Mike, list, I'm glad you found the recent exchange worthwhile--it certainly was for me. I didn't expect much "general agreement" early on, but I appreciate your offering it. That Edwina and I seem to have come to solid agreement on some points and some partial (or, perhaps, tentative) agreement on other matters is encouraging, especially given our somewhat different "knowledge bases" as Edwina put it in this thread.
In an off-list exchange both Edwina and I expressed our disappointment that there wasn't more discussion of biosemiotics on the list especially given that several forum members have at least some interest in it, while there are even a few here with expertise in the field. MB: What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality, continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it, namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness). I can certainly see how the universal categories might provide a valuable tool for categorization in KR, and I am almost certain that there are other disciplines and, surely, other areas of inquiry, where the categories might be of considerable value and usefulness. MB: I see the universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the reality of Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make it actual, which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains removed from the essence of Firstness. For me as well, the universal categories are "the governing primitives." When one reflects on Peirce's architectonic as outlined in the Classification of Sciences (for now restricting that classification to the pure theoretical sciences, what he calls Science of Discovery) one might begin by asking: What is First Science for Peirce? For Theoretical Science as a whole, clearly pure Mathematics (as it appears to be for nearly all modern scientists). But for cenoscopic Philosophy (that is, for all theoretical inquiry prior to that of Idioscopy, or, the special sciences), First Science is Phenomenology, primarily if not exclusively concerned with the categories. Peirce even says that the categories are *discovered* in phenomenology and then only retrospectively seen to be present in monadic dyadic triadic valency as an aspect of the simplest mathematics in theoretical mathematics (and given his *Reduction Thesis*, these three are all that are needed for all other -adicies; this holds for EGs as well). Nothing could be clearer than that in *logic as semeiotic*--which is "down the road" in the classification, following, as it does, theoretical esthetics and theoretical ethics--that the principles involved in analyzing the universal categories play a key role in the three sub-branches of semeiotics, notably in theoretical grammar and theoretical rhetoric, or methodeutic. They have a somewhat less important role to play in critical logic, but appear there in an analysis of the three inference patters of abduction, induction, and deduction which become essential in the final branch of logic in structuring a "complete inquiry." I should also add that the categories are found again in Metaphysics, and even in Idioscopy (these Special Sciences requiring instruments like microscopes and telescopes to do their work, having special methodologies, etc.) in the ordering of Physical Science into the *classificatory, descriptive, and nomonological *(law enunciating). And the diagram I reproduced above does not show that this same tripartite ordering--*classificatory, descriptive, and nomonological--*is also given by Peirce for Psychical Science. These divisions all can be analyzed in part via the universal categories. Finally, the very structure of the classification of science (as well as the two principal classification of signs) is mainly based on the categories (with a few dyadic exceptions in the former). MB: One can take these viewpoints based on Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) I guess put another way, for me, the universal categories are the adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which is a process of representation. While I have a keen interest in especially Peirce's phenomenology, semeiotics, and metaphysics, I find that the universal categories are for me as well the 'adjudicators' (to use your expression) in how I think about Peirce's work in all other sciences which interest me (and in the arts, etc. as well). However, it would appear that there has been *considerably* less interest in Peirce's Phenomenology and the phenomenological categories per se then there has been in his semeiotic, both in this forum and in Peirce scholarship generally. Indeed, some have been seemingly antithetical to the former, and I recall some sharp on and off-list exchanges with Joe Ransdell in which he argued that (1) there was very little to say about the categories and (2) Peirce had already said it, principally in the early *On a New List of Categories*. Sometimes Joe seemed even to suggest that Peirce's phenomenology wasn't a proper science at all, that what work there was to be done involving it was to properly be accomplished in other sciences, especially semeiotic. His somewhat contradictory views are summarized in "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?" http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHENOM.HTM. *JR: Now let us turn to Peirce's phenomenology proper. As I remarked earlier, the essence of it is found in the 1867 paper (The New List GR] on the categories, and I should perhaps remark before proceeding that if Peirce is to be regarded as a phenomenologist it should be understood that most of Peirce's analyses should be looked for under the heading of semiotic. For his phenomenology proper is really quite simple: the paper in question is quite short, and there is not a whole lot more to be done in phenomenology proper than what he does therein, though the line of argument certainly could be--and I believe should be--developed at much greater length and in much greater detail. Let me hasten to say that I do not mean to trivialize the matter by stressing the relative simplicity of it. The point is simply that the way Peirce conceives phenomenology it leaves most of the work to be done under other headings, and most of what Peirce himself did along these lines would properly be regarded as a part of semiotic. * Needless to say, I disagreed then and disagree now. Not only does Peirce have a great deal to say about the categories *as such* throughout his career, but to suggest that they "should be looked for under the heading of semiotic" is to me simply mistaken. Joe seemed to me to be first and foremost