.
> 
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
>


Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-04-21 Thread Benjamin Kaduk via openssl-users
On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 12:46:43PM -0700, Sam Roberts wrote:
> The announcement claims that this affects SSL_check_chain().
> 
> Is that an exhaustive list? If an application does NOT call that
> function, does this mean the vulnerability is not exploitable?

That is correct (speaking only in terms of public APIs).

> I ask because the the fixed function tls1_check_sig_alg is called by
> tls1_check_chain, and that is called directly by SSL_check_chain, but
> it is also called by tls1_set_cert_validity, and that is called from
> inside the tls state machine, but with different parameters, so its a
> bit hard to see if it is affected or not.

As you note, the valid call chains are a bit convoluted, but the relevant
codepath is only exercised for TLS 1.3 and SSL_check_chain().

-Ben


Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-04-21 Thread Sam Roberts
The announcement claims that this affects SSL_check_chain().

Is that an exhaustive list? If an application does NOT call that
function, does this mean the vulnerability is not exploitable?

I ask because the the fixed function tls1_check_sig_alg is called by
tls1_check_chain, and that is called directly by SSL_check_chain, but
it is also called by tls1_set_cert_validity, and that is called from
inside the tls state machine, but with different parameters, so its a
bit hard to see if it is affected or not.

Thanks,
Sam

On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 6:26 AM OpenSSL  wrote:
>
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [21 April 2020]
> =
>
> Segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain (CVE-2020-1967)
> =
>
> Severity: High
>
> Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during 
> or
> after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a
> result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension.
> The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received
> from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of
> Service attack.
>
> OpenSSL version 1.1.1d, 1.1.1e, and 1.1.1f are affected by this issue.  This
> issue did not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.1d.
>
> Affected OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1g
>
> This issue was found by Bernd Edlinger and reported to OpenSSL on 7th April
> 2020. It was found using the new static analysis pass being implemented in 
> GCC,
> - -fanalyzer. Additional analysis was performed by Matt Caswell and Benjamin
> Kaduk.
>
> Note
> =
>
> This issue did not affect OpenSSL 1.0.2 however these versions are out of
> support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended support is available
> for premium support customers: https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html
>
> This issue did not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0 however these versions are out of
> support and no longer receiving updates.
>
> Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
>
> References
> ==
>
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200421.txt
>
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional 
> details
> over time.
>
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2020-04-21 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [21 April 2020]
=

Segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain (CVE-2020-1967)
=

Severity: High

Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during or
after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a
result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension.
The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received
from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of
Service attack.

OpenSSL version 1.1.1d, 1.1.1e, and 1.1.1f are affected by this issue.  This
issue did not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.1d.

Affected OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1g

This issue was found by Bernd Edlinger and reported to OpenSSL on 7th April
2020. It was found using the new static analysis pass being implemented in GCC,
- -fanalyzer. Additional analysis was performed by Matt Caswell and Benjamin
Kaduk.

Note
=

This issue did not affect OpenSSL 1.0.2 however these versions are out of
support and no longer receiving public updates. Extended support is available
for premium support customers: https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

This issue did not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0 however these versions are out of
support and no longer receiving updates.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200421.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-12-06 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [6 December 2019]
===

rsaz_512_sqr overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2019-1551)
===

Severity: Low

There is an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in
exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis
suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a
result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed
likely. Attacks against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an
attack the target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not
recommended anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API
BN_mod_exp may be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are affected by this issue. However due to the
low severity of this issue we are not creating new releases at this time. The
1.1.1 mitigation for this issue can be found in commit 419102400. The 1.0.2
mitigation for this issue can be found in commit f1c5eea8a.

This issue was found by OSS-Fuzz and Guido Vranken and reported to OpenSSL on
12th September 2019. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov with additional
analysis by Bernd Edlinger.

Note
=

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is currently only receiving security updates. Support for 1.0.2
will end on 31st December 2019. Extended support is available for premium
support customers: https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html

OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates. It is unknown
whether issues in this advisory affect it.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20191206.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-09-11 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [10 September 2019]
=

ECDSA remote timing attack (CVE-2019-1547)
==

Severity: Low

Normally in OpenSSL EC groups always have a co-factor present and this is used
in side channel resistant code paths. However, in some cases, it is possible to
construct a group using explicit parameters (instead of using a named curve). In
those cases it is possible that such a group does not have the cofactor present.
This can occur even where all the parameters match a known named curve.

If such a curve is used then OpenSSL falls back to non-side channel resistant
code paths which may result in full key recovery during an ECDSA signature
operation.

In order to be vulnerable an attacker would have to have the ability to time
the creation of a large number of signatures where explicit parameters with no
co-factor present are in use by an application using libcrypto.

For the avoidance of doubt libssl is not vulnerable because explicit parameters
are never used.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1, 1.1.0 and 1.0.2 are affected by this issue.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1d
OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0l
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2t

This issue was reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan,
Nicola Tuveri, Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, and Billy Brumley. The
fix was developed by Billy Brumley. It was reported to OpenSSL on 5th August
2019.


Fork Protection (CVE-2019-1549)
===

Severity: Low

OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was
intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to
ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state.
However this protection was not being used in the default case.

A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision
timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child
process sharing state is significantly reduced.

If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using
OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all.

OpenSSL version 1.1.1 is affected by this issue.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1d

This issue was reported by Matt Caswell. The fix was developed by Matthias
St. Pierre. It was reported to OpenSSL on 27th May 2019.


Padding Oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey (CVE-2019-1563)


Severity: Low

In situations where an attacker receives automated notification of the success
or failure of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large
number of messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported
encryption key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the
public RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are
not affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the
CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info to
decrypt.

OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1d
OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0l
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2t

This issue was reported by and the fix developed by Bernd Edlinger. It was
reported to OpenSSL on 21st August 2019.


Note
=

OpenSSL 1.0.2 is currently only receiving security updates. Support for 1.0.2
will end on 31st December 2019.

Support for 1.1.0 ends on 11th September 2019 so 1.1.0l is expected to be the
last 1.1.0 release.

Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.


References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190910.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-07-30 Thread Jakob Bohm via openssl-users

Having reviewed the git commit for 1.1.1 I notice the following issue:

The environment variables that usually point to the secure administrator
directories (such as "Program Files") are not themselves secured, and not
intended as a secure means of obtaining these directory locations, which
are (by definition) subject to change via system configuration (initial
or later!).

There are official system library calls to obtain the actual locations
as follows:

1. If looking for the location where a program is itself installed, use
  the GetModuleFilenameW(own-hinstance) call to obtain the path to once
  own DLL or EXE.  This automatically adapts to wherever the DLL or EXE
  is copied or moved.   This is a kernel32.dll API and returns a location
  with security very close to that of the binary itself.The name
  returned is from the in-process instance of the dynamic linker.

2. If looking for the location where the running program's top level file
  (such as openssl.exe or 
some-program-loading-an-openssl-using-plugin.exe),

  use that same call but pass NULL for the hinstance parameter.

3. If looking for the system-wide secured "/etc" directory, use the
  GetSystemDirectoryW() call and append the fixed string "\\Drivers\\etc" .
  This location is permanently restricted to the system administrators and
  already contains a few traditional unix files such as "hosts". This too
  is a kernel32.dll API.  The name returned is from a system internal value
  set during OS boot.

4. If looking for the directory intended to hold system-wide configuration
  and data files, use the SHGetFolderPathW(CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA) API from
  shfolder.dll or shell32.dll (fallback) to ask for the "all-users data
  directory", append a company/project name (such as "\\OpenSSL") and
  specify an appropriate ACL in the security argument to CreateDirectoryW()
  (if the directory doesn't already exist with a user-modified ACL,
  CreateDirectoryW will atomically detect this and return a specific error
  code in the per thread GetLastError() variable).Note that mkdir()
  only creates one level of directories per invocation and you may want
  different ACLs when creating missing parent directories.  The values
  returned by SHGetFolderPathW() are typically from one or more 
Administrator

  controlled registry keys.

Some of the above APIs may require their return value to be canonicalized
via the GetFullPathNameW() API in corner cases, retaining the result in
a global variable is advisable.

On 30/07/2019 16:27, OpenSSL wrote:

OpenSSL Security Advisory [30 July 2019]


Windows builds with insecure path defaults (CVE-2019-1552)
==



Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded



OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-07-30 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [30 July 2019]


Windows builds with insecure path defaults (CVE-2019-1552)
==

Severity: Low

OpenSSL has internal defaults for a directory tree where it can find a
configuration file as well as certificates used for verification in
TLS.  This directory is most commonly referred to as OPENSSLDIR, and
is configurable with the --prefix / --openssldir configuration options.

For OpenSSL versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the mingw configuration targets
assume that resulting programs and libraries are installed in a
Unix-like environment and the default prefix for program installation
as well as for OPENSSLDIR should be '/usr/local'.

However, mingw programs are Windows programs, and as such, find
themselves looking at sub-directories of 'C:/usr/local', which may be
world writable, which enables untrusted users to modify OpenSSL's
default configuration, insert CA certificates, modify (or even
replace) existing engine modules, etc.

For OpenSSL 1.0.2, '/usr/local/ssl' is used as default for OPENSSLDIR
on all Unix and Windows targets, including Visual C builds.  However,
some build instructions for the diverse Windows targets on 1.0.2
encourage you to specify your own --prefix.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1, 1.1.0 and 1.0.2 are affected by this issue.
Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been
assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new
releases at this time.

The mitigations are found in these commits:
- - For 1.1.1, commit 54aa9d51b09d67e90db443f682cface795f5af9e
- - For 1.1.0, commit e32bc855a81a2d48d215c506bdeb4f598045f7e9 and
  b15a19c148384e73338aa7c5b12652138e35ed28
- - For 1.0.2, commit d333ebaf9c77332754a9d5e111e2f53e1de54fdd

The 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 mitigation set more appropriate defaults for
mingw, while the 1.0.2 mitigation documents the issue and provides
enhanced examples.

This issue was reported by Rich Mirth.  The fix was developed by
Richard Levitte from the OpenSSL development team.  It was reported to
OpenSSL on 9th Jun 2019.

Note
=

OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates.
Support for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0
will end on 11th September 2019. Users of these versions should
upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.


Referenses
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190730.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-03-06 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [6 March 2019]


ChaCha20-Poly1305 with long nonces (CVE-2019-1543)
==

Severity: Low

ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every
encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96
bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce
with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a
nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are
significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored.

It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages
encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality
and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be
longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce
expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could
inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce.

Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity
guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these
ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected.

Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because
no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use
this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12
bytes may be vulnerable.

OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited
scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and
therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. The 1.1.1 mitigation
for this issue can be found in commit f426625b6a. The 1.1.0 mitigation for this
issue can be found in commit ee22257b14.

This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.0.2.

This issue was discovered by Joran Dirk Greef of Ronomon. The fix was developed
by Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team. It was reported to OpenSSL on
26th February 2019.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support
for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th
September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190306.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-02-27 Thread Scott Neugroschl
Thanks.

-Original Message-
From: openssl-users  On Behalf Of Matt 
Caswell
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2019 11:18 AM
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory



On 27/02/2019 18:43, Scott Neugroschl wrote:
> Is this a client-side or server-side vulnerability?  Or does it matter?

It can apply to either side.

