Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
List, Matt: Thank you for articulating your views. I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical generalizations. To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, within the mindset of philosophers. Firstness is the personal pronoun I, Secondness is the brute action of personality/belief and Thirdness is the relation between the two.:-) :-) :-) We disagree on some issues. Most notably, the following We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, I am not aware of any imperatives in choosing a philosophy. Perhaps you could explain what/ where/ how/ and why such imperatives exist. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, 1. The simple is for simpletons. I admit the critical importance of perplexity in all of nature. 2. The natural sciences of which I am a student of, electricity, chemistry, biology and medicine, are all based on the concept of the discrete identity of the individual parts of the whole. The identity of every human being is discrete and unique. Space and time are continuous. Our differences are so profound that I will read your response and then drop the tread. Cheers Jerry On Jun 17, 2014, at 10:33 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Jerry asked, What is your understanding of your usage of the term us in your sentence? Could you find a better articulation of your intended meaning(s)? My usage was in response to what Stephen said, quoted here: Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. After we are, reality remains. The part of my response Jerry asked me to better articulate: The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before us and there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. And I defined 'we' as those of us whose essence is our mind. In another post I wrote: Regarding what I meant by 'essence of mind,' Peirce did say 'Matter is effete mind', but I think he could have also said the reverse, that 'Matter is nascent mind.' Maybe some minds are hardening into nothing but habit, i.e., matter, and some minds hardened into habits are transforming into what most people would recognize as minds. Now, why idealism? We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, eg., dualism says part of the world is ideal and the other part is material. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, since the alternative is only more complicated. That leaves the first two mentioned which are monistic. Since in anyone's thinking the material world is derived from their ideas, it seems simpler to choose idealism, and admit the mental as the primordial stuff of reality and the physical as a special case of the ideal. To infer that in our evolution, somewhere along the line, particles snapped together and produced ideas seems to gratuitously give the common notion of mind, e.g., that animals have a mind but non-animals don't, a privileged status analogous to the idea that the current human form couldn't have evolved from an extremely simple past so it must have snapped together from God's command; anything that preserves our nobility. I used we as in those of us whose essence is our mind in a way I understand Peirce. He was an idealist, as I am, which means we believe reality is mental. I used 'we' in the widest sense because there is no value in Stephen Rose's statement if the term is taken in a narrower sense. Here's why i think that: If he claimed pragmaticism was a bastion against solipsism he would've use the term 'I' or 'you' in the singular. If he meant some narrow use of 'we' like 'all Americans', or 'all humans over the age of two,' etc., it would be a worthless statement—everyone knows that reality kept going after great grandma and grampa's death. But if he meant it in the widest sense Mr. Rose's statement does have value but it directly contradicts Peirce's idealism, so he shouldn't identify the idea with pragmaticism. The widest sense of 'we' is everything, and to a synechistic idealist that means all minds, which encompasses reality. The idea that Reality is the container of everything but separate from everything is absurd: There is something in addition to everything? It also contradicts synechism in that it
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:5995] Re: QBism, once again
Howard wrote: Quantum physics runs directly into this conceptual(5995-1) problem with the (discrete) particle-(continuous) wave complementarity. Matter cannot be described without using both concepts in an unintuitive relation. I think physicists are ahead of biologists by at least one century, in the sense that biologists (most, if not all, of them) still believe that the wave-particle complementarity (WPC) is unique to physics and not applicable to biology. But I saw several observations on molecular and cell biology reported at the EMBO/EMBL Conference on Molecular Machines held in Heidelberg last month that clearly demonstrated the involvement of both particle and wave properties of matter, but everything is explained away only in terms of the particle aspect, completely ignoring the wave aspect of matter. When I pointed this out at the meeting on several occasions, some young audience (graduate students and postdocs) apparently liked and agree with my commentaries, as evidenced by the fact that I was invited to have a drink and dance with them at Cave in Heidelberg until 3 am ! Also some of the established investigators at the meeting apparently agreed with me (or at least thought my commentaries were thought-provoking), since my poster (Experimental and Theoretical Evidence for the Energy Quantization of Molecular Machines and Living Cells) were chosen as one of the presentations to be published in a special issue of Structural and Computational Biotechnology Journal dedicated to the Conference, the manuscript of which being due in 10 days. In this manuscript, I will emphasize the fundamental significance of WPC in interpreting biological data on the molecular and cellular levels, a conclusion supported by my own recent findings that a wide variety of biological processes, from protein folding to enzyme catalysis and brain functions, obeys the generalized Planck equation (also called BRE, blackbody radiation-like equation, or the Planck distribution) which consists of two terms one related to standing waves and the other to their energies. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net At 02:58 PM 6/19/2014, Edwina wrote, (following Howard's response to Søren): Søren wrote: This understanding of experience as an irreducible aspect of reality is very difficult to swallow for so-called scientific realists. HP: On the contrary, what you call the individual's irreducible aspect of reality was first clearly distinguished by Newton (his greatest discovery according to Wigner). This irreducible aspect is what physicists call the local initial conditions as contrasted with universal nature's laws. Edwina: I think that the 'individual's irreducible aspect of reality' can be traced much further than Newton. How about Aristotle? HP: Agreed. What can't be traced to Aristotle? Nevertheless, to clearly distinguish initial conditions from laws you need Newton's mathematics which described continuity with discrete symbols. In my opinion, Aristotle's greatest discovery was complementarity -- the epistemological fact that to understand reality we need multiple models that are logically irreducible to each other. His four causes are one example. Another example of irreducibility is discreteness and continuity: That which moves does not move by counting. Peirce had trouble accepting the necessity of complementary models because they are often logically inconsistent. He spent many years trying to describe continuity (his synechism) by discrete logic (as did many other mathematicians). He did not solve the problem (e.g., see http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/USC/DP16.htmlContinuous Frustration: C.S. Peirces Mathematical Conception of Continuity).http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/USC/DP16.html Quantum physics runs directly into this conceptual problem with the (discrete) particle-(continuous) wave complementarity. Matter cannot be described without using both concepts in an unintuitive relation. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
I don't see how anyone can avoid choosing, either consciously or subconsciously, either monism or dualism. You can switch, but I don't see a way out. I'm not sure if there's a real philosophical difference between the two monistic philosophies or if one is just a more convenient view from which to explain and understand certain issues. If we've successfully boiled our philosophical disagreement down to a difference in the values we hold then I consider this a successful discussion. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 10:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: List, Matt: Thank you for articulating your views. I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical generalizations. To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, within the mindset of philosophers. Firstness is the personal pronoun I, Secondness is the brute action of personality/belief and Thirdness is the relation between the two.:-) :-) :-) We disagree on some issues. Most notably, the following We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, I am not aware of any imperatives in choosing a philosophy. Perhaps you could explain what/ where/ how/ and why such imperatives exist. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, 1. The simple is for simpletons. I admit the critical importance of perplexity in all of nature. 2. The natural sciences of which I am a student of, electricity, chemistry, biology and medicine, are all based on the concept of the discrete identity of the individual parts of the whole. The identity of every human being is discrete and unique. Space and time are continuous. Our differences are so profound that I will read your response and then drop the tread. Cheers Jerry On Jun 17, 2014, at 10:33 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Jerry asked, What is your understanding of your usage of the term us in your sentence? Could you find a better articulation of your intended meaning(s)? My usage was in response to what Stephen said, quoted here: Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. After we are, reality remains. The part of my response Jerry asked me to better articulate: The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before us and there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. And I defined 'we' as those of us whose essence is our mind. In another post I wrote: Regarding what I meant by 'essence of mind,' Peirce did say 'Matter is effete mind', but I think he could have also said the reverse, that 'Matter is nascent mind.' Maybe some minds are hardening into nothing but habit, i.e., matter, and some minds hardened into habits are transforming into what most people would recognize as minds. Now, why idealism? We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, eg., dualism says part of the world is ideal and the other part is material. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, since the alternative is only more complicated. That leaves the first two mentioned which are monistic. Since in anyone's thinking the material world is derived from their ideas, it seems simpler to choose idealism, and admit the mental as the primordial stuff of reality and the physical as a special case of the ideal. To infer that in our evolution, somewhere along the line, particles snapped together and produced ideas seems to gratuitously give the common notion of mind, e.g., that animals have a mind but non-animals don't, a privileged status analogous to the idea that the current human form couldn't have evolved from an extremely simple past so it must have snapped together from God's command; anything that preserves our nobility. I used we as in those of us whose essence is our mind in a way I understand Peirce. He was an idealist, as I am, which means we believe reality is mental. I used 'we' in the widest sense because there is no value in Stephen Rose's statement if the term is taken in a narrower sense. Here's why i think that: If he claimed pragmaticism was a bastion against solipsism he would've use the term 'I' or 'you' in the singular. If he meant some narrow use of 'we' like 'all Americans', or 'all humans over
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
7. If Triadic Philosophy has any claim to originality it might be in the third term in its root triad which is Aesthetics. What in heaven's name is aesthetics doing in what bids to be the upper limit of a universal philosophy that will create a sea change in our troubled earth? The simple answer is that it fell naturally into place. Charles Sanders Peirce eventually gave a place to aesthetics and ethics but suggested that aesthetics comes first. I beg to differ and much of what follows is an effort to explain. But for the moment we can rest in the knowledge that in Triadic Philosophy the root triad is Reality, Ethics, Aesthetics. 8. Why have a triad at all? The answer opens up what may be the biggest aha moment in Triadic Philosophy. The reason history has turned out so sadly is, in large part, because we failed to think in threes! We thought and we fought. We thought in twos. We thought either-or. We saw only two things when there were always three. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 1:11 PM, Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see how anyone can avoid choosing, either consciously or subconsciously, either monism or dualism. You can switch, but I don't see a way out. I'm not sure if there's a real philosophical difference between the two monistic philosophies or if one is just a more convenient view from which to explain and understand certain issues. If we've successfully boiled our philosophical disagreement down to a difference in the values we hold then I consider this a successful discussion. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 10:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: List, Matt: Thank you for articulating your views. I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical generalizations. To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, within the mindset of philosophers. Firstness is the personal pronoun I, Secondness is the brute action of personality/belief and Thirdness is the relation between the two.:-) :-) :-) We disagree on some issues. Most notably, the following We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, I am not aware of any imperatives in choosing a philosophy. Perhaps you could explain what/ where/ how/ and why such imperatives exist. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, 1. The simple is for simpletons. I admit the critical importance of perplexity in all of nature. 2. The natural sciences of which I am a student of, electricity, chemistry, biology and medicine, are all based on the concept of the discrete identity of the individual parts of the whole. The identity of every human being is discrete and unique. Space and time are continuous. Our differences are so profound that I will read your response and then drop the tread. Cheers Jerry On Jun 17, 2014, at 10:33 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Jerry asked, What is your understanding of your usage of the term us in your sentence? Could you find a better articulation of your intended meaning(s)? My usage was in response to what Stephen said, quoted here: Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. After we are, reality remains. The part of my response Jerry asked me to better articulate: The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before us and there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. And I defined 'we' as those of us whose essence is our mind. In another post I wrote: Regarding what I meant by 'essence of mind,' Peirce did say 'Matter is effete mind', but I think he could have also said the reverse, that 'Matter is nascent mind.' Maybe some minds are hardening into nothing but habit, i.e., matter, and some minds hardened into habits are transforming into what most people would recognize as minds. Now, why idealism? We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, eg., dualism says part of the world is ideal and the other part is material. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, since the alternative is only more complicated. That leaves the first two mentioned which are monistic. Since in anyone's thinking the material world is derived from their ideas, it seems simpler to choose idealism, and admit the
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
