Speak of the Devil

British govt just started pushing for Part III of RIPA citing terrorism and kiddie porn as major reasons to require people to disclose encryption keys... http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060518-6870.html Seems we may have a strong ally on our side on this one. International bankers might

Did you see this?

U.K. Government to force handover of encryption keys http://news.zdnet.co.uk/0,39020330,39269746,00.htm

Re: Speak of the Devil

On Thu, 18 May 2006, Mike Perry wrote: A few varying thoughts here: I can't speak for the british government, but if someone came to me and said someone is using your SSL-enabled webmail system to traffic kiddie porn and felt that somehow the easiest way to sniff their traffic was with my

[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [Clips] UK Government to force handover of encryption keys]

I have no keys, and I must disclose. - Forwarded message from R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 18 May 2006 14:17:16 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] UK Government to force handover of encryption keys --- begin forwarded text

Re: Speak of the Devil

On Fri, May 19, 2006 at 03:59:46AM -0400, Dan Mahoney, System Admin wrote: I can't speak for the british government, but if someone came to me and said someone is using your SSL-enabled webmail system to traffic kiddie porn and felt that somehow the easiest way to sniff their traffic was I

P2P revisited.

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 If we created a P2P client using Tor that acted as an exit node we could get a lot more users, a lot more traffic, and a lot more capacity, all adding to the anonymity Tor provides. Any downsides? I'm not saying Tor implement a P2P network,

Re: Speak of the Devil

I agree to your posting except the following: Eugen Leitl schrieb: Yes, you're being a good German here. Facilitating the totalitarian takover, by cooperating instead of being difficult. That was totally inappropriate and since then I wonder on what prejudices you base your judgement on...

Re: P2P revisited.

Watson Ladd [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If we created a P2P client using Tor that acted as an exit node we could get a lot more users, a lot more traffic, and a lot more capacity, all adding to the anonymity Tor provides. Any downsides? While it could motivate some people to run Tor on

Re: Did you see this?

On Thu, May 18, 2006 at 07:16:49PM -0700, Eric H. Jung wrote: U.K. Government to force handover of encryption keys http://news.zdnet.co.uk/0,39020330,39269746,00.htm Yes, once this is passed encrypting storage with a passphrase becomes a pointless exercise in the UK unless you are prepared to

plausible deniability

Hi, Yes, once this is passed encrypting storage with a passphrase becomes a pointless exercise in the UK unless you are prepared to spend time at Her Majesty's pleasure in order to protect your data. I thought plausible deniability feature of True Crypt is usable for repressive regimes like

Re: plausible deniability

Matej Kovacic wrote: Hi, Yes, once this is passed encrypting storage with a passphrase becomes a pointless exercise in the UK unless you are prepared to spend time at Her Majesty's pleasure in order to protect your data. I thought plausible deniability feature of True Crypt is usable

RE: Did you see this?

Hi. As the RIPA 3 is currently written there seem to be two big holes. 1. Destroy the key and retain proof that you destroyed it - eg microwave the USB key. It seems that the law is only really designed to cope with keys (passphrases) that you can remember. Therefore if you have a physical

Re: Speak of the Devil

On Fri, 19 May 2006, Eugen Leitl wrote: What has this to do with turning over your keys because somebody claims that children are being violated somewhere? But, think of the children! Won't *somebody* think of the children??? -J

RE: Did you see this?

I didn't say a false key, I said a dummy key. One that will work, but would unlock a dummy outer volume - but not all data within it. There is no way of telling the inner contents of such a drive from random data. There are several products that can do that. The act specifically says that if there

Threats to anonymity set at and above the application layer; HTTP headers

It's pretty well understood that anonymity can be lost at higher protocol layers even when it's well protected at lower layers. One eye-opening paper on this point is Can Pseudonymity Really Guarantee Privacy? by Rao and Rohatgi (in the Freehaven Anonymity Bibliography):