Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Adam Young 

On 04/06/2016 05:41 PM, Fox, Kevin M wrote:

-1 for man in the middle susceptible solutions. This also doesn't solve all the 
issues listed in the spec, such as suspended nodes, snapshotted nodes, etc.
Self signed MITM  That is only an issue if you are not trusting the 
initial setup.  I wan a real CA, we can't force everyone to do that.



Secure the Message bus is essential anyway.  Let's not piecemeal a 
solution here.





Nova has several back channel mechanisms at its disposal. We should use one or 
more of them to solve the problem properly instead of opening a security hole 
in our solution to a security problem.

Such as:
  * The nova console is one mechanism that could be utilized as a secure back 
channel.
  * The vm based instances could add a virutal serial port as a back channel.
  * Some bare metal bmc's support virtual cd's which could be loaded with fresh 
credentials upon request.
  * The metadata server is reliable in certain situations.

I'm sure there are more options too.

The instance user spec covers a lot of that stuff.

I'm ok if we want to refactor the instance user spec to cover creating phase 1 
credentials that are intended to be used for things other then getting a 
keystone token. It could be used to register/reregister with ipa, chef, puppet, 
etc. We just need to reword the spec to cover that use case too.

I'm also not tied to the implementation listed. it just needs to meet the 
requirements.

Thanks,
Kevin


From: Adam Young [ayo...@redhat.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 2:09 PM
To: openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

On 04/06/2016 05:42 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:

On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:

We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual machine
with an identity provider.

Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.


Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that cannot
be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.

For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.

Is the following possible:

1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.

There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
to Nova.

We need to secure the message queue from the compute node to conductor.
This is very achievable:

1.  Each compute node gets its own rabbit user
2.  Messages from compute node to Conductor are validated as to what
node sent them

We should enable TLS on the network as well, or password can be
sniffed.  Self signed is crappy, but probably sufficient for a baseline
deployment. Does not defend against MITM.  Puppet based deployments can
mitigate.
X509 client cert is a better auth mechanism than password, but not
essential.




   The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
against MITM attacks.

Also currently the metadata server is readonly with the guest pulling
information from it - it doesn't currently allow guests to push information
into it. This is nice because the metadata servers could theoretically be
locked down to prevent may interactions with the rest of nova - it should
only need read-only access to info about the guests it is serving. If we
turn the metadata server into a bi-directional service which can update
information about guests, then it opens it up as a more attractive avenue
of attack for guest OS trying breach the host infra. This is a fairly
general concern with any approach where the guest has to have the ability
to push information back into Nova.


2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?

3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the public
key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed document from
the VM?

Regards,
Daniel


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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Fox, Kevin M 
-1 for man in the middle susceptible solutions. This also doesn't solve all the 
issues listed in the spec, such as suspended nodes, snapshotted nodes, etc.

Nova has several back channel mechanisms at its disposal. We should use one or 
more of them to solve the problem properly instead of opening a security hole 
in our solution to a security problem.

Such as:
 * The nova console is one mechanism that could be utilized as a secure back 
channel.
 * The vm based instances could add a virutal serial port as a back channel.
 * Some bare metal bmc's support virtual cd's which could be loaded with fresh 
credentials upon request.
 * The metadata server is reliable in certain situations.

I'm sure there are more options too.

The instance user spec covers a lot of that stuff.

I'm ok if we want to refactor the instance user spec to cover creating phase 1 
credentials that are intended to be used for things other then getting a 
keystone token. It could be used to register/reregister with ipa, chef, puppet, 
etc. We just need to reword the spec to cover that use case too.

I'm also not tied to the implementation listed. it just needs to meet the 
requirements.

Thanks,
Kevin


From: Adam Young [ayo...@redhat.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 2:09 PM
To: openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

On 04/06/2016 05:42 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
>> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual machine
>> with an identity provider.
>>
>> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
>>
>>
>> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
>> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that cannot
>> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
>>
>> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
>> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
>>
>> Is the following possible:
>>
>> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
>> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.
> There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
> to Nova.
We need to secure the message queue from the compute node to conductor.
This is very achievable:

1.  Each compute node gets its own rabbit user
2.  Messages from compute node to Conductor are validated as to what
node sent them

We should enable TLS on the network as well, or password can be
sniffed.  Self signed is crappy, but probably sufficient for a baseline
deployment. Does not defend against MITM.  Puppet based deployments can
mitigate.
X509 client cert is a better auth mechanism than password, but not
essential.