Matt


> 
> Thanks,
> 
> ScottN
> 
> ---
> Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
> 4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 
> 583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: openssl-users  On Behalf Of OpenSSL
> Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:59 AM
> To: openssl-proj...@openssl.org; OpenSSL User Support ML 
> ; OpenSSL Announce ML 
> 
> Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory
> 
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019] 
> 
> 
> 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559) 
> 
> 
> Severity: Moderate
> 
> If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
> SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) 
> then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte 
> record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is 
> received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently 
> based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this 
> amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
> 
> In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in 
> use.
> Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used 
> ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a 
> protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do 
> anyway).
> 
> This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.
> 
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.
> 
> This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod 
> Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. 
> It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
> 
> Note
> 
> 
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. 
> Support for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end 
> on 11th September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 
> 1.1.1.
> 
> References
> ==
> 
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt
> 
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional 
> details over time.
> 
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
> 


Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-02-27 Thread Matt Caswell



On 27/02/2019 18:43, Scott Neugroschl wrote:
> Is this a client-side or server-side vulnerability?  Or does it matter?

It can apply to either side.

Matt


> 
> Thanks,
> 
> ScottN
> 
> ---
> Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
> 4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 
> 583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: openssl-users  On Behalf Of OpenSSL
> Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:59 AM
> To: openssl-proj...@openssl.org; OpenSSL User Support ML 
> ; OpenSSL Announce ML 
> 
> Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory
> 
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019] 
> 
> 
> 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559) 
> 
> 
> Severity: Moderate
> 
> If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
> SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) 
> then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte 
> record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is 
> received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently 
> based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this 
> amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
> 
> In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in 
> use.
> Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used 
> ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a 
> protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do 
> anyway).
> 
> This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.
> 
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.
> 
> This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod 
> Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. 
> It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
> 
> Note
> 
> 
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. 
> Support for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end 
> on 11th September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 
> 1.1.1.
> 
> References
> ==
> 
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt
> 
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional 
> details over time.
> 
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
> 


RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-02-27 Thread Scott Neugroschl
Is this a client-side or server-side vulnerability?  Or does it matter?

Thanks,

ScottN

---
Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 
583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |




-Original Message-
From: openssl-users  On Behalf Of OpenSSL
Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:59 AM
To: openssl-proj...@openssl.org; OpenSSL User Support ML 
; OpenSSL Announce ML 
Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019] 


0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559) 


Severity: Moderate

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) 
then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte 
record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is 
received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based 
on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a 
padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.

In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use.
Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used 
ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a 
protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do 
anyway).

This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.

This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram, 
with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was 
reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support 
for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th 
September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details 
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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OpenSSL Security Advisory

2019-02-26 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019]


0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559)


Severity: Moderate

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then
OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is
received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an
invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way
that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle
that could be used to decrypt data.

In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use.
Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used
ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a
protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do
anyway).

This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.

This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram,
with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was
reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.

Note


OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support
for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th
September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2018-11-12 Thread Matt Caswell
OpenSSL Security Advisory [12 November 2018]


Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication 
(CVE-2018-5407)
===

Severity: Low

OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been shown
to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack. An attacker
with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during ECDSA signature
generation could recover the private key.

This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 and is already fixed in the latest
version of OpenSSL 1.1.0 (1.1.0i). OpenSSL 1.0.2 is affected but due to the low
severity of this issue we are not creating a new release at this time. The 1.0.2
mitigation for this issue can be found in commit b18162a7c.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0i.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Nicola Tuveri.

Note


OpenSSL 1.1.0 is currently only receiving security updates. Support for this
version will end on 11th September 2019. Users of this version should upgrade to
OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20181112.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html



signature.asc
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2018-06-12 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512


OpenSSL Security Advisory [12 June 2018]


Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732)


Severity: Low

During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a key
for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This could be
exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.

Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing a new release of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.0.2 at this time. The fix will be included in OpenSSL 1.1.0i
and OpenSSL 1.0.2p when they become available. The fix is also available in
commit ea7abeeab (for 1.1.0) and commit 3984ef0b7 (for 1.0.2) in the OpenSSL git
repository.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken who also
developed the fix.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20180612.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2018-04-16 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 Apr 2018]


Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737)


Severity: Low

The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount
cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the
private key.

Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing a new release of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.0.2 at this time. The fix will be included in OpenSSL 1.1.0i
and OpenSSL 1.0.2p when they become available. The fix is also available in
commit 6939eab03 (for 1.1.0) and commit 349a41da1 (for 1.0.2) in the OpenSSL git
repository.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
The fix was developed by Billy Brumley.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20180416.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2018-03-27 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [27 Mar 2018]


Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack 
(CVE-2018-0739)
==

Severity: Moderate

Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There are
no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources so this
is considered safe.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0h
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2o

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz project.
The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC (CVE-2018-0733)


Severity: Moderate

Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is
effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each byte.
This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as
authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the security
claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the HP-UX assembler, so
that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0h

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg (IBM).
The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
=

Severity: Low

This issue has been reported in a previous OpenSSL security advisory and a fix
was provided for OpenSSL 1.0.2. Due to the low severity no fix was released at
that time for OpenSSL 1.1.0. The fix is now available in OpenSSL 1.1.0h.

There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect
would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks
against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work
necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline.
The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant.
However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share
the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option
since CVE-2016-0701.

This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
like Intel Haswell (4th generation).

Note: The impact from this issue is similar to CVE-2017-3736, CVE-2017-3732
and CVE-2015-3193.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0h
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd November 2017 by David Benjamin
(Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. The fix was
developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20180327.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2017-12-07 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Dec 2017]


Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737)
==

Severity: Moderate

OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then
OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you
attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit
handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()),
however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is
called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error
will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is
subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will
succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from
the SSL/TLS record layer.

In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that
resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already
received a fatal error.

This issue does not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th November 2017 by David Benjamin
(Google). The fix was proposed by David Benjamin and implemented by Matt Caswell
of the OpenSSL development team.

rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
=

Severity: Low

There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect
would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks
against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work
necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline.
The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant.
However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share
the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option
since CVE-2016-0701.

This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
like Intel Haswell (4th generation).

Note: The impact from this issue is similar to CVE-2017-3736, CVE-2017-3732
and CVE-2015-3193.

Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing a new release of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 at this time. The fix will be included in OpenSSL 1.1.0h when it
becomes available. The fix is also available in commit e502cc86d in the OpenSSL
git repository.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd November 2017 by David Benjamin
(Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. The fix was
developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

Note


Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions
0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer
receiving security updates.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20171207.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2017-11-02 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [02 Nov 2017]


bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736)
==

Severity: Moderate

There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No
EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA
as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very
difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients.

This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like
Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.

Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2017-3732 and CVE-2015-3193 but must be
treated as a separate problem.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0g
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2m

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th August 2017 by the OSS-Fuzz project.
The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735)


Severity: Low

This issue was previously announced in security advisory
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170828.txt, but the fix has not previously
been included in a release due to its low severity.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0g
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2m


Note


Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions
0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer
receiving security updates.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20171102.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2017-02-16 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 Feb 2017]


Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash (CVE-2017-3733)


Severity: High

During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is
negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this
can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers
are affected.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0e

This issue does not affect OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 31st January 2017 by Joe Orton (Red Hat).
The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

Note


Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions
0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer
receiving security updates.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170216.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2017-01-26 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Jan 2017]


Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731)
=

Severity: Moderate

If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific
cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client
to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.

For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305;
users should upgrade to 1.1.0d

For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have
not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th November 2016 by Robert Święcki of
Google. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730)
===

Severity: Moderate

If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange
then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer
leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service
attack.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d

This issue does not affect OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

Note that this issue was fixed prior to it being recognised as a security
concern. This means the git commit with the fix does not contain the CVE
identifier. The relevant fix commit can be identified by commit hash efbe126e3.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 14th January 2017 by Guido Vranken. The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732)
==

Severity: Moderate

There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No
EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA
as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very
difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2k

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 15th January 2017 by the OSS-Fuzz project.
The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
===

Severity: Low

This issue was previously fixed in 1.1.0c and covered in security advisory
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20161110.txt

OpenSSL 1.0.2k users should upgrade to 1.0.2k


Note


Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions
0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer
receiving security updates.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170126.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-11-10 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256


OpenSSL Security Advisory [10 Nov 2016]


ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054)
==

Severity: High

TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to a DoS
attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL crash. This
issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0c

This issue does not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th September 2016 by Robert
Święcki (Google Security Team), and was found using honggfuzz. The fix
was developed by Richard Levitte of the OpenSSL development team.

CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053)


Severity: Moderate

Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer
dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE type
in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the structure
callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings. Only CHOICE
structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are affected.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0c

This issue does not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 12th October 2016 by Tyler Nighswander of
ForAllSecure. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
===

Severity: Low

There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0c

This issue does not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.2. Due to the low
severity of this defect we are not issuing a new 1.0.2 release at this time.
We recommend that 1.0.2 users wait for the next 1.0.2 release for the fix to
become available. The fix is also available in the OpenSSL git repository in
commit 57c4b9f6a2.

This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
providing reproducible case. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
the OpenSSL development team.

Note


As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy
(https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL
version 1.0.1 will cease on 31st December 2016. No security updates for that
version will be provided after that date. Users of 1.0.1 are advised to
upgrade.

Support for versions 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those
versions are no longer receiving security updates.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20161110.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-09-26 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1


OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Sep 2016]


This security update addresses issues that were caused by patches
included in our previous security update, released on 22nd September
2016.  Given the Critical severity of one of these flaws we have
chosen to release this advisory immediately to prevent upgrades to the
affected version, rather than delaying in order to provide our usual
public pre-notification.


Fix Use After Free for large message sizes (CVE-2016-6309)
==

Severity: Critical

This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a, released on 22nd September 2016.

The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a
message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to store
the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a dangling pointer
to the old location is left which results in an attempt to write to the
previously freed location. This is likely to result in a crash, however it
could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0b

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 23rd September 2016 by Robert
Święcki (Google Security Team), and was found using honggfuzz. The fix
was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

Missing CRL sanity check (CVE-2016-7052)


Severity: Moderate

This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.0.2i, released on 22nd September 2016.

A bug fix which included a CRL sanity check was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
but was omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2i. As a result any attempt to use
CRLs in OpenSSL 1.0.2i will crash with a null pointer exception.

OpenSSL 1.0.2i users should upgrade to 1.0.2j

The issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd September 2016 by Bruce Stephens and
Thomas Jakobi. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development
team.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160926.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-09-22 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1


OpenSSL Security Advisory [22 Sep 2016]


OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
=

Severity: High

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension.
If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status
Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the
server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory
exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do
not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

Servers using OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1g are not vulnerable in a default
configuration, instead only if an application explicitly enables OCSP stapling
support.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0a
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 29th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team,
Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL
development team.

SSL_peek() hang on empty record (CVE-2016-6305)
===

Severity: Moderate

OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer sends an
empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service
attack.

OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0a

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th September 2016 by Alex Gaynor. The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183)
==

Severity: Low

SWEET32 (https://sweet32.info) is an attack on older block cipher algorithms
that use a block size of 64 bits. In mitigation for the SWEET32 attack DES based
ciphersuites have been moved from the HIGH cipherstring group to MEDIUM in
OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.2.  OpenSSL 1.1.0 since release has had these
ciphersuites disabled by default.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th August 2016 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan and Gaetan Leurent (INRIA). The fix was developed by Rich Salz of the
OpenSSL development team.

OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303)
==

Severity: Low

An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.

The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
on most platforms.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 11th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team,
Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302)
===

Severity: Low

If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a
DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will
ultimately crash.

The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires
a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 19th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team,
Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182)


Severity: Low

The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word().
This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an
overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate
or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because
record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team,
Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180)
==

Severity: Low

The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is
the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount
of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are presented.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
OpenSSL 1.0.1 us

[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-05-03 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [3rd May 2016]


Memory corruption in the ASN.1 encoder (CVE-2016-2108)
==

Severity: High

This issue affected versions of OpenSSL prior to April 2015. The bug
causing the vulnerability was fixed on April 18th 2015, and released
as part of the June 11th 2015 security releases. The security impact
of the bug was not known at the time.

In previous versions of OpenSSL, ASN.1 encoding the value zero
represented as a negative integer can cause a buffer underflow
with an out-of-bounds write in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER. The ASN.1 parser does
not normally create "negative zeroes" when parsing ASN.1 input, and
therefore, an attacker cannot trigger this bug.

However, a second, independent bug revealed that the ASN.1 parser
(specifically, d2i_ASN1_TYPE) can misinterpret a large universal tag
as a negative zero value. Large universal tags are not present in any
common ASN.1 structures (such as X509) but are accepted as part of ANY
structures.

Therefore, if an application deserializes untrusted ASN.1 structures
containing an ANY field, and later reserializes them, an attacker may
be able to trigger an out-of-bounds write. This has been shown to
cause memory corruption that is potentially exploitable with some
malloc implementations.

Applications that parse and re-encode X509 certificates are known to
be vulnerable. Applications that verify RSA signatures on X509
certificates may also be vulnerable; however, only certificates with
valid signatures trigger ASN.1 re-encoding and hence the
bug. Specifically, since OpenSSL's default TLS X509 chain verification
code verifies the certificate chain from root to leaf, TLS handshakes
could only be targeted with valid certificates issued by trusted
Certification Authorities.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2c
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1o

This vulnerability is a combination of two bugs, neither of which
individually has security impact. The first bug (mishandling of
negative zero integers) was reported to OpenSSL by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala
(Red Hat) and independently by Hanno Böck in April 2015. The second
issue (mishandling of large universal tags) was found using libFuzzer,
and reported on the public issue tracker on March 1st 2016. The fact
that these two issues combined present a security vulnerability was
reported by David Benjamin (Google) on March 31st 2016. The fixes were
developed by Steve Henson of the OpenSSL development team, and David
Benjamin.  The OpenSSL team would also like to thank Mark Brand and
Ian Beer from the Google Project Zero team for their careful analysis
of the impact.

The fix for the "negative zero" memory corruption bug can be
identified by commits

3661bb4e7934668bd99ca777ea8b30eedfafa871 (1.0.2)
and
32d3b0f52f77ce86d53f38685336668d47c5bdfe (1.0.1)

Padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
==

Severity: High

A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
AES-NI.

This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
bytes.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2h
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1t

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th of April 2016 by Juraj
Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. The fix was developed by Kurt Roeckx
of the OpenSSL development team.

EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105)
=

Severity: Low

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption.

Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL
command line applications. These internal uses are not considered vulnerable
because all calls are bounded with length checks so no overflow is possible.
User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted
data may be vulnerable. (Note: Initial analysis suggested that the
PEM_write_bio* were vulnerable, and this is reflected in the patch commit
message. This is no longer believed to be the case).

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2h
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1t

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 3rd March 2016 by Guido Vranken. The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

EVP_En

[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-03-01 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [1st March 2016]
=

NOTE: With this update, OpenSSL is disabling the SSLv2 protocol by default, as
well as removing SSLv2 EXPORT ciphers.  We strongly advise against the use of
SSLv2 due not only to the issues described below, but to the other known
deficiencies in the protocol as described at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176


Cross-protocol attack on TLS using SSLv2 (DROWN) (CVE-2016-0800)


Severity: High

A cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS
sessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a
Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle.  Note that traffic between clients and
non-vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting
SSLv2 and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP or
POP) shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability is
known as DROWN (CVE-2016-0800).

Recovering one session key requires the attacker to perform approximately 2^50
computation, as well as thousands of connections to the affected server. A more
efficient variant of the DROWN attack exists against unpatched OpenSSL servers
using versions that predate 1.0.2a, 1.0.1m, 1.0.0r and 0.9.8zf released on
19/Mar/2015 (see CVE-2016-0703 below).

Users can avoid this issue by disabling the SSLv2 protocol in all their SSL/TLS
servers, if they've not done so already. Disabling all SSLv2 ciphers is also
sufficient, provided the patches for CVE-2015-3197 (fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1r and
1.0.2f) have been deployed.  Servers that have not disabled the SSLv2 protocol,
and are not patched for CVE-2015-3197 are vulnerable to DROWN even if all SSLv2
ciphers are nominally disabled, because malicious clients can force the use of
SSLv2 with EXPORT ciphers.

OpenSSL 1.0.2g and 1.0.1s deploy the following mitigation against DROWN:

SSLv2 is now by default disabled at build-time.  Builds that are not configured
with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.  Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will
need to explicitly call either of:

   SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
   or
   SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);

as appropriate.  Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly
uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client or server variants,
SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed.
Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no
longer available.

In addition, weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up are now disabled in default builds of
OpenSSL.  Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will
not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2g
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1s

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on December 29th 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and
Sebastian Schinzel. The fix was developed by Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell
of OpenSSL.


Double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
===

Severity: Low

A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys
and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that
receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources.  This scenario is considered
rare.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2g
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1s

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on February 7th 2016 by Adam Langley
(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. The fix was developed by Dr Stephen Henson
of OpenSSL.


Memory leak in SRP database lookups (CVE-2016-0798)
===

Severity: Low

The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had
confusing memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no way of
distinguishing these two cases.

Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.  Servers that do not configure SRP, or
configure SRP but do not configure a seed are not vulnerable.

In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.

To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user is now disabled even if the user has configured
a seed.  Applications are advised to migrate to
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However, note that OpenSSL makes no strong
guarantees about the indistinguishability of valid and invalid
logins. In particular, computations are currently not

[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-01-28 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [28th Jan 2016]
=

NOTE: SUPPORT FOR VERSION 1.0.1 WILL BE ENDING ON 31ST DECEMBER 2016. NO
SECURITY FIXES WILL BE PROVIDED AFTER THAT DATE. UNTIL THAT TIME SECURITY FIXES
ONLY ARE BEING APPLIED.

DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
==

Severity: High

Historically OpenSSL usually only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating
X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The
primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH
configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker
could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires
that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same
private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's
private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a
static DH ciphersuite.

OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS.
It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the
same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be
vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set
this option and would therefore not be at risk.

OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if:
- - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh()/SSL_set_tmp_dh() is used and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is 
not
  set.
- - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback()/SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() is used, and both 
the
  parameters and the key are set and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not used. This is
  an undocumted feature and parameter files don't contain the key.
- - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate and
  so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2.

It will not reuse the key for DHE ciphers suites if:
- - SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set
- - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback()/SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() is used and the
  callback does not provide the key, only the parameters. The callback is
  almost always used like this.

Non-safe primes are generated by OpenSSL when using:
- - genpkey with the dh_rfc5114 option. This will write an X9.42 style file
  including the prime-order subgroup size "q". This is supported since the 1.0.2
  version. Older versions can't read files generated in this way.
- - dhparam with the -dsaparam option. This has always been documented as
  requiring the single use.

The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites.
This could have some performance impact.

Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default
and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f

OpenSSL 1.0.1 is not affected by this CVE because it does not support X9.42
based parameters. It is possible to generate parameters using non "safe" primes,
but this option has always been documented as requiring single use and is not
the default or believed to be common. However, as a precaution, the
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE change has also been backported to 1.0.1r.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 12 January 2016 by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team
(incorporating some work originally written by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
core team).

SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)


Severity: Low

A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the
server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been
disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1r

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and
Sebastian Schinzel. The fix was developed by Nimrod Aviram with further
development by Viktor Dukhovni of the OpenSSL development team.


An update on DHE man-in-the-middle protection (Logjam)


A previously published vulnerability in the TLS protocol allows a
man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections
using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange to 512-bit export-grade
cryptography. This vulnerability is known as Logjam
(CVE-2015-4000). OpenSSL added Logjam mitigation for TLS clients by
rejecting handshakes

[openssl-users] Updated OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-12-04 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [3 Dec 2015] - Updated [4 Dec 2015]
=

[Updated 4 Dec 2015]: This advisory has been updated to include the details of
CVE-2015-1794, a Low severity issue affecting OpenSSL 1.0.2 which had a fix
included in the released packages but was missed from the advisory text.

NOTE: WE ANTICIPATE THAT 1.0.0t AND 0.9.8zh WILL BE THE LAST RELEASES FOR THE
0.9.8 AND 1.0.0 VERSIONS AND THAT NO MORE SECURITY FIXES WILL BE PROVIDED (AS
PER PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS). USERS ARE ADVISED TO UPGRADE TO LATER VERSIONS.

BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
==

Severity: Moderate

There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No
EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA
as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very
difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 13 2015 by Hanno
Böck. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL
development team.

Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
===

Severity: Moderate

The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference
if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent
mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify
certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate
verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which
performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and
servers which enable client authentication.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1q

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 27 2015 by Loïc Jonas Etienne
(Qnective AG). The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
==

Severity: Moderate

When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected.
SSL/TLS is not affected.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1q
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0t
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zh

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on November 9 2015 by Adam Langley
(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
=

Severity: Low

If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
identify hint data.

This issue was fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p but has not been previously
listed in an OpenSSL security advisory. This issue also affects OpenSSL 1.0.0
and has not been previously fixed in an OpenSSL 1.0.0 release.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2d
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1p
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0t

The fix for this issue can be identified in the OpenSSL git repository by commit
ids 3c66a669dfc7 (1.0.2), d6be3124f228 (1.0.1) and 1392c238657e (1.0.0).

The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Anon DH ServerKeyExchange with 0 p parameter (CVE-2015-1794)


Severity: Low

If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anonymous DH ciphersuite with
the value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur leading to a possible denial
of service attack.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade

[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-12-03 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [3 Dec 2015]
===

NOTE: WE ANTICIPATE THAT 1.0.0t AND 0.9.8zh WILL BE THE LAST RELEASES FOR THE
0.9.8 AND 1.0.0 VERSIONS AND THAT NO MORE SECURITY FIXES WILL BE PROVIDED (AS
PER PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS). USERS ARE ADVISED TO UPGRADE TO LATER VERSIONS.

BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
==

Severity: Moderate

There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No
EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA
as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very
difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 13 2015 by Hanno
Böck. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL
development team.

Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
===

Severity: Moderate

The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference
if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent
mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify
certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate
verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which
performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and
servers which enable client authentication.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1q

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 27 2015 by Loïc Jonas Etienne
(Qnective AG). The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
==

Severity: Moderate

When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected.
SSL/TLS is not affected.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1q
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0t
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zh

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on November 9 2015 by Adam Langley
(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
=

Severity: Low

If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
identify hint data.

This issue was fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p but has not been previously
listed in an OpenSSL security advisory. This issue also affects OpenSSL 1.0.0
and has not been previously fixed in an OpenSSL 1.0.0 release.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2d
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1p
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0t

The fix for this issue can be identified in the OpenSSL git repository by commit
ids 3c66a669dfc7 (1.0.2), d6be3124f228 (1.0.1) and 1392c238657e (1.0.0).

The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Note


As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy
(https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions
1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these
versions will be provided after that date. In the absence of significant
security issues being identified prior to that date, the 1.0.0t and 0.9.8zh
releases will be the last for those versions. Users of these versions are
advised to upgrade.


References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20151203.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time

Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-announce] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-12 Thread Jakob Bohm

On 10/07/2015 23:03, Jeffrey Walton wrote:

During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a
valid
leaf certificate to act as a CA and issue an invalid certificate.

Why was this introduced in a patch release?  I thought
improved chain building was a new feature, and thus
delineated by a library version number such as 1.0.2 or
1.0.3 .

I *think* improved chain building should have present in the library
earlier. The methods always exited. See, for example, 4158,
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt.

