[PEIRCE-L] sign, system, structure

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear list members,

 

I have started writing my blog (is it a blog?)  about systems theory, based on Peirce´s categories and signs theory. Please criticize it. Usually (as default) I will not mention people´s names, except by quoting from something already published. But please write: "mention me", then I will. But if you don´t, I sure will mention the anonymous critique in my blog, and answer to it, either by refuting it, or changing my work hypothesis at this point. There is e.g. a way I put the term "object", I am not sure whether Peirce would agree: An object becomes an object only due to the sign, before that it is a subject. "Subject" I have translated from german "Gegenstand", which means thing or subject. I am not sure about the term choice, maybe "thing" would be better, or "entity"?

 

Anyway, the website is: www.signs-in-time.de . Why doesn´t it turn blue now, as a link? Maybe after posting. Write you later,

 

Best,

Helmut

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences

[Everett, Daniel]

Fantastic, John. 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 25, 2017, at 15:17, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> I drew the attached CSPsciences.jpg to illustrate Peirce's
> "Outline Classification of the Sciences", CP 1.180-202
> or EP 2.258-262 (1903).
> 
> The dotted lines show dependencies: the category at the lower end of
> each line depends on the one at the higher end.  Only two sciences
> have no dependencies on anything else:  mathematics and phenomenology.
> 
> From Peirce (CP 1.186, EP 2.259):
>> Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally
>> present in the phenomenon; meaning by 'the phenomenon', whatever is
>> present at any time to the mind in any way; Normative science distin-
>> guishes what ought to be from what ought not to be, and makes many
>> other divisions and arrangements subservient to its primary dualistic
>> distinction; Metaphysics seeks to give an account of the universe of
>> mind and matter.  Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and
>> on mathematics; Metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.
> 
> Since Peirce's list includes philosophy, it's broader than the English
> word 'science'.  I put the word 'knowledge' at the top, since it is
> broad enough to include the German Wissenschaft or the Latin scientia.
> It's also broad enough to include unformalized knowledge.  That breadth
> is necessary to include history, which Peirce classified among the
> "psychic sciences".
> 
> Peirce included logic at two places in his classification.
> As part of mathematics, logic is an abstract calculus for relating
> propositions, independent of any application.  But logic is also
> a normative science for determining how people "ought" to reason
> in order to preserve truth.
> 
> I used the phrases 'empirical science' and 'organized experience'
> to avoid Peirce's word 'idioscopy', which he took from Benthem (1843).
> Even for the Century Dictionary (1891), that word was considered
> too obscure or obsolete to include.  I think it's time to retire it.
> 
> Any comments, suggestions, or complaints are welcome.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences

[Stephen C. Rose]