>   The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
> secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
> to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
> against MITM attacks.
>
> Also currently the metadata server is readonly with the guest pulling
> information from it - it doesn't currently allow guests to push information
> into it. This is nice because the metadata servers could theoretically be
> locked down to prevent may interactions with the rest of nova - it should
> only need read-only access to info about the guests it is serving. If we
> turn the metadata server into a bi-directional service which can update
> information about guests, then it opens it up as a more attractive avenue
> of attack for guest OS trying breach the host infra. This is a fairly
> general concern with any approach where the guest has to have the ability
> to push information back into Nova.
>
>> 2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
>> conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?
>>
>> 3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the public
>> key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed document from
>> the VM?
> Regards,
> Daniel


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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Adam Young 

On 04/06/2016 05:42 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:

On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:

We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual machine
with an identity provider.

Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.


Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that cannot
be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.

For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.

Is the following possible:

1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.

There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
to Nova.
We need to secure the message queue from the compute node to conductor.  
This is very achievable:


1.  Each compute node gets its own rabbit user
2.  Messages from compute node to Conductor are validated as to what 
node sent them


We should enable TLS on the network as well, or password can be 
sniffed.  Self signed is crappy, but probably sufficient for a baseline 
deployment. Does not defend against MITM.  Puppet based deployments can 
mitigate.
X509 client cert is a better auth mechanism than password, but not 
essential.





  The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
against MITM attacks.

Also currently the metadata server is readonly with the guest pulling
information from it - it doesn't currently allow guests to push information
into it. This is nice because the metadata servers could theoretically be
locked down to prevent may interactions with the rest of nova - it should
only need read-only access to info about the guests it is serving. If we
turn the metadata server into a bi-directional service which can update
information about guests, then it opens it up as a more attractive avenue
of attack for guest OS trying breach the host infra. This is a fairly
general concern with any approach where the guest has to have the ability
to push information back into Nova.


2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?

3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the public
key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed document from
the VM?

Regards,
Daniel



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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Hayes, Graham 
On 06/04/2016 17:38, Fox, Kevin M wrote:
> A lot of the problems are documented here in the problem description section:
> https://review.openstack.org/#/c/93/
>
> Thanks,
> Kevin

I am very much ++ on instance users.

> 
> From: Daniel P. Berrange [berra...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 9:04 AM
> To: Hayes, Graham
> Cc: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM
>
> On Wed, Apr 06, 2016 at 04:03:18PM +, Hayes, Graham wrote:
>> On 06/04/2016 16:54, Gary Kotton wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/6/16, 12:42 PM, "Daniel P. Berrange" <berra...@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
>>>>> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
>>>>> machine
>>>>> with an identity provider.
>>>>>
>>>>> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
>>>>> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
>>>>> cannot
>>>>> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
>>>>>
>>>>> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
>>>>> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is the following possible:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
>>>>> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.
>>>>
>>>> There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
>>>> to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
>>>> secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
>>>> to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
>>>> against MITM attacks.
>>
>> I thought the metadata API traffic was taken off the network by the
>> compute node? Or is that just under the old nova-network?
>
> Nope, there's no guarantee that the metadata server will be on the
> local compute node - it might be co-located, but it equally might
> be anywhere else.
>
> Regards,
> Daniel
> --
> |: http://berrange.com  -o-http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
> |: http://libvirt.org  -o- http://virt-manager.org :|
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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Fox, Kevin M 
A lot of the problems are documented here in the problem description section:
https://review.openstack.org/#/c/93/

Thanks,
Kevin

From: Daniel P. Berrange [berra...@redhat.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 9:04 AM
To: Hayes, Graham
Cc: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

On Wed, Apr 06, 2016 at 04:03:18PM +, Hayes, Graham wrote:
> On 06/04/2016 16:54, Gary Kotton wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 4/6/16, 12:42 PM, "Daniel P. Berrange" <berra...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
> >>> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
> >>> machine
> >>> with an identity provider.
> >>>
> >>> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
> >>> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
> >>> cannot
> >>> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
> >>>
> >>> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
> >>> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
> >>>
> >>> Is the following possible:
> >>>
> >>> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
> >>> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.
> >>
> >> There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
> >> to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
> >> secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
> >> to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
> >> against MITM attacks.
>
> I thought the metadata API traffic was taken off the network by the
> compute node? Or is that just under the old nova-network?

Nope, there's no guarantee that the metadata server will be on the
local compute node - it might be co-located, but it equally might
be anywhere else.

Regards,
Daniel
--
|: http://berrange.com  -o-http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org  -o- http://virt-manager.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org   -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Hayes, Graham 
On 06/04/2016 17:04, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 06, 2016 at 04:03:18PM +, Hayes, Graham wrote:
>> On 06/04/2016 16:54, Gary Kotton wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/6/16, 12:42 PM, "Daniel P. Berrange"  wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
> machine
> with an identity provider.
>
> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
>
>
> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
> cannot
> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
>
> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
>
> Is the following possible:
>
> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.