Here's a real world failure due to previous, naive path building:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mailing.openssl.users/72_VQJmCmCU/hUMtemRNvRoJ.
The CA re-issued a root by changing the hash and serial number, but
recertifying the same public key and DN. Then, the server sent the old
root too as an intermediate. So there were two roots available, each
with the same DN.


In fact, I thought that was the reason we all
had to wait ages before this long standing shortcoming
was fixed.

It almost sound like you are complaining you did not have to wait ages :)

It's the inconsistency of first insisting this cannot go
into a patch and then pushing out a broken implementation
inside a patch which was only supposed to fix security
and build issues.

This is the kind of event which has caused many dists
to cherry pickindividual changes rather than just
following the official releases.

Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  http://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

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Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-announce] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-12 Thread Jeffrey Walton
 In fact, I thought that was the reason we all
 had to wait ages before this long standing shortcoming
 was fixed.

 It almost sound like you are complaining you did not have to wait ages :)

 It's the inconsistency of first insisting this cannot go
 into a patch and then pushing out a broken implementation
 inside a patch which was only supposed to fix security
 and build issues.

OK.. so that's a legitimate gripe.

OpenSSL has opportunities for improvements in their testing and
release process. There is ***absolutely no reason a patch should
not be tested before being released. Its been a chronic problem with
the project.

For what its worth, I've given up on the Testing Group
(https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/openssl-testing). No
meaningful change came from it. The devs are still undisciplined in
this area, and they still do what they want.

Jeff
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Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread Salz, Rich
How deep does the certificate chain have to be?

It does not matter.

If I have 2 self-signed CA certificates, and a non-CA certificate is received 
for verification, will this hit the problem?
Also, is it a condition of the bug that both CA certificates have to have the 
same subject names and keys, as suggested in the file?

I think you are confused.  The bug is not about CA's.  It's about a non-CA 
fooling the runtime into treating it as if it were a CA and being able to issue 
a certificate.

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Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread Matt Caswell


On 10/07/15 13:09, R C Delgado wrote:
 Hello,
 
 With regards to CVE-2015-1793, I've seen the example in verify_extra_test.c.
 How deep does the certificate chain have to be?
 If I have 2 self-signed CA certificates, and a non-CA certificate is
 received for verification, will this hit the problem?
 
 Also, is it a condition of the bug that both CA certificates have to
 have the same subject names and keys, as suggested in the file?


The conditions for triggering the bug are a little complicated, but I'll
do my best to explain it.

Under normal circumstances things work as follows:

We are provided with a certificate to verify from a remote peer. Lets
call the certificate we are trying to verify Leaf.
As well as Leaf that has been provided from the remote peer, they also
supply us with a set of untrusted certs.
Finally we also have a store of trusted certs.

OpenSSL will first attempt to build a certificate chain. The chain
building works as follows (much simplified):

1. Set Leaf as the top of the chain
2. Look for the issuer of the cert at the top of the chain from within
the untrusted set. If we find it add it to the top of the chain
3. Repeat (2) until we can't find any more certs from the untrusted set
4. Look for the issuer of the top of the chain from the set of trusted certs
5. Repeat (4) until we can't find any more certs from the trusted set

If we've found a valid chain with a trusted self signed cert at the top,
then we stop there. If not, then we continue to look to see if there is
an alternative chain that can be built. This works as follows:

Pop all the trusted certs off the top of the chain, then start popping
the untrusted certs off. Each time we pop an untrusted cert off start
the chain building again from step 4.

The bug occurs when during the initial chain building:
1) We have added at least one cert from the untrusted set
2) We have added at least one cert from the trusted store

For 1.0.2 there is the additional condition:
3) After doing (1) and (2) above we do not have a valid chain

Finally (for both 1.0.1 and 1.0.2)
4) After popping off at least one untrusted cert from the chain we can
build an alternative valid chain

Under the above conditions the end entity cert Leaf could issue a new
certificate even though it is not supposed to (I'll call that invalid
certificate Bad).

So these certs would need to be present (at a minimum):

Chain 1:

Trusted Cert 1
|
Untrusted Cert 1
|
Leaf
|
Bad

Chain 2:

Trusted Cert 2
|
Leaf
|
Bad

There are other possible longer chains, but this is the minimum set. For
1.0.2, Chain 1 would have to be non-trusted, even though we have added a
trusted cert. This can occur if Trusted Cert 1 is not self signed and
its issuer is not in the trusted store. For 1.0.1 any chain will do.
Untrusted Cert 1 and Trusted Cert 2 would both have to be valid issuers
of Leaf (i.e. they have the same subject names and public keys). Chain 2
must be trusted (so Trusted Cert 2 has to be a self-signed root).

Matt
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread R C Delgado
Hello,

With regards to CVE-2015-1793, I've seen the example in verify_extra_test.c.
How deep does the certificate chain have to be?
If I have 2 self-signed CA certificates, and a non-CA certificate is
received for verification, will this hit the problem?

Also, is it a condition of the bug that both CA certificates have to have
the same subject names and keys, as suggested in the file?

Many thanks for your help.
RCD
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Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread R C Delgado
Thank you very much. It really helps.

On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 2:32 PM, Matt Caswell m...@openssl.org wrote:



 On 10/07/15 13:09, R C Delgado wrote:
  Hello,
 
  With regards to CVE-2015-1793, I've seen the example in
 verify_extra_test.c.
  How deep does the certificate chain have to be?
  If I have 2 self-signed CA certificates, and a non-CA certificate is
  received for verification, will this hit the problem?
 
  Also, is it a condition of the bug that both CA certificates have to
  have the same subject names and keys, as suggested in the file?


 The conditions for triggering the bug are a little complicated, but I'll
 do my best to explain it.

 Under normal circumstances things work as follows:

 We are provided with a certificate to verify from a remote peer. Lets
 call the certificate we are trying to verify Leaf.
 As well as Leaf that has been provided from the remote peer, they also
 supply us with a set of untrusted certs.
 Finally we also have a store of trusted certs.

 OpenSSL will first attempt to build a certificate chain. The chain
 building works as follows (much simplified):

 1. Set Leaf as the top of the chain
 2. Look for the issuer of the cert at the top of the chain from within
 the untrusted set. If we find it add it to the top of the chain
 3. Repeat (2) until we can't find any more certs from the untrusted set
 4. Look for the issuer of the top of the chain from the set of trusted
 certs
 5. Repeat (4) until we can't find any more certs from the trusted set

 If we've found a valid chain with a trusted self signed cert at the top,
 then we stop there. If not, then we continue to look to see if there is
 an alternative chain that can be built. This works as follows:

 Pop all the trusted certs off the top of the chain, then start popping
 the untrusted certs off. Each time we pop an untrusted cert off start
 the chain building again from step 4.

 The bug occurs when during the initial chain building:
 1) We have added at least one cert from the untrusted set
 2) We have added at least one cert from the trusted store

 For 1.0.2 there is the additional condition:
 3) After doing (1) and (2) above we do not have a valid chain

 Finally (for both 1.0.1 and 1.0.2)
 4) After popping off at least one untrusted cert from the chain we can
 build an alternative valid chain

 Under the above conditions the end entity cert Leaf could issue a new
 certificate even though it is not supposed to (I'll call that invalid
 certificate Bad).

 So these certs would need to be present (at a minimum):

 Chain 1:

 Trusted Cert 1
 |
 Untrusted Cert 1
 |
 Leaf
 |
 Bad

 Chain 2:

 Trusted Cert 2
 |
 Leaf
 |
 Bad

 There are other possible longer chains, but this is the minimum set. For
 1.0.2, Chain 1 would have to be non-trusted, even though we have added a
 trusted cert. This can occur if Trusted Cert 1 is not self signed and
 its issuer is not in the trusted store. For 1.0.1 any chain will do.
 Untrusted Cert 1 and Trusted Cert 2 would both have to be valid issuers
 of Leaf (i.e. they have the same subject names and public keys). Chain 2
 must be trusted (so Trusted Cert 2 has to be a self-signed root).

 Matt
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Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread Lewis Rosenthal

On 07/10/2015 09:32 AM, Matt Caswell wrote:


On 10/07/15 13:09, R C Delgado wrote:

Hello,

With regards to CVE-2015-1793, I've seen the example in verify_extra_test.c.
How deep does the certificate chain have to be?
If I have 2 self-signed CA certificates, and a non-CA certificate is
received for verification, will this hit the problem?

Also, is it a condition of the bug that both CA certificates have to
have the same subject names and keys, as suggested in the file?


The conditions for triggering the bug are a little complicated, but I'll
do my best to explain it.


snip

So these certs would need to be present (at a minimum):

Chain 1:

Trusted Cert 1
|
Untrusted Cert 1
|
Leaf
|
Bad

Chain 2:

Trusted Cert 2
|
Leaf
|
Bad

There are other possible longer chains, but this is the minimum set. For
1.0.2, Chain 1 would have to be non-trusted, even though we have added a
trusted cert. This can occur if Trusted Cert 1 is not self signed and
its issuer is not in the trusted store. For 1.0.1 any chain will do.
Untrusted Cert 1 and Trusted Cert 2 would both have to be valid issuers
of Leaf (i.e. they have the same subject names and public keys). Chain 2
must be trusted (so Trusted Cert 2 has to be a self-signed root).


Thanks, Matt. This is the most cogent explanation I've seen to date.

Cheers

--
Lewis
-
Lewis G Rosenthal, CNA, CLP, CLE, CWTS, EA
Rosenthal  Rosenthal, LLCwww.2rosenthals.com
visit my IT blogwww.2rosenthals.net/wordpress
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure applies   see www.2rosenthals.com
-

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Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread R C Delgado
Hello,

One further question. Can you please confirm that the alternative
certificate chain feature is enabled by default? It seems to be implied in
all emails regarding this matter, and I'm assuming the Advisory email would
have mentioned it otherwise.

I've searched the OpenSSL code and seen that X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
exists but is not set in the flags member by default when a new X509
context is initialised. And my code does not modify the context to include
this flag.

Please let me know if I'm missing something.

(I'm using OpenSSL 1.0.1o)

Many thanks,
RCD



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Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2015-1793

2015-07-10 Thread Matt Caswell


On 10/07/15 19:34, R C Delgado wrote:
 Hello,
 
 One further question. Can you please confirm that the alternative
 certificate chain feature is enabled by default? It seems to be implied
 in all emails regarding this matter, and I'm assuming the Advisory email
 would have mentioned it otherwise.

Yes, it is enabled by default.

Matt

 
 I've searched the OpenSSL code and seen that X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
 exists but is not set in the flags member by default when a new X509
 context is initialised. And my code does not modify the context to
 include this flag. 
 
 Please let me know if I'm missing something.
 
 (I'm using OpenSSL 1.0.1o)
 
 Many thanks,
 RCD
 
 
 
 
 
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Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-announce] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-10 Thread Jeffrey Walton
 During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
 1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
 attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
 logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
 certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a
 valid
 leaf certificate to act as a CA and issue an invalid certificate.

 Why was this introduced in a patch release?  I thought
 improved chain building was a new feature, and thus
 delineated by a library version number such as 1.0.2 or
 1.0.3 .

I *think* improved chain building should have present in the library
earlier. The methods always exited. See, for example, 4158,
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt.

Here's a real world failure due to previous, naive path building:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mailing.openssl.users/72_VQJmCmCU/hUMtemRNvRoJ.
The CA re-issued a root by changing the hash and serial number, but
recertifying the same public key and DN. Then, the server sent the old
root too as an intermediate. So there were two roots available, each
with the same DN.

 In fact, I thought that was the reason we all
 had to wait ages before this long standing shortcoming
 was fixed.

It almost sound like you are complaining you did not have to wait ages :)

Jeff
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Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-09 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Thu, Jul 09, 2015 at 01:13:30PM +, Salz, Rich wrote:

  This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o.
 