a semiotician and, in my opinion and by his own admission, little suited to work in phenomenology (Peirce commented that few were). However, Ransdell does conclude the paper just cited with this remark, affirming both their central importance to his philosophy as well as allowing that Peirce's Phenomenology is a science in its own right (but one, however, radically different from what has hitherto been called "phenomenology"). *JR: These categories and their inter-relationships are the rudimentary conceptual elements out of which Pierce's entire philosophy is built. My brief account does not do them justice, but these three conceptions are truly remarkable and what Peirce did with them constructively is even more so. But is this sort of thing appropriately describable as phenomenology? As I said earlier, I am inclined to think so myself, but if phenomenology should turn out to go in this direction it might involve the abandonment of quite a lot which has traditionally been associated with it.* So, in a word, it seems to me that Joe was of two minds in this matter of the status of phenomenology, a bit internally conflicted (I'd have to dig up some list posts and emails to support this comment). On the other hand, some Peirce scholars have taken up his phenomenology in earnest (and there are a few phenomenologists in this forum), but much work needs to be done. I changed the Subject to reflect the emphasis of this message. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 10:34 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Hi Gary R, List, > > I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current response. I > have read your points multiple times and tried to think clearly about what > you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you have > written in this response. As a result, I changed the subject line from 'Re: > Order of Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one > overlap in the Venn diagram. > > What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal > categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality, > continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a > medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it, > namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the > same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars > (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness). > I frankly do not see why we need to use language such as > "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where habit or any of > the other senses of Thirdness may occur without Secondness and Firstness. > > I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these > questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community of > Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through the lens > of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself in this group. > That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and making and > representation may indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the > universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as > well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the reality of > Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once > we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make it actual, > which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from > quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains > removed from the essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based > on Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) > I guess put another way, for me, the universal categories are the > adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which is a > process of representation. However, of course, from the vantage of > representation, semiosis naturally holds sway. > > Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective, you did an > admirable job. > > Mike > On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina, list, > > Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken me a > couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be especially busy. > > In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to come to agreement on > certain recent points of contention, I'd like to begin my response with a > principle upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted me, then > commented. > > 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in > consideration of just those habits of thought and action which, through > hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense writ large) > tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, > or any given community of inquirers might think. > EDWINA: Agree. > > > Mike and John S suggested that it might be a valuable strategy to see if > through dialogue here that there might be some significant ideas or > principles of Peircean semeiotics and philosophy more generally with which > we might come to at least some agreement. While I'm not looking for > anything like "general agreement" on any point, I'd be interested to see if > there's anyone in the forum who *disagrees* that this (stated perhaps too > tersely above) is what Peirce means by the expression "regulative hope," > that is, in referring it to the sense of how inquiry taken up in the > scientific spirit brings us closer to a grasp of the Real? > > Now, on to the other points. > > 1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that you question, disagree, or reject > here will be found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says that 'the > subject matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena > to ends'. > > > EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can cherry > pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their pragmatic use > within an analysis. > > > I agree in a general sense. But in this particular matter of the > quotation, 'the subject matter of normative science consists of the > relations of phenomena to ends,' I don't believe that there is any > cherry picking going on whatsoever The subject matter of the other two > branches of cenoscopic philosophy, phenomenology and metaphysics, are > different from that of the normative sciences. One can agree or disagree > with with what Peirce saw as the purpose of each of these three branches, > but at least in a pragmatic analysis of his architectonic philosophy in > consideration of scientific inquiry, it is important, I believe, to > distinguish them. This is principally, I believe, *because* he develops > his architectonic philosophy, outlined in his