Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues. I see this as a form of abstraction, so the phenomena for Husserl are an abstraction form everyday experience, in which we do presume existence (typically at least). I am unclear if Peirce had a similar view, but the quote Helmut gave from Peirce does suggest that, in the setting aside of questions of reality.
John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: Friday, 19 February 2016 3:32 PM To: cl...@lextek.com Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron? Clark, list, thank you for the hint to Husserl. Now I just have looked him up at Wikipedia, and I think I like his phenomenology. I just had read something about and from Habermas, especially about the dualism of system and "Lebenswelt" (life-world). Now just I have seen, that the term "Lebenswelt" is from Husserl. Is it a sort of collective Umwelt? If it is, then is it the Umwelt (subjective environment) not of an organism as a subject, but of a society-as-a-subject? In this case, "Lebenswelt" is not something objective either, but subjective too, but with the subject not being an individual, but a society. Regularly at this point, with me, an objecting reflex is excited: I do not want to take a society for a subject. If a society is about to become a subject, it is lethal for the individuals, because they will cease to be subjects. This is, because in a systems hierarchy, there can only be one subject-level (one system of interpretance, one interpreting sytem, or one subject, that makes everything else objects). But this is opening another barrel. But all in all, I would say, that "Lebenswelt" is not something objective or ontologic as my had-been-understanding of the Peircean "phaneron", as I think, that you have also pointed out, and also, that even for Peirce, "phaneron" may not be a "definite idea", but "something pointed to in experience". Vagueness, alright. We cannot fix an egg to a jelly fish with a nail, but can talk about both. Best, Helmut 19. Februar 2016 um 22:27 Uhr "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote: On Feb 19, 2016, at 1:47 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: "[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds." (Adirondack Lectures, 1905; in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1 [eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931], paragraph 284) So Peirce has not entertained a doubt. But that is not a scientifical premiss. Or has he justified this idea somewhere else? Because this idea of the phaneron perhaps is the only idea from Peirce I cannot approve, because I do not understand it: Our minds are separated, arent they? Besides very rare events that seem to be telepathic. The other problem of course is what presence means in this context. (Not a small point - as I’ve noted Derrida’s critique of presence draws a lot on Peirce’s semiotics) Sticking with Peirce it’s worth asking about the relationship between place and time in the formulation of presence. Especially when a doctrine of continuity of some sense is part of Peirce’s thinking. I tend to read Peirce as speaking rather loosely here to get the general idea of the phaneron in experience without necessarily making it a definite idea. That is it is something pointed to in experience rather than an artificial category with carefully delineated meaning. This would of course also be more in keeping with Peirce’s maxim and his logic of vagueness. The other interesting part are the universal aspects of the phaneron. Again this pops up in German phenomenology with Husserl as well as post-Husserlean phenomenologists. Peirce is of course doing something different from Husserl. One has to be very careful reading one in terms of the other as there are so many places they differ. But the question of what is common to minds is a problem for Husserl as well. I think Peirce’s assumption something is common is a typical one. However I again think that some of Peirce’s other arguments and ideas should make us careful here. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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