 In other words, if you are not using those specific releases -- i.e., the
 ones that came out less than 30 days ago -- you do not need to upgrade.

More accurately, you should upgrade anyway, to address the issues
resolved by those earlier releases, even though the specific issue
in the most recent release applies only to its immediate predecessors.

-- 
Viktor.
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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-09 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015]
===

Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
==

Severity: High

During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid
leaf certificate to act as a CA and issue an invalid certificate.

This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including
SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o.

OpenSSL 1.0.2b/1.0.2c users should upgrade to 1.0.2d
OpenSSL 1.0.1n/1.0.1o users should upgrade to 1.0.1p

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 24th June 2015 by Adam Langley/David
Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). The fix was developed by the BoringSSL project.

Note


As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy
(https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions
1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these
releases will be provided after that date. Users of these releases are advised
to upgrade.

References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150709.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html

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Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-09 Thread Salz, Rich
 
 This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o.

In other words, if you are not using those specific releases -- i.e., the ones 
that came out less than 30 days ago -- you do not need to upgrade.


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Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-announce] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-09 Thread Matt Caswell


On 09/07/15 22:46, Jakob Bohm wrote:
 On 09/07/2015 15:10, OpenSSL wrote:
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA1

 OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015]
 ===

 Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
 ==

 Severity: High

 During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
 1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
 attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
 logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
 certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a 
 valid
 leaf certificate to act as a CA and issue an invalid certificate.
 Why was this introduced in a patch release?  I thought
 improved chain building was a new feature, and thus
 delineated by a library version number such as 1.0.2or
 1.0.3.   In fact, I thought that was the reason we all
 had to wait ages before this long standing shortcoming
 was fixed.

Is it a new feature or a defect fix?

On the one hand OpenSSL has never been able to handle alternative
certificate chains. If the first chain attempted fails to verify then we
stop. Its always been done that way and from that point of view the
ability to handle alternative cert chains is a new feature.

On the other hand, from a users perspective, if you present OpenSSL with
a perfectly valid certificate, and a perfectly valid trust store, then
you expect it to successfully verify the certificate no matter what.
OpenSSL was failing to do that, and therefore this would suggest it is a
defect.

My initial view was the former. This issue was raised a number of times
within RT and on the openssl-dev list and also via other routes. It was
clearly causing real problems for end users (and increasingly so). There
was much discussion on this topic, but ultimately the decision was taken
to change our mind, and treat it as a defect. For that reason it was
included in a patch release.

 This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including
 SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication.
 Does this vulnerability also affect applications that
 use OpenSSL or the openssl command line to handle S/MIME
 or other CMS messages?

Yes. Ultimately it affects all applications that verify certificates.
That includes the openssl command line applications.

Matt

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Re: [openssl-users] [openssl-announce] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-09 Thread Jakob Bohm

On 09/07/2015 15:10, OpenSSL wrote:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015]
===

Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
==

Severity: High

During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid
leaf certificate to act as a CA and issue an invalid certificate.

Why was this introduced in a patch release?  I thought
improved chain building was a new feature, and thus
delineated by a library version number such as 1.0.2or
1.0.3.   In fact, I thought that was the reason we all
had to wait ages before this long standing shortcoming
was fixed.

This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including
SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication.

Does this vulnerability also affect applications that
use OpenSSL or the openssl command line to handle S/MIME
or other CMS messages?

For example, the mail client mutt handles S/MIME by
invoking the openssl command line via macros in the
default configuration file.

P.S.

Sorry for first trying to send to -announce, MUA must
have ignored the Reply-To.

Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.http://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

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[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-06-11 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [11 Jun 2015]
===

DHE man-in-the-middle protection (Logjam)


A vulnerability in the TLS protocol allows a man-in-the-middle
attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections using ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This
vulnerability is known as Logjam (CVE-2015-4000).

OpenSSL has added protection for TLS clients by rejecting handshakes
with DH parameters shorter than 768 bits. This limit will be increased
to 1024 bits in a future release.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n

Fixes for this issue were developed by Emilia Käsper and Kurt Roeckx
of the OpenSSL development team.

Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
===

Severity: Moderate

When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if
the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field.

This can be used to perform denial of service against any
system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
certificates.  This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
client authentication enabled.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2 and 1.0.1. Recent
1.0.0 and 0.9.8 versions are not affected. 1.0.0d and 0.9.8r and below are
affected.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n
OpenSSL 1.0.0d (and below) users should upgrade to 1.0.0s
OpenSSL 0.9.8r (and below) users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 6th April 2015 by Joseph Birr-Pixton. The
fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
===

Severity: Moderate

X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
time string.

An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
callbacks.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0s
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 8th April 2015 by Robert Swiecki
(Google), and independently on 11th April 2015 by Hanno Böck. The fix
was developed by Emilia Käsper of the OpenSSL development team.

PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
=

Severity: Moderate

The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.

Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
servers are not affected.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0s
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 18th April 2015 by  Michal
Zalewski (Google). The fix was developed by Emilia Käsper of the
OpenSSL development team.

CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
===

Severity: Moderate

When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
if presented with an unknown hash function OID.

This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which
verifies signedData messages using the CMS code.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0s
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 31st March 2015 by Johannes Bauer. The
fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)


Severity: Low

If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client

[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-03-19 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

OpenSSL Security Advisory [19 Mar 2015]
===

OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS (CVE-2015-0291)
=

Severity: High

If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur.
This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.

This issue affects OpenSSL version: 1.0.2

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a.

This issue was was reported to OpenSSL on 26th February 2015 by David Ramos
of Stanford University. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson and Matt
Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

Reclassified: RSA silently downgrades to EXPORT_RSA [Client] (CVE-2015-0204)


Severity: High

This security issue was previously announced by the OpenSSL project and
classified as low severity. This severity rating has now been changed to
high.

This was classified low because it was originally thought that server RSA
export ciphersuite support was rare: a client was only vulnerable to a MITM
attack against a server which supports an RSA export ciphersuite. Recent
studies have shown that RSA export ciphersuites support is far more common.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team. It was previously announced in the OpenSSL
security advisory on 8th January 2015.

Multiblock corrupted pointer (CVE-2015-0290)


Severity: Moderate

OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the multiblock performance improvement. This feature
only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI
instructions. A defect in the implementation of multiblock can cause OpenSSL's
internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking
IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this
will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then
it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a
potential DoS attack.

This issue affects OpenSSL version: 1.0.2

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th February 2015 by Daniel Danner and
Rainer Mueller. The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development
team.

Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen (CVE-2015-0207)
===

Severity: Moderate

The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial
ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to
DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A
defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in
the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation
fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An
example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to
connect to a DTLS1.2 only server.

This issue affects OpenSSL version: 1.0.2

OpenSSL 1.0.2 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.2a.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 27th January 2015 by Per Allansson. The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp (CVE-2015-0286)
===

Severity: Moderate

The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1m.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0r.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zf.

This issue was discovered and fixed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters (CVE-2015-0208)
=

Severity: Moderate

The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify

[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-01-08 Thread OpenSSL
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [08 Jan 2015]
===

DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record (CVE-2014-3571)
===

Severity: Moderate

A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due
to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Markus Stenberg of
Cisco Systems, Inc. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
core team.

DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record (CVE-2015-0206)
===

Severity: Moderate

A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain
conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS
records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak
could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory
exhaustion.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1 and 1.0.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 7th January 2015 by Chris Mueller who also
provided an initial patch. Further analysis was performed by Matt Caswell of the
OpenSSL development team, who also developed the final patch.

no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL (CVE-2014-3569)
=

Severity: Low

When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is
received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in
a NULL pointer dereference.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th October 2014 by Frank Schmirler. The
fix was developed by Kurt Roeckx.


ECDHE silently downgrades to ECDH [Client] (CVE-2014-3572)
==

Severity: Low

An OpenSSL client will accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuite
using an ECDSA certificate if the server key exchange message is omitted. This
effectively removes forward secrecy from the ciphersuite.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


RSA silently downgrades to EXPORT_RSA [Client] (CVE-2015-0204)
==

Severity: Low

An OpenSSL client will accept the use of an RSA temporary key in a non-export
RSA key exchange ciphersuite. A server could present a weak temporary key
and downgrade the security of the session.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


DH client certificates accepted without verification [Server] (CVE-2015-0205)
=

Severity: Low

An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client
to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1 and 1.0.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


Certificate fingerprints can be modified (CVE-2014-8275)


Severity: Low

OpenSSL accepts several non-DER-variations of certificate signature
algorithm and signature encodings. OpenSSL also does not enforce a
match between the signature algorithm between the signed and unsigned
portions

OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-10-15 Thread OpenSSL
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [15 Oct 2014]
===

SRTP Memory Leak (CVE-2014-3513)


Severity: High

A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1j.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.

The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.


Session Ticket Memory Leak (CVE-2014-3567)
==

Severity: Medium

When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
attack.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1j.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0o.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zc. 

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 8th October 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


SSL 3.0 Fallback protection
===

Severity: Medium

OpenSSL has added support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to allow applications
to block the ability for a MITM attacker to force a protocol
downgrade.

Some client applications (such as browsers) will reconnect using a
downgraded protocol to work around interoperability bugs in older
servers. This could be exploited by an active man-in-the-middle to
downgrade connections to SSL 3.0 even if both sides of the connection
support higher protocols. SSL 3.0 contains a number of weaknesses
including POODLE (CVE-2014-3566).

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1j.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0o.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zc. 

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf

Support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV was developed by Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller.


Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete (CVE-2014-3568)
==

Severity: Low

When OpenSSL is configured with no-ssl3 as a build option, servers
could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
configured to send them.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1j.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0o.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zc. 

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Akamai Technologies on 14th October 2014.

The fix was developed by Akamai and the OpenSSL team.


References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20141015.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html

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OpenSSL Security Advisory - CVE-2014-3508

2014-08-08 Thread Simner, John
Hi,
Please can I enquire what the actual vulnerability is with...


Information leak in pretty printing functions (CVE-2014-3508)

=



A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as

X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the

stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the

attacker. OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers themselves are not affected.



OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zb

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0n.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1i.



Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. This issue

was reported to OpenSSL on 19th June 2014.



The fix was developed by Emilia Käsper and Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL

development team.





I have tried to look up CVE-2014-3508 and found it is not there yet.

What is meant by echo pretty printing output to the attacker?



Thank you for your assistance and look forward to your response.



Thanks..

John


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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-06 Thread Geoffrey Thorpe
The redhat podcast with Mark (Cox) probably answers this best;
http://bit.ly/Th64oP



On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 12:04 PM, Juha Saarinen j...@saarinen.org wrote:

 Hi Steve,

 That’s quite a few in one go - is this due to greater testing of OpenSSL
 and more scrutiny of the code by the community?

 Of the flaws listed, which is the one of most concern?

 This kind of begs the question what to do with all those embedded systems
 that run older versions of OpenSSL.

 Thanks

 —
 Juha



 On 5/06/2014, at 11:54 pm, OpenSSL open...@openssl.org wrote:

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  OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
  
 
  Resend: first version contained characters which could cause signature
 failure.
 
  SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
  ===
 
  An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
  keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be
 exploited
  by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and
  modify traffic from the attacked client and server.
 
  The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
  server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL.
 Servers
  are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
  of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a
 precaution.
 
  OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to
 0.9.8za.
  OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to
 1.0.0m.
  OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to
 1.0.1h.
 
  Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
  researching this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
  2014 via JPCERT/CC.
 
  The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly
 based
  on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.
 
  DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)
  
 
  By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
  can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.
 
  Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.
 
  OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
  OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
  OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
  Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This
  issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.
 
  The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.
 
  DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)
  
 
  A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS
 fragments
  to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
  run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
 
  Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.
 
  OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
  OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
  OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
  Thanks to Juri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was
  reported to OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.
 
  The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.
 
  SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198)
  =
 
  A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to
  cause a denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw
  only affects OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is
  enabled, which is not the default and not common.
 
  OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
  OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
  This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by
  Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.
 
  SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service
 (CVE-2010-5298)
 
 ===
 
  A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote
  attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
  This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0
  and 1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the
  default and not common.
 
  OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
  OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
  This issue was reported in public.
 
  Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)
  
 
  OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
  denial of service attack.
 
  OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
  OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
  OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
  Thanks to Felix Grobert

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-06 Thread Jakob Bohm

On 6/5/2014 11:31 PM, Green, Gatewood wrote:

Openssl-0.9.8za will not build in FIPS mode. The openssl-fips-1.2(.4) seems to 
be missing the symbol BN_consttime_swap.



By the way, the BN_consttime_swap implementation in 1.0.1g (still
downloading 1.0.1h) doesn't seem to completely match its
description:

 - If nwords is 0, the code will overflow the input buffers by
  pretending that nwords is 10.  Adding case 0 to the bottom
  of the switch should fix that.
 - If BN_ULONG is not exactly BN_BITS2 in size, the condition may also
  bit mishandled, is this property guaranteed by the type definitions
  on all platforms?
 - Other than the assert checking the power-of-2 assumption, the code
  should work with any condition in the range
  0 to (1  (BN_BITS32-1)) inclusive, but not for larger values.
 - The only thing that needs a and b to be different variables is the
  assert checking that condition.

At least this is how I read the code.

Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  http://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2730 Herlev, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-06 Thread Jeff Wieland

In 0.9.8za, there is a missing compiler directive to
include limits.h in ssl/s3_pkt.c.  Without it, compiling
fails on SPARC Solaris 10 with INT_MAX being undefined on
line 536, which looks like:

OPENSSL_assert(s-s3-wnum  INT_MAX);

It appears that 1.0.0m has the same problem.  I haven't looked at
1.0.1h as yet.

OpenSSL wrote:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]


Resend: first version contained characters which could cause signature failure.

SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
===

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
researching this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
2014 via JPCERT/CC.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based
on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.

DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)


By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This
issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)


A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Juri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was
reported to OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198)
=

A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to
cause a denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw
only affects OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is
enabled, which is not the default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by
Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service (CVE-2010-5298)
===

A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote
attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0
and 1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the
default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.

Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)


OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
denial of service attack.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Felix Grobert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this
issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

Other issues


OpenSSL 1.0.0m and OpenSSL 0.9.8za also contain a fix for
CVE-2014-0076: Fix for the attack described in the paper Recovering
OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack

OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-05 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]


SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
===

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and 
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
researching this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
2014 via JPCERT/CC.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based
on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.

DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)


By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This
issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)


A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was
reported to OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198)
=

A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to
cause a denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw
only affects OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is
enabled, which is not the default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by
Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service (CVE-2010-5298)
===
 
A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote
attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0
and 1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the
default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  

Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)


OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
denial of service attack.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratrić at Google for discovering this
issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

Other issues


OpenSSL 1.0.0m and OpenSSL 0.9.8za also contain a fix for
CVE-2014-0076: Fix for the attack described in the paper Recovering
OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack
Reported by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger.  This issue was previously
fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1g.


References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)

iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJTkEfyAAoJENNXdQf6QOnimvkP/0J12wcv/wq6NDfLCu8X

OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-05 Thread OpenSSL
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]


Resend: first version contained characters which could cause signature failure.

SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
===

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and 
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
researching this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
2014 via JPCERT/CC.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based
on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.

DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)


By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This
issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)


A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Juri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was
reported to OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198)
=

A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to
cause a denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw
only affects OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is
enabled, which is not the default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by
Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service (CVE-2010-5298)
===
 
A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote
attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0
and 1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the
default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  

Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)


OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
denial of service attack.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Felix Grobert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this
issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

Other issues


OpenSSL 1.0.0m and OpenSSL 0.9.8za also contain a fix for
CVE-2014-0076: Fix for the attack described in the paper Recovering
OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack
Reported by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger.  This issue was previously
fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1g.


References
==

URL for this Security Advisory:
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-05 Thread Jeff Wieland

In 0.9.8za at least, there is a missing directive to include limits.h.
Without it, compilation fails on SPARC Solaris 10 with INT_MAXbeing
undefined on line 536, which looks like:

OPENSSL_assert(s-s3-wnum  INT_MAX);

It appears that 1.0.0m has the same problem.  I haven't looked at
1.0.1h as yet.

OpenSSL wrote:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]


Resend: first version contained characters which could cause signature failure.

SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
===

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
researching this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
2014 via JPCERT/CC.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based
on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.

DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)


By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This
issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)


A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Juri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was
reported to OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198)
=

A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to
cause a denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw
only affects OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is
enabled, which is not the default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by
Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service (CVE-2010-5298)
===
  
A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote

attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0
and 1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the
default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.

Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)


OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
denial of service attack.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Felix Grobert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this
issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

Other issues


OpenSSL 1.0.0m and OpenSSL 0.9.8za also contain a fix for
CVE-2014-0076: Fix for the attack described in the paper Recovering
OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack
Reported by Yuval

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-05 Thread Juha Saarinen
Hi Steve,

That’s quite a few in one go - is this due to greater testing of OpenSSL and 
more scrutiny of the code by the community?

Of the flaws listed, which is the one of most concern?

This kind of begs the question what to do with all those embedded systems that 
run older versions of OpenSSL.

Thanks

— 
Juha



On 5/06/2014, at 11:54 pm, OpenSSL open...@openssl.org wrote:

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256
 
 OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
 
 
 Resend: first version contained characters which could cause signature 
 failure.
 
 SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
 ===
 
 An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
 keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
 by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and 
 modify traffic from the attacked client and server.
 
 The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
 server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
 are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
 of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.
 
 OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
 OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
 Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
 researching this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
 2014 via JPCERT/CC.
 
 The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based
 on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.
 
 DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)
 
 
 By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
 can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.
 
 Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.
 
 OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
 OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
 Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This
 issue was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.
 
 The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.
 
 DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)
 
 
 A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
 to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
 run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
 
 Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.
 
 OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
 OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
 Thanks to Juri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was
 reported to OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.
 
 The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.
 
 SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198)
 =
 
 A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to
 cause a denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw
 only affects OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is
 enabled, which is not the default and not common.
 
 OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
 This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by
 Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.
 
 SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service 
 (CVE-2010-5298)
 ===
 
 A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote
 attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
 This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0
 and 1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the
 default and not common.
 
 OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
 This issue was reported in public.  
 
 Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)
 
 
 OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
 denial of service attack.
 
 OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za
 OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.
 
 Thanks to Felix Grobert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this
 issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2014.
 
 The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.
 
 Other issues
 
 
 OpenSSL 1.0.0m and OpenSSL 0.9.8za

RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-06-05 Thread Green, Gatewood
Openssl-0.9.8za will not build in FIPS mode. The openssl-fips-1.2(.4) seems to 
be missing the symbol BN_consttime_swap.

Woody

Gatewood C Green Jr (Woody)
Principal Software Engineer, Product Security Champion
SIEM Engineering
McAfee. Part of Intel Security.
Direct: 208.552.8269
Mobile: 208.206.7455

-Original Message-
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org] 
On Behalf Of OpenSSL
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2014 5:54 AM
To: openssl-...@openssl.org; openssl-users@openssl.org; 
openssl-annou...@openssl.org
Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]


Resend: first version contained characters which could cause signature failure.

SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224) 
===

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak 
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited 
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and modify 
traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and* server. 
OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers are only 
known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users of OpenSSL 
servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching 
this issue.  This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
2014 via JPCERT/CC.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based 
on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.

DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)


By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be 
made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users 
should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.  This issue 
was reported to OpenSSL on 9th May 2014.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195) 


A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to 
an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run 
arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8za OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users 
should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Juri Aedla for reporting this issue.  This issue was reported to 
OpenSSL on 23rd April 2014 via HP ZDI.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2014-0198) 
=

A flaw in the do_ssl3_write function can allow remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service via a NULL pointer dereference.  This flaw only affects 
OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not 
the default and not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of 
the OpenSSL development team.

SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS session injection or denial of service (CVE-2010-5298) 
===
 
A race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function can allow remote attackers to 
inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service.
This flaw only affects multithreaded applications using OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 
1.0.1, where SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, which is not the default and 
not common.

OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

This issue was reported in public.  

Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470) 


OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a 
denial of service attack.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8za OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should 
upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to Felix Grobert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue.  
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2014.

The fix

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-14 Thread Steven Kneizys
Ah, of course!   I was so focused on not accessing that routine and not
being able to just link in the obj files that the obvious solution of
using the library properly escaped me!  Thanks.

After a Visual Studio 2012 build in directory:
E:\usr_local\src\openssl-1.0.1f_32

I then was able put that change in and to compile and link very easily:
cl -IE:\usr_local\src\openssl-1.0.1f_32\inc32 heartbleed.c /c
link heartbleed.obj
E:\usr_local\src\openssl-1.0.1f_32\out32dll\libeay32.lib
E:\usr_local\src\openssl-1.0.1f_32\out32dll\ssleay32.lib

I put those two dll files (ssleay32.dll and libeay32.dll) in my directory
with the new exe from the build and it worked just fine.

Thanks again to Tim Hudson, and of course to Rob Stradling for sharing the
utility,

Steve...


On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 10:58 PM, Tim Hudson t...@cryptsoft.com wrote:

  On 11/04/2014 10:38 PM, Steven Kneizys wrote:

 The same issue when I tried to port over to windows, the ssl3_write_bytes
 is not exposed in the library.  There doesn't seem to be an easy workaround
 that I can see.


 The work around is trivial if you wanted to do that.

 Change to use the SSL_get_ssl_method function.

 This line:

 if (ssl3_write_bytes(v_ssl, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf,
 3 + payload + padding) = 0)

 Simply becomes:

 if (SSL_get_ssl_method(v_ssl)-ssl_write_bytes(v_ssl,
 TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf,
 3 + payload + padding) = 0)

 Tim.




-- 
Steve Kneizys
Senior Business Process Engineer
Voice: (610) 256-1396  [For Emergency Service (888)864-3282]
Ferrilli Information Group -- Quality Service and Solutions for Higher
Education
web: http://www.ferrilli.com/ http://www.figsolutions.com/

Making you a success while exceeding your expectations.


Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-14 Thread Matthias Apitz

some nice pictures how the bug works: http://www.xkcd.com/1354/

HIH

matthias
-- 
Sent from my FreeBSD netbook

Matthias Apitz, g...@unixarea.de, http://www.unixarea.de/ f: +49-170-4527211
UNIX since V7 on PDP-11, UNIX on mainframe since ESER 1055 (IBM /370)
UNIX on x86 since SVR4.2 UnixWare 2.1.2, FreeBSD since 2.2.5
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing Listopenssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager   majord...@openssl.org


Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-14 Thread Tim Hudson
On 11/04/2014 12:58 AM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
 guru@hein:~/openssl-1.0.1f/apps (sleep 3 ; echo B ; sleep 3) | ./openssl 
 s_client -connect www.openssl.org:443

If you are using s_client for testing then you should add the -msg
option and see what is being sent.

Responding to a correctly formed heartbeat request is not an error - it
is an indication that the server remains configured with heartbeat support.
For example repeating that command as:

(sleep 3 ; echo B ; sleep 3) | ./openssl s_client -connect www.openssl.org:443 
-msg

And you can see the decoded heartbeat request and response - all with
legal length values - 0x12 indicating 18 bytes of payload followed by
the required 16 bytes of padding all exactly adding up to match the
record size (3+18+16=37 which is the 0x0025 length field).

