Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories

2017-10-17 Thread Helmut Raulien
    Supplement: "External, internal" are a bit likely to lead to misunderstandings, I guess. I think, or rather guess, that, as secondness is actuality and firstness possibility, this also applies to the degenerate modes (I rather think of them as submodes). So, that (3.1.) is possibility rather,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories

2017-10-17 Thread Helmut Raulien
  Edwina, list, my concepts of (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.) I mostly have abducted from immediate object (2.1.), dynamic object (2.2.), immediate (3.1.), dynamic (3.2.), final (3.3.) interpretant, and also the parts of the consciousness: Sensation of altersense (2.1.), will of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

2017-10-17 Thread kirstima
John, Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist untill they become actual. Thus a token. There always is the Scylla and Charybnis between understandability and logic. But claiming existance to possibilities just does not hold. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 17.10.2017 05:48: This

Re: LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

2017-10-17 Thread kirstima
John, Jerry, list I feel utterly surprised. It never occurred to me that LEM could be taken as a 'technical' term. - Thank you Jerry for correcting that mistake. The three basic assumtions of modern logic are, of course, intertwined. If LEM is put questionable, the other two simultaneously

[PEIRCE-L] Categories

2017-10-17 Thread Edwina Taborsky
Helmut - I can see how you are arriving at this outline of the categories - matter-form-interaction - and they DO fit into the three modal categories. My own view of the six modes possible within these three categories analyzes how they function within time and space. 1-1

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

2017-10-17 Thread Gary Richmond
John, list, The snippet you quoted from this recent discussion of "existence" and "reality" wasn't mine, so I'll confine myself to your conclusion. You wrote: . . . many sentences that talk about possibilities and generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables. Therefore,

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

2017-10-17 Thread Helmut Raulien
Edwina, list, I completely agree with your outline of what a thing categorially is. My proposal about a thing is: Category 1 is matter/material, cat. 2 is form, and cat. 3 is interaction. 2.1. (firstness of secondness) is the form from the inside, the thing´s perspective, and 2.2. (secondness of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

2017-10-17 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/17/2017 8:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I would rather see as Mark Type Token, using Type as mediation... I agree that the type is the mediator, but changing the order would conflict with the names Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It's better to draw them in a triangle with Type at

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

2017-10-17 Thread Edwina Taborsky
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } John - yes, I agree that we are getting hung up on words, - I have some thoughts on why - but won't go into them. With regard to the Mark Token Type - which I would rather see as Mark Type Token, using Type as

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.1

2017-10-17 Thread gnox
We now commence discussion of the second Lowell Lecture. As before, I will post parts of it serially, without comment, and those who have comments or questions can post them to the list as replies, keeping the subject line unchanged (unless a thread moves on to a topic unrelated to this lecture).