 There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
 to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
 secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
 to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
 against MITM attacks.
>>
>> I thought the metadata API traffic was taken off the network by the
>> compute node? Or is that just under the old nova-network?
>
> Nope, there's no guarantee that the metadata server will be on the
> local compute node - it might be co-located, but it equally might
> be anywhere else.
>

Sorry - I knew the actual HTTP server was else where, but I thought the
network traffic was taken out of the tenant space at the compute node,
and then moved to the underlying cloud infrastructure networking.

If that network is MITM'd there could be bigger issues.


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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Daniel P. Berrange 
On Wed, Apr 06, 2016 at 04:03:18PM +, Hayes, Graham wrote:
> On 06/04/2016 16:54, Gary Kotton wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 4/6/16, 12:42 PM, "Daniel P. Berrange"  wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
> >>> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
> >>> machine
> >>> with an identity provider.
> >>>
> >>> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
> >>> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
> >>> cannot
> >>> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
> >>>
> >>> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
> >>> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
> >>>
> >>> Is the following possible:
> >>>
> >>> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
> >>> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.
> >>
> >> There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
> >> to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
> >> secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
> >> to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
> >> against MITM attacks.
> 
> I thought the metadata API traffic was taken off the network by the
> compute node? Or is that just under the old nova-network?

Nope, there's no guarantee that the metadata server will be on the
local compute node - it might be co-located, but it equally might
be anywhere else.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
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|: http://autobuild.org   -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Hayes, Graham 
On 06/04/2016 16:54, Gary Kotton wrote:
>
>
> On 4/6/16, 12:42 PM, "Daniel P. Berrange"  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
>>> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
>>> machine
>>> with an identity provider.
>>>
>>> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
>>>
>>>
>>> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
>>> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
>>> cannot
>>> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
>>>
>>> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
>>> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
>>>
>>> Is the following possible:
>>>
>>> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
>>> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.
>>
>> There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
>> to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
>> secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
>> to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
>> against MITM attacks.

I thought the metadata API traffic was taken off the network by the
compute node? Or is that just under the old nova-network?

>> Also currently the metadata server is readonly with the guest pulling
>> information from it - it doesn't currently allow guests to push
>> information
>> into it. This is nice because the metadata servers could theoretically be
>> locked down to prevent may interactions with the rest of nova - it should
>> only need read-only access to info about the guests it is serving. If we
>> turn the metadata server into a bi-directional service which can update
>> information about guests, then it opens it up as a more attractive avenue
>> of attack for guest OS trying breach the host infra. This is a fairly
>> general concern with any approach where the guest has to have the ability
>> to push information back into Nova.
>
> What about having metadata support HTTPS?

How do you get the CA cert on to the VM then?

It is more difficult than it seems.



>>
>>> 2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
>>> conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?
>>>
>>> 3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the
>>> public
>>> key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed document
>>> from
>>> the VM?
>>
>> Regards,
>> Daniel
>> --
>> |:
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__berrange.com=BQICAg;
>> c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz9JYBk8YT
>> eq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvwo=SYfUKobB
>> orFrSzQyAW8b93HqsY5XVNomIMKWyfg1bos=   -o-
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.flickr.com_photos_
>> dberrange_=BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHp
>> ZBmzzkWT5jqz9JYBk8YTeq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMM
>> HDQ3tqvwo=_gK2KOkWFfLW-FbojWkpCgftjVLN_QZDGkjh8pMnls0=  :|
>> |:
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__libvirt.org=BQICAg
>> =Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz9JYBk8YTe
>> q9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvwo=Yguim8-Kw
>> fw5GFNoKeCd5_x2TQdaMSYWCRtjLOBMBnU=   -o-
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__virt-2Dmanager.org=B
>> QICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz9J
>> YBk8YTeq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvwo=tw
>> oB0qqGMKwvX2dYl1m-qYeJRYIU_XnKP4o2bR8pLQ4=  :|
>> |:
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__autobuild.org=BQICAg
>> =Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz9JYBk8Y
>> Teq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvwo=iSsOzMl
>> SpSW3eL2vujxnGA8kwXnfy7cqGKvNIztgils=-o-
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__search.cpan.org_-7Edan
>> berr_=BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzz
>> kWT5jqz9JYBk8YTeq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3t
>> qvwo=uigHG_KOapyOIfMYts-LD2fB5Tbvk-7C3fTHl8KntLU=  :|
>> |:
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__entangle-2Dphoto.org
>> =BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz
>> 9JYBk8YTeq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvwo=
>> S8SF6URSAV0y9k6m_v9KqNluZ_ocrHkp9_U5lYxDzfU=-o-
>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__live.gnome.org_gtk-2Dv
>> nc=BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT
>> 5jqz9JYBk8YTeq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvw
>> o=TMVQTuB-w7M5dWCDE3CRseA9l-xWWfqP-tlPW34Lqg4=  :|
>>
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>>

Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Fox, Kevin M 
Nova Instance user spec.
https://review.openstack.org/93

We really really need to solve this. it is affecting almost every project in 
one way or another.

