Edwina, the story of my life is, that I frequently want things that donot emerge due to my wanting. But I agree. At least I am a mechanic, so I can know something.
Best, Helmut
25. Dezember 2020 um 20:27 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
Helmut - I don't think that we can 'want' both
Helmut - I don't think that we can 'want' both democracy and
capitalism. Neither emerges due to our 'wanting'.
Capitalism is an economic mode that enables a growth economy and
population growth. No other economic mode enables either. And
democracy is simply a political system
Edwina,
so, if we want both democracy and capitalism, we should support individual private enterprises, I agree. And for companies bigger than an individual co-operatives. Otherwise the business-owners cannot become majority.
I don´t think, that all knowledge is incomplete. Due to Goedel, as far
Helmut - No, I don't think that Godel's incompleteness theory has
anything to do with democracy. After all, if we take as a given, that
all knowledge is incomplete [and Peirce would be the first to say
this!], then, we'd have to question other historical forms of
governance - such as a
Helmut, List:
I am still having trouble following you here. Intuitionistic logic does not
have anything to do with belief or truth, except as a formal system for
drawing valid deductive inferences such that the conclusion is true as long
as the premisses are true. Its main difference from
Steven, List:
SS: Notice the large amount of leeway given in this notion of “justified
true” belief:
There is indeed considerable leeway for "justified" since it can range from
merely plausible for abduction/retroduction to probable for induction to
certain for deduction. Even in the last case,
Jon, List,
the fallacy of intuitionistic logic in my hypothesis is, that it first includes belief into the concept of truth, then sees, that belief is not two-valued, and then denies the law of the excluded middle for both. But the NOT-operator can only be applied for truth-problems, and so
Jon Schmidt,
We appear to state the same things. Notice the large amount of leeway given in
this notion of “justified true” belief:
justified true belief
justified if it is the conclusion of a valid argument (note: valid argument
includes mere plausibility)
a belief is true if the
Helmut, Steven, List:
HR: For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify
intuitionistic logic.
What would it mean to *justify* intuitionistic logic? What kind of
reasoning would one use to do so? From my standpoint, it is "justified" by
not imposing excluded middle as if it were an
Correction: I guess I meant "operator" instead of "quantor". I am not a certified logician.
Steven,
yes, I nearly totally agree. Interesting, that Goedel said that. An observer cannot know the onologic state of a system the observer is part of. Then calling it knowledge is false, it
Steven,
yes, I nearly totally agree. Interesting, that Goedel said that. An observer cannot know the onologic state of a system the observer is part of. Then calling it knowledge is false, it is belief. Truth can only justifiedly be assumed about a system the observer is not part of, like a
Helmut,
I think I follow. You guys are clearly expert logicians, but it is easy to get
so far into the weeds the way out is lost forever.
Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be
knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic.
Yes. Logic can kill you.
Supplement: Interesting is the difference between belief and knowledge: The belief values (affirmation, weak, strong negation) classify three groups: Believers, non-believers, and deniers. Affirmation makes believers a class, weak negation makes non-believers and deniers one class, strong
List,
For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitionistic logic. Is it the not yet done proof, is it the weak negation, or is it habout handling concepts?
If it is the not yet achieved proof, I think, that is nominalism, isnt it? And it can easily, by induction, be
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