Hi Gary,
Cognitions determined by previous cognitions, I would say, refers only to indices and symbols. But what about icons? They transport their meanings within themselves, with no previous cognition (knowing, that the smoke comes from a fire, or what a words conventional meaning is) needed, I think.
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 11. Juni 2014 um 04:38 Uhr
Von: "Gary Moore" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
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Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] on Peirce’s “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”
Von: "Gary Moore" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
An: "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu peirce-l@list.iupui.edu" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu peirce-l@list.iupui.edu" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] on Peirce’s “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”
PART 2: NOTES (as I read along) on Peirce’s “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”, “Item 1” of JSP Cognition Series, from THE ESSENTIAL PIERCE, Volume 1, PP. 11-27, & CRONOLOGICAL EDITION, Volume 2, pp. 162-211**10 June 2014 10:34 pm CST
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But the first argument has already been set aside. WE HAVE NO INTUITIVE POWER OF DISTINGUISHING ULTIMATE PREMISES FROM COGNITIONS DETERMINED BY PREVIOUS COGNITIONS. And the second argument is paralleled by the sophism of Achilles and the Tortoise. From the fact that every cognition is determined by a previous one, it follows then that there has been an infinite series of finite times previous to any cognition since the latest time when there had been no cognition of the same object but not that there has been an infinitely long time between those two dates. It may perhaps follow that ANY ABSOLUTELY [page 164] DETERMINATE COGNITION DOES NOT EXIST IN THOUGHT, but that thought is constantly in movement. But that has no bearing upon the present question.¶
-x-
On the other hand, whatever we know, we know ONLY BY ITS RELATIONS. Now every knowledge of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. But to know a cognition is to know the immediate object of it as it is known in the cognition; hence to know an intuition is to know its object apart from its relations. HENCE TO KNOW AN INTUITION IS IMPOSSIBLE. But we have seen that an incognizable COGNITION does not exist. Hence, no intuition exists.¶
-x-
Moreover, since the object of an intuition is quite without the consciousness it is ABSOLUTELY unknown except through the knowledge contained in the intuition. Hence, the peculiar character of the intuition CANNOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR; because neither is its cause knowable except so far as the knowledge effect itself is a knowledge of it, nor is any law knowable according to which precisely SUCH an effect must necessarily be produced from any ABSOLUTELY UNKNOWABLE cause. Hence, the proper determination of the intuition is INEXPLICABLE. Hence, we have no right to suppose that ANY cognition is an intuition, for the ONLY justification of a hypothesis is that it explains the facts. But to suppose the facts inexplicable is NOT to explain them. Now we do not know intuitively that any cognition is an intuition; hence if we do not know it by hypothetic inference we are ALTOGETHER unwarranted in holding it.¶
-x-
Moreover, any change in an intuition whether by synthesis with others or by analysis, results in a cognition determined by previous ones. Hence, as long as an intuition is an intuition it REMAINS what it had been from the moment when it arose. Hence, if there is any finite degree of liveliness of consciousness in it, the passage from no consciousness to a finite consciousness, must have taken place in no time, which is contrary to the general presumption of continuity. Thus there is no reason at all for admitting intuitions while there are very weighty reasons against it.¶
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