Re: [pass] [PATCH] Allow custom subcommands
On 04/10/2016 05:45, Sylvain Viart wrote: Pass itself could be signed. By the user at init. But why? Do you have a version of Linux which only executes signed scripts/binaries? As for the admin being tricked into installing a malicious plugin - what's the difference between that and installing a malicious version of 'pass' itself? The only protection for 'pass' is installing it from a trusted location, and/or verifying the code by eye. Surely the same applies to plugins? Regards, Brian. ___ Password-Store mailing list Password-Store@lists.zx2c4.com http://lists.zx2c4.com/mailman/listinfo/password-store
Re: [pass] [PATCH] Allow custom subcommands
Hi Thorsten, Le 03/10/2016 à 19:30, Thorsten Wißmann a écrit : >> > Does GPG web of trust sure enough, to allow co-signing script to enable >> > such signed plugins? > I don't understand your question. But are you asking how my patch could > be extended to call only 'signed' extensions? It was, yes. I also mention the "web of trust" behavior of GPG, which nice but complicated, just to see if some reader are involved in such reflexion… ;-) > If some bad guy has write access to some directory in $PATH and wants to > take over your password store, then the bad guy can simply add a > malicious `pass` executable and the user would not notice. Pass itself could be signed. By the user at init. I was more thinking, about installing malicious plugin, not having malicious inside your computer. I don't think than a password manager can be used on a share system, with shared memory or process… It is only designed to work on a personal computer. (I never though about that before but…) > I.e. I don't think `pass` should do something like signing of program > code. It's some separate problem to check if the programs in your $PATH > are trustworthy or not. I see your point, you may be right. I just emailed the reference about signing plugins to let you know. Not tested your plugin yet… I like the logic like git or rvm. Regards, Sylvain. -- Sylvain Viart - DevOps système linux - freelance developer ___ Password-Store mailing list Password-Store@lists.zx2c4.com http://lists.zx2c4.com/mailman/listinfo/password-store
Re: [pass] [PATCH] Allow custom subcommands
Hi Sylvain, On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 07:20:47AM +0200, Sylvain Viart wrote: > Le 30/09/2016 à 11:33, Thorsten Wißmann a écrit : > > if there is an executable pass-clipwiz in the PATH. This does not only > > fit the usual pass workflow (first show a file, then paste it using > > clipwiz), but one also gets the tab-completion for custom pass scripts > > for free. > > Sounds cool! > > See also: > > [pass] Extending pass with user-defined hooks / add ons > https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/password-store/2015-August/001659.html I see, thanks! I think the main decision is whether those extensions should be part of "the password store" (that approach) or of the system (my approach). > Does GPG web of trust sure enough, to allow co-signing script to enable > such signed plugins? I don't understand your question. But are you asking how my patch could be extended to call only 'signed' extensions? If some bad guy has write access to some directory in $PATH and wants to take over your password store, then the bad guy can simply add a malicious `pass` executable and the user would not notice. I.e. I don't think `pass` should do something like signing of program code. It's some separate problem to check if the programs in your $PATH are trustworthy or not. Cheers, Thorsten signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Password-Store mailing list Password-Store@lists.zx2c4.com http://lists.zx2c4.com/mailman/listinfo/password-store
