Re: [openstack-dev] "Evil" Firmware

2014-01-17 Thread Ian Wells
On 17 January 2014 09:12, Robert Collins wrote: > > The physical function is the one with the "real" PCI config space, so as > > long as the host controls it then there should be minimal risk from the > > guests since they have limited access via the virtual > functions--typically > > mostly just

Re: [openstack-dev] "Evil" Firmware

2014-01-17 Thread Ian Wells
On 17 January 2014 01:16, Chris Friesen wrote: > On 01/16/2014 05:12 PM, CARVER, PAUL wrote: > > Jumping back to an earlier part of the discussion, it occurs to me >> that this has broader implications. There's some discussion going on >> under the heading of Neutron with regard to PCI passthrou

Re: [openstack-dev] "Evil" Firmware

2014-01-17 Thread Robert Collins
> The physical function is the one with the "real" PCI config space, so as > long as the host controls it then there should be minimal risk from the > guests since they have limited access via the virtual functions--typically > mostly just message-passing to the physical function. As long as its a

Re: [openstack-dev] "Evil" Firmware

2014-01-16 Thread Chris Friesen
On 01/16/2014 05:12 PM, CARVER, PAUL wrote: Jumping back to an earlier part of the discussion, it occurs to me that this has broader implications. There's some discussion going on under the heading of Neutron with regard to PCI passthrough. I imagine it's under Neutron because of a desire to pro

Re: [openstack-dev] "Evil" Firmware

2014-01-16 Thread CARVER, PAUL
Clint Byrum wrote: >Excerpts from Alan Kavanagh's message of 2014-01-15 19:11:03 -0800: >> Hi Paul >> >> I posted a query to Ironic which is related to this discussion. My thinking >> was I want to ensure the case you note here (1) " a tenant can not read >> >another tenants disk.." the ne