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Wednesday February 14, 2007 Some Straight Talk on Afghanistan and an Interesting Arrest in Texas Two very pessimistic reports on the combat situation in Afghanistan point to the fundamental risk there of failure, a risk that is also very high in Somalia, where the same mistakes are being repeated by the United States, the local government and the international community. The danger in Somalia is borne out by the Texas arrest of U.S. <http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/02/american_homegrown_terrorist_s.php> citizen who was trained in Somalia and acknowledges spending time with al Qaeda operatives there, according to an FBI affidavit. Along with numerous Europeans and other Africans, Daniel Maldanado went to Somalia to fight for a true Islamic republic, the affidavit says. Two things are distressing about the bleak assessments, although they are welcome for their uncharacteristic candor. The first is that the lessons of Afghanistan appear to have not been assimilated at all in the policy community. That is, the lessons of the first Afghanistan fiasco, when, following the Soviet retreat, little attention was paid to developments there. The resulting Taliban triumph within a few years, and the rise of the radical salafist theology that seeks to obliterate us, should have been as much of prod to learn lessons as there can be. Yet, despite the loss of blood and treasure there since 9-11, virtually nothing appears to have been learned. And that is indeed tragic. The second is that, unable to assimilate those lessons in the most urgent of times, there is little learning that can be applied to situations like Somalia. In other words, we are, as we currently sit, as vulnerable or more than we were prior to 9-11 from those non-state actors operating in stateless areas, failed states and criminal states. First, Army <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR200702130 1259.html> Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry warned of the entrenched Taliban network in Pakistan, with renewed command and control capabilities, under the protection of Pakistani security forces. He also warned in stark terms that the Karzai government is faced with the strong possibility of an irreversible loss of legitimacy, one that will give the Taliban the opening it craves to return to power. This came as the Canadian <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/2/7AED6DC2-EE17-43F7-9728-48551E2 50FDE.html> senate issued a gloomy report on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, warning that the mission will fail unless significantly more resources are dedicated to the struggle there. It is clear in Afghanistan that the coalition forces won the military war and set the stage for the civilians to follow suit in the political and psychological wars that would inevitably follow. In Somalia, the Ethiopians, at great cost and some risk, removed the Union of Islamic Courts, setting the stage for similar follow-up. In both cases the civilian governments have failed miserably. But our policy has reflected no anticipation of events that were not difficult to anticipate. The constant short-term tradeoffs in Afghanistan with the warlords, the unwillingness to confront Pakistan over the entrenched Islamist presence in the territories, the inability come up with mechanisms to induce the interim Somali government to form a truly broad-based, national government, have all undermined the chances for long-term success. The problem is that these regions are a direct threat to us, and reversing these reversals will cost human lives, perhaps many of them. These will be primarily of the troops who will have to be dispatched again to stabilize the situation, and perhaps those of our citizens and allies here and abroad who will suffer from the attacks that will be launched from there. They will be launched. But we will likely have learned little. posted by Douglas Farah Comment <http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/160/some-straight-talk-on-somalia-and-a n-interesting-arrest-in-texas#comment> Monday February 12, 2007 The More Things Change... Several recent events show just how little the world has changed since 9-11, despite promises, proclamations, and flat-out falsehoods that try to paint a different picture. The two incidents that stand out are the Saudi arrests of 10 <http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/02/time_for_real_tf_arrests_in_sa.php> "terrorist financiers," and the continued hate that appears in Saudi <http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/02/saudi_and_iranian_textbooks_al.php> and Iranian textbooks. The charade has gone on since 9-11, and is unlikely to change anytime soon. The current reason that the actions are likely to continue unabated is the Shi'ite resurgence, which is shaking the Sunni regimes of the Gulf to their core. The escalating conflict between Sunni <http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/02/time_for_real_tf_arrests_in_sa.php% 22> and Shi'ite seems to have launched a new wave of sectarian attacks between the two, carried out in newspapers, TV shows and textbooks so that children learn to hate early. Since 9-11 the pattern with the Saudi on these issues has been unchanging. Protests are raised, the Saudi say they are changing and/or cracking down, criticism subsides and then life goes back to normal. Adel Al Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador-designate to the U.S., is a true master of offering the various and shifting Saudi defenses of the indefensible. Let's hope the Congress keeps him plenty busy by continuing to ask the necessary questions and demanding the administration follow up. At the same time the Saudis are touting the arrest of mostly political dissidents as terrorist sponsors, the elites of