If Gmail can get the time zone via JavaScript (when the client is using
Tor) then why can it not get the real IP also via JavaScript (when the
client is using Tor)? I don't think it can get the real IP since I have
used various tests including http://www.decloak.net/ and Tor with
JavaScript
Hello,
I think there are two useful usecases for a vm in combination with tor:
For Hidden Services:
If you run your HS inside a VM, it is harder for a imaginary attacker to
gather the location / identity of the HS.
For a simple User:
If you run all the applications inside a vm, it is easier for
Hi,
I don't understand, too and in my opinion, this is utter nonsense. I'm
not aware of any negative impacts on privacy due to the usage of
https://, but without, there is the danger of eavesdropping at the exit
node.
best regards,
Jan
Am 27.10.2010 20:19, schrieb Matthew:
Hello,
There
Hi,
Am 27.10.2010 20:55, schrieb Joe Btfsplk:
On 10/27/2010 1:19 PM, Matthew wrote:
Hello,
There is a Hints and Tips for Whistleblowers Guide available at
http://ht4w.co.uk/.
Thanks for the link.
I'm not sure this is a good ressource, due to the misinformation it is
spreading.
Don't
Am 27.10.2010 21:04, schrieb Andrew Lewman:
On Wed, 27 Oct 2010 19:19:02 +0100
Matthew pump...@cotse.net wrote:
There is a Hints and Tips for Whistleblowers Guide available at
http://ht4w.co.uk/.
The first problem is the content is actually served up by
hostingprod.com and not
Hi,
just wanted to add one thing:
There is no real reason not to use another layer of cryptography on top
of Tor hidden services. Using HTTPS, and convincing users to use
HTTPS, is far harder than merely using another layer of cryptography,
and provides no real benefit.
And (from a user
Hi,
no core files on my Ubuntu 8.04 relay.
regards,
Jan
Am 25.11.2010 04:29, schrieb Walt Mankowski:
On Wed, Nov 17, 2010 at 03:17:41PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi folks,
If you use our debs on Debian or Ubuntu, can you please do
ls -la /var/lib/tor/core*
as root, and let us know
Am 12.01.2011 09:32, schrieb Timo Schoeler:
thus Mike Perry spake:
Some of us are also compiling abuse response templates. The goal for
abuse responses is to inform people about Tor, and to suggest
solutions for their security problems that involve improving their
computer security for
2011/1/13 Olaf Selke olaf.se...@blutmagie.de:
On 12.01.2011 22:02, coderman wrote:
On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 7:57 AM, Klaus Layer klaus.la...@gmx.de wrote:
...
Error creating network socket: No buffer space available
errors. The numtcpsocks parameter limit is set to 550 on the vserver. Before
Am 28.01.2011 19:13, schrieb Moritz Bartl:
According to some Twitter users, only DNS is down. Third party DNS (or
Tor) work.
This differs from ISP to ISP, it looks like they tried to f*ck up the
net as much as possible. A lot of routes to egyptian ISPs just
disappeared from the global routing
Hi,
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972 4FA7 7C7F 9260 B939 89D2 2A70 654D 3B92
This node looks suspicious to me, because there is no contact info
Am 29.01.2011 20:13, schrieb Jon:
On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 12:46 PM, Jan Weiher j...@buksy.de wrote:
Hi,
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972
Am 29.01.2011 21:27, schrieb Gitano:
On 2011-01-29 19:46, Jan Weiher wrote:
while scrolling through the tor status page (torstatus.blutmagie.de), I
stumpled upon the following node (the reason why it came to my eye was
the long uptime):
gatereloaded 550C C972 4FA7 7C7F 9260 B939 89D2
Am 29.01.2011 21:44, schrieb Andrew Lewman:
On Sat, 29 Jan 2011 19:46:20 +0100
Jan Weiher j...@buksy.de wrote:
This node looks suspicious to me, because there is no contact info
given and the exit policy allows only unencrypted traffic:
It hasn't shown up in any of the exit scans
At some point, we intend to shrink exit policies further as Tor scales
to more decentralized schemes. Those exit policies will likely be
represented as bits representing subsets of ports. When that time
comes, we will very likely combine encrypted and unencrypted versions
of ports together,
I'm aware of the fact that it is not recommended to use tor without
additional encryption, but some users do. And I dont see any reason for
only allowing unencrypted traffic than snooping?
[...]
I don't see why any of this really matters. Anyone running tor should have
the good sense to
Assuming the worse, and disregarding volunteer exit bandwidth without
some proper investigation, doesn't sound like a good approach to me...
Nobody does that, but I think its fair to say that if you want that
somebody can contact you about your node, you publish your contact
details in the
You make it sound as though running an Exit node is a privilege and that
people who run them somehow owe the Tor project? They're volunteering
bandwidth, for the benefit of the network.
This was not my intention. But I think it should be possible to ask a
volunteer about what he is doing?
In email, what are anonymity risks? Header contains sender domain (maybe IP)
but what else?
Probably the whole header. But except from the obvious I would
especially look for the received: lines, the date (because it might
contain your timezone) and the X-Mailer header (shows your user
Interesting. Hetzner is officially down on anything which causes
them trouble (benji said so himself, repeatedly), so they're
effectively accepting of a Tor middleman, but Tor exits are
probably going to be pretty short-lived in Hetzner space.
If you got your own IP space with own ripe
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