Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Jon, John, List,

 

I think that "implication, imagination, or belief" mostly do not sit in the symbols of notation such as cuts, but in the variables. Are they thoroughly cecked out premisses, or not? If the object does not affect the interpreter, they may be, then it is analysis, and the inquiry is deduction. If the object of inquiry affects the interpreter, it is partially synthesis, premisses are not completely checked out for their truth, and the cascade of abduction-deduction-induction is applied. Because usually an induction is incomplete, a residue of "implication, imagination, or belief" remains, without making the process nonscientific at all.

 

But I admit, that I have not yet understood, why Peirce pulls this remaining insecurity out of the variables, and puts it into the symbols, such as the shading.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 11. August 2020 um 02:58 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

John, All:

 

JFS:  As Peirce showed in R670, a scroll is logically equivalent to a nest of two ovals.

 

As Peirce explains in R 490, the truth of that statement depends on how we interpret a nest of two ovals, since "if A then B" is not logically equivalent to "not (A and not-B)" when we recognize that a shaded area represents a kind of possibility (Gamma), not just the denial of actuality (Alpha and Beta).

 

JFS:  AS Peirce said in NEM 3:140, a scientific notation should leave as little as possible to implication, imagination, or belief.

 

As Peirce confesses in RS 30, for that very reason (and others) the derivation of negation from the primitive relation of consequence should always be preserved in EGs by including a small blackened circle in any shaded area that does not otherwise have an inner close.

 

JFS:  If you have any further questions, please study the progression from R669 to R670, L231, L378, and L376 and my commentary about them.

 

If you have any further questions, please study R 490, RS 30, and my commentary about them.

 

JFS:  Unless any MSS later than December 1911 are found which say anything to the contrary, the version in L231 must  be considered definitive.

 

No one has the unilateral authority to declare that anything Peirce wrote "must be considered definitive," especially when the text of the manuscript in question includes no such claim for itself.

 

Besides, as I already pointed out, Peirce begins his December 1911 letter to Risteen (RL 376) by stating, "I mentioned to you, while you were [here] last year, that I have a diagrammatic syntax which analyzes the syllogism into no less than six inferential steps. I now describe its latest state of development for the first time" (R 500:1, bold added).  This suggests that he made additional adjustments during the five-plus months after writing RL 231 in June (and two-plus months after writing RL 378 in September), but unfortunately the extant text of RL 376 breaks off without getting much into the details of EGs.  Hopefully the rest of the pages will turn up someday and shed further light.

 

Moreover, as I also already pointed out, in the same letter Peirce explicitly references the 1903 Lowell Lectures and accompanying Syllabus as "the better exposition" than what he provided in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," not RL 231 (or RL 378).  Consequently, if any explanation of EGs could properly "be considered definitive" from Peirce's standpoint, it would have to be that one.

 

In summary, I believe that we must carefully take all of Peirce's writings about EGs into account rather than privileging any one article, letter, or manuscript.  Thanks to Dr. Pietarinen, the three volumes of Logic of the Future will greatly facilitate this.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Aug 9, 2020 at 10:30 PM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

Jon AS,

In NEM 3:140, Peirce made a clear distinction between the vague words of ordinary language, and the precise terminology of science:

CSP>  The language and symbols of ordinary life are short, defective and figurative.  As little as possible is spoken, as much as possible is left to implication, imagination and belief.  But scientific symbols and methods should be complete.  As little as possible should be left to implication, imagination and belief.

By these criteria, eg1911, as specified in L231, is complete.  It is logically equivalent to every version of classical first-order logic from Frege (1879) and Peirce (1885) to the present.  Nothing is left to implication, imagination, or belief.

As Peirce showed in R670, a scroll is logically equivalent to a nest of two ovals.  AS Peirce said in NEM 3:140, a scientific notation should leave as little as possible to implication, imagination, or belief.  That implies that there is no room for any residual meaning for a scroll that is in any way different from the meaning of a nest of two ovals.

If you have any further questions, please study the progression from R669 to R670, L231, L378, and L376 and my commentary about them.  Unless any MSS later than December 1911 are found which say anything to the contrary, the version in L231 must  be considered definitive.

John

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