Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH] Fix OpenSSL private key passphrase notices

2020-02-27 Thread Steffan Karger
Hi,

On 21-10-2019 13:35, Santtu Lakkala wrote:
> Clear error stack on successful certificate loading in
> tls_ctx_load_cert_file_and_copy() and handle errors also for
> PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() call in tls_ctx_load_priv_file().
> 
> Due to certificate loading possibly leaking non-fatal errors on OpenSSL
> error stack, and some slight oversights in error handling, the
> 
>> PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'Private Key'
> 
> line was never produced on the management channel for PEM formatted keys.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Santtu Lakkala 
> ---
>  src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 11 +--
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
> index 07916c3c..74c8fa65 100644
> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
> @@ -921,6 +921,10 @@ end:
>  crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", 
> cert_file);
>  }
>  }
> +else
> +{
> +crypto_print_openssl_errors(M_DEBUG);
> +}
>  
>  if (in != NULL)
>  {
> @@ -963,12 +967,7 @@ tls_ctx_load_priv_file(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const 
> char *priv_key_file,
>  pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
> SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(ctx->ctx),
> 
> SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx->ctx));
> -if (!pkey)
> -{
> -goto end;
> -}
> -
> -if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
> +if (!pkey || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
>  {
>  #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
>  if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == 
> EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT))
> 

Thanks, and apologies for the late repsonse. This patch does was it
says, and looks good to me. I think this one should go into both master
and release/2.4.

Acked-by: Steffan Karger 

-Steffan


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[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH] Fix OpenSSL private key passphrase notices

2019-10-21 Thread Santtu Lakkala
Clear error stack on successful certificate loading in
tls_ctx_load_cert_file_and_copy() and handle errors also for
PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() call in tls_ctx_load_priv_file().

Due to certificate loading possibly leaking non-fatal errors on OpenSSL
error stack, and some slight oversights in error handling, the

>PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'Private Key'

line was never produced on the management channel for PEM formatted keys.

Signed-off-by: Santtu Lakkala 
---
 src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 11 +--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
index 07916c3c..74c8fa65 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
@@ -921,6 +921,10 @@ end:
 crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file);
 }
 }
+else
+{
+crypto_print_openssl_errors(M_DEBUG);
+}
 
 if (in != NULL)
 {
@@ -963,12 +967,7 @@ tls_ctx_load_priv_file(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const 
char *priv_key_file,
 pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(ctx->ctx),

SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx->ctx));
-if (!pkey)
-{
-goto end;
-}
-
-if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
+if (!pkey || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
 {
 #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
 if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == 
EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT))
-- 
2.20.1



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