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On 25/11/07 02:54, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On 11/24/07, anonym <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [snip]
>> Now, with this background information in mind I can go on to my actual
>> questions for those of you who have managed to read all this (sorry for
>>
On 11/24/07, anonym <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
> Now, with this background information in mind I can go on to my actual
> questions for those of you who have managed to read all this (sorry for
> being so verbose): Why does this happen? Is netstat operating on a too
> high level to detect th
On Sat, Nov 24, 2007 at 01:19:33PM +0100, Marco A. Calamari wrote:
> But I strongly suggest to discuss more and warn about using the
> 600+ router from China.
>
> Consider two facts:
>
> 1) mout are born in few weeks
> 2) all of them are exit router, no other
> country has more than 50%
>
> Ad
Marco A. Calamari ha scritto:
> The right question is "What the Chinese government
> or TLA's can do controlling at leat the 25%
> of network?"
Most of the Internet links wordlwide go through the US, so it makes
sense for US intelligence to tap it there (see recent AT&T taps with
Narus equipment).
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Greetings list,
Some of you might know me as the new maintainer of the Incognito LiveCD
(blatant advertising: http://incognito.anonymityanywhere.com). Any way,
it uses a kernel level network filter (with Linux' netfilter/iptables)
which forwards all T
> But I strongly suggest to discuss more and warn about using the
> 600+ router from China.
Why?
Tor is only for okey that what goes out of the exit is viewed by BigBrother &
encrypted traffic.
Exit nodes in China isn't different from GCHQ logging all communications
within the British Empire.
Hello,
I'm glad to hear you are running a router!
Just change your policy to:
accept *:443
reject *:*
There are many popular tools for viewing statistics about connections
on UNIX systems. If you want to see a list of the connections that
your server is making without logging them, you can use
On Sat, 2007-11-24 at 14:58 +0100, kazaam wrote:
> >
> > 1) mout are born in few weeks
> > 2) all of them are exit router, no other
> > country has more than 50%
>
> What wanna Chinese do if they just have exit-routers?
> Phishing unsecured logins or trying to fake ssl certificates?
> Just wi
Hi,
So finally I am running "research36" :) To begin I decided to not be an exit
mode, but will change this soon.
Which policy must I put in the log file if I want to be an "exit node" but ONLY
on the port 443? Yes, I don't want to allow the port 80, non-encrypted...
Other question: What can I
On Nov 24, 2007 5:19 AM, Marco A. Calamari <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> But I strongly suggest to discuss more and warn about using the
> 600+ router from China.
>
> Consider two facts:
>
> 1) mout are born in few weeks
> 2) all of them are exit router, no other
> country has more than 50%
>
> Ad
I didn't want to spread panic or so. I know that the law is not in action at
the moment and many things can happen. The BVerfG and the EuGH, both can stop
the data retention law.
But maybe it's not unwise not to be unprepared if the law will not be dumped by
any court. Anyway it should be a good
On Sat, 2007-11-24 at 10:44 +0100, Andrew wrote:
> kazaam schrieb:
> > All german nodes (entry,middle and exit) are forced to log who
> connected to them and what they manipulated on the packet.
> So if you are accidently just connected to german nodes they got you.
> There's afaik no way in tor
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Martin Senftleben wrote:
> Am Samstag, 24. November 2007 schrieb Alexander W. Janssen:
>> Andrew wrote:
>> 'Nuff said. Let's stop the nay saying ;) The law isn't active yet.
>> The law isn't even ratified. And no one even started logging.
>
> The lat
Am Samstag, 24. November 2007 schrieb Alexander W. Janssen:
> Andrew wrote:
> 'Nuff said. Let's stop the nay saying ;) The law isn't active yet.
> The law isn't even ratified. And no one even started logging.
The latter isn't right. There are quite a few companies which log the
data of their cus
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Andrew wrote:
> Actually, it might be wise to develop a feature that lets the client
> choose no more than one node from _any_ country, since other EU
> countries might use the directive that led to the german law, to pass
> similar laws.
Which means,
kazaam schrieb:
> All german nodes (entry,middle and exit) are forced to log who connected to
> them and what they manipulated on the packet. So if you are accidently just
> connected to german nodes they got you. There's afaik no way in tor to
> prevent that this happens. Maybe blocking all ger
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