Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation

[Arne Schwabe]

--- a/src/openvpn/options.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
@@ -8553,6 +8553,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
  {
  options->imported_protocol_flags |=
CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT; }
+else if (streq(p[j], "secure-renog"))


Should be rewritten to use --protocol-flags instead.


It is already using protocol-flags. That is in the middle of 
protocol-flags in options.c




  tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(key, , false);
-secure_memzero(, sizeof(key2));
+*original_key = key2;


We should do the zeroing in tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key()
shortly after we used it to XOR then. And maybe only delay it if we need to
XOR anyways, could use original_key == NULL as indication.


We cannot do that. The reason is that a client might reconnect to the 
same session (using the TM_UNTRUSTED session slot) or if we have a 
simple reconnect. And after the reconnect we need to calculate a new 
key. And anyway the data is memory anyway just implicit in the OpenSSL 
data structure (tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi) that holds the HMAC/encryption 
key for the session just not explicitly.





@@ -587,8 +655,8 @@ tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf,
  ctx->cleanup_key_ctx = true;
  ctx->opt.flags |= CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM;
  memset(>opt.key_ctx_bi, 0, sizeof(ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi));
-tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(>opt.key_ctx_bi, _key, true);
-secure_memzero(_key, sizeof(client_key));
+tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(>opt.key_ctx_bi,
+ >original_tlscrypt_keydata, true);


Same as above for the server side. Could zero here immediately if
original_tlscrypt_keydata == NULL



If we zero the key here, it will not be available when we want to 
calculate the secure renegotiation key with xor.


Arne


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Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation

[Heiko Hund]

On Freitag, 9. September 2022 21:59:02 CEST Arne Schwabe wrote:
> --- a/src/openvpn/multi.c
> +++ b/src/openvpn/multi.c
> @@ -1803,6 +1803,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c)
>  {
>  o->imported_protocol_flags |= CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT;
>  }
> +if (proto & IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENOG)

I think any occurrence of "renog" (i.e. short for renegotiation[s]) should be 
changed to "reneg" throughout this patch. See --reneg-x options. Could be just 
me, so a more opinions would be welcome.

> --- a/src/openvpn/options.c
> +++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
> @@ -8553,6 +8553,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
>  {
>  options->imported_protocol_flags |=
> CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT; }
> +else if (streq(p[j], "secure-renog"))

Should be rewritten to use --protocol-flags instead.

> @@ -71,9 +71,77 @@ tls_crypt_init_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const char
> *key_file, msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: --tls-crypt not supported");
>  }
>  crypto_read_openvpn_key(, key, key_file, key_inline, key_direction,
> -"Control Channel Encryption", "tls-crypt");
> +"Control Channel Encryption", "tls-crypt",
> keydata); }
> 
> +/**
> + * Will produce dest = dest XOR data
> + */
> +static void
> +xor_key2_key(struct key2 *dest, const struct key2 *data)

I wonder if this would be more readable as
xor_key(struct key2 *key, const struct key2 *mask)

> +bool
> +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotition_key(struct tls_multi *multi,
> + struct tls_session *session)

typo renegotiation_key

> +struct key2 rengokeys;

typo renogkeys (renegkeys, IMHO)

> @@ -285,7 +354,7 @@ tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key,
> struct buffer *wkc_buf, }
> 
>  tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(key, , false);
> -secure_memzero(, sizeof(key2));
> +*original_key = key2;

We should do the zeroing in tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key() 
shortly after we used it to XOR then. And maybe only delay it if we need to 
XOR anyways, could use original_key == NULL as indication.

> @@ -587,8 +655,8 @@ tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf,
>  ctx->cleanup_key_ctx = true;
>  ctx->opt.flags |= CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM;
>  memset(>opt.key_ctx_bi, 0, sizeof(ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi));
> -tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(>opt.key_ctx_bi, _key, true);
> -secure_memzero(_key, sizeof(client_key));
> +tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key(>opt.key_ctx_bi,
> + >original_tlscrypt_keydata, true);

Same as above for the server side. Could zero here immediately if 
original_tlscrypt_keydata == NULL






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