Supplement: Thank you, Jon, for this great metaphor of the two bins! I guess that a lot of "living experience"-affairs may be handled (I wont say analyzed) by applying this metaphor. But how is it logically? With mutually exclusive bins it is easy. It is XOR. XOR is "NOT (A AND B)", if you want to express it with EGs. Mutually nonexclusive bins on the other hand may be OR, AND, or Subset of one´s of the other. To express it with EGs becomes a bit complicated. Conclusion: Trying to abstract living experience with logic is hard and complicated somehow, but not doing it, avoiding it, is hazardous, because one will easily be a victim of one or the other fallacy. Fallacies are the most dangerous things at all, I think, because they are the fancy dresses common sense and populism are made of. Avoiding fallacies would make the world a better place, to put it pathetically. Pathos, however, is not illogical. Feeling does not work without logic: Both are not different categories, though they are two bins: 1ns and 3ns, but 1ns and 3ns are not two mutually exclusive bins... blahblahblah, bin the bin, or can the can (Suzie Quatro)...
Dear Jon, List,
I think, classification is justified, if the pair of bins really consists of two mutually exclusive bins. My bins "analysis" and "synthesis" really are mutually exclusive, I think. The hazard is on, I think, when two non-exclusive bins are treated like mutually exclusive ones. This is done all the time, here two examples: A young beautiful woman marries an old, rich guy. Now people argue, that she only marries him because of the money. But the bins "love" and "money" are not mutually exclusive, so nobody can justifiedly suggest, that she does not love him for real. Other example: The "Frontex" policy leads to the situation, that refugees in rubber boats are not rescued from the mediterranian sea, and drown. Politicians claim, that rather the reasons for fleeing should be overcome. But these bins are not mutually exclusive: On one bin is written: "Everybody in sea-distress must be rescued if possible". On the other bin is written: "Fleeing resons must be fought, but if people are rescued, more people will flee". But, as these bins are not mutually exclusive, a situation may fill both bins at the same time, and what happens in the second bin, does not make the first bin redundant. Everybody in sea-distress must be rescued if possible, period. Keeping people fom going into rubber boats must be achieved with other means than not rescuing. These examples show that it is ok to have two mutually exclusive bins: In one bin there are the pairs of mutually exclusive bins ("tertium non datur", classification), and in the other bin there are the pairs of mutually not exclusive bins (graduality, composition).
Best,
Helmut
03. August 2020 um 23:00 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
wrote:
"Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
wrote:
Dear Helmut,
It's one of the occupational hazards of the classifying mind
that one can start out consciously characterizing aspects of
real situations and end up unwittingly thinking we've gotten
everything under the sun sorted into mutually exclusive bins.
Once the idols of compartmentality and the illusions of autonomous
abstraction get their hold on our minds it is almost impossible to
reconstitute or synthesize what we've torn asunder, if only in our
own minds. The ounce of prevention here is always keeping in mind
that from which all abstractions are abstracted, living experience.
Regards,
Jon
On 8/3/2020 1:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> List,
> with regard to this thread, but also to the classification of sciences, but also
> all inquiry, signs, objects, I am thinking about the distinction of analysis
> versus synthesis. To tell, whether a science, a sign, an inquiry is analytical
> or synthetical, I??d say, we have to tell whether the inquirer / interpreter is
> part or sufferer of the object or not. If he*she is not, he*she may have
> theoretc control over it, and the inquiry is analytical in the sense of "divide
> et impera". Analysis is virtual division. If the inquirer on the other hand is
> part or sufferer of the object, the object controls her*him to some extent, and
> the inquiry has to be partly synthetical.
> If a biochemist analyses some protein, it is analytic inquiry. If the climate
> change is the object, it is mostly synthetic inquiry. I think you can classify
> sciences or branches of sciences that way. Physics and chemistry are mostly
> analytic. Ecology, psychology, theology, metaphysics are mostly synthetic.
> Semiotics is kind of both, I think.
