RE: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread Tony
For basic anonymity for bit torrent leeching try this https://www.relakks.com/ TOR doesn't have the bandwidth to spare. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of a a Sent: 19 February 2007 19:49 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Security concerning

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake Watson Ladd ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): Hello! Tor currently uses RSA encrypted DH exchanges. This requires that the server and client both make 3 exponentiations: Two for DH, One for RSA. But we can reduce this significantly. I've already presented this before, but now I think I can

Re: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread a a
Oh, excuses. I do not (at least not after the distinct replies) intend to use this either to leech torrents or to leech Tor. Anyways, after testing this for approximately three minutes, my ol' pa went totally nutters on the realisation that this might circumvent the firewall (and yes, he's

Re: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread Enigma
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 I can't give you a technical answer to that but rest assured you would not like the result if all worked the way you want it to be. That's because using P2P with anonymous networks such as Tor will be much too slow, it will heavily decrease your P2P

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread James Muir
Mike Perry wrote: Thus spake Watson Ladd ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): Hello! Tor currently uses RSA encrypted DH exchanges. This requires that the server and client both make 3 exponentiations: Two for DH, One for RSA. But we can reduce this significantly. I've already presented this before, but now I

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread Watson Ladd
that's not really a problem. all computations are done in the group ZZ_p. 1/k really means the inverse of k modulo the order of g in ZZ_p. So b/k does not have to be an integer. putting the security of the scheme aside, one question that comes to mind is how Alice (the OP) is going to get

Re: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread coderman
On 2/19/07, a a [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... A more accurate question on my behalf would therefore be: Can Tor (if you use it without (or with, for that matter) port forwarding the firewall, create holes in the firewall by allowing incoming connections through the Tor proxy. The µTorrent case

Re: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake a a ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): Oh, excuses. I do not (at least not after the distinct replies) intend to use this either to leech torrents or to leech Tor. Anyways, after testing this for approximately three minutes, my ol' pa went totally nutters on the realisation that this might

Re: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread a a
Um, as I said, I am not really interested in BitTorrent specifically (although using BT (or any other application) behind a firewall without having to port forward and creating security exposure is something to wish for, but apparently not possible without bad exploitation). About the P2P,

Re: Security concerning Tor, BitTorrent and Firewall

2007-02-19 Thread coderman
On 2/19/07, Mike Perry [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... One alternate way your firewall could be broken is that it is allowing UPNP (or Apple's equivalent.. forget its name). zeroconf fortunately doesn't do the UPnP port forwarding stuff. filtering multicast is an easy way to halt zeroconf

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread James Muir
putting the security of the scheme aside, one question that comes to mind is how Alice (the OP) is going to get an authentic copy of Ricky's DH public key, y. One way to do this is to include it in the router descriptors. But then we have to ask if it's worth adding a new public key for each OR

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake James Muir ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): Mike Perry wrote: Thus spake Watson Ladd ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): Well, one immediate problem is that b/k has to be an integer.. So b=rk for some random r and b is thus not completely random.. To clarify the effects of this, you should rewrite your

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread James Muir
Problem is: (g^X)^k = g for some given k. Find X equivalent to 1/k. Rewrite as (g^k)^X = g Seems like you need to take the Discrete Log of both sides to get your X=1/k value. This is hard. Since we are working modulo p and we know that g is a generator of ZZ_p its order is p-1. So, to find

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread Watson Ladd
James Muir wrote: putting the security of the scheme aside, one question that comes to mind is how Alice (the OP) is going to get an authentic copy of Ricky's DH public key, y. One way to do this is to include it in the router descriptors. But then we have to ask if it's worth adding a new

Re: PHP coder needs Tor details

2007-02-19 Thread Mr. Blue
Few days ago I've successfully combined Tor and PHP and am utilizing them now. Regarding Tor nodes... where is that list stored on a computer. I am currently harvesting http://belegost.mit.edu/tor/ and using regular expression to put each node in a DB by its name, uptime, IP...etc. This makes me

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread James Muir
We already distribute different keys for the current protocol. But the one I proposed is insecure so we might as well forget about it. Schnorr signatures are secure and are intended for this purpose, but we can only use them after 2008. the way things are done now, each OR has two public keys

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread Watson Ladd
James Muir wrote: You may already know that the current scheme has a security reduction (Goldberg, PET 2006), so I imagine there would have to be a comparable argument before the powers that be would consider a new scheme. Out of curiosity, what is it about your scheme that makes you say

Re: Removing 1 modular exponentiation

2007-02-19 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake Watson Ladd ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): James Muir wrote: You may already know that the current scheme has a security reduction (Goldberg, PET 2006), so I imagine there would have to be a comparable argument before the powers that be would consider a new scheme. Out of