Jon, Kirstima, List,
I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and why everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do not have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I think, that the universe has a mind. So universals are not extra-mental, because they are part of the universe´s mind, and had been so even before there were organisms. So my question is: Is nominalism only then a stupid thing, if the nominalist believes that the universe is inanimate except for the organisms (who have not been there from the start), but if you believe that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of an organism (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense?
Best,
Helmut
22. Januar 2017 um 21:19 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Kirsti, List:
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Apology accepted, and thanks for clearing all of that up.
Regards,
Jon
On Sun, Jan 22, 2017 at 3:55 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Jon,
You are right about my unhappy choice of word. It was an overstatement, to say the least.
Long ago, when you had used "segments" in connection with continuity, It gave me the impression of some lines of thought akin to nominalistic ways. - But you responded with taking a critical stand towards using "segments". - So that question was settled. - I hope?
No allegations (or labels) were intended about you or your ways of thinking. Just generals remarks. Followed by a series of misunderstandings. - My sincere apologies for my part in generating such. No offence intended.
Colloquial language, to my mind, may aim to exactness, but never fully reaches this aim. With these ambiquities we just have to try to cope, as best we can.
To my mind, we live in a nominalistic culture, setting its traps to all its members, even Peirceans. Which does not mean quite the same as did nominalism and realism as philosophical stands CSP talked about so much.
But you may percieve these issues differenty. Still, no controversy there.
Regards, Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 21.1.2017 18:04:Kirsti, List:
What you wrote on Tuesday: "Definitions I do abhorre."
What I wrote on Thursday: "You say now that you are not denying the
usefulness of definitions,but you said before that you abhor definitions."
What you wrote today: "I definitely never said that I "abhorr
definitions"."
All of these comments are copied directly from the messages threaded
below. Needless to say, I am even more confused now, and still
wondering what exactly you find "nominalistic" about my "ways of
thinking."
Regards,
Jon
On Sat, Jan 21, 2017 at 7:26 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] [1] [1] [1] -Sorry Jon. Again. - I definitely never said that I "abhorr
definitions". If you do not regocnize an intrepretation here,
compared to what I wrote, I'm afraid there is nothing to discuss. -
We are not on anything like a same page.
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 19.1.2017 16:25:
Kirsti, List:
Just to clarify, Alan is my middle name; I go by Jon.
What makes you think that I am missing that "crucial aspect"? I
provided this quote very early in the thread.
But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the
sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a
mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider
sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will
be convenient to call the former singular and the latter only an
individual … With reference to individuals, I shall only remark
that there are certain general terms whose objects can only be in
one place at one time, and these are called individuals. They are
generals that is, not singulars, because these latter occupy neither
time nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one
date. (W2:180-181; 1868)
You say now that you are not denying the usefulness of definitions,
but you said before that you abhor definitions. I find this
confusing. Again, how would one go about better understanding the
concepts of universal/general/continuous and
particular/singular/individual by means of "strict experimental work"?
In other words, how can we achieve the third grade of clarity
regarding those concepts?
Most importantly, I am still wondering what you find "nominalistic"
about my "ways of thinking." On a Peirce list, that is a rather
serious allegation.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 7:51 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Alan,
Sorry for the typo. - Sill it seems to me you miss a crucial aspect
of ' to kath ekaston', what is singular. - The difference lies in it
being determinate only as long as 'time is so'. - What is real, in
contrast to existent individuals, always lies (partly) in the
future. Thus it is never wholly determined, but possesses the
element of vagueness, never wholly captured by any definition.
I am not denying the usefulness of definitions. - By no means.
With all respect,
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 22:10:
Kirsti, List:
What problems do you think I am trying to solve with definitions?
What is intrinsically nominalistic about working with definitions?
Peirce associated them with the second grade of clarity, and wrote
many of them for the _Century Dictionary_ and Baldwin's
_Dictionary_.
How would one go about better understanding the concepts of
universal/general/continuous and particular/singular/individual by
means of "strict experimental work"?
Since you brought it up, I actually found no mentions of "atomos" but
three of "atomon" in the Collected Papers.
