Helmut, Stan, lists, "A subsumes B" can be interpreted in more than one ways:
"A contains B." "A depends on B." "A is supervenient on B." "B is prerequisite for A." "A emerges from B." The choice between these possible interpretations under a given context of discourse can be made only on the basis of the physicochemically realistic *MECHANISMS *that can implement the relations, and not just based on logic. I believe that "When it comes to evaluating the validity of any suggested (090715-1) physicochemical interactions, MECHANISMS trump logic." For the convenience of possible future discussions, Statement (090715-1) may be referred to as the *Principle of Mechanisms over Logic*" (*PoMoL* or more briefly *PML*). Most theoretical and philosophical discussions on *emergence* and *organizations *seem to ignore discussing the difficult problems of specifying the physical, chemical, macroscopic, and/or microscopic *mechanisms* responsible for emergence or organization, resulting in end-less and futile debates. For example, the issue of whether or not neurons synchronize their electrical activities through non-local effect (i..e, via entanglement) is an issue concerning the MECHANISM of neuronal interactions, and not concerning something outside of it, as some members on these lists seem to assume. To highlight the fundamental import of mechanisms in science, I am tempted to suggest the following generalization: "*Mechanisms* are to hard sciences (new philosophy ?) (090715-2) what *logic* is to soft sciences (traditional philosophy ?)." If I am not mistaken, Statement (090715-2) applies to Peirce's philosophy as well, since most of the *mechanisms* that are widely discussed in the contemporary physics (e.g., the second law, statistical mechanics, quantum mechanics, dark matter and structure of the spiral galaxies), chemistry (e.g., covalent vs. noncovalent bonds, transition-state theory of chemical kinetics, self-organizing chemical reactions or chemical waves), and biology (e.g., the role of DNA in storing and expressing genetic information, molecular biology, role of chemical waves in cell biology, neurotransmitters, neural synchrony and consciousness, fMRI and human thought, etc.) were unknown to him. If this is true, PML would suggest the following conclusion: "It is impossible to anticipate a complete agreement between (090715-3) Peircean semiotics and natural sciences because the former is based mainly on *logic* while the latter is based mainly on *mechanisms*." With all the best. Sung On Mon, Sep 7, 2015 at 6:46 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Sung, Stan, lists, > the interpretation as a subsumptive hierarchy in this case has a > metaphoric character, I think, because there is the demand, that within > subsumption the higher level "is-a-kind-of " the lower level: To say, that > cells are a kind of molecules, is a metaphor. And it is only understandable > (for an alien who has visited the earth, and whose body does not consist of > cells) from the time on when there have emerged multicellular organisms. > Best, > Helmut > > > "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Helmut, Stan, lists, > > (*1)* I agree. The structural hierarchy shown in Figure 1 is both > *compositional* and *subsumptive*. "Compositional" can mean either > reductive or reductionistic (top-down) or constructive or synthetic > (bottom-up), and "subsumptive" can mean emergent (bottom-up) or > supervenient (top-down). It may well be that these various names mean > little unless their associated *mechanisms *of *organization *are > specified*, *of which there are almost infinite number, just as there are > almost infinite number of organizations (both as types and as tokens) in > the Universe. > > > *Societies* (Languages, sciences, technologies, arts, > religions; SOCIOLOGY) ^ > | > * Brains* (Self-replication with variations, symbolic; > PSYCHOLOGY) > ^ > | > *Cells* (Life, or the highly condensed form of information > [3]; BIOLOGY) > ^ > | > *Molecules* (Catalysis of chemical reactions; CHEMISTRY) > ^ > | > *Atoms* (Crystals; PHYSICS) > > Figure 1. Five levels of material ORGANIZATION with associated EMERGENT > properties. > The bottom-up direction = *COMPOSITIONAL HIERARCHY* > The top-down direction = *SUBSUMPTION HIERARCHY *[1] (?) > Reproduced from [biosemiotics:8854]. > > > (*2*) I think the type-token distinction applies to each level of Figure > 1. For example, the atom is a type and the hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen etc. > atoms are tokens. The society is a type, but the American society, the > Nigerian society, the Korean society, etc. are tokens. > > (*3*) Again, I would like to emphasize that Figure 1 embodies the > 'principle of the