HEARTBEATING
 ??? [length 0005]
18 03 03 00 3d
 TLS 1.2 [length 0025], HeartbeatRequest
01 00 12 00 00 c5 3c e4 48 f7 55 a8 83 62 df 03
a7 6b c2 48 05 60 e9 48 9e c1 6e 69 f4 fd 48 60
a9 35 bd 0c c3
 ??? [length 0005]
18 03 03 00 3d
 TLS 1.2 [length 0025], HeartbeatResponse
02 00 12 00 00 c5 3c e4 48 f7 55 a8 83 62 df 03
a7 6b c2 48 05 75 07 79 df 92 dd b2 3c a6 9d 73
12 54 9c 66 57
read R BLOCK

A number of users have provided various tools for testing whether or not
an exploit is present. None of these tools are officially supported or
blessed so are all use-at-your-own-risk.

A couple of the tools others have mentioned already on this list are:

https://github.com/noxxi/p5-scripts/blob/master/check-ssl-heartbleed.pl
https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389

There are a whole range of checking tools that have varying approaches
to how they test. Understanding what each tool does is important to
understanding the effectiveness of their results in terms of claiming
vulnerable or not vulnerable to the issue. Most people I've interacted
with are using a combination of tools.

The appropriate response to the issue is to follow the advice in the
advisory - either move to a version with the patch for the defect
applied or move to a version where the heartbeat code has been removed
completely via compilation of the library with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS.

If you connect to a site which does not support heartbeat (compiled out)
then you will get something like this:

HEARTBEATING
140153106511512:error:1413B16D:SSL routines:tls1_heartbeat:peer does not
accept heartbearts:t1_lib.c:4049:
 ??? [length 0005]
15 03 01 00 20
 TLS 1.0Alert [length 0002], warning close_notify
01 00

It is also possible to use the message callback function to block the
response to heartbeat in application code if your library hasn't been
patched.
However the right solution is to fix the library via either of the
methods mentioned in the advisory at
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140407.txt

Tim.

__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing Listopenssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager   majord...@openssl.org


the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Matthias Apitz
El día Wednesday, April 09, 2014 a las 01:05:22AM -0700, monloi perez 
escribió:

 True. Thanks for the quick reply.
 
 
 On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 3:33 PM, Alan Buxey a.l.m.bu...@lboro.ac.uk 
 wrote:
  
 https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
 
 1.0.1 introduced the heartbeat support.
 
 1.0.0 and earlier are fortunate in that they didnt have it.but then they 
 didnt have things to stop you from being BEASTed so some you win, some you 
 lose. ;)
 
 alan

Hello,

As you can read in the above change log, heartbeat support was
introduced in version 1.0.1 of openssl. Does this mean that also the bug
was introduced with this version in March 2012, or was it later?

What is the exact bug, can someone show a svn/git diff of the first
source version having the bug?

Is it possible that the bug was introduced with intention (to make
use of it later)?

Here in Germany in the news we have rumor, that the bug was used by NSA,
of course the American Goverment says no.

Thanks

matthias

-- 
Matthias Apitz   |  /\   ASCII Ribbon Campaign:
E-mail: g...@unixarea.de |  \ /   - No HTML/RTF in E-mail
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Michael Tuexen
On 12 Apr 2014, at 17:43, Matthias Apitz g...@unixarea.de wrote:

 El día Wednesday, April 09, 2014 a las 01:05:22AM -0700, monloi perez 
 escribió:
 
 True. Thanks for the quick reply.
 
 
 On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 3:33 PM, Alan Buxey a.l.m.bu...@lboro.ac.uk 
 wrote:
 
 https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
 
 1.0.1 introduced the heartbeat support.
 
 1.0.0 and earlier are fortunate in that they didnt have it.but then they 
 didnt have things to stop you from being BEASTed so some you win, some you 
 lose. ;)
 
 alan
 
 Hello,
 
 As you can read in the above change log, heartbeat support was
 introduced in version 1.0.1 of openssl. Does this mean that also the bug
 was introduced with this version in March 2012, or was it later?
As the security advisory states, the bug showed up in version 1.0.1
released in March 2012.
 
 What is the exact bug, can someone show a svn/git diff of the first
 source version having the bug?
http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=4817504d069b4c5082161b02a22116ad75f822b1
 
 Is it possible that the bug was introduced with intention (to make
 use of it later)?
 
 Here in Germany in the news we have rumor, that the bug was used by NSA,
 of course the American Goverment says no.
I have read the rumor. It is wrong. I was Robins boss at the time he
did the work, he worked in my lab. Neither me personally nor my lab at the 
university
had any cooperations with any security agency (from any country).
Robin worked on the OpenSSL code for multiple years. During his work with the 
DTLS
code, he fixed a lot of bugs in that code and implemented some features,
like the support of RFC 6520. He worked in the public, all his patches were 
submitted
with his name. The intention was to improve OpenSSL, not to introduce bugs.
Unfortunately, the patch above contained a bug which wasn't catched,
neither by Robin, nor by the reviewers, nor by the people using the stack.
It is a bug. A bug with a huge impact. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Best regards
Michael Tüxen
 
 Thanks
 
   matthias
 
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Matthias Apitz
El día Saturday, April 12, 2014 a las 09:08:15PM +0200, Michael Tuexen escribió:

  What is the exact bug, can someone show a svn/git diff of the first
  source version having the bug?
 http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=4817504d069b4c5082161b02a22116ad75f822b1
  

Hi,

Thanks for the git diff (and the other statements). Could you please be
so kind and point to the exact place of the offending statement (or
missing boundary check) in the 19 *.[ch] files? I only want (as a C
programmer) to get my own impression of the nature of the issue. Thanks

matthias

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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Michael Tuexen
On 12 Apr 2014, at 21:30, Matthias Apitz g...@unixarea.de wrote:

 El día Saturday, April 12, 2014 a las 09:08:15PM +0200, Michael Tuexen 
 escribió:
 
 What is the exact bug, can someone show a svn/git diff of the first
 source version having the bug?
 http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=4817504d069b4c5082161b02a22116ad75f822b1
 
 
 Hi,
 
 Thanks for the git diff (and the other statements). Could you please be
 so kind and point to the exact place of the offending statement (or
 missing boundary check) in the 19 *.[ch] files? I only want (as a C
 programmer) to get my own impression of the nature of the issue. Thanks
Here is the commit of the fix:
http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=731f431497f463f3a2a97236fe0187b11c44aead

Best regards
Michael
 
   matthias
 
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Matthias Apitz
El día Saturday, April 12, 2014 a las 09:30:22PM +0200, Matthias Apitz escribió:

 El día Saturday, April 12, 2014 a las 09:08:15PM +0200, Michael Tuexen 
 escribió:
 
   What is the exact bug, can someone show a svn/git diff of the first
   source version having the bug?
  http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=4817504d069b4c5082161b02a22116ad75f822b1
   
 
 Hi,
 
 Thanks for the git diff (and the other statements). Could you please be
 so kind and point to the exact place of the offending statement (or
 missing boundary check) in the 19 *.[ch] files? I only want (as a C
 programmer) to get my own impression of the nature of the issue. Thanks

ah, I see it in ssl/d1_both.c, the memcpy for the payload is done
regardless if payload length and payload fit; forget my request.

Thx

matthias
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Michael Smith

On Apr 12, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Michael Tuexen michael.tue...@lurchi.franken.de 
wrote:
  
 I have read the rumor. It is wrong. 

Introduced with intent vs. known to the NSA -- two 
different things, right? 

I don't have any direct knowledge of what goes on in the 
NSA, but if they don't have a whole cubicle farm full 
of people looking for vulnerabilities, I'd be surprised. 
OpenSSL would be an obvious high-value target for scrutiny 
just because of its ubiquity. 



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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Jan Danielsson
On 12/04/14 21:30, Matthias Apitz wrote:
 http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=4817504d069b4c5082161b02a22116ad75f822b1
 
 Thanks for the git diff (and the other statements). Could you please be
 so kind and point to the exact place of the offending statement (or
 missing boundary check) in the 19 *.[ch] files? I only want (as a C
 programmer) to get my own impression of the nature of the issue. Thanks

   Check ssl/d1_both.c

   /Jan
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Matthias Apitz
El día Saturday, April 12, 2014 a las 03:43:29PM -0400, Michael Smith escribió:

 
 On Apr 12, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Michael Tuexen 
 michael.tue...@lurchi.franken.de wrote:
   
  I have read the rumor. It is wrong. 
 
 Introduced with intent vs. known to the NSA -- two 
 different things, right? 
 
 I don't have any direct knowledge of what goes on in the 
 NSA, but if they don't have a whole cubicle farm full 
 of people looking for vulnerabilities, I'd be surprised. 
 OpenSSL would be an obvious high-value target for scrutiny 
 just because of its ubiquity. 

agreed; and this bug wasn't hard to see (even for me, sitting in a
restaurant with a netbook); in my company we do code review face to
face, i.e. two persons (the coder and the reviewer) wade through the new
code; one target of always questioning are copies in memory: do the
amount of data fit into target location and is the source amount a valid
space...

matthias

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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Matthias Apitz
El día Saturday, April 12, 2014 a las 03:43:29PM -0400, Michael Smith escribió:

 
 On Apr 12, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Michael Tuexen 
 michael.tue...@lurchi.franken.de wrote:
   
  I have read the rumor. It is wrong. 
 
 Introduced with intent vs. known to the NSA -- two 
 different things, right? 
 
 I don't have any direct knowledge of what goes on in the 
 NSA, but if they don't have a whole cubicle farm full 
 of people looking for vulnerabilities, I'd be surprised. 
 OpenSSL would be an obvious high-value target for scrutiny 
 just because of its ubiquity. 

and one comment more: the bug works in both directions; when a client
with an openssl lib/DLL with this bug connects to a well prepared SSL server,
the server can fetch up to 64 kbyte of memory from the client, for example the
stored saved passwords in your browser...

matthias
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Michael Tuexen
On 12 Apr 2014, at 21:43, Michael Smith m...@smithbowen.net wrote:

 
 On Apr 12, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Michael Tuexen 
 michael.tue...@lurchi.franken.de wrote:
 
 I have read the rumor. It is wrong. 
 
 Introduced with intent vs. known to the NSA -- two 
 different things, right? 
My statement was referring to the Introduced with intend.

I personally don't know anything about known to the NSA.

Best regards
Michael
 
 I don't have any direct knowledge of what goes on in the 
 NSA, but if they don't have a whole cubicle farm full 
 of people looking for vulnerabilities, I'd be surprised. 
 OpenSSL would be an obvious high-value target for scrutiny 
 just because of its ubiquity. 
 
 
 
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Re: the nature of the heartbeat issue (was Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory)

2014-04-12 Thread Michael Smith

On Apr 12, 2014, at 5:40 PM, Michael Tuexen michael.tue...@lurchi.franken.de 
wrote:
  
 Introduced with intent vs. known to the NSA -- two 
 different things, right? 
 My statement was referring to the Introduced with intend.

Understood. I'm personally quite sure it *wasn't* introduced 
with intent, which is why I thought it was important to 
note the distinction.  

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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-11 Thread Walter H.

On 10.04.2014 13:16, Rob Stradling wrote:

On 09/04/14 20:43, Salz, Rich wrote:
Can you please post a good and a bad server example. I have 
tested a lot of servers, including 'akamai.com', and they all show 
HEARTBEATING at the end:


Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch openssl/s_client to 
make your own test.  That's the simplest.


Simpler still...

https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389

It's based on what Viktor posted, but it works without patching the 
OpenSSL library code.




Hello,

I get a link error - the same es the 2nd comment mentions there;

how can I fix this?

