Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-03 Thread Benjamin Udell
Sungchul, I lack the background in math and physics and other sciences to make any serious assessment of your conjectures about the recurrence of Planck-like distributions in various fields. From what I've read or skimmed over the years, I'd say that most likenesses among distributions turn

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-03 Thread Clark Goble
On Oct 3, 2014, at 5:41 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: This conclusion seems consistent with the postulate I proposed in 2012 that the wave-particle complementarity operates not only in physics, but also in biology and semiotics (see Table 2.13 in the chapter entitled

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-02 Thread Clark Goble
On Oct 1, 2014, at 3:00 PM, Howard Pattee hpat...@roadrunner.com wrote: On Oct 1, 2014, at 4:00 AM, John Collier wrote: I think that it is a given that for any realist position there is a nominalist position in the contemporary sense that can fit the same assent structure. Typically

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-01 Thread Benjamin Udell
Clark, list, Maybe I've underestimated the amount of instrumentalism - it's hard for me to discern how seriously people take their own ideas of 'useful fictions' in practice. Often enough the phrase 'useful fiction' seems a cynical or self-deprecating way to say enlightening approximation.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-01 Thread Clark Goble
On Oct 1, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Maybe I've underestimated the amount of instrumentalism - it's hard for me to discern how seriously people take their own ideas of 'useful fictions' in practice. And I should add my own important caveat. I’m simply not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-01 Thread Clark Goble
(Changed title to distinguish it from Natural Propositions thread and to match my previously renamed posts) On Oct 1, 2014, at 4:00 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: The more contemporary nominalism is based in a view of language and thought (which is understood on a linguistic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-10-01 Thread Howard Pattee
On Oct 1, 2014, at 4:00 AM, John Collier wrote: I think that it is a given that for any realist position there is a nominalist position in the contemporary sense that can fit the same assent structure. Typically one is realist about some things, but not others (for example one can be a

[PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

2014-09-30 Thread Clark Goble
(Changed the thread title since we’ve drifted far from natural propositions) On Sep 30, 2014, at 11:58 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: [CG] Whether the “nearly real” is good enough is a reasonable question. Like you, I see it as good enough, but I