emergence-invariance complementarity' first discussed in > the PEIRCE-L list on 9/1/2015. The principle of ORGANIZATION (PO) (i.e., > the material arrangement in space and time driven by free energy > dissipation) applies to atoms to molecules to cells to brains to the > cosmos. It seems to me that the principle of organization is consistent > with Peircean *synechism*. Here Organization may be viewed as a type > which contains many tokens, each distinguished by individual mechanisms of > organization (perhaps this is what Helmut meant above ?): > > (i) Atoms = organized systems of electrons, protons and neutrons connected > by strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces, > (ii) Molecules = organized systems of atoms connected by chemical bonds, > (iii) Cells = organized systems of molecules interacting through shape > complementarity [1], > (iv) Brains = organized systems of neurons and other cells through > intercellular interactions mediated by electromagnetic and concentration > waves, and > (v) Societies = organized systems of individuals interacting through > linguistic (e.g., sound waves), visual (i.e., elecromagnetic waves), and > tactile communications. > > (*4*) Figure 1 provides fairly comprehensive examples of DISCONTINUITIES > in the Universe each characterized by a different set of EMERGENT > PROPERTIES engendered by unique *mechanisms* of organization. Peirce > discussed CONTINUITY under the rubric of SYNECHISM. I am not a Peirce > scholar to know whether or not Peirce also discussed DISCONTINUITY in his > writings and, if so, whether or not he gave any name to DISCONTINUITY as he > did for CONTINUITY ? > > (*5*) I suggest that semiosis, e.g, the *irreducibly triadic process* > of transferring meaning from an utterer to a hearer mediated by a sign, is > a form of organization, i.e., a form of organized processes. Since > irreducible triadic processes can occur in atomic systems as they can in > molecular systems (e.g., the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction), it may be > justified to conclude that semiosis is another *scale-invariant *(i.e., > regardless of scale) *universal principle* applicable to the structural > hierarchy shown in Figure 1. > > (*6*) If there is a *scale-invariant semiosis *(as indicated in (5)), > there must be "*scale-dependent semiosis*" as well, according to the > Yin-Yang doctrine of the Daoist philosophy and the complementarity > principle of Bohr [2] as generalized in the form of complementarism in [3]. > If this conjecture is true, > > *"The structural hierarchy shown in Figure 1 embodies both > *(090615-1) > *the scale-invariant and the scale-dependent semioses." * > > All the best. > > Sung > > > > References: > [1] Ji, S. and Ciobanu, G. (2003). Conformon-driven biopolymer > shape changes in cell modeling. *BioSystems *70:165-181. > [2] Plotnitsky, A. (2003). Niel Bohr and Complementarity: An > Introduction. Springer, New York. > > [3] Ji, S. (2004). Semiotics of Life: A Unified Theory of Molecular > Machines, Living Cells, the Mind, Peircean Signs, and the Universe based > on the Principle of Information-Energy Complementarity. *Reports, the > Research Group on Mathematical Linguistic *(Martin-Vide, C., ed.), Rovira > i Virgili University, Tarragona, Spain, pp. 1-183. PDF at > http://www.cnformon.net under Publciaitons > Proceedings &Abstracts. > > > > On Sun, Sep 6, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> Stan, Sung, lists, >> Stan, is it ok, to say: >> -Subsumptive or specification hierarchy is about types, or intensions of >> terms/concepts, >> -Compositional or scale hierarchy is about tokens, or sets of same >> tokens, or subsets of extensions of terms/concepts, >> -Subsumptive hierarchy requires (or is the product of) a subsumer (such >> as Linne), who looks at (or has inquired, or merely guesses) the history >> and ancestry of the subsystems, >> -Compositional hierarchy requires (or is the product of) an observer who >> looks only at the momentary situation of the subsystems? >> >> Sung, in this case, your hierarchy "atoms, molecules, cells, brains, >> societies" can be both kinds of hierarchies (and before I hadnt thought >> that this was possible), but eg. the subsystem "molecules" in one case is >> the type, and in the other case is the set of tokens, that are parts of the >> respective cell that belongs to the set of "cells", that are parts of the >> respective brain, and so on. >> >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> "Stanley N Salthe" <ssal...