Helmut, Gary F, John S, list, Helmut asked: " But I have not understood, what people mean by "metaphysics". Is it the same as "transcendence"?"
First, to answer your second question, for Peirce metaphysics is most certainly *not* *transcendence* if by 'transcendental' one means experience or existence which is beyond the natural. Quite the contrary as I hope will become clear from my comments below. I would agree with Gary F that the optimal way to get a grasp of what metaphysics is for Peirce is to study his discussions of it in the CP and EP. But for now, just a few general remarks which I hope might be helpful to you in approaching what might be termed Peirce's* scientific metaphysics*. I'll begin by commenting on this within the framework of Peirce's outline of the Sciences of Discovery (Peirce's term) which John Sowa's diagram means to contemporize in certain ways for a particular purpose he's already commented on. As Fernando Zalamea remarked, and with which comment. John has agreed, there is nothing particularly new in Sowa's diagam, which is equivalent to Peirce's outline of the "perennial classification" to use Beverly Kent's expression (Kent's book outlines and analyzes several earlier attempts by Peirce to classify discovery science, Peirce finally arriving at the classification under discussion, one that he did not further modify). And, as just suggested, this was not meant by Peirce to be a classification of all Science, but only of its arguably most important grand division, Science of Discovery. As previously noted (following Albert Adkins following Comte), in Peirce's classification 'super-ordinate' sciences give general principles to 'sub-ordinate' sciences while these, in turn, provide more concrete cases to those 'higher' in the classification. There are, however, and this seems to me important as to the terminology used at the head of Sowa's diagram, that there are two other Grand Sciences for Peirce, namely, Practical Science, what we today call 'applied science' (which Peirce made some unsatisfactory attempts at classifying) and Science of Review, which if any part of science ought be headed 'Knowledge', this branch should be as it brings together (in outlines, diagrams, digests, works of 'the philosophy of science', etc.) the findings of Science of Discovery (Sowa's 'Knowledge'), again Peirce's own expression for the classification diagrammed in this discussion. Of course the contents of such a Review Science will itself be at times in need of modification and enlargement as new findings are made in science of discovery; so even this 'knowledge in review' is not meant to be at all static, certainly not a final repository of scientific knowledge. But now turning to metaphysics within Discovery Science, or, Knowledge (or, Scientific Inquiry as I've suggested as closer to Peirce's notion of the Science of Discovery), I'd like to point to the following concepts and principles, imagining that none of what follows is much in question as Peirce's view whether or not ones agree with him in these matters or not. (It might be helpful to have Sowa's diagram at hand in following these comments.) So, according to Peirce's schema, metaphysics is sub-ordinate to mathematics and philosophy while super-ordinate to the two branches of the Special Sciences (what Sowa terms 'Empirical', 'Organized Experience') which it resembles in being less abstract than mathematics and the other philosophical sciences, indeed, meaning to go beyond theoretical abstraction in investigating *what is in fact real in nature*. It seems to me that some writers on Peirce have conflated at least facets of his phenomenology and metaphysics, for example, in this way: while metaphysics draws principles from phenomenology (and the other sciences 'above' it in the classification), it's findings are *not*, like phenomenology's, a matter of inquiring into a 'seeming reality' (that which merely 'appears' to be real for the inquirer) but, rather, inquires in order to determine exactly what *is real *in the natural world in the interest of preparing the ground for the specific types of observations which the special sciences make, using their particular methodologies, techniques, and instruments (microscopes, telescopes, etc.) So it is super-ordinate to these physical and social sciences while, in the sense just mentioned, it gains real concrete examples from them. As it is sub-ordinate to mathematics and the philosophical sciences which precede it, it will for example, be subject to a severe logical-matematical criticism (which, btw, will involve discussions of categoriality in reality). As Peirce argues, everyone has metaphysical views whether he admits it or not (we all have notions of the nature of reality; Peirce remarks that even the "practical man" has them), so that it is better that they be brought to light and criticized and so, then, possibly refined or revised if that seems warranted. This scrutiny is far preferable to these metaphysical ideas being left lying below the surface, uncriticized, perhaps deeply affecting one's scientific attitudes as he's unaware of them acting 'subconsciously'. In a word, Peirce's is intended to be a "scientific metaphysics," not an a priori affair, which variety of metaphysics he was swift to sharply, almost ruthlessly criticize. Perhaps the strongest argument for Peirce's brand of metaphysics follows from the pragmatic principles which precede it in the last branch of logic, viz., methodeutic or theoretical rhetoric. Traditional metaphysics "is what it is," that is, it isn't *necessarily* intended to have practical bearings--in the mind of the a prior metaphysician at least it is, as it were, infallible. Peirce's scientific metaphysics is, on the other hand, meant to have practical bearings on the special sciences, is intended to be logically criticized and, like all of science, is conducted under the principle of fallibility. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sat, Sep 2, 2017 at 8:31 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Kirsti, John, Tommi, List, > "First in dignity, last in the order of learning": What is meant by > "learning"? Is it the learning of the researcher, or the learning of the > pupil, who is being taught by the researcher the results of the research? I > think, that trying to find out what is behind nature (metaphysics), these > metaphysical laws are learned lastly by the researcher. But when the > researcher teaches them to his/her pupils, it didactically is better to > mention them first. Because they are perhaps quite simple, eg. a "GUT" > (Great unifying theory), or the three Peircean categories, or mathematics, > or something like that, and for the pupil it will be more effective to > learn them first, so he/she will better be able to understand the unfolding > complexity of reality, already knowing the basis for this complexity, so > can mentally reduce this complexity then. > > But I have not understood, what people mean by "metaphysics". Is it the > same as "transcendence"? That would be the necessary conditions for > experience, or something like that Kant wrote. Why does the > easy-to-understand part of laws of nature not belong to metaphysics then? > Not mysterious enough? I think, that Thomas of Aquino has seen everything > much more complicatedly than necessary, because of his religion, in which > God´s ways are unfathomable, or what is the saying again. And why ever > should there be different basic rules for different sciences? Why should > the same logical laws that apply to mathematics not apply to psychology? I > think they do: If people go crazy, they do it because of a reason, don´t > they? > Best, > Helmut > > 02. September 2017 um 22:57 Uhr > kirst...@saunalahti.fi > wrote: > There is a link between ideas of recursion and that of cyclical > arithmetics. Has this not been recognized? > > Kirsti > > John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.9.2017 20:53: > > On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: > >> I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could > >> be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics > >> is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. > > > > I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion > > of the commentaries by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle: > > https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf > > > > The question Avicenna raised and Aquinas analyzed is the seemingly > > circular reasoning in calling metaphysics "prima philosophia et > > ultima scientia". > > > > From p. 2 of the article: > >> According to the beliefs of the Medieval philosopher, the system > >> of knowledge encompasses mathematics as well as ethics, natural > >> sciences as well as theology... > >> I hope to disclose what Thomas Aquinas meant by metaphysics as > >> the first and simultaneously the last philosophy (prima in > >> dignitate, ultima in addiscendo, first in dignity, last in the > >> order of learning), while also revealing the difficulties faced > >> by those who ask: “What is first” in this particular context. > > > > Since Peirce had studied Scholastic logic and philosophy early > > in his career, he must have been aware of these issues for many > > decades before his 1903 classification. I believe that the dotted > > lines in CSPsciences.jpg, for which Peirce cited Comte, represent > > ideas he had been contemplating for many years. > > > > Tommi > >> So because anything that can be found real can also be merely > >> "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible > >> to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical > >> concepts and structures are present in any other science (and > >> therefore > >> "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). > > > > Yes. That is why Peirce said that philosophy and the special sciences > > depend on mathematics for their methods of reasoning. As he said, > > mathematics is based on "diagrammatical reasoning": draw or imagine > > a diagram of any kind and make observations about the connections > > and patterns in it. The diagram need not conform to any prior > > knowledge or experience. > > > > Tommi > >> philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory > >> in special science... But from such principle follows severe > >> restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all > >> to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in > >> which sense psychology is dependent on logic). > > > > That would explain the phrase "ultima in addiscendo" by Aquinas. > > But a restriction on the content of metaphysics would not affect > > the principles it derives from mathematics, phenomenology, and > > the normative sciences. > > > > I would also cite Peirce's article on "Logical Machines" (1887), > > which he published in vol. 1 of the American Journal of Psychology: > > http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf > > > > From p. 4 of "Logical Machines": > >> When we perform reasoning in our unaided minds, we do substantially > >> the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy > >> under certain general conditions, and observe the result. In this > >> point of view too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much > >> as there are certain relations between its parts, which involve other > >> relations that were not expressly intended... [But] every machine > >> has two inherent impotencies... > > > > In this comment, Peirce admitted that machines could do mathematical > > reasoning. The two impotencies of a machine: "it is destitute of all > > originality, of all initiative"; and "it has been contrived to do a > > certain thing, and it can do nothing else". > > > > He added "the mind working with a pencil and plenty of paper has > > no such limitations... And this great power it owes, above all, to > > one kind of symbol, the importance of which is frequently entirely > > overlooked -- I mean the parentheses." > > > > With that comment, Peirce stated the importance of recursion. > > He used recursive methods in various writings, but most logicians > > and philosophers who read his writings missed that point because > > the word 'recursion' was not used in mathematics until the 1930s. > > > > And by the way, recursion looks circular, but useful recursions > > always include a test for stopping when the result is achieved. > > These issues about recursion came out of the debates of Gödel, > > Church, and Turing when they were together in Princeton. > > > > John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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