Gary F., List:
It sounds like we both analyze the girl's scream as a Sign for the mother,
rather than as a Dynamic Object for the mother. Since you call it a
"natural sign," I am guessing that we also both view the hot burner as its
Dynamic Object. In this case, the burner *determines *the Sign
Edwina, List:
I am having trouble following you here. Since you agree that a Sign is not
a thing, what does it mean to say that things must also be Signs? Are you
suggesting that *all things* must also be Signs, or that *all Dynamic
Objects* must also be Signs, or something else entirely? In
Jon, Helmut,
Jon, yes, I’m sure that Peirce’s emphasis is on a sign not being a thing. I
think he says it that way, rather than invoking his usual distinction between
existence and reality, because “New Elements” was intended to be the preface to
an “elementary” book in the sense that it would
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon AS - I agree with your outline of the 'sign is not a real
thing'.
With regard to the necessity of the Dynamic Object, I'd suggest that
this Dynamic Object, as a thing also requires that it be related, so
to
Helmut, Gary F., List:
I suspect that we are misplacing the emphasis if we read Peirce as saying
that "a sign is not a *real *thing"; I take him to be saying instead that
"a sign is not a real *thing*." In other words, genuine Signs are
constituents of the *third *Universe of Experience, rather