@binghamton.edu> wrote: >> >> Sung -- Yes, in this case either interpretation is possible. But the >> consequences of each choice are quite different, each representing a >> different discourse. >> >> STAN >> >> On Sat, Sep 5, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >>> >>> Stan, lists, >>> >>> Figure 1 seems to represent your 'scale hierarchy' (viewed from bottom >>> up), since atoms are smaller than molecules which are smaller than cells >>> which are smaller than brains which are smaller than societies [1]. >>> >>> Can we also say that Figure 1 represents a "specification" hierarchy [1] >>> as well in the sense that >>> >>> "Physical laws constrain chemistry, chemical laws constrain biology, >>> biological (090515-1) >>> laws constrain psychology, and psychological laws constrain social >>> behaviors." >>> >>> >>> I think the term "supervenience" may apply here as well -- >>> "supervenience" as defined in [2]: >>> >>> "A set of properties *A* supervenes upon another set *B* just in case >>> no two things can differ with respect to *A*-properties without also >>> differing with respect to their *B*-properties." >>> >>> "Donald Davidson played a key role in bringing the idea to center >>> stage. He introduced the term ‘supervenience’ into contemporary philosophy >>> of mind in the following passage: >>> >>> [M]ental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, >>> on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that >>> there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in >>> some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect >>> without altering in some physical respect (1970, 214)." >>> >>> >>> Employing the concept of supervenience, Figure 1 may be described >>> alternatively thus: >>> >>> "Sociology is supervenient on psychology which is supervenient >>> (090515-2) >>> on biology which is supervenient on chemistry which is supervenient >>> on physics." >>> >>> >>> >>> *Societies* (Languages, sciences, >>> technologies, arts, religions; >>> SOCIOLOGY) >>> >>> ^ >>> | >>> * Brains* (Self-replication with >>> variations, symbolic; >>> PSYCHOLOGY) >>> ^ >>> | >>> *Cells* (Life, or the highly >>> condensed form of information [3]; >>> BIOLOGY) >>> ^ >>> | >>> *Molecules* (Catalysis of >>> chemical reactions; >>> CHEMISTRY) >>> ^ >>> | >>> *Atoms* (Crystals; >>> PHYSICS) >>> >>> Figure 1. Five levels of material ORGANIZATION with associated EMERGENT >>> properties. >>> The bottom-up direction = *COMPOSITIONAL HIERARCHY* >>> The top-down direction = *SUPSUMPTION HIERARCHY *[1] >>> (?) >>> >>> >>> If the logic behind the above considerations is sound, we may conclude >>> that >>> >>> "Figure 1 embodies both the *scale* and *specification* heirarchies >>> (090515-3) >>> of Salthe." >>> >>> "The emergence of new properties may required both scale and >>> (090515-4) >>> specification hierarchies." >>> >>> >>> "When A *emerges* from B in a hierarchy, A can be said to be >>> (090515-5) >>> *supervenient* on B." >>> >>> All the best. >>> >>> Sung >>> >>> References: >>> [1] Salthe, S. (XXXX). Where Science Meets Philosophy. *Axiomathes* >>> *22*:355-383. >>> [2] Supervenience. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 5, 2015 at 9:31 AM, Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Sung -- It's OK as a compositional hierarchy >>>> >>>> STAN >>>> >>>> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 8:03 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Helmut, Stan, and lists, >>>>> >>>>> Applying the so-called "the principle of the *emergence-invariance >>>>> complementarity*" discussed on these lists recently [1, 2] to the >>>>> problem of "thought", I came up with the following tentative conclusions: >>>>> >>>>> (1) *INVARIANCE:* >>>>> >>>>> "What is common to crystals and the human brain is >>>>> ORGANIZATION, (090415-1) >>>>> of matter, there being various degrees of organizations, each >>>>> of which >>>>> having a distinct function." >>>>> >>>>> (2) *EMERGENCE:* >>>>> >>>>> "What emerges when the complexity of organization increases from >>>>> (090415-2) >>>>> that of crystals to that of the human brain is *thought*." >>>>> >>>>> What connects crystals and the human brain is the living cell or life >>>>> which is in turn a highly condensed form of information leading to the >>>>> following thesis. >>>>> >>>>> (3) *EMERGENCE of LIFE from MATTER:* >>>>> >>>>> "Life can be viewed as highly condensed form of *information*, >>>>> just (090415-3) >>>>> as physicists consider matter as highly condensed form of >>>>> *energy*" [3]. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Statements (090415-1), (090415-2), and (090415-3), can be organized as >>>>> a hierarchy as shown in Figure 1. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Societies* (Languages, >>>>> sciences, technologies, arts, religions, etc.) >>>>> ^ >>>>> | >>>>> * Brains* (Self-replication >>>>> with variations, symbolic) >>>>> ^ >>>>> | >>>>> *Cells* (Life, or the highly >>>>> condensed form of information [3]) >>>>> ^ >>>>> | >>>>> *Molecules* (Catalysis of >>>>> chemical reactions) >>>>> ^ >>>>> | >>>>> *Atoms* (Crystals) >>>>> >>>>> Figure 1. Five levels of material ORGANIZATION with associated >>>>> EMERGENT properties. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> All the best. >>>>> >>>>> Sung >>>>> >>>>> >>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>> >>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>> Rutgers University >>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>> 732-445-4701 >>> >>> www.conformon.net >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> References: >>>>> [1] Ji, S. (2015). Emergence vs. Invariance: Are they >>>>> complementary aspectg sof complex system >>>>> Posted to PEIRCE-L on September 1, 2015. >>>>> [2] Ji, S. (2015). Can crystals think ? Posted to PEIRCE-L on >>>>> Septbmer 2, 2015. >>>>> [3] Ji, S. (2004). Semiotics of Life: A Unified Theory of >>>>> Molecular Machines, Cells, the Mind, Peircean Signs, and the Universe >>>>> based >>>>> on the Principle of Information-Energy Complementarity. >>>>> <http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SOLManuscriptsubmitted_final_downloaded_from_Taragona_09032011_modified_07282012.pdf> >>>>> In: >>>>> Reports, Research Group on Mathematical Iinguistics, XVII Tarragona >>>>> Seminar >>>>> on Formal Syntax and Semantics, Rovira i Virgili University, Tarragona, >>>>> 23-27 April 2003. PDF at http://www.conformon,.net under >>>>> Publications > Proceedings and Abstracts. P. 2. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 11:53 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Sung, >>>>>> I think, that the human mind is a (as I call it) "causally closed" >>>>>> system, because the pictures and wishes a human has got in his/her mind, >>>>>> are not (except if they are communicated) shared by other minds. See in >>>>>> my >>>>>> first post about "causalities" the attachment. And I think, that crystals >>>>>> are not causally closed. The quasi-mind of the universe, or of the >>>>>> evolution, has made human minds possible, but does not have telepathical >>>>>> connection with them either. That is what I assume, but it may be >>>>>> different. Some religions say that it is, eg. the Atman- Paratman theory >>>>>> by >>>>>> the Hindus, I think. Peirce thought, that all minds are connected, which >>>>>> I >>>>>> just do not understand: >>>>>> >>>>>> "[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any >>>>>> way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it >>>>>> corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to >>>>>> whose >>>>>> mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having >>>>>> entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found >>>>>> in my mind are present at all times and to all minds." (Adirondack >>>>>> Lectures, 1905; in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1 >>>>>> [eds. >>>>>> Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University >>>>>> Press, 1931], paragraph 284) >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Helmut >>>>>> >>>>>> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Helmut, >>>>>> >>>>>> By the same token then, wouldn't you have to say that " . . . >>>>>> .although humans do not think, it is the quasi-mind that is thinking" ? >>>>>> The key question would be, do we need to invoke a quasi-mind to explain >>>>>> the >>>>>> human mind ? Aren't humans self-sufficient to think and mind ? >>>>>> >>>>>> To me, "thought" can mean either the "result" or the "process" of >>>>>> thinking. In either case, "thought" is an example of what Prigogine >>>>>> called >>>>>> "dissipative structures" [1, 2] which I have abbreviated as >>>>>> "dissipatons" >>>>>> in [3]. >>>>>> Again, I agree with Pickering that crystals do not think as we do >>>>>> [4], because crystals are *equilibrium structures* and not *dissipative >>>>>> structures*. From the thermodynamic point of view, the raising of >>>>>> questions like "Can crystals think ?" is unthinkable. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> All the best. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sung >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Reference: >>>>>> [1] Prigogine, I. and Lefever, R. (1968). Symmetry-breaking >>>>>> instabilities in dissipative systems. II. *J. Chem. Phys*. >>>>>> *48:*1695-1700. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> [2] Prigogine, I. (1977). Dissipative Structures and Biological >>>>>> Order, *Adv. Biol. Med. Phys.