Thanks,
Walter

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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-11 Thread Steven Kneizys
The same issue when I tried to port over to windows, the ssl3_write_bytes
is not exposed in the library.  There doesn't seem to be an easy workaround
that I can see.

Steve...

On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 7:40 AM, Walter H. walte...@mathemainzel.infowrote:

  On 10.04.2014 13:16, Rob Stradling wrote:

 On 09/04/14 20:43, Salz, Rich wrote:

 Can you please post a good and a bad server example. I have tested a
 lot of servers, including 'akamai.com', and they all show HEARTBEATING at
 the end:


 Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch openssl/s_client to make
 your own test.  That's the simplest.


 Simpler still...

 https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389

 It's based on what Viktor posted, but it works without patching the
 OpenSSL library code.


  Hello,

 I get a link error - the same es the 2nd comment mentions there;

 how can I fix this?

 Thanks,
 Walter

 --
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 Best regards,
 Mes salutations distinguées,

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 Lederergasse 47a/7   _/  _/  _/_/
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RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-11 Thread JAaron Anderson

Also try your range here
https://ssltools.websecurity.symantec.com/checker/views/certCheck.jsp
Hth
jaa


-Original Message-
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org
[mailto:owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Walter H.
Sent: Friday, April 11, 2014 7:40 AM
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

On 10.04.2014 13:16, Rob Stradling wrote: 

On 09/04/14 20:43, Salz, Rich wrote: 


Can you please post a good and a bad server
example. I have tested a lot of servers, including 'akamai.com', and they
all show HEARTBEATING at the end: 



Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch
openssl/s_client to make your own test.  That's the simplest. 



Simpler still... 

https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389 

It's based on what Viktor posted, but it works without patching the
OpenSSL library code. 




Hello,

I get a link error - the same es the 2nd comment mentions there;

how can I fix this?

Thanks,
Walter


-- 

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Best regards,
Mes salutations distinguées, 

Ing. Walter Höhlhubmer _/  _/  _/_/
  _/  _/  _/_/
Lederergasse 47a/7   _/  _/  _/_/
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(+43 664 / 951 83 72)_/  _/  _/_/ 


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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-11 Thread Leonardo Secci
In debian I solved linking directly static library.

gcc -ansi -pedantic -o heartbleed heartbleed.c -lcrypto \
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.a

Regards

In data venerdì 11 aprile 2014 08:38:07, Steven Kneizys ha scritto:
 The same issue when I tried to port over to windows, the ssl3_write_bytes
 is not exposed in the library.  There doesn't seem to be an easy workaround
 that I can see.
 
 Steve...
 
 On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 7:40 AM, Walter H. 
walte...@mathemainzel.infowrote:
   On 10.04.2014 13:16, Rob Stradling wrote:
  On 09/04/14 20:43, Salz, Rich wrote:
  
  Can you please post a good and a bad server example. I have tested a
  lot of servers, including 'akamai.com', and they all show HEARTBEATING at
  the end:
  
  
  Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch openssl/s_client to make
  your own test.  That's the simplest.
  
  
  Simpler still...
  
  https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389
  
  It's based on what Viktor posted, but it works without patching the
  OpenSSL library code.
  
   Hello,
  
  I get a link error - the same es the 2nd comment mentions there;
  
  how can I fix this?
  
  Thanks,
  Walter
  
  --
  
   Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
  
  Best regards,
  Mes salutations distinguées,
  
   Ing. Walter Höhlhubmer _/  _/  _/_/
   
_/  _/  _/_/
  
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_/_/  _/_/  _/_/
  
  (+43 664 / 951 83 72)_/  _/  _/_/

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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-11 Thread Rob Stradling

Thanks Leonardo!

On 11/04/14 13:54, Leonardo Secci wrote:

In debian I solved linking directly static library.

gcc -ansi -pedantic -o heartbleed heartbleed.c -lcrypto \
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.a

Regards

In data venerdì 11 aprile 2014 08:38:07, Steven Kneizys ha scritto:

The same issue when I tried to port over to windows, the ssl3_write_bytes
is not exposed in the library.  There doesn't seem to be an easy workaround
that I can see.

Steve...

On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 7:40 AM, Walter H.

walte...@mathemainzel.infowrote:

  On 10.04.2014 13:16, Rob Stradling wrote:
On 09/04/14 20:43, Salz, Rich wrote:

Can you please post a good and a bad server example. I have tested a
lot of servers, including 'akamai.com', and they all show HEARTBEATING at
the end:


Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch openssl/s_client to make
your own test.  That's the simplest.


Simpler still...

https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389

It's based on what Viktor posted, but it works without patching the
OpenSSL library code.

  Hello,

I get a link error - the same es the 2nd comment mentions there;

how can I fix this?

Thanks,
Walter

--

  Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Best regards,
Mes salutations distinguées,

  Ing. Walter Höhlhubmer _/  _/  _/_/

   _/  _/  _/_/

Lederergasse 47a/7   _/  _/  _/_/
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-11 Thread Tim Hudson
On 11/04/2014 10:38 PM, Steven Kneizys wrote:
 The same issue when I tried to port over to windows,
 the ssl3_write_bytes is not exposed in the library.  There doesn't
 seem to be an easy workaround that I can see.

The work around is trivial if you wanted to do that.

Change to use the SSL_get_ssl_method function.

This line:

if (ssl3_write_bytes(v_ssl, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf,
3 + payload + padding) = 0)

Simply becomes:

if (SSL_get_ssl_method(v_ssl)-ssl_write_bytes(v_ssl,
TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf,
3 + payload + padding) = 0)

Tim.



Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-10 Thread Matthias Apitz
  -Original Message-
  From: Matthias Apitz [mailto:g...@unixarea.de]
  Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:41 AM
  To: Apitz,Matthias
  Subject: Fwd: RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory
  
  - Forwarded message from Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com -
  
  Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 15:43:28 -0400
  From: Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com
  To: openssl-users@openssl.org openssl-users@openssl.org
  Subject: RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory
  
   Can you please post a good and a bad server example. I have
  tested a lot of servers, including 'akamai.com', and they all show
  HEARTBEATING at the end:
  
  Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch openssl/s_client to
  make your own test.  That's the simplest.  My example tests only
  for those who have disabled TLs heartbeats, which is the safest
  thing, but not necessarily the only thing, to do.
  

Hello,

I have instrumented an openssl 1.0.1f as posted by Victor:

guru@hein:~/openssl-1.0.1f diff ssl/t1_lib.c.unpatched
ssl/t1_lib.c
2671c2671
   s2n(payload, p);
---
   s2n(0x4000, p);

but I still see HEARTBEATING, for example even from www.openssl.org:

guru@hein:~/openssl-1.0.1f/apps (sleep 3 ; echo B ; sleep 3) | ./openssl 
s_client -connect www.openssl.org:443
...
HEARTBEATING
DONE

Do I something wrong? 

Thx

matthias

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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-10 Thread Rob Stradling

On 09/04/14 20:43, Salz, Rich wrote:

Can you please post a good and a bad server example. I have tested a lot of 
servers, including 'akamai.com', and they all show HEARTBEATING at the end:


Look at Victor's recent post about how to patch openssl/s_client to make your 
own test.  That's the simplest.


Simpler still...

https://gist.github.com/robstradling/10363389

It's based on what Viktor posted, but it works without patching the 
OpenSSL library code.


To compile:
$ gcc -ansi -pedantic -o heartbleed heartbleed.c -lssl -lcrypto

Examples:
$ ./heartbleed www.ibm.com:443
NOT VULNERABLE (TLS Heartbeat extension not supported by the server)

$ ./heartbleed secure.comodo.net:443
NOT VULNERABLE (TLS Heartbeat extension supported by the server)

$ ./heartbleed mail.visservansolkema.nl:443
VULNERABLE!

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 10:57:35AM +0200, Matthias Apitz wrote:

 I have instrumented an openssl 1.0.1f as posted by Victor:
 
 guru@hein:~/openssl-1.0.1f diff ssl/t1_lib.c.unpatched
 ssl/t1_lib.c
 2671c2671
s2n(payload, p);
 ---
s2n(0x4000, p);
 
 but I still see HEARTBEATING, for example even from www.openssl.org:
 
 guru@hein:~/openssl-1.0.1f/apps (sleep 3 ; echo B ; sleep 3) | ./openssl 
 s_client -connect www.openssl.org:443
 ...
 HEARTBEATING
 DONE
 
 Do I something wrong? 

That logs the request, you also need to see the reply...  With servers that
reply to the hearbeat you should see:

...
HEARTBEATING
read R BLOCK
DONE

-- 
Viktor.
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-09 Thread Alan Buxey
https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html

1.0.1 introduced the heartbeat support.

1.0.0 and earlier are fortunate in that they didnt have it.but then they 
didnt have things to stop you from being BEASTed so some you win, some you 
lose. ;)

alan

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-09 Thread monloi perez
True. Thanks for the quick reply.


On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 3:33 PM, Alan Buxey a.l.m.bu...@lboro.ac.uk wrote:
 
https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html

1.0.1 introduced the heartbeat support.

1.0.0 and earlier are fortunate in that they didnt have it.but then they 
didnt have things to stop you from being BEASTed so some you win, some you 
lose. ;)

alan

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-09 Thread Ted Byers
How do I determine whether or not the web servers I run are affected?  They
are Apache 2.4, built for 64 bit Windows and downloaded from Apachelounge.
I have no idea what version of openssl it was built with.  Does anyone here
know if the feature that introduces the risk can be turned off, without
introducing other risks?  If so, how?

Also, could the security keys we bought have been compromised?

Any advice on how I can protect my servers better would be appreciated.

Thanks

Ted

-- 
R.E.(Ted) Byers, Ph.D.,Ed.D.


On Mon, Apr 7, 2014 at 4:31 PM, OpenSSL open...@openssl.org wrote:

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Apr 2014]
 

 TLS heartbeat read overrun (CVE-2014-0160)
 ==

 A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can
 be
 used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server.

 Only 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including
 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1.

 Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
 Adam Langley a...@chromium.org and Bodo Moeller bmoel...@acm.org for
 preparing the fix.

 Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.1g. Users unable to
 immediately
 upgrade can alternatively recompile OpenSSL with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS.

 1.0.2 will be fixed in 1.0.2-beta2.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)

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 =szjb
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 __
 OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
 User Support Mailing Listopenssl-users@openssl.org
 Automated List Manager   majord...@openssl.org



Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

2014-04-09 Thread Ali Jawad
http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/#www.unlocator.com


On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 2:05 PM, Ted Byers r.ted.by...@gmail.com wrote:

 How do I determine whether or not the web servers I run are affected?
 They are Apache 2.4, built for 64 bit Windows and downloaded from
 Apachelounge.  I have no idea what version of openssl it was built with.
 Does anyone here know if the feature that introduces the risk can be turned
 off, without introducing other risks?  If so, how?

 Also, could the security keys we bought have been compromised?

 Any advice on how I can protect my servers better would be appreciated.

 Thanks

 Ted

 --
 R.E.(Ted) Byers, Ph.D.,Ed.D.


 On Mon, Apr 7, 2014 at 4:31 PM, OpenSSL open...@openssl.org wrote:

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Apr 2014]
 

 TLS heartbeat read overrun (CVE-2014-0160)
 ==

 A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can
 be
 used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server.

 Only 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including
 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1.

 Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
 Adam Langley a...@chromium.org and Bodo Moeller bmoel...@acm.org for
 preparing the fix.

 Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.1g. Users unable to
 immediately
 upgrade can alternatively recompile OpenSSL with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS.

 1.0.2 will be fixed in 1.0.2-beta2.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJTQt1bAAoJENNXdQf6QOniGhkP/AjjZgV+g7ZyxnxdnvA2+sdV
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 =szjb
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
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 OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
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