This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and that which
is one in number from a particular point of view is shadowed forth
in the two words _individual _{to ATOMON} and _singular _(to kath'
hekaston); but as those who have used the word _individual _have not
been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has come
to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)
(As a technical term of logic, _individuum _first appears in
Boëthius, in a translation from Victorinus, no doubt of {ATOMON}, a
word used by Plato (_Sophistes_, 229 D) for an indivisible species,
and by Aristotle, often in the same sense, but occasionally for an
individual. Of course the physical and mathematical senses of the
word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term for individuals is {ta
kath' hekasta}, Latin _singularia_, English _singulars_.) Used in
logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more
formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only
actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general
character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated
by its mode of being to be so determinate. See Particular (in logic)
... (2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is
that an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it
does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it
might react, or have reacted, against my will. (CP 3.611-613; 1911)
But experience only informs us that single objects exist, and that
each of these at each single date exists only in a single place.
These, no doubt, are what Aristotle meant by {to kath' hekaston} and
by {ai prötai ousiai} in his earlier works, particularly the
Predicaments. For {ousia} there plainly means existent, and {to ti
einai} is existence. (I cannot satisfy myself that this was his
meaning in his later writings; nor do I think it possible that
Aristotle was such a dolt as never to modify his metaphysical
opinions.) But {to ATOMON} was, I think, the strict logical
individual, determinate in every respect. In the metaphysical
sense, existence is that mode of being which consists in the
resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all
the other such individuals of the same universe. (CP 6.335-336; c.
1909)
Regards,
Jon
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 11:39 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Solving problems with definitions and defining is the nominalistic
way to proceed.
I do not work in the way of presenting definitions. - I work with
doing something, with a (more or less) systematic method. - Just
like in a laboratory.
I have done strict experimental work. And strict up to most
meticulous details!
Since then, I have been studieing tests. With just as keely
meticulous aattitude.
Definitions I do abhorre.
If you are looking for definitions, you'll be certainly going amiss
with CSP. - So I will not offer you any.
CSP does mention ATOMOS, once. Referring to Ariatotle and the
ancients.
Best,
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 16:12:
Kirsti, List:
KM: Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not
consist of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or
not so. A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without
breaking the very continuity you are trying to capture. - It
presents just the same geometrical problem as do points.
You are correct, "segment" was probably a poor choice of word on my
part.
KM: You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of
thinking) by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
What specific "nominalistic ways of thinking" do you detect in my
posts? How would you define an "individual" from a Peircean
standpoint?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymantwitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] [2] [2] [2]
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 5:04 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Jon S.
Not only is continuity the most difficult problem for philosophy to
handle, it is also the most difficult problem for mathematics to
handle.
Taking into consideration the view of CSP that we always have to
start with math, then proceed to phenomenology, and only after this
try to handle logic (in the broad sense or in ny more restricted
sense), it follows that some (not yet definable) mathematical ideas
should be developed. - Such may not as yet exist!
Viewing Moore's collection of mathematical writings of CSP & his
introductions there seems to prevail a basic misunderstanding of the
relation between continua and continuity.
Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not consist
of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or not so.
A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without breaking the
very continuity you are trying to capture. - It presents just the
same geometrical problem as do points.
One has to start with (geometrical) topology. A topic SCP says so
little about e.g. in Kaina Stoicheia. - He only states that it must
come first. And followed by perspective, and only after these any
kinds of measuring.
But what kind of topology? - And how and why the simplest math must
come before phenomenology & be followed by (a special kind of)
phenomenology?
Definitely not Husserlian, according to CSP.
But there are grounds in the writings of CSP to assume that
Hegelian dialectics, with the three moments, are not such a far
catch.
You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of thinking)
by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
True continuity involves time. (And vice versa: time involves
continuity.) They are like RECTO and VERSO in CSP's Existential
Graphs.
Or a jacket with a lining. Most jackets do have a separable inside
cloth but even if it is taken away, there always remains a RECTO and
VERSO. As well as both taken together: the jacket!
With this there comes triadicity.
Keen to hear your response,
Kirsti
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