Classification of Sciences, > as an aid to pragmatic inquiry, including what you referred to above as "their > pragmatic use within an analysis." > > 2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of > habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including, > but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean notion > concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry towards the Truth > such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as > Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves all three categories, not just > 3ns. > > EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits that > would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including but not > limited to, true beliefs'. I'm not questioning this statement. I'm > questioning the view that a 'final state' exists, where habits are no > longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let me explain. I can, for > example, analyze the biological and chemical nature of a lion - such that I > can determine the essentially true nature of it as a biological species. > And - this analysis would not be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of > the lion species. It's a 'scientific truth'. > > I agree that a final state does not, cannot exist in Peirce science > exactly because it involves an evolutionary philosophy. That's why I > suggested that the expression 'final state' refers to a *regulative > principle,* and so I earlier used the term 'asymptotic' to suggest that > while one can, perhaps, get closer and closer to the complete facts, > principles, laws regarding the truth of any reality into which one might > inquire, one can never *definitively* or *fully* arrive there (this is > not to suggest that we can't grasp many specific 'truths', such as the real > characteristics of an plant or animal species--see below). Peirce's term > 'final' is misleading if one doesn't keep this in mind. So, in my view > Peirce's notion is not Hegelian in the sense the 3ns is the be all and end > all. For as long is there is evolutionary growth of any sort in the cosmos, > *all > three categories will be in effect*. > > In the case of the true (real) nature of the lion as a species, I fully > agree that what we now know represents scientific truth even should that > species evolve. Peirce suggests that there are no doubt many of these > "scientific truths," but that we can't be certain that any *one *in > particular will 'hold' in the future. But there's no reason to doubt what > we've no reason to doubt as to what science has already discovered. > > ET: BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature of > this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to adaptation and > evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and change. So, habit > formation and truth are not the same thing. > > I agree that "habit formation and truth are not the same thing." What I > suggested was that our human striving to understand the nature of reality > together in a scientific way is the optimal way to arrive at whatever > truths we may ever hope to achieve in whatever areas of inquiry we may take > up. We could, of course, be wrong at any point in our inquiry, while the > history of science will show that this has been the case any number of > times. But, again, we clearly make scientific discoveries or we wouldn't > see, for example, the development of the technologies we've witnessed even > in our own lives--but our understandings remain fallible especially as we > continue our inquiries. > > 4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is the > primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of Mind" > (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently commented on as > it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other two categories > quasi-necessarily. > > EDWINA: My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws > of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. . . However, I don't > see that habits 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily. That > is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns. . . > > Here I will have to partially disagree. Although one can abstract > (prescind) 1ns and 2ns from 3ns, it is of the very nature of the categories > that in the phaneron and in reality that they are all present, that in > particular that 3ns involves (cf 'involutional' as Peirce uses it) 2ns and > 1ns. > > *1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture III | CP 5.66* > > *Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a > Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it > is Representation as an element of the Phenomenon.* > You agree that this is so apparently only for semiosis: ET (continuing > from above): . . .but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does. . . > > I am beginning to see what you've been aiming at as regards habits in your > writing, for example: > > ET (continuing): . . .a universe made up only of habits is obviously dead > - in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has ended, and > the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only > as pure theoretical speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future. > > And I see you as actually resolving the whole question in writing in the > snippet above that for Peirce this *virtual* cessation of all life, > growth, and evolution is but "speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] > future" (which is why I just used the term 'virtual' and not 'actual'). > > ET: . . . [Semiosis] exists as Mind - which functions within all three > primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as equal and basic > primordial forces. > > I wouldn't use 'exists' or 'forces' as you have here because I associate > both those terms with 2ns, but I agree that semiosis involves all three of > Peirce's categories and further agree that they are 'equal', 'basic' and > 'priordial'. I don't, however, see them in reality as ever occurring apart > from each other even while one may (at least seemingly) dominate in any > given situation. > > ET: As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he > mean by it? > > I personally think that Peirce was clear enough by what he meant by > entelechy in writing: > > 1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:304 > > . . . The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua* fact, > will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth” of being. The > “Truth,” the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate > interpretant of every sign. > > I expect that you'll disagree with much of what I've written above. But I > believe that besides that one clear point of agreement at the top of this > post as well as some apparent partial agreement in a few other points, > that, with further inquiry, we might arrive at others. > > Meanwhile, I very much look forward to your response to this message > should you offer one. But, I think that for now I'll leave the last word to > you. Thank you again for your very thoughtful response to my last post. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* > > On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Gary R - see my responses below: >> >> >> >> On Sat 07/04/18 1:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, Jon, list, >> >> 1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that you question, disagree, or reject >> here will be found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says that 'the >> subject matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena >> to ends'. >> >> EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can cherry >> pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their pragmatic use >> within an analysis. >> ----------------------------------------------------- >> >> 2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of >> habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including, >> but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean notion >> concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry towards the Truth >> such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as >> Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves all three categories, not just >> 3ns. >> >> EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits that >> would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including but not >> limited to, true beliefs'. I'm not questioning this statement. I'm >> questioning the view that a 'final state' exists, where habits are no >> longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let me explain. I can, for >> example, analyze the biological and chemical nature of a lion - such that I >> can determine the essentially true nature of it as a biological species. >> And - this analysis would not be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of >> the lion species. It's a 'scientific truth'. >> >> BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature of >> this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to adaptation and >> evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and change. So, habit >> formation and truth are not the same thing. >> >> -------------------------------------------- >> >> 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in >> consideration of just those habits of thought and action which, through >> hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense writ large) >> tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon, >> or any given community of inquirers might think. >> >> EDWINA: Agree. >> >> ------------------------ >> >> 4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is the >> primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of Mind" >> (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently commented on as >> it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other two categories >> quasi-necessarily. >> >> EDWINA: My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws >> of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. Peirce himself said >> that without it - mass would at one instant weigh a pound and at the next >> instant, weigh a ton' [memory quote]. However, I don't see that habits >> 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily. That is, Thirdness >> does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns, but semiosis certainly, >> absolutely, does - for a universe made up only of habits is obviously dead >> - in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has ended, and >> the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only >> as pure theoretical speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future. >> >> So, semiosis is, in my view, above all a dynamic process of >> Mind-becoming-Matter. There is no need for the 'sop to Cerberus of bringing >> in a human observer. Therefore, it is not a communication system, not an >> 'interpretation system' but an actual pragmatic system of how matter >> exists in our universe. It exists as Mind - which functions within all >> three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as equal >> and basic primordial forces. >> >> -------------------------------------------------------- >> >> 4] Gary R: Finally, it is Peirce who calls the Sign an entelechy. >> >> EDWINA; Again, we have to each of us clarify what we mean by 'Sign'. I >> mean, by Sign, the full irreducible triad of DO-[IO-R-II]. The reason I >> insist on the relation of DO with this triad is because no Sign can exist >> in isolation; it is always within some interaction. >> >> However, others mean by Sign - what I refer to only as the Repesentamen, >> the node of mediation. >> >> So- I think one has to be very specific about this meaning. >> >> As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he mean >> by it? After all, his comparison of it with Thirdness does not mean that >> there is an a priori agenda of Mind-forming-Matter. As he says, Thirdness, >> as habits, providing predictive constraints, 'is essentially of a general >> nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled' 1.26. Again, "this mode of >> being which consists, mind my word, if you please, the mode of being which >> consists in the fact that future facts of Secondness will take on a >> determinate general character, I call a Thirdness" 1.26. >> >> Thirdness is general and not specific; it is not 'a priori' and with a >> specific potential/purpose [which is what is suggested in some uses of the >> term 'entelechy'] but, as general -its articulation within an individual >> form of matter - is open to local stimuli. That is, with the reality >> of both Secondness, which is the local individual 'articulation' of >> Mind-as-Matter [and thus, susceptible to local stimuli] and the reality of >> Firstness, which is the reality of chance deviations from the norm - then, >> this general character of habits, is open to adaptation and change. >> There is no predetermined future identity of the Universe or of how >> Mind-as-Matter will function. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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