Can we please get a summit session dedicated to the topic? Last summit we had 
only 10 minutes. :/

Thanks,
Kevin


From: Adam Young [ayo...@redhat.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2016 3:00 PM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
machine with an identity provider.

Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.


Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
cannot be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.

For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.

Is the following possible:

1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.

2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?

3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the
public key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed
document from the VM?





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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Gary Kotton 


On 4/6/16, 12:42 PM, "Daniel P. Berrange"  wrote:

>On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
>> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
>>machine
>> with an identity provider.
>> 
>> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
>> 
>> 
>> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
>> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that
>>cannot
>> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
>> 
>> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
>> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
>> 
>> Is the following possible:
>> 
>> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
>> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.
>
>There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
>to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
>secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
>to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
>against MITM attacks.
>
>Also currently the metadata server is readonly with the guest pulling
>information from it - it doesn't currently allow guests to push
>information
>into it. This is nice because the metadata servers could theoretically be
>locked down to prevent may interactions with the rest of nova - it should
>only need read-only access to info about the guests it is serving. If we
>turn the metadata server into a bi-directional service which can update
>information about guests, then it opens it up as a more attractive avenue
>of attack for guest OS trying breach the host infra. This is a fairly
>general concern with any approach where the guest has to have the ability
>to push information back into Nova.

What about having metadata support HTTPS?

>
>> 2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
>> conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?
>> 
>> 3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the
>>public
>> key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed document
>>from
>> the VM?
>
>Regards,
>Daniel
>-- 
>|: 
>https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__berrange.com=BQICAg;
>c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz9JYBk8YT
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>https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.flickr.com_photos_
>dberrange_=BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHp
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>|: 
>https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__libvirt.org=BQICAg
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>|: 
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>=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz9JYBk8Y
>Teq9N3-diTlNj4GyNc=lt2m-p7I77Tg88WS4WvodfNMyitjWmfDMMHDQ3tqvwo=iSsOzMl
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>|: 
>https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__entangle-2Dphoto.org
>=BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT5jqz
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>nc=BQICAg=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs=VlZxHpZBmzzkWT
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>
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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-06 Thread Daniel P. Berrange 
On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 06:00:55PM -0400, Adam Young wrote:
> We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual machine
> with an identity provider.
> 
> Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.
> 
> 
> Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
> secure way to do this.  Injecting files does not provide a path that cannot
> be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.
> 
> For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
> others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.
> 
> Is the following possible:
> 
> 1.  In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
> infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.

There's no currently secure channel for the guest to push information
to Nova. The best we have is the metadata service, but we'd need to
secure that with https, because the metadata server cannot be assumed
to be running on the same host as the VM & so the channel is not protected
against MITM attacks.

Also currently the metadata server is readonly with the guest pulling
information from it - it doesn't currently allow guests to push information
into it. This is nice because the metadata servers could theoretically be
locked down to prevent may interactions with the rest of nova - it should
only need read-only access to info about the guests it is serving. If we
turn the metadata server into a bi-directional service which can update
information about guests, then it opens it up as a more attractive avenue
of attack for guest OS trying breach the host infra. This is a fairly
general concern with any approach where the guest has to have the ability
to push information back into Nova.

> 2.  Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
> conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?
> 
> 3.  A third party system could then validate the association of the public
> key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed document from
> the VM?

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: http://berrange.com  -o-http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org  -o- http://virt-manager.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org   -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
|: http://entangle-photo.org   -o-   http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc :|

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Re: [openstack-dev] [nova] Minimal secure identification of a new VM

2016-04-05 Thread Joshua Harlow 

Adam Young wrote:

We have a use case where we want to register a newly spawned Virtual
machine with an identity provider.

Heat also has a need to provide some form of Identity for a new VM.


Looking at the set of utilities right now, there does not seem to be a
secure way to do this. Injecting files does not provide a path that
cannot be seen by other VMs or machines in the system.

For our use case, a short lived One-Time-Password is sufficient, but for
others, I think asymmetric key generation makes more sense.

Is the following possible:

1. In cloud-init, the VM generates a Keypair, then notifies the No0va
infrastructure (somehow) that it has done so.


So this can be somewhat done already:

https://cloudinit.readthedocs.org/en/latest/topics/examples.html#call-a-url-when-finished

But unsure what endpoint u want that thing to call (and the data it 
sends might need to be tweaked); and said calling a URL might need 
https, which then begs the question of what certs and stuff is https 
using to ensure its calling a URL that is 'really nova'.




2. Nova Compute reads the public Key off the device and sends it to
conductor, which would then associate the public key with the server?

3. A third party system could then validate the association of the
public key and the server, and build a work flow based on some signed
document from the VM?


Seems like a useful idea, if we can figure out how to do it.

-Josh







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