[osint] Chertoff Editorial

2007-04-23 Thread Bruce Tefft
 
 
Make No Mistake: This Is War

By Michael Chertoff
Sunday, April 22, 2007; B07

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR200704
2001940_pf.html

As the rubble of the Twin Towers smoldered in 2001, no one could have
imagined a day when America's leaders would be criticized for being tough in
protecting Americans from further acts of war.

Now, less than six years later, that day has arrived.

Since Sept. 11, a conspiracy-minded fringe has claimed that American
officials plotted the destruction. But when scholars such as Zbigniew
Brzezinski accuse our leaders of falsely depicting or hyping a war on
terror to promote a culture of fear, it's clear that historical
revisionism has gone mainstream.

Brzezinski stated the obvious in describing terrorism as a tactic, not an
enemy [Terrorized by 'War on Terror,' Outlook, March 25]. But this misses
the point. We are at war with a global movement and ideology whose members
seek to advance totalitarian aims through terrorism.
Brzezinski is deeply mistaken to mock the notion that we are at war and to
suggest that we should adopt more muted reactions to acts of terrorism.

The impulse to minimize the threat we face is eerily reminiscent of the way
America's leaders played down the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary
fanaticism in the late 1970s. That naive approach ultimately foundered on
the kidnapping of our diplomats in Tehran.

A sensible strategy against al-Qaeda and others in its ideological terror
network begins with recognizing the scope of the threat they pose. Al-Qaeda
and its ilk have a world vision that is comparable to that of historical
totalitarian ideologues but adapted to the 21st-century global network.

Is this actually a war? Well, the short answer comes from our enemies.
Osama bin Laden's fatwa of Feb. 23, 1998, was a declaration of war, a
self-serving accusation that America had somehow declared war on Islam,
followed by a ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians
and military . . . in any country where it is possible to do it.

Since then, bin Laden and his allies have sought to carry out acts designed
to strike at our global system of security, safety and economy.
I am reminded of that every day when I see threat assessments and other
evidence of a militarized and networked foe.

Measured by intent, capability and consequence, fanatical Islamist
ideologues have declared -- and are prosecuting -- what is, by any objective
rendering, a real war.

Intent: Today's extreme Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda do not merely seek
political revolution in their own countries. They aspire to dominate all
countries. Their goal is a totalitarian, theocratic empire to be achieved by
waging perpetual war on soldiers and civilians alike.
That includes the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Capability: The fanatics' intent, while grandiose, is not entirely fanciful.
Islamist extremists such as those in al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated
groups from North Africa to Iraq and South Asia are fighting for and
sometimes achieving control of territory in which they can train; assemble
advanced, inhumane weaponry; impose their own vision of repressive law; and
dominate local life. To be sure, as Brzezinski observes, the geographic
reach of this network does not put them in the same group as the Nazis or
Stalinists when they achieved first-class military power. But without
relentless vigilance and effort from the civilized world, Islamist
extremists could gain control of a state or establish a network of radical
statelets in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Consequence: The events of Sept. 11 highlight the dramatic difference
between the consequences of Islamist extremist war-making and those of the
political terrorist attacks unleashed against the West in the 1970s.
The Sept. 11 attacks were the most devastating single blow ever visited upon
our homeland by foreign enemies. The Islamist extremists' plot last summer
to blow up multiple transatlantic airlines in Britain threatened a similarly
devastating -- but thankfully unrealized -- consequence.
Both episodes demonstrate that the terrorist ideologues aim to achieve not
only a massive loss of life but also substantial disruption of our
international system of travel and trade.

Simply put, our foes have declared their intent to make war, have
demonstrated a capability to prosecute war and have laid on us the horrific
consequences commensurate with war.

In the aftermath of Sept. 11, our allies correctly perceived al-Qaeda's
strikes as acts of international aggression. By Sept. 12, the U.N.
Security Council had passed a resolution vowing to respond, and NATO began
its unprecedented move of declaring the attacks to be aggression against all
of its members.

