On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
of this classification recently discussed here was an important part
of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
(meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the
more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of
structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have
strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver.
But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
driver.
My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with
further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus
on meaning.
Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite
another affair.
(Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
_total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking
how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that
to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps
that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the
paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way
of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t
be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning
of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
“would be” as a way of ultimately grounding meaning.
He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism
contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of meaning
using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the whole
point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the differences
between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and others.
Again, I’m fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far
better versed in the nuances of Peirce’s development than I. But it
really seemed to me to be that distancing himself from others over
meaning that led to his getting into deeper nuance in the structure of
the object and interpretant than he had in previous decades.
SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about
what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to
use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to now?
Maybe it is both. . .
This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by
Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at times
emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while
others at times emphasize using his ideas to further contemporary
thought. But this appears to be mainly a matter of _emphasis_, and
it seems to me that some of the strongest contributors to this forum
see it as a both (that is certainly my position).
If the list is only for understanding the history or exegesis of
Peirce’s own writings then it’s far too limited to be of that much
interest I must confess. It’s in application that Peirce’s thought
has most value. Whether that be in philosophy (my own interest) or
chemistry or related fields as others have focused on. But if it’s
merely dry history of philosophy with no interest in relevancy then
the list will surely die quickly.
I do not at all think that "it is safe to say" that Peirce's work on
meaning has been more influential than his work in semiotics,
especially in recent decades. While it is true that James and Dewey
didn't fully (really, not all that mujch) embrace Peirce's work on
signs. But this field of modern semeiotics which Peirce had pretty
much invented (although drawing from Classical, Medieval, and other
sources) was, naturally, both entirely new to them and quite
difficult to fully grasp (as it is even in our day, although I see
some considerable progress in this regard). As I see it, neither
James nor Dewey had studied enough of the developments in the logic
of Peirce's time to fully (much) understand his semiotic (this was
especially so for James, while Peirce did not think very much of
Dewey's work in logic).
Sorry, I should have clarified that I meant within philosophy proper.
In terms of semiotics you are of course correct. Within philosophy
though the import of Peirce’s logic and semiotics have not yet been
appreciated I fear. My personal opinion is that had people like Dewey
(or later Rorty and Putnam) applied the logic more a lot of
philosophical dead ends would have been avoided. (Indeed I think most
of Quine’s major works largely end up positions Peirce already held
due to his logic)
Again, while I agree with the important of, not only the pragmatic
maxim, but all of his work in pragmaticism, your notion that "the
place of meaningfulness . . . in some ways exceeds his work on
signs" is your opinion, while many would disagree. I haven't time to
discuss this at the moment except to say that I am of that camp
which would _strongly_ disagree.
Well again I’m limiting myself to philosophy and again noting that
in saying how importance meaning is that doesn’t mean his logic is
unimportant. Just not as important.
I still have to address your earlier points which are well made and
need engaged with. Hopefully later this week. I hope that I clarified
that I’m speaking more of philosophy rather than applied semiotics.
