Hi there,
regardless of it's relevance for Tor nodes, there are very good news for
Germany, and probably the rest of the European Union. Today the Federal
Constitutional Court decided, that the data retention law violates the
German Constitution and all data must be deleted immediately. This
On 02.03.2010 14:04, Marco Bonetti wrote:
Sven Anderson wrote:
Here a German article:
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/0,1518,681122,00.html
Do you, or anyone else, have an English article on this topic? In Italy
we've something very similar since many years.
Here is is a short one
On 02.03.2010 15:27, Robert Marquardt wrote:
We should not forget that the court did not forbid the storage of
data but rather criticised the specific legislation. It did not
challenge the 2006 EU directive thats the basis of the law.
The only way to get rid of the data retention laws across
Hi Scott,
Am 13.04.2009 um 19:00 schrieb Scott Bennett:
1) Why is the nicname/whois port the most heavily used? In fact,
why is it getting much use at all?
My guess: spammers and profilers, scanning for email adresses and
other personal data.
2) Why are there
Am 17.03.2009 um 04:59 schrieb pho...@rootme.org:
In five years of running a node, I had my share of these too. From
abusive forum posts to stupid people trying to break into .mil
sites. I
probably had 1 abuse complaint for every 10 TB of traffic served
through
Not if the abuse caused
Am 17.03.2009 um 17:07 schrieb pho...@rootme.org:
something, but not for the general Internet connections. Since a
criminal
usually has a strong interest to hide something, I expect the
proportion
of criminal traffic to be quite high, especially in countries with a
stable freedom of
Am 19.12.2008 um 11:24 schrieb Eugen Leitl:
This is off-topic, but isn't UDP making data retention more difficult
than TCP/IP.
Since you seem to talk about Germany: Again, data retention does and
will not happen on a per-packet basis and especially not on the
transport layer (TCP/UDP)
Am 19.12.2008 um 14:32 schrieb Sven Anderson:
Am 19.12.2008 um 11:24 schrieb Eugen Leitl:
This is off-topic, but isn't UDP making data retention more difficult
than TCP/IP.
Since you seem to talk about Germany: Again, data retention does and
will not happen on a per-packet basis
Am 15.12.2008 um 12:57 schrieb Hannah Schroeter:
After all, a running Exitnode relaying on the standard ports like
HTTP
seems to be (for me) better than a completely switched off node
because
of legal troubles regarding file sharing.
But in the end, the situation is all the same for
Am 15.12.2008 um 14:11 schrieb David Kammering:
And, if I see things right, the bandwidth argument doesn't compute.
IIRC, only the client-tracker traffic is relayed via tor, and
that's
not the mass traffic of the actual big files.
Hmm, I must admit that I'm not too deep into p2p via Tor,
Am 15.12.2008 um 14:35 schrieb Mitar:
Without adding those IP to ExitRules it is not really nice that I
would be blocking them just with a firewall but this could be maybe
also seen as a feature: making Tor network unstable for Bittorrent
users (for data transmissions).
I also had these
Am 09.12.2008 um 14:23 schrieb Hans Schnehl:
Unfortunatelly it does not solve the problem, the mere fact traffic is
going to be logged and held for 6 months is the problem, not who does
the actual logging. So the necessary data will be easily obtained on
request of executives from the isp's
Am 08.12.2008 um 14:05 schrieb Benjamin S.:
Am Samstag, den 06.12.2008, 19:49 -0500 schrieb Gregory Maxwell:
http://community.zdnet.co.uk/blog/0,100567,10009938o-2000331777b,00.htm?new_comment
I've confirmed the reports of UK ISPs censoring Wikipedia using some
UK tor exists.
I think
Am 06.12.2008 um 15:56 schrieb Scott Bennett:
It appears that a theoretical method of breaking quantum key
distribution
has been found, there's no cause for alarm (yet:-) because it
requires the use
of wormholes or some equivalent. :-) The abstract looks intriguing,
but the
paper was
Am 05.12.2008 um 10:22 schrieb Seth David Schoen:
Sven Anderson writes:
Karsten N. just sent to the German exitnodes list a link to an
article,
which is very convincing and legally well-founded (see below). It
explains that any service that is being donated to the public, that
is,
without
Am 13.11.2008 um 17:17 schrieb Praedor Atrebates:
I use OpenDNS servers and tor messages always contain a message that
my
service provider may be hijacking DNS requests. It isn't a
problem for
functionality of tor but it is somewhat annoying to see that warning
all the
time. Is there
Am 13.11.2008 um 17:26 schrieb Matt LaPlante:
The very nature of OpenDNS conflicts with the concept of anonymity and
privacy. By using the service, you're not only giving them the
opportunity to track your requests, you're also allowing them to
redirect your lookups to third parties at will.
Am 13.11.2008 um 19:48 schrieb Praedor Atrebates:
What about this: I run a relay server on my laptop and my home
desktop. My
laptop can end up on whatever network I connect to (obviously). I
DO have my
own registered domain name and use it no matter what network I
connect to, so
my IP
Hi,
I just wondered if Tor might be vulnerable to DNS attacks during the
bootstrapping phase? Is there a public key of a directory server
included in all the Tor download packages to secure the initial
contact to the directory servers?