I dont think, that materialism and idealism are monisms, but, that monism is a hypothesis, that says, that both, ideas and matter, are derivates of the same thing (genotype or so), of which none is more fundamental than the other. What makes them different derivates on one hand, and combines them and makes them equal in regards of relevance again, is a third, lets say structure. This structure is only there, if the other two concepts are present and separate, otherwise there would be no use of the structure (nothing to separate or to combine). So, such a triadic hypotethis is a monism, because of the irreducibility of the triad ideas, matter, and structures, and because each can be each in a different time scale of a different semiosis, and is therefore essentially, monistically the same. Idealism and materialism are dualisms, I think. So it is possible to choose between idealism, materialism and monism. Von:Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com I dont see how anyone can avoid choosing, either consciously or subconsciously, either monism or dualism. You can switch, but I dont see a way out. Im not sure if theres a real philosophical difference between the two monistic philosophies or if one is just a more convenient view from which to explain and understand certain issues. If weve successfully boiled our philosophical disagreement down to a difference in the values we hold then I consider this a successful discussion. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 10:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: List, Matt: Thank you for articulating your views. I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical generalizations. To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, within the mindset of philosophers. Firstness is the personal pronoun I, Secondness is the brute action of personality/belief and Thirdness is the relation between the two. :-) :-) :-) We disagree on some issues. Most notably, the following We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, I am not aware of any imperatives in choosing a philosophy. Perhaps you could explain what/ where/ how/ and why such imperatives exist. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockhams Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, 1. The simple is for simpletons. I admit the critical importance of perplexity in all of nature. 2. The natural sciences of which I am a student of, electricity, chemistry, biology and medicine, are all based on the concept of the discrete identity of the individual parts of the whole. The identity of every human being is discrete and unique.Space and time are continuous. Our differences are so profound that I will read your response and then drop the tread. Cheers Jerry On Jun 17, 2014, at 10:33 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Jerry asked, What is your understanding of your usage of the term us in your sentence? Could you find a better articulation of your intended meaning(s)? My usage was in response to what Stephen said, quoted here: Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. After we are, reality remains. The part of my response Jerry asked me to better articulate: The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before us and there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. And I defined we as those of us whose essence is our mind. In another post I wrote: Regarding what I meant by essence of mind, Peirce did say Matter is effete mind, but I think he could have also said the reverse, that Matter is nascent mind. Maybe some minds are hardening into nothing but habit, i.e., matter, and some minds hardened into habits are transforming into what most people would recognize as minds. Now, why idealism? We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, eg., dualism says part of the world is ideal and the other part is material. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockhams Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, since the alternative is only more complicated. That leaves the first two mentioned which are monistic. Since in anyones thinking the material world is derived from their ideas, it seems simpler to choose idealism, and admit the mental as the primordial stuff of reality and the physical as a special case of the ideal. To infer that in our evolution, somewhere along the line, particles snapped
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
Matt wrote: Just like 'standing still' is a special case of (062014-1) motion, matter is a special case of mind. Do you mean by (062014-1) that Matter is a necessary condition for mind ? Would you agree that Just as 'standing still' is assocaited with a zero(062014-2) velcoity and motion with non-zero velocities, so matter is associated with a zero capacity for thinking while mind has non-zero capacity of thinking ? It may be that Statement (062014-1) is akin to saying that a glass is half full, whereas Statement (062014-2) is akin to saying that a glass is half empty: Both statements are true. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net You're unnecessarily complicating things. Just like 'standing still' is a special case of motion, matter is a special case of mind. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 5:26 PM, Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de wrote: I dont think, that materialism and idealism are monisms, but, that monism is a hypothesis, that says, that both, ideas and matter, are derivates of the same thing (genotype or so), of which none is more fundamental than the other. What makes them different derivates on one hand, and combines them and makes them equal in regards of relevance again, is a third, lets say structure. This structure is only there, if the other two concepts are present and separate, otherwise there would be no use of the structure (nothing to separate or to combine). So, such a triadic hypotethis is a monism, because of the irreducibility of the triad ideas, matter, and structures, and because each can be each in a different time scale of a different semiosis, and is therefore essentially, monistically the same. Idealism and materialism are dualisms, I think. So it is possible to choose between idealism, materialism and monism. Von: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com I don't see how anyone can avoid choosing, either consciously or subconsciously, either monism or dualism. You can switch, but I don't see a way out. I'm not sure if there's a real philosophical difference between the two monistic philosophies or if one is just a more convenient view from which to explain and understand certain issues. If we've successfully boiled our philosophical disagreement down to a difference in the values we hold then I consider this a successful discussion. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 10:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: List, Matt: Thank you for articulating your views. I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical generalizations. To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, within the mindset of philosophers. Firstness is the personal pronoun I, Secondness is the brute action of personality/belief and Thirdness is the relation between the two.:-) :-) :-) We disagree on some issues. Most notably, the following We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, I am not aware of any imperatives in choosing a philosophy. Perhaps you could explain what/ where/ how/ and why such imperatives exist. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, 1. The simple is for simpletons. I admit the critical importance of perplexity in all of nature. 2. The natural sciences of which I am a student of, electricity, chemistry, biology and medicine, are all based on the concept of the discrete identity of the individual parts of the whole. The identity of every human being is discrete and unique. Space and time are continuous. Our differences are so profound that I will read your response and then drop the tread. Cheers Jerry On Jun 17, 2014, at 10:33 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Jerry asked, What is your understanding of your usage of the term us in your sentence? Could you find a better articulation of your intended meaning(s)? My usage was in response to what Stephen said, quoted here: Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. After we are, reality remains. The part of my response Jerry asked me to better articulate: The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before us and there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. And I defined 'we' as those
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Links to Peirce Centennial Seminar threads on Peirce: A Guide to the Perplexed by de Waal
Thank you, Kees. I'll admit that the work that I did would add up to a solid day's work if done in a single sitting and inclusive of various arrangements and suchlike that I tried out. Best, Ben On 6/20/2014 7:19 AM, Cornelis de Waal wrote: Dear Ben, This is indeed most impressive and looks like a tremendous lot of work. Thanks! This will be very helpful, as I do want to go back to some discussions. With the best wishes, Kees *From: * Gary Richmond *Date: * Tuesday, June 17, 2014 6:17 PM *To: * Benjamin Udell *Cc: * peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu , Catherine Legg, K cdw...@iupui.edu mailto:cdw...@iupui.edu , Nathan Houser *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Links to Peirce Centennial Seminar threads on Peirce: A Guide to the Perplexed by de Waal Ben, list, Ben, thanks so much. The page is beautifully organized and looks great. I've already begun using it. A few days ago Cathy Legg remarked on the list of resources Soren offered in his first post in the Chapter 9 thread. I've been wanting to find that post since then, but I haven't had any time to search for it. The new page linking to the seminar threads made it very easy indeed. I'd like to note that when I first asked Ben to create this page I thought it would be an easy thing to do (for him). As it turns out, it took many exhausting hours for Ben to complete it, and so I especially appreciate his having done so. Note that the page can be accessed on the Arisbe home page. Be sure to refresh your browser. Best, Gary; *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 5:57 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: List, At Gary Richmond's suggestion, I've created an Arisbe page with links to the threads of peirce-l's Peirce Centennial Seminar, January to June, 2014 (and still going!) on Peirce: A Guide to the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/seminar-waal.htm Some may find it a little challenging to follow the full threads on a given chapter, since even a slight change of thread title will convince some archive systems that it is a new thread. I've advise exploring chronological lists at the archives. Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
Hi Sung, On Jun 20, 2014, at 6:34 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Matt wrote: Just like 'standing still' is a special case of (062014-1) motion, matter is a special case of mind. Do you mean by (062014-1) that Matter is a necessary condition for mind ? I didn't mean that. That the special case is a necessary condition for the usual case? Maybe it's true, but I'm not signing my name to that. Would you agree that Just as 'standing still' is assocaited with a zero(062014-2) velcoity and motion with non-zero velocities, so matter is associated with a zero capacity for thinking while mind has non-zero capacity of thinking ? I thought of this. I do agree. I used to be a relativist. Back then I would've agreed and further stated that thinking and not thinking are each special states relative to each other—each seeing itself as mind and the other as matter; or if keeping short of the absolutes*, each one thinking he has the superior capacity of mind. But now I tend to think that matter is dormant mind, not completely dead, and that capacity is not relative.** * The pre-quantum physicists must have thought that the special case of absolute zero velocity was nowhere to be found in the physical universe. But now there's a Planck-Wheeler time and space so I guess there's a minimum speed. But that's out of my scope. Is there a similar minimum capacity for thought? I don't think I'd even understand the answer. ** Relativism still nags me. I haven't yet jumped with both feet into 'extreme scholastic realism'. Matt It may be that Statement (062014-1) is akin to saying that a glass is half full, whereas Statement (062014-2) is akin to saying that a glass is half empty: Both statements are true. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net You're unnecessarily complicating things. Just like 'standing still' is a special case of motion, matter is a special case of mind. Matt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1
