We were not able to enable dual stack with l3 routers in Juno release. You may
need to wait for Kilo to see if that can be pushed in.
Xu Han Peng (xuhanp)
On Sat, Nov 22, 2014 at 3:03 AM, Harm Weites h...@weites.com wrote:
We're running Juno since a few weeks now, is
On 21 Nov 2014 18:25, Ken1 Ohmichi ken1ohmi...@gmail.com wrote:
Sent from my iPod
On 2014/11/22, at 7:56, Christopher Yeoh cbky...@gmail.com wrote:
Sent from my iPad
On 22 Nov 2014, at 4:56 am, Matthew Treinish mtrein...@kortar.org
My thesis is now complete!
The entire research, including source code and screen recordings, are
included in my deliverable here:
I am now in the process of drafting up a whitepaper based on my thesis research.
For whatever reason, this wasn’t linked appropriately to the older post in the
list. That post is here:
OpenStack-dev mailing list
On Nov 22, 2014, at 1:45 AM, Robert Collins robe...@robertcollins.net wrote:
On 22 November 2014 08:11, Jeremy Stanley fu...@yuggoth.org wrote:
On 2014-11-21 12:31:08 -0500 (-0500), Donald Stufft wrote:
Death to SSLv3 IMO.
Sure, we should avoid releasing new versions of things which
On Nov 21, 2014, at 8:07 PM, Mike Bayer mba...@redhat.com wrote:
On Nov 21, 2014, at 7:35 PM, Kevin Benton blak...@gmail.com
This is great! I'm not sure if you have been following some of the
discussion about the separation of vendor drivers in
On 2014-11-22 13:37:55 -0500 (-0500), Donald Stufft wrote:
Yes this. SSLv3 isn’t a “Well as long as you have newer things
enabled it’s fine” it’s a “If you have this enabled at all it’s a
problem”. As far as I am aware without TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV a MITM
who is willing to do active attacks can
I'm in my phone but rfc 2246 says that there are many ways in which an attacker
can attempt to make an attacker drop down to the least secure option they both
support. It's like the second or third paragraph of that section.
On Nov 22, 2014, at 4:00 PM, Jeremy Stanley fu...@yuggoth.org
I refreshed my memory and I was wrong about the specific attack. However the
point still stands that both the rfc and respected folks such as Thomas porin
state that you should look at the version negotiation as a way to selectively
enable new features not as a way to ensure that a connection
On 2014-11-22 19:45:09 +1300 (+1300), Robert Collins wrote:
Given the persistent risks of downgrade attacks, I think this does
actually qualify as a security issue: not that its breaking, but
that SSLv3 is advertised and accepted anywhere.
Which downgrade attacks? Outside of Web browser
Paul, I worked much of this in to my blueprint .
On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Paul Michali (pcm) p...@cisco.com wrote:
I talked to Carl today to discuss the L3 agent restructuring and the
On 2014-11-22 16:33:52 -0500 (-0500), Donald Stufft wrote:
I refreshed my memory and I was wrong about the specific attack.
However the point still stands that both the rfc and respected
folks such as Thomas porin state that you should look at the
version negotiation as a way to selectively
1. The issue is that if we do 1:1 and allow status/state to proliferate
throughout all objects we will then get an issue to fix it later, hence even if
we do not do sharing, I would still like to have all objects besides LB be
treated as logical.
2. The 3rd use case
Mail list logo