Il 30/12/2007 04:31, F. Fox ha scritto:
blau wrote:
(snip)
If you run a service on the public net, say a website, it
makes sense to run a Tor middleman node on the same host. This way users
can reach your service anonymously - without the risks of passing
through an exit relay.
(snip)
Hi folks,
My talk at 24C3 in Berlin is now up on the web in various formats.
Basically I gave an overview of some of the big technical things we did
in 2007, some of the policy/legal issues that we're tackling, and some of
the technical things that need to come next. The focus was on Germany,
so
On Jan 9, 2008 5:14 AM, Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
My talk at 24C3 in Berlin is now up on the web in various formats.
hi Roger,
this looks like an interesting talk; i wish i could have seen it in
person. some comments...
Theory: Tor is slow because a handful of people
F. Fox wrote:
Another thing: How would the PKI work over Internet2? AFAIK, Tor needs
to be able to talk to an authoritative directory server; also, the
directory it gets would be full of Internet1 (as I'll refer to the
normal Internet here) nodes.
Clearly, an entirely new PKI would have to
Couldn't you just make your node a middleman and ban tor from connecting to
your Internet One Connection?
Comrade Ringo Kamens
On Jan 9, 2008 12:40 PM, Nathaniel Fairfield [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
F. Fox wrote:
Another thing: How would the PKI work over Internet2? AFAIK, Tor needs
to be
Ringo Kamens wrote:
Couldn't you just make your node a middleman and ban tor from
connecting to your Internet One Connection? Comrade Ringo Kamens
Sorry, I meant to make clear that my node *is* a middleman, or what I've
been calling a relay.
And as I said in my initial email:
It seems to me
On Jan 9, 2008 8:15 AM, coderman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
... the DTLS proposal hasn't seen any attention lately
things i would add to a revised DTLS proposal in my copious free time:
- preserve TCP support while converting all traffic to DTLS; use
airhook [0] like library for transparent TCP,
Hi folks,
We're getting close to having 0.1.2.19 ready. Phobos has put snapshots up;
the packaging changes are a) the Vidalia bundles now ship with Vidalia
0.0.16 (which includes many bugfixes, and hopefully not too many new
bugs), and b) the OS X bundles now include the stable Torbutton xpi too.
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kazaam schrieb:
Hi, I myself am using the foxyproxy plugin and not torbutton. With
foxyproxy I simply make a blacklistrule which routes evertyhing
through tor and only whitelist pages I'm really trusting.
With TorButton I see many problems:
The final part of my scheme would require that I be able to restrict
my tor node to ONLY relay traffic to/from I2 nodes. I can't figure
out how to do this.
I doubt your school will do this for you, but the only way it's gonna
work is to get a BGP feed into quagga (or some other BGPd) and
Hi,
I myself am using the foxyproxy plugin and not torbutton. With foxyproxy I
simply make a blacklistrule which routes evertyhing through tor and only
whitelist pages I'm really trusting.
With TorButton I see many problems:
* People use Tor and surfe the web. They then wanna visit a page they
On Wed, 09 Jan 2008, Roger Dingledine wrote:
We're getting close to having 0.1.2.19 ready. Phobos has put snapshots up;
the packaging changes are a) the Vidalia bundles now ship with Vidalia
0.0.16 (which includes many bugfixes, and hopefully not too many new
bugs), and b) the OS X bundles
Hello,
This message started flooding my logs: Jan 09 22:19:27.260 [notice]
We're missing a certificate from authority tor26 with signing key
: launching request.
A friend of my has exact the same message flooding over his log. We
are both running
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accept no limits @ 2008/01/03 12:41:
shinjiru explicitly allows anonymous hosting.
how does anonymous money transfer work in this case?
I got this question in personal mails after my posting, too.
yes this is a rather useful topic.
So
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[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(snip)
| Very true. This is one reason why I suggest only organizations (as
| opposed to residential users) - who have the money, manpower, and other
| resources to deal with legal issues - allow exits from any node they
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For anyone interested:
http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com/89256.html
Anonymous commenting allowed, of course. =;o)
- --
F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+
Owner of Tor node kitsune
http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com
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Roger Dingledine wrote:
(snip)
| Even if you hup your Tor rather than restarting it, you're still killing
| all the circuits going through you...
(snip)
I didn't know this; since I'm using Kitsune-OR experimentally in part,
I've SIGHUP'ed it quite
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Jan Reister wrote:
(snip)
| No, in blau's case it's just a normal site, reachable with an end-to-end
| tor circuit.
If you're talking about the Noreply.org keyserver - which I'm not sure
of - then indeed, it has a hidden service gateway. Check the
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Peter Palfrader wrote:
(snip)
| You are right, currently Tor requires each node be able to talk to every
| other node. For servers there is no way to say they only want to talk
| to some other servers.
|
| Also, you can't configure different
On Wed, Jan 09, 2008 at 07:31:02PM -0800, F. Fox wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
(snip)
| Even if you hup your Tor rather than restarting it, you're still killing
| all the circuits going through you...
(snip)
I didn't know this; since I'm using Kitsune-OR experimentally in part,
I've
On Wed, 09 Jan 2008 19:31:02 -0800 F. Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
(snip)
| Even if you hup your Tor rather than restarting it, you're still killing
| all the circuits going through you...
(snip)
I didn't know this; since I'm using Kitsune-OR experimentally in part,
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