I also want to emphasize again that everybody, but
Am 20.10.2008 um 15:29 schrieb Dominik Schaefer:
Roger Dingledine schrieb:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 02:30:32AM +0200, Sven Anderson wrote:
All sources I know don't let any doubt that ISPs will _only_ keep
data, which they log anyways, that is which IP has been assigned
to which user
Am 20.10.2008 um 00:06 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
So it will be very interesting how this will continue, since it
is assumed by many, that the data retention law violates the German
constitution.
Quite so. Good thing all the German laws are so clear. :)
As long as the constitution has the
Am 19.10.2008 um 17:06 schrieb krishna e bera:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 01:45:22PM +0200, Dominik Schaefer wrote:
As already said, much more difficult is the part about anonymizing
services, which brings us right to the still missing 'technical
directive'.
That will define the specifics: who
Am 18.10.2008 um 10:49 schrieb Karsten N.:
Some papers of non-gouverment organizations like ULD: Tor and JAP are
not affected by the telecommunication law, because it is not a
telecommunication service (in the case of law) and tor nodes have NOT
to log.
That's not true, the ULD is a 100%
Am 18.10.2008 um 22:13 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
2) Maybe, consider starting circuits unpredictably before we want to
attach a stream to them (we already mostly do that, since we build
circuits preemptively), and closing circuits unpredictably after we
are
done using them. The idea there is
Hi Sebastian,
Am 17.10.2008 um 13:51 schrieb Sebastian Schmidt:
I'm a law student at the saarland university. I got noticed in the
newest blog entry of the tor-blog that you wanna gather some
information about what the owner of tor-servers in germany have to
do on 01.01.2009. And what are
Dear Raccoon,
Am 28.09.2008 um 14:27 schrieb The23rd Raccoon:
[2]. http://www.stinkymeat.net/
thanks for that reference. Great!
As for your article: as far as I can tell the calculations seem to be
valid, but I wonder, why others didn't address this in their timing
attack work before.
Am 24.09.2008 um 00:04 schrieb Marco Bonetti:
This is the part I don't like: as I pointed out with the command
ouputs,
they not only hijack your queries in order to protect your
navigation, but they also spoof google services.
If I'd been using OpenDNS, I'll think twice before sending my
Am 15.09.2008 um 16:16 schrieb Bernhard Fischer:
We have a new version of OnionCat ready which is now capable of
IPv4-forwarding.
Read http://www.abenteuerland.at/onioncat/ for further instructions
on how to
use OnionCat and IP.
Does it really work in an acceptable way? I ask because
Am 12.09.2008 um 17:50 schrieb John Brooks:
Also, if this is enabled by default, it will still only be respected
if you are already serving the normal tor directory - in countries
with laws restrictive enough to prevent mirroring the hidden service
directory, it seems that you'd have issues
Am 29.08.2008 um 07:15 schrieb F. Fox:
xiando wrote:
is it - in analogy to exit policies - possible to block certain (or
all) hidden services of using my node as directory or introduction
point and to disable rendezvous point functionality for my node? (I
understand that I cannot block being
Am 24.08.2008 um 17:47 schrieb Scott Bennett:
Yesterday my tor server logged a message advising me of name
server
problem at the Comcast name servers whose addresses are given via
DHCP to
my computer upon connection to the Comcast network:
Aug 23 17:11:32.227 [notice] Your DNS
Am 24.08.2008 um 20:26 schrieb Drake Wilson:
Quoth Sven Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED], on 2008-08-24 19:08:57 +0200:
Are these tests done by the tor software? I think this tests are not
valid, since services like OpenDNS.com reply _every_ name with an
address:
DNS semantics say that when a name
Am 24.08.2008 um 22:52 schrieb Sven Anderson:
You can switch off a lot of things, and I guess then they will also
not answer the non-existing domains. However, that only works for
static IP addresses (which is true for most Tor nodes I assume).
For the records, I tested it:
You have
Am 21.08.2008 um 10:55 schrieb M:
I set it up through 8118 and it connected through TOR and Privoxy.
Should i keep it this way or use SOCKS?
I guess you are using TLS connections? Then it doesn't matter anyways.
--
http://sven.anderson.deBelieve those who are seeking the truth.
tel:
Am 20.08.2008 um 19:04 schrieb [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Sorry, I didn't get it: in case I'm using Thunderbird and Torbutton,
and connect to the smtp server trough tor. Will my real ip adress
occur in the mail headers, or the ip of the exit node?
I'm guessing the ip of the exit node, right?
Am 20.08.2008 um 05:49 schrieb Roy Lanek:
9/11 has been planned much earlier than 2001.
Dear Mr Fletcher (sic!),
I don't think that this mailing-list is the appropriate place to
propagate your FUD based conspiracy theories as if they were facts. So
would you mind to stop it?
Beside
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