Helmut,

“Retroduction” is logically the same as “abduction”, but it’s the term Peirce 
used for it in his “Neglected Argument” (and other late papers), defining it as 
“reasoning from consequent to antecedent.” There is something “backwards” about 
that, so “retroduction” is probably a better name. Besides, in English, 
“abduction” can also mean kidnapping, which adds to the confusion. As a way of 
‘fixing belief,” I think your description of it as “a guess that 
self-stabilizes and becomes homeostatic” is really quite accurate!

Gary f.

 

} You can't depend on your judgment when your imagination is out of focus. 
[Mark Twain] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> 
Sent: 13-May-18 12:35
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: retroduction and abduction

 

List,

maybe in the other thread "Peirce and theism" I have made a mistake by 
identifying "retroductive argument" with "circular argument". But perhaps 
"retroduction" is the same like "abduction"? Or may abduction also be a 
far-fetched guess, while retroduction is something more: A guess that 
self-stabilizes and becomes homeostatic: A circular argument?

Best, Helmut

  

Gesendet: Sonntag, 13. Mai 2018 um 18:14 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> >
An: h.raul...@gmx.de <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> 
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> , 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Betreff: Aw: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

  

  

Supplement: If what i wrote below is correct, then there is a problem with the 
term "theist", because in terms of reality as functionality hardly anybody 
would be able to call her/himself an atheist: God as a self-stabilizing 
(self-upstepping, homeostatic) concept is not easy to refute, is it?

  

Thank you, Gary f., for correcting my use of the term "proof". I now recall, 
that K.O. Apel didn´t say "final proof", but "ultimate foundation" 
("Letztbegründung") "of discourse ethics". He also wrote of "self-upstepping of 
reality" ("Selbstaufstufung der Realität") in this context. I think, this means 
a circular (retroductive) argument.

I see that "proof of existence" needs direct experience. But I think, that this 
direct experience may also be in a premiss of a deductive argument- or even in 
a pre-premiss which has formed the premiss by a deductive argument, or a 
pre-pre-premiss...

So the direct experience needed for calling something existent is a 
spatiotemporal one, I think.

Now my guess about what is needed to call something "real" or "being" or "ens" 
or "ontological" is a direct experience too: The direct experience of fixation 
of belief by a retroduction ("self-upstepping of reality", maybe badly 
translated). Of course spatiotemporal direct experience does the job too, as 
existence is a subset of reality.

Well, I am just trying to get the concepts in order. Existence is spatial, I 
think, and reality is functional.

 

Best, Helmut

13. Mai 2018 um 17:07 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
wrote:

Helmut, since you ask,

The only “proof of existence” is direct experience; no kind of reasoning is up 
to the task of verifying the genuine Secondness of anything that exists — as 
opposed to an ens rationis, which may or may not be real, but its reality is 
not that of an existing thing.

Usually in logic, if not in religion, “proof” refers to a deductive argument, 
and that is the milieu in which a circular argument is invalid. Peirce’s 
“Neglected Argument” is much more retroductive than deductive. 

I think Peirce preferred not to use terms like “theism” or “theist” (or 
“deist”) because those are technical terms in theology. One thing Peirce 
apparently shared with William Fox is that they both became impatient with 
theology and simply avoided it as they grew older. “God” on the other hand is a 
vernacular term, and a supremely vague one (as Peirce pointed out more than 
once), so using “belief in God” rather than “theism” is a way of placing the 
matter in the realm of instinctive common sense, where he thought the concept 
of God belonged. If we regard his NA as deductive, we have to say that its 
premisses are that belief in a Creator is instinctive, and that such 
instinctive beliefs are more reliable than beliefs based on reasoning. Both of 
those premisses are questionable, in my opinion, but if we grant them, then the 
deductive argument has some validity. But the deductive argument is not the one 
that matters to Peirce anyway, as far as I can see.

 

Gary f.

 

} You can't depend on your judgment when your imagination is out of focus. 
[Mark Twain] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> >
Sent: 13-May-18 04:22
 

Gary, Gary, list,

I understand that when it is about reality (of God), Peirce was a theist, and 
when it is about existence, not. Now i have a more general question about real 
versus existent:

Is it so, that for the proof of reality a circular argument is valid, but for 
the proof of existence it is not?

Examples for circular arguments that prove (or even create) a reality: K.O. 
Apel´s final proof of discourse ethics, Anselm´s God-proof.

Best, Helmut

  

 Sonntag, 13. Mai 2018 um 06:35 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >
wrote:

Gary F, list,

 

GF: After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to say 
about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t contribute a 
definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who denies the 
existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362). Since Peirce 
consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality) of God, that 
would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never self-applied that 
term.

On this list and elsewhere we've discussed how difficult it is (or how lax one 
can become) sometimes in discussing Reality without using words like 'is', 
'existence', and so forth. Peirce sometimes expresses himself about matters 
pertaining to reality in such truly inappropriate existential language.  So, 
you knowing this, I will assume that you are merely playing with words in what 
you wrote above. For if in Peircean terms one more properly defines an 
"atheist" as "One who denies the reality of God" Peirce was most certainly not 
an atheist.

GF: I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist” either, though. Nor did I 
find him applying it to anyone else.

That he did or did not self- or other-apply the word "theist" seems of little 
importance in my view. For, as Jon S. wrote today: "If Peirce was not a theist, 
then what other term should we use instead for someone who very explicitly, on 
more than one occasion, in no uncertain terms, affirmed his belief in the 
Reality of God? So, a theist, properly understood in Peircean terms, is simply 
one who believes in the Reality of God. In this sense Peirce was most certainly 
a theist.

GF: So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells us 
more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any other 
source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:

“The word “God,” … is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in 
my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.” (I wish I knew 
more about Ens necessarium … )

I too wish I knew more about Ens Necessarium. In his 1937 book,  Ends & Means, 
Aldous Huxley offers a hint in remarking that a traditional theistic argument 
was "that if there is an ens necessarium it must be at the same time an ens 
realissimum."

 

That certainly makes good sense for Peirce's theism!

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

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