Margaretha, Jon AS, List, I don’t see as much similarity between Popper’s “Three Worlds” and Peirce’s three “categories” as Jon does. The main difference is that there’s no Firstness in Popper’s schema. The list of “logical distinctions” Margaretha gives in explanation of it is a list of dyadic relations. But Firstness, in its simplest (relational) definition, is “that which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else.” In other words, a First (in Peirce’s phenomenology) is a Quality (or quale) independent of any relation, dyadic, triadic or n-adic. But every experience involves relations; so the only way to get a strict conception of monadic Firstness is to prescind <https://gnusystems.ca/howtodefine.htm#prscnd> it from experiential relationships, such as the subject-object relationship in perception or the subject-predicate relationship in propositions.
Some of the posts about phaneroscopy on this list seem to show an inability to perform such prescission, or perhaps the posters just don’t see the point of it. This is quite natural, as we are all aware that perception of any existing thing is essentially an interaction (based on a dyadic relation) between a perceiver and a perceived object. So we can’t easily conceive of a thing existing “regardless of anything else”; and indeed a First does not exist as the things in Popper’s First World do. That’s why existence, in Peirce’s terminology, always involves Secondness. But qualia, unlike our conceptions of them and words for them, are innocent of both Secondness and Thirdness. Like Jon, I’m wondering what you mean by “in-depth discussion of the role of metaphors.” I’ll just mention that I’m especially interested in the metaphors that we are not aware of as such. For instance, the container metaphor that lurks in the background whenever we talk about the “content” if a text or other sign. My chapter on Context and Content <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm> uses a semiotic analysis to uncover some of the misleading ideas arising from that metaphor. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 20-Oct-21 18:06 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Post Peirce Margaretha, List: MH: Popper introduced what is now called the Three-Worlds Hypothesis. It is a heuristic advising people to carefully reflect on the initial logical distinctions with which they work as containers. This sounds conceptually similar to Peirce's "three Universes of Experience," respectively comprising "Ideas," "Brute Actuality," and "Signs" (CP 6:455, EP 2:435, 1908). Popper's three worlds are "first, the world of physical objects or of physical states; secondly the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought" (Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, p. 106). Hence, it seems to me that Popper's world 1 directly corresponds to Peirce's second universe, while Popper's worlds 2 and 3 only loosely correspond to Peirce's first and third universes. MH: Below is a blog of someone who is seeing all these connection as well (with pictures of Peirce and Rosenberg!) While the linked blog entry correctly identifies James and Peirce as the founders of pragmatism, it unfortunately proceeds to make an all-too-common mistake in summarizing that philosophy. One of the core tenets of Pragmatism is that theories should be considered as instruments, not solutions or truths. In their view, a theory, like any other tool, should be judged primarily by its ability to get a desired result, rather than validity in any absolute sense. This is consistent with James's nominalist version of pragmatism, which is a theory of truth, but definitely not with Peirce's extreme scholastic realist version of pragmatism--i.e., pragmaticism--which is a theory of meaning. MH: The one thing that is missing on this blog is an in-depth discussion of the role of metaphors in it all. Please elaborate, including any relevant insights that Peirce might have offered. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 11:37 AM Margaretha Hendrickx <mahe3...@gmail.com <mailto:mahe3...@gmail.com> > wrote: I second Gary's and Jon's comment and would like to use it as an opportunity to further scholarship on the connections between the work of Karl Popper and CSP. Popper introduced what is now called the Three-Worlds Hypothesis. It is a heuristic advising people to carefully reflect on the initial logical distinctions with which they work as containers. Popper advised us to remain diligent about maintaining the following logical distinctions: - between self and other (similar to Emmanuel Levinas who also worked with the concept of the other as irreducible into the same) - between self and artefacts (such as texts, laptops, internets, and nuclear power plants) - between self and the forces regulating the universe independent of our human understanding of them - between artefact and the forces regulating the universe independent of our human understanding of them Based on what I have learned so far, the Three-Worlds (TWH)hypothesis is closer to Ogden & Richards triangle of reference than to CPS triad which seems to be more concerned with classification. The reason I bring up the TWH is that it has been helpful for me to recognize whenever I was projecting and confusing my (world 2) phantasy life with (world 1) reality, and go overboard in my phantasy life making attributions to others, blindly without any good reason. Marshall Rosenberg is someone who worked it all in the context of non-violent communication models. Below is a blog of someone who is seeing all these connection as well (with pictures of Peirce and Rosenberg!) https://medium.com/@davegray/the-roots-of-liminal-thinking-3be4bea6fd63 The one thing that is missing on this blog is an in-depth discussion of the role of metaphors in it all. ~ Margaretha H.
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