Tor currently has an accounting system for allowing data quota limitations
to be applied. This allows a relay to enter 'hibernation', maintaining it's
'up' status, and directory-perceived uptime, without actually relaying
traffic. However, it is feasible that an operator might want to control Tor
f
Sigh... yes; especially when one (upon rare occasion) requests the
embedded http images, and thereby asks TBird to visit a web page. One
would then want the transaction monitored by both TorButton and
NoScript. :-(
(p.s. open up about:config in TB and scan for "jav". I hope there really
is no
> Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2009 10:02:42 -0300
> From: free...@gmail.com
> To: or-talk@freehaven.net
> Subject: Re: The dh small subgroup confinement attack and Tor
>Since the recommended way to
> run a Browser on Tor is with ALL scripting disabled, this shouldn't
> effect people that are configured corr
On Sun, 9 Aug 2009 04:53:15 -0700 (PDT)
Curious Kid wrote:
>
> Maybe not a good week.
>
> Browser flaws expose users to man-in-the-middle attacks
> http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=3950
>
> Pretty-Bad-Proxy: An Overlooked Adversary in Browsers’ HTTPS
> Deployments
> http://research.microsoft
Ringo wrote:
> Hey Tor,
>
> I was watching a presentation today
> (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySQl0NhW1J0) and saw that this attack
> applied to some of the cryptography Tor uses. I googled around and
> couldn't find any information about where this attack would apply in Tor
> or if it had bee
Maybe not a good week.
Browser flaws expose users to man-in-the-middle attacks
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=3950
Pretty-Bad-Proxy: An Overlooked Adversary in Browsers’ HTTPS Deployments
http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/79323/pbp-final-with-update.pdf
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