That radical Islamist fanatics have not yet achieved all the elements of
state power should not blind us to the global threat they pose. This
globalized war has theaters from traditional battlefields in Afghanistan and
Iraq 

[osint] UPI Analysis: Owning the keys to the Internet

2007-04-23 Thread Shaun Waterman
Please find below an example of UPI's continuing coverage of cyber-security and 
the Department of Homeland Security, published earlier this month. I hope you 
find it interesting. You may link to it on the Web here: 
HYPERLINK 
http://www.upi.com/inc/2007/04/12/analysis_owning_the_keys_to_the_internet/print_view/
 
http://www.upi.com/inc/2007/04/12/analysis_owning_the_keys_to_the_internet/print_view/
Please note that the story remains the copyright property of UPI. If you wish 
to publish or archive this article, or get more information about UPI products 
and services, please contact me or e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
To stop receiving these alerts, just reply with the word unsubscribe in the 
subject line.
Shaun Waterman
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tel: 202 898 8081

Analysis: Owning the keys to the Internet

By SHAUN WATERMAN
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor

WASHINGTON, April 12 (UPI) -- The U.S. government is pressing ahead with plans 
to implement a new security regime for the basic architecture of the World Wide 
Web, despite unease in some corners of the international Internet management 
community. 

This is the U.S. government stepping forward and showing leadership, Douglas 
Maughan, an official with the Department of Homand Security Science and 
Technology Directorate, told United Press International. 

At issue is the long-debated implementation of a new security system governing 
the Domain Name System, or DNS, the Internet architecture that directs surfers 
to the sites they want to visit. The DNS translates the familiar www Web page 
addresses known as URLs into the numerical Internet Protocol, or IP, codes 
which identify the servers hosting that page. 

Because DNS, like much of the Internet, was built with a relatively open 
architecture, it is possible to fake Internet addresses. Various techniques for 
doing this, known to specialists as DNS spoofing or poisoning, are widely 
used by cyber-criminals. They can con people into believing they are logging on 
to their bank or e-mail accounts, entering personal information or passwords 
that can then be used to rob them. 

The DNS Security Extensions Protocol, or DNSSec, is designed to end such abuse 
by allowing the instantaneous authentication of DNS information -- effectively 
creating a series of digital keys for the system. 

One lingering question -- largely academic until now -- has been who should 
hold the key for the so-called DNS Root Zone, the part of the system that sits 
above the so-called Top Level Domains, like .com and .org. 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is funding the development of a 
technical plan for implementing DNSSec, and last October distributed an initial 
draft of it to a long list of international experts for comments. 

The draft lays out a series of options for who could be the holder, or 
operator, of the Root Zone Key, essentially boiling down to a governmental 
agency or a contractor. 

Nowhere in the document do we make any proposal about the identity of the Root 
Key Operator, said Maughan, the cyber-security research and development 
manager for Homeland Security. 

Maughan said a new version of the draft specification, incorporating 
suggestions from the experts who reviewed it, would be released later this year 
for public comment. 

We are still working through some of the process issues such as how to record 
and respond to all the public comments, he said, adding he hoped the document 
would be released no later than the end of the summer. 

He said the new version adopts a different nomenclature for the Root Key 
Operator, to make it clear that a non-governmental organization or non-U.S. 
governmental agency could play the role. 

We recognize that increasing the security of the Internet requires global 
cooperation, stated a note accompanying the draft technical specification when 
it was circulated last year. 

Nonetheless, at a recent meeting in Lisbon of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers, the international non-profit that currently manages 
DNS, there was some concern that the U.S. government might push ahead with 
implementation unilaterally. 

Our concern is that if unilateral action is taken it could generate friction 
in the operation of the Internet, Bernard Turcotte, president of the Canadian 
Internet Registration Authority, who was at the Lisbon meeting, told UPI. 

Maughan said that while the U.S. government was committed to implementing 
DNSSec this year in the .gov domain, which it owns, that could be done 
independently, regardless of whether the new security system was rolled out 
Internet-wide or not. 

We can secure .gov and all the zones under .gov (like dhs.gov, or usdoj.gov) 
even if the Root (Zone) remains unsigned, he said, pointing out that HYPERLINK 
http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Analysis/2007/04/12/analysis_owning_the_keys_to_the_internet/#;
 nSweden had already 

[osint] UPI: Recent stories on intelligence reform and the DNI

2007-04-23 Thread Shaun Waterman

Over the past two weeks, UPI has published a series of long articles looking in 
depth at the challenges the new Director of National Intelligence Michael 
McConnell faces, and the changes he is making to his office and the rest of the 
Intelligence Community.