* *16: *99-113. >>>>>> >>>>>> [3] Ji, S. (2012). Principles of Self-Organization and >>>>>> Dissipative Structures. >>>>>> <http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=1088> In: *Molecular Theory >>>>>> of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical * >>>>>> >>>>>> [4] Pickering, J. (2007). Affordances are Signs. *tripleC* *5* >>>>>> (2):64-74. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Applications.* Springer, New York. Chapter 3, pp. 69-78. PDF at >>>>>> http://www.cpnformon.net under Publications > Book Chapters. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 1:53 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Sung, List, >>>>>>> Maybe it is correct to say, that "Thought (...) appears in the work >>>>>>> (...) of crystals", although crystals do not think, if it is the >>>>>>> quasi-mind >>>>>>> of the universe that is thinking, but not each single crystal. Just like >>>>>>> when a human is uttering a symbolic word, it is not the word, that is >>>>>>> thinking. >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Helmut >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Peirceans and biosemioticians, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These following two quotes address the relations among three quite >>>>>>> distinct types of material objects -- *crystals*, *bees*, and >>>>>>> *humans*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Thought is no necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in >>>>>>> the work of bees, of crystals and (090215-1) >>>>>>> throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that >>>>>>> it is really there, than that the >>>>>>> colors, the shapes, etc. of objects are really there." (CP 4.551) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ". . . . This is not to say that bees and crystals think in anything >>>>>>> like the way that human beings think, (090215-2) >>>>>>> and they surely cannot know they are thinking, . . . " [1] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To me, the first quote of Peirce highlights the CONTINUITY or >>>>>>> invariance (i.e., thought, mind, semiosis, or ITR, irreducible triadic >>>>>>> relation) found among these material systems. In contrast, Pickering >>>>>>> [1], >>>>>>> while cognizant of the continuity, nevertheless, is not blind to the >>>>>>> DISCONTINUITY, or the emergent properties (resulting from the increasing >>>>>>> organizational complexities from crystals, to bees and to humans), among >>>>>>> the same set of objects. I agree with Pickering. Organizations are not >>>>>>> all same. Some organizations (as in the human brain) can cause thinking >>>>>>> that is detectable by an EEG machine, while some other organizations >>>>>>> (e.g., >>>>>>> in crystals) cannot cause any thinking since no EEG signals can be >>>>>>> generated. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To emphasize Statement (090215-1) at the neglect of Statement >>>>>>> (090215-2) would be akin to asserting that light is particles (ignoring >>>>>>> its >>>>>>> wave properties) or waves (ignoring its particle properties), as was the >>>>>>> common thinking among physicists before the principle of complementarity >>>>>>> was established in the mid-1920s' [2]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some Peircean scholars may wish to uphold (090215-1) and deny the >>>>>>> validity of (090215-2), but, if what I referred to as "the principle of >>>>>>> "*emergence-invariance >>>>>>> complementarity*" in my last posting on these lists [3] is right, >>>>>>> both (090215-1) and (090215-2) would be valid since they reflect the >>>>>>> *complementary >>>>>>> aspects of mind. *That is: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "*Mind may be both continuous* (as Peirce asserts) *and* >>>>>>> *discontinuous* (as suggested by the complementarity principle)." >>>>>>> (090215-3) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> All the best. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sung >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Reference: >>>>>>> [1] Pickering, J. (2007). Affordances are Signs. *tripleC* *5* >>>>>>> (2):64-74. >>>>>>> [2] Plotnitsky, A. (2003). Niel Bohr and Complementarity: An >>>>>>> Introduction. Springer, New York. >>>>>>> [3] Ji, S. (2015). Emergence vs. Invariance: Are they >>>>>>> complementary aspects of complex systems ? Posted to PEIRCE-L on >>>>>>> 9/1/2015. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>>>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>>>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>>>>>> Rutgers University >>>>>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>>>>>> 732-445-4701 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> www.conformon.net >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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