Saudi society are working extremely hard to get the few designated terror supporters (Wa'el Julaidan, Yasin al Qadi et al) off the U.N. and U.S. sanctions list. Others are being rehabilitated in other ways. My friends following this closely say the Saudi government has given virtually everyone designated a clean bill of health, allowing them to again write in Saudi newspapers and lifting whatever minor restrictions may have existed on their activities. The case of the textbooks, to me, is the most disturbing and not unrelated to the terror financing issues. Both go to the core of the wahhabist belief that any compromise with any other group, even if they are Muslims, is forbidden by Allah. These are deeply theological issues, not simple policy options one can choose to change at some point for political reasons. This is the fundamental issue that U.S. and European foreign policy does not yet take into account. You cannot negotiate with Allah's immutable word. But we keep trying in the mistaken belief there can be trade offs, compromises and a tactical decisions that are based on worldly considerations. To keep succeeding generations on board, this stereotyping of Jews, Christians (and Shi'ites), the indoctrination must start at a very young age. This cannot change if the wahhabi grip is to maintain its hold. The schools are the necessary venue for sowing these seeds. Likewise, financing jihad is crucial to the Saudi interpretation of theology. You cannot stop people from spending for Allah's cause. It simply will not happen. So the prospects for any sort of real change are not good, and falling as the Sunnis feel threatened. It is time to recognize that within our policy. There are absolutes that will not change until the wahhabis are gone. Al Jubeir can talk for years about the changes taking place, but they are words who can package the unacceptable for a Western audience. It doesn't mean anything is going to change. Little has since 9-11. posted by Douglas Farah Comment <http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/159/the-more-things-change#comment> [2] Friday February 9, 2007 The Muslim Brotherhood Makes its Move in Palestinian Territories The big winner in the Hamas-Fatah peace <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR200702080 0182.html> pact appears to be the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is an armed branch. While giving up very little Hamas, through the intercession of leaders of the Brotherhood, has sidestepped the issue of recognizing Israel while ceding little to Fatah and opening the way, they hope, for international recognition. This is a common tactical decision by the Brotherhood, which is often willing to trade off short-term contradictions for long-term gains, with the clear understanding that anything written now can be rewritten later. But the fundamental issue between Fatah and Hamas ( and the Brotherhood) is deep and perhaps irreconcilable, and goes to the heart of the Islamist project. For Hamas, it is a religious matter of faith that Israel cannot be recognized and the Caliphate must be reestablished. Fatah, for all its bumbling incompetence, sees the territorial issues as a matter of policy and politics. The noted scholar Mamaoun Fandy, recently warned in an <http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD144007> article excerpted in the Middle East Media Research Institute, the Muslim Brotherhood has now conquered Palestine as a symbol in the Arab world. This conquest "will transform [the Palestinian problem] from a resolvable territorial struggle into a religious struggle that cannot be resolved," he wrote. A reversal of this trend is highly unlikely because al Jazeera is, at least in large part, controlled by the Mulim Brotherhood, giving it the dominant medium in the region. Here is a further excerpt that captures the dilemma, both for secular Palestinians and outside policy makers: "At the time, the incitement was nationalist [in character], while today - after the Muslim Brotherhood has conquered a significant part of the symbolic Palestine - the incitement has become Islamist, and the domestic has become commingled with the external. This is because the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological discourse is not based on the separation of the domestic and the external, and because their ideology transcends the borders of [particular Arab] states. "Hasn't the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt said that he had no objection to having [even] a Malaysian Muslim rule Egypt, as long as it was not ruled by a Coptic Egyptian? Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood conquest of the symbolic Palestine means giving the [Palestinian] problem a religious character - and herein lies the danger. "First of all, giving the Palestinian problem a religious character will lead to a Malaysian Muslim having more rights in Palestine than a Christian Palestinian. Likewise, it will transform [the Palestinian problem] from a resolvable territorial struggle into a religious struggle that cannot be resolved." This move by the Brotherhood, as it strengthens its hand in Egypt and grows in influence in Europe and the United States, has gone largely unnoticed and is likely not clearly understood by U.S. policy makers. The focus is almost entirely on Hamas' unwillingness to recognize Israel, which is a valid point. But the much larger point is that the Brotherhood is succeeding in creating a governed space, making the already-difficult resolution of any conflict impossible. Fatah has led in the Hamas electoral victory through kleptocracy, nepotism, corruption, human rights abuse and sheer incompetence. There is little that can be in its defense. Except that the alternative will be far worse. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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