/*
* key_id increments to KEY_ID_MASK then recycles back to 1.
* This way you know that if key_id is 0, it is the first key.
*/
++session->key_id;
session->key_id &= P_KEY_ID_MASK;
if (!session->key_id)
{
session->key_id = 1;
}
Okay, so
On Mon, Jan 09, 2023 at 05:36:06PM +0100, Arne Schwabe wrote:
> Am 09.01.23 um 16:01 schrieb Frank Lichtenheld:
> > On Mon, Dec 12, 2022 at 12:27:45PM +0100, Arne Schwabe wrote:
> > > Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys.
> > > If a replayed/faked packet is
Am 09.01.23 um 16:01 schrieb Frank Lichtenheld:
On Mon, Dec 12, 2022 at 12:27:45PM +0100, Arne Schwabe wrote:
Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys.
If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the
legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This
On Mon, Dec 12, 2022 at 12:27:45PM +0100, Arne Schwabe wrote:
> Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys.
> If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the
> legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
>
> This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt.
Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys.
If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the
legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this
feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt
