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Jerry,
I presented a talk at a Peirce session of an APA conference in April 2015. On
slide 19 of that talk, I made the point that Peirce's EGs resolve a supposed
ambiguity of the word 'is'. Some logicians claim that it's ambiguous because
that verb can be used in three different ways. See be
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 06. Dezember 2023 um 20:02 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: jonalanschm...@gmail.com
Cc: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
Jon, List,
Thank you, Jon! Regarding the by you mentioned difference between "top down" and "bottom up", I gue
Jon, List,
Thank you, Jon! Regarding the by you mentioned difference between "top down" and "bottom up", I guess, that a theory mostly goes top down, attempting to follow reality, given that the theory (and reality too, of course) is not e.g. solipsistic or nominalistic. I mean, if it is a univ
Helmut, List,
The question is easily answered by looking at the triadic or hexadic
classes of signs.
In the first case, only the Argument is a sign whose interpreter is a
Thirdness.
In the second case, in the absence of denominations, it suffices to list
the classes of signs that incorporate interp
Helmut, List:
Assignments of Peirce's three universal categories to different phenomena
are not absolute, they are contextual in accordance with the relevant
relations among them. For example, the sign, its object, and its
interpretant only correspond respectively to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns within their