Shorter versions of some of these pieces appeared in the Washington Times. The 
full-length versions are pasted, one after the other, below, and you can link 
to them at the following URL's:

April 10, New DNI says he lacks authority
http://www.upi.com/inc/2007/04/09/state_of_security_dni_lacking_power1/print_view/

April 13, White House threatens veto of intelligence auth bill
http://www.upi.com/inc/2007/04/13/analysis_bush_veto_of_spy_law_threatened/print_view/

April 16, Relationship with military key factor for new DNI
http://www.upi.com/inc/2007/04/15/state_of_security_dni_defense_relation4/print_view/

April 19, New DNI seeks to leverage personnel powers
http://www.upi.com/inc/2007/04/18/analysis_dni_leverages_personnel_powers/print_view/

Please note that these links no longer expire after 60 days, so you can post or 
archive them. If you wish to publish or archive this article, or get more 
information about UPI products and services, please contact me or e-mail [EMAIL 
PROTECTED] 
To stop receiving these alerts, just reply with the word unsubscribe in the 
subject line.
Shaun Waterman 
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tel: 202 898 8081

Analysis: New DNI says he lacks authority

By SHAUN WATERMAN
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor

WASHINGTON April 10 (UPI) -- Newly confirmed Director of National Intelligence 
Michael McConnell says he doesn't have the authorities he needs to lead the 16 
agencies he oversees -- and that his office isn't properly structured to take 
best advantage of the authorities he does have. 

At least he can fix the latter, and officials say he is trying to do so in a 
little-noticed redrawing of his office's organization chart last month. 

We don't have it right yet, McConnell told a conference of federal officials 
last week, speaking of the intelligence restructuring mandated by Congress in 
2004. 

As director of national intelligence, McConnell said, I'm responsible for 
basically two things ... the budget for the 16 (U.S. intelligence agencies) and 
ensuring that no one breaks the law. 

But, he added, 15 of those agencies, all save the CIA, are part of other 
Cabinet-level departments, and he lacks direct line management authority over 
them. 

I would submit that's a challenge. If you're going to dictate someone else's 
budget in another department and worry about compliance with the law and the 
regulations where you ... cannot hire or fire, it puts you in a challenging 
management condition, he said. 

McConnell's chief of staff, David Shedd, told United Press International in an 
interview that a recently announced restructuring of the way the director's 
office was organized was designed to address those challenges. 

One important change was the metamorphosis of Shedd's own job into the new post 
of director of the intelligence staff. 

From his new perch he will convene regular meetings of a new executive 
committee, chaired by McConnell, on which will sit the Pentagon's intelligence 
chief, representatives of the departments of State, Treasury and Homeland 
Security, and the heads of the major intelligence agencies. 

The intent, said a statement from McConnell's office, is to use the 
(executive committee) to initiate, change, and end programs, policies, and 
capabilities. 

In his new post, Shedd will also directly oversee the work of the three 
officials who exercise the director's most significant authorities over the 
occasionally fractious collection of 16 agencies that insiders call the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. 

The chief information officer, the chief personnel (or human capital) officer 
and the chief financial officer all have significant policy authorities over, 
respectively, the information technology, staffing and budgets of the U.S. 
intelligence agencies. 

Because they will all report to the staff director, who will convene and draw 
up the agendas for the executive committee, Shedd said, the committee will be a 
place in which the director can effectively drive forward his policy agenda in 
those three areas. 

The committee will be the nexus between those issues and the agency heads, 
said Shedd. McConnell, he added, wants that lash-up to be close. 

Two other important changes, Shedd said, were the creation of deputy director 
posts for acquisition and for policy, plans and requirements. 

Last week McConnell said the ability of U.S. agencies to purchase, procure 
(and) acquire large-scale systems, had atrophied during the 1990s, as U.S. 
spending on intelligence declined 40 percent, and there was something called 
the dot (com) boom. 

Fungible skills inside the government, very sophisticated program management 
skills, engineering