> I think, it is helpful, to analytically and synthetically look at the ways
> analysis and synthesis are subsequentially done. I think, many possibilities for
> fallacies are opening up, if analysis and synthesis are alternated in the wrong
> way, without me knowing yet, what in this respect a wrong and a justified way
> would be.
> I think, for example, that natural fallacy is something like that: First
> analysing a phenomenon, and then synthesizing the analysed parts as a rule.
> In mathematics, a synthesis has to be corrobated by a proof. In other sciences,
> this is not so easy.
> To keep my post Peirce-related, here a quote from the Commens Dictionary:
> "
> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | EP 2:372-3
>
> /Two meanings of the term ???philosophy???/ call for our particular notice. The two
> meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge positive, that is in making it
> a knowledge of things real, in opposition to mathematical knowledge, which is
> knowledge of the consequences of arbitrary hypotheses; and they further agree in
> making philosophical truth extremely general. But in other respects they differ
> as widely as they well could. For one of them, which is better entitled (except
> by usage) to being distinguished as /philosophia prima/ than is ontology,
> embraces all that positive science which rests upon familiar experience and does
> not search out occult or rare phenomena; while the other, which has been called
> /philosophia ultima/, embraces all that truth which is derivable by collating
> the results of the different special sciences, but which is too broad to be
> perfectly established by any one of them. The former is well named by Jeremy
> Bentham???s term /cenoscopy/ [???], the latter goes by the name of /synthetic
> philosophy/.
>
> "
> Best,
> Helmut
> 03. August 2020 um 18:17 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> *wrote:*
>
> Jon et al.,
>
> The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its
> /dynamic/ object ???in view??? only by means of the /indexical /function of the
> sign, which connects it to actual /experience/. Diagrammatic signs are not so
> good at that.
>
> The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, is this: if theorematic
> reasoning is /only /a /mathematical/ procedure, it leaves out the /experiential
> /element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism.
>
> Mathematics is not a positive science, meaning that it involves no actual
> experience (other than the experience of doing mathematics, in which the
> universe of discourse is entirely imaginary). All positive sciences (including
> phaneroscopy, logic and semiotic) deal with what Peirce calls /real relations/
> as opposed to /relations of reason/ (CP 1.365, for instance). A proposition in a
> positive science thus must employ a genuine Index
> <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/snm.htm#gndx>, as opposed to a degenerate index such as
> ???the letters attached to a geometrical or other diagram??? (EP2:172).
>
> Gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
> Sent: 3-Aug-20 11:35
> To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Subject: Re: Pragma, Pragmata, Pragmatitude!
>
> Dear Gary, All ...
>
> I was obviously having a lot more fun with words in those days ...
> sigh, good times ... the point of it all being I always see the
> whole complex of meanings associated with the Greek root "pragma,
> pragmata" through the more threadbare veil of the Latin "object".
> That complex contains all the senses of aims, concerns, ends, goals,
> intentional objects, and purposes we tend to express more obliquely
> through the use of "object" to mean "objective". Still, the latter
> use does have some currency in cybernetics, operations research,
> and systems theory, so it's a handy sense to keep in mind.
>
> Cf: Liddell & Scott
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> unicode test: ????????????
It's one of the occupational hazards of the classifying mind
that one can start out consciously characterizing aspects of
real situations and end up unwittingly thinking we've gotten
everything under the sun sorted into mutually exclusive bins.
Once the idols of compartmentality and the illusions of autonomous
abstraction get their hold on our minds it is almost impossible to
reconstitute or synthesize what we've torn asunder, if only in our
own minds. The ounce of prevention here is always keeping in mind
that from which all abstractions are abstracted, living experience.