Søren thank you for the reply. I'm very sorry to hear that your paper was not accepted to the Peirce Congress. I know that I would have liked to hear it. There were so many papers submitted to the conference that there was no way the refereeing committee could all look at all of them, which introduced some randomness attendant on who scored various papers. I hope that I will see your paper presented at another conference in the not-too-distant future - perhaps one that is more specifically targetted to these philosophical interests. I'm interested in the link you drew between Peirce's view and some ideas in current physics, as well as your critique of this as, as you put it physicist Wheeler is basing his view on an information theoretical view and fails on establishing the reflective phenomenological basis. I totally agree with the critique but I admit I don't have a clear sense of *how* the (Peircean) remedy will look. *How* does an information-theoretic science become welded to a phenomenological investigation? What does the resulting science look ike? What are its rules of engagement, and how does it determine its results? At this point I am wondering whether semiotics is the bridge between the two. Cheers, Cathy On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 1:34 AM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk wrote: Dear Cathy Thank you for your appreciation of my work. It is heartwarming coming from such a good philosopher ! The references came from the fact that a lot of my writing was based on those two article that was not accepted by the referees of the Centennial conference, probably because this is a “dangerous area” in Peirce’s philosophy for many analytically trained philosophers. There is no doubt that Peirce’s evolutionary process view combined with his fallibilism adds something to both Buddhism and Christianity as also Hartshorne see it in his development of a process theology. Thus evolution is God’s way of creating the world. The problem with this understanding for most ordinary Christians is that it would demand a change in their concept of God to Peirce’s: God is real but does not exists and therefore is not conscious and cannot have a will based on a personhood as it is understood by most Theists. Therefore the whole creationist concept of a conscious plan in the creation of the world would collapses and only Peirce’s synechist and thycistic semiotic Agapism remains. As in evolutionary epistemology there is a deep connection between the process of human cognition , ecology and evolution in the form of semiosis’ combination of chance, love and logic. John Archibald Wheeler’s “it from bit participatory universe” is the closest a modern philosophical physicist has come to Peirce’s vision. But as most physicist Wheeler is basing his view on an information theoretical view and fails on establishing the reflective phenomenological basis, which that is so foundational to Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics and view of the “natural light of reasoning”. J.A. Wheeler (1990). “Information, physics, Quantum: The search for links”, pp. 3-29 in W.H. Zurek (Ed.). *Complexity, entropy and the physics of information. *Vol. VIII in Santa Fe Institute, Studies in the Sciences of complexity. Addison Wesley publishing Company. Best Søren *Fra:* Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] *Sendt:* 16. juni 2014 07:09 *Til:* Søren Brier; Gary Richmond; g...@gnusystems.ca *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu *Emne:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1 Hi all, I’m very behind on this thread, but have been reading and enjoying it. I just haven’t had the chance to pull my thoughts together enough to post. First of all, a big thank you to Søren for starting us off with such wonderfully erudite postings – even including bibliographies which are a resource for all of us to keep and refer to in the future! I have a bit of background knowledge of world religion and certain spiritual traditions, but have certainly learned quite a bit more through this thread – about key ideas in Buddhism, Dogen, St John of the Cross, and more. Totally agree with you Søren about the way the phenomenological tradition has done useful ground work for this area of philosophy but is still regarded with suspicion by the ‘mainstream’. Thank you to those (Gary R, Gary F and Søren spring to mind) who were willing to describe a little of their own mystical (or otherwise spiritual) experiences in this public forum. This kind of candour and trust is what makes philosophy a truly enriching exercise, and peirce-l a valuable forum. Gary F I was very interested in the way you highlighted the role of the **natural light of reason** in Peirce’s philosophy as giving him a distinctive take on these questions. I’m very interested in that as I’m still pursuing iconic signification as a kind of direct ‘seeing’ to break the
