Re: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Here is the entire beginning of my section 5 to which Gary F. refers: *"5. Some preliminary and necessary clarifications about terminology.* *Universal Categories are "categories of elements of phenomena.*" Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish clearly, in any statement, whether one is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Robert, you wrote yesterday: RM: here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out that Peirce proposes a name to designate each category and a derived name to designate the elements (phanerons) belonging to each of these categories. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On

Re: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

correction concerning item 1: 1- I construct a mathematical object diagrammatized as follows: 3 → 2 →1 (C), which is a Poset in which the graphs-numbers 3,2,1 are connected by arrows that represent homogenous binary relations between them that verify the axioms required to be a Poset Honorary

Re: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Gary F. ... now it's you who goes faster than the music GF : *"Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as “phanerons.” *(sic). I have never written such nonsense. For more than 40 years I have been talking about the elements of phenomena; I have even built a

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Gary, List   I donot know the state of the art of mathemathics at Peirce´s time, but today, I would say, mathemathics is primary and totally general, not just hypothetical, and covers not only deduction, but also induction, is not only the basis for negative logic / sciences, but for positive as

RE: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Jack, list, I should point out (to avoid further confusion) that Robert’s brand of category theory is a post-Peircean development and does not adhere strictly to Peirce’s phaneroscopic terminology. Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as “phanerons.” He refers to the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

that all phenomena are Firsts. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien Sent: 9-Jul-21 12:38 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12 Gary F., The idea, that a phenomenon is a first, I have got during the recent thread

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Gary F.,   The idea, that a phenomenon is a first, I have got during the recent thread about phaneroscopy, aka phenomenology, in which it was more or less agreed, that that subject is about phenomena as firstnesses, or as a science itself being a firstness, in contrast to semiotics. Or something

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Helmut, A phenomenon is anything that appears, or is present to the mind. The phaneron is the collective total of whatever appears or could appear or be present to the mind generically (not to a particular mind). The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Gary, List   Now I am confused about the definition of phenomenon, and accordingly phenomenology / phaneroscopy. If secondness, reaction, is a part of its, a phenomenon is not a first. I had thought it was. But firsts don´t have parts (see previous slide), so there cannot be a second of a first.

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Below the text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Secondness from the Century