Regards,
Jon
On 8/3/2020 1:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> List,
> with regard to this thread, but also to the classification of sciences, but also
> all inquiry, signs, objects, I am thinking about the distinction of analysis
> versus synthesis. To tell, whether a science, a sign, an inquiry is analytical
> or synthetical, I??d say, we have to tell whether the inquirer / interpreter is
> part or sufferer of the object or not. If he*she is not, he*she may have
> theoretc control over it, and the inquiry is analytical in the sense of "divide
> et impera". Analysis is virtual division. If the inquirer on the other hand is
> part or sufferer of the object, the object controls her*him to some extent, and
> the inquiry has to be partly synthetical.
> If a biochemist analyses some protein, it is analytic inquiry. If the climate
> change is the object, it is mostly synthetic inquiry. I think you can classify
> sciences or branches of sciences that way. Physics and chemistry are mostly
> analytic. Ecology, psychology, theology, metaphysics are mostly synthetic.
> Semiotics is kind of both, I think.
> I think, it is helpful, to analytically and synthetically look at the ways
> analysis and synthesis are subsequentially done. I think, many possibilities for
> fallacies are opening up, if analysis and synthesis are alternated in the wrong
> way, without me knowing yet, what in this respect a wrong and a justified way
> would be.
> I think, for example, that natural fallacy is something like that: First
> analysing a phenomenon, and then synthesizing the analysed parts as a rule.
> In mathematics, a synthesis has to be corrobated by a proof. In other sciences,
> this is not so easy.
> To keep my post Peirce-related, here a quote from the Commens Dictionary:
> "
> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | EP 2:372-3
>
> /Two meanings of the term ???philosophy???/ call for our particular notice. The two
> meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge positive, that is in making it
> a knowledge of things real, in opposition to mathematical knowledge, which is
> knowledge of the consequences of arbitrary hypotheses; and they further agree in
> making philosophical truth extremely general. But in other respects they differ
> as widely as they well could. For one of them, which is better entitled (except
> by usage) to being distinguished as /philosophia prima/ than is ontology,
> embraces all that positive science which rests upon familiar experience and does
> not search out occult or rare phenomena; while the other, which has been called
> /philosophia ultima/, embraces all that truth which is derivable by collating
> the results of the different special sciences, but which is too broad to be
> perfectly established by any one of them. The former is well named by Jeremy
> Bentham???s term /cenoscopy/ [???], the latter goes by the name of /synthetic
> philosophy/.
>
> "
> Best,
> Helmut
> 03. August 2020 um 18:17 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> *wrote:*
>
> Jon et al.,
>
> The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its
> /dynamic/ object ???in view??? only by means of the /indexical /function of the
> sign, which connects it to actual /experience/. Diagrammatic signs are not so
> good at that.
>
> The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, is this: if theorematic
> reasoning is /only /a /mathematical/ procedure, it leaves out the /experiential
> /element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism.
>
> Mathematics is not a positive science, meaning that it involves no actual
> experience (other than the experience of doing mathematics, in which the
> universe of discourse is entirely imaginary). All positive sciences (including
> phaneroscopy, logic and semiotic) deal with what Peirce calls /real relations/
> as opposed to /relations of reason/ (CP 1.365, for instance). A proposition in a
> positive science thus must employ a genuine Index
> <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/snm.htm#gndx>, as opposed to a degenerate index such as
> ???the letters attached to a geometrical or other diagram??? (EP2:172).
>
> Gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
> Sent: 3-Aug-20 11:35
> To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Subject: Re: Pragma, Pragmata, Pragmatitude!
>
> Dear Gary, All ...
>
> I was obviously having a lot more fun with words in those days ...
> sigh, good times ... the point of it all being I always see the
> whole complex of meanings associated with the Greek root "pragma,
> pragmata" through the more threadbare veil of the Latin "object".
> That complex contains all the senses of aims, concerns, ends, goals,
> intentional objects, and purposes we tend to express more obliquely
> through the use of "object" to mean "objective". Still, the latter
> use does have some currency in cybernetics, operations research,
> and systems theory, so it's a handy sense to keep in mind.
>
> Cf: Liddell & Scott
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> unicode test: ????????????
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