--- On Wed, 2/18/09, tor-opera...@sky-haven.net
wrote:
> > But do you see any reason that this applies to the
> > non OS tricks solution of simply having two exit
> > nodes with different policies solution that I
> suggested?
> >
> > If we are to assume that both nodes would actually be
> > r
> >If you are really creative (and desperate,) ;) you
> >could probably already achieve port rate limiting
> >by just running several exit nodes with different
> >exit policies and bandwidths. And prioritization
> >and rate limiting could probably both be achieved
> >by adjusting the bandwith
slush wrote:
>
> If you are really creative (and desperate,) ;) you
> could probably already achieve port rate limiting
> by just running several exit nodes with different
> exit policies and bandwidths. And prioritization
> and rate limiting could probably both be achieved
>
On Wed, 18 Feb 2009 17:38:08 -0800 (PST) Martin Fick
wrote:
>
>In other words, from an anonymity standpoint, it
>seems like you would ideally want all exit nodes
>to open up every port, even if they drastically
>rate limit the 'evil'/abuse oriented ports?
>This way if you have to use a serv
>
> Yes, wow my English was pretty poor in that post, sorry. ;)
I think Im undestanding you :-).
I guess I misunderstood you, sorry. It sounded like you
> were suggesting that middle nodes treat such data
> differently. I guess you were only referring to exit
> nodes then?
>
Exactly!
Makes s
>
> >Disagree. I wrote _port_ oriented QoS, not _content_. There can be config
>
> is encrypted between the client and the exit
But not between exit and target (well, we are not speaking about tunelling
any kind of SSL connection).
> >option to prioritize some port (port range) above other. J
--- On Wed, 2/18/09, slush wrote:
> > Yes, but exit nodes already no where your traffic is
> > going (and on which port), middle and entrance nodes do not.
>
> You probably mean "exit nodes already know"?
Yes, wow my English was pretty poor in that post, sorry. ;)
...
> > If they did, it woul
No, the middle node cannot change data. It can, however, randomly cut out
and drop circuits, connections, or drop off the face of the earth entirely.
That is probably what was happening to him. The middle node essentially
knows nothing (other than who the entry and exit nodes are), so there would
b
On Wed, 18 Feb 2009 23:26:26 +0100 slush wrote:
>> As has been discussed to death here many times already, there is no
>> way to inspect traffic prior to its exit without destroying the functional
>> protections of tor.
>
>
>Disagree. I wrote _port_ oriented QoS, not _content_. There ca
Hi!
On Tue, Feb 17, 2009 at 11:32 PM, Scott Bennett wrote:
> In the particular case I was describing, the node that was consistently
> appearing in the circuits that cut off files happened not to be an exit in
> any of the failure cases. IIRC, it was nearly always in a middleman position,
>
>
> > Simply I imagine that in same style like ExitPolicy. Did
> > you ask others, why
> > are they using ExitPolicies? I dont think so. It is part of
> > Tor and nobody
> > (as far as I know) is against - because it is free choice
> > of relay operator
> > which kind of traffic he will support.
>
On Wed, Feb 18, 2009 at 6:36 AM, downie - wrote:
>...
> There was a geoip-cache file from November, which I guess is the last time
> it worked.
> I renamed that in case it was corrupted. A new one hasn't been created, I
> don't think.
the behavior you describe is exactly as if whatever Vidalia's
--- On Wed, 2/18/09, slush wrote:
>
> > As has been discussed to death here many times
> > already, there is no
> > way to inspect traffic prior to its exit without
> destroying the functional
> > protections of tor.
>
>
> Disagree. I wrote _port_ oriented QoS, not _content_.
> There can be co
>
> Well, that's what exit policies are for. As far as relay traffic goes,
> the more traffic my relay handles, the more useful my relay seems to be and
> the better it makes me feel about running a relay.
>
Well, me to.
> As has been discussed to death here many times already, there i
> Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2009 21:17:03 -0800
> Subject: Re: Geoip information
> From: coder...@gmail.com
> To: or-talk@freehaven.net
>
> > ... start Tor from Vidalia, and watch the Connection
> > box in the Network Map, I see a connection opened to
> > geoip.vidalia-project.net:1443 , then closed,
On Wed, 18 Feb 2009 01:33:11 +0100 slush wrote:
>On Tue, Feb 17, 2009 at 10:00 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
>
>> Really? I know that seems to be in accord with the received wisdom
>> on this list, but I, for one, no longer make that assumption. For one
>> thing,
>> my node spends most of t
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