This makes perfect sense in relation to Peirce but I do not think it
fulfills what Peirce might have conceded is a more useful and pragmaticist
effort to create the world in which triadic thinking would not be an
academic cul de sac but rather a theater of understanding based on his
musings and spiritual experiences. My own effort to do this leads me to
elevate ethics and aesthetics from their lower place and turn them into the
second and third elements of a root triad (icon index symbol) which I
term Reality Ethics and Aesthetics in that order. This is the basis for an
actual discipline which I believe can lead to real, practical actions and
expressions that are in keeping with what Peirce suggested was the end of
logic, not to mention the PM. Clearly, there are many other ways to get to
a more popular understanding. Maybe the mysteries of influence do not
require any such interpolation. I would then say that if Aristotle has
facilitated the binary culture and thinking of Western Christendom Peirce
when he has his day will provide a triadic framework for a less conflicted
future, a more useful pedagogy and the transmutation of separated religions
into a more hospitable spirituality that is universal and diverse.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Aug 25, 2017 at 3:17 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> I drew the attached CSPsciences.jpg to illustrate Peirce's
> "Outline Classification of the Sciences", CP 1.180-202
> or EP 2.258-262 (1903).
>
> The dotted lines show dependencies: the category at the lower end of
> each line depends on the one at the higher end.  Only two sciences
> have no dependencies on anything else:  mathematics and phenomenology.
>
> From Peirce (CP 1.186, EP 2.259):
>
>> Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally
>> present in the phenomenon; meaning by 'the phenomenon', whatever is
>> present at any time to the mind in any way; Normative science distin-
>> guishes what ought to be from what ought not to be, and makes many
>> other divisions and arrangements subservient to its primary dualistic
>> distinction; Metaphysics seeks to give an account of the universe of
>> mind and matter.  Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and
>> on mathematics; Metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.
>>
>
> Since Peirce's list includes philosophy, it's broader than the English
> word 'science'.  I put the word 'knowledge' at the top, since it is
> broad enough to include the German Wissenschaft or the Latin scientia.
> It's also broad enough to include unformalized knowledge.  That breadth
> is necessary to include history, which Peirce classified among the
> "psychic sciences".
>
> Peirce included logic at two places in his classification.
> As part of mathematics, logic is an abstract calculus for relating
> propositions, independent of any application.  But logic is also
> a normative science for determining how people "ought" to reason
> in order to preserve truth.
>
> I used the phrases 'empirical science' and 'organized experience'
> to avoid Peirce's word 'idioscopy', which he took from Benthem (1843).
> Even for the Century Dictionary (1891), that word was considered
> too obscure or obsolete to include.  I think it's time to retire it.
>
> Any comments, suggestions, or complaints are welcome.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences

[John F Sowa]

I drew the attached CSPsciences.jpg to illustrate Peirce's
"Outline Classification of the Sciences", CP 1.180-202
or EP 2.258-262 (1903).

The dotted lines show dependencies: the category at the lower end of
each line depends on the one at the higher end.  Only two sciences
have no dependencies on anything else:  mathematics and phenomenology.

From Peirce (CP 1.186, EP 2.259):

Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally
present in the phenomenon; meaning by 'the phenomenon', whatever is
present at any time to the mind in any way; Normative science distin-
guishes what ought to be from what ought not to be, and makes many
other divisions and arrangements subservient to its primary dualistic
distinction; Metaphysics seeks to give an account of the universe of
mind and matter.  Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and
on mathematics; Metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.


Since Peirce's list includes philosophy, it's broader than the English
word 'science'.  I put the word 'knowledge' at the top, since it is
broad enough to include the German Wissenschaft or the Latin scientia.
It's also broad enough to include unformalized knowledge.  That breadth
is necessary to include history, which Peirce classified among the
"psychic sciences".

Peirce included logic at two places in his classification.
As part of mathematics, logic is an abstract calculus for relating
propositions, independent of any application.  But logic is also
a normative science for determining how people "ought" to reason
in order to preserve truth.

I used the phrases 'empirical science' and 'organized experience'
to avoid Peirce's word 'idioscopy', which he took from Benthem (1843).
Even for the Century Dictionary (1891), that word was considered
too obscure or obsolete to include.  I think it's time to retire it.

Any comments, suggestions, or complaints are welcome.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[John F Sowa]

Stefan B, Stephen CR, Bev, and Kirsti,

I drew a new diagram based on Peirce's classification of the
sciences.  I'll send it to the list in a separate thread.

Stephan

I believe you are seeing this from a very different viewpoint.
I am interested in the sociology and history of knowledge.


So am I.  And so was Peirce.  I believe that the new diagram
will show how all these issues are related.


[The cycle] isn't useful if i want to point out that there are
possible differences in the kind of abduction and the kind of
induction used and if i want to point out that there is difference
between guessing a word one hasn't clearly understood from context
and guessing whether saturn has "ears", moons or rings.


I'm not claiming that all possible relationships can be explained
with a single diagram.  When Peirce was talking about diagrammatical
reasoning, he had intended different diagrams to highlight different
relations for different purposes.

Stephen

Do W's atomic facts fit in?


Yes.  When Peirce talked about induction, abduction, and deduction,
he didn't place any restriction on the subject matter or how it
happened to be represented.

Bev

What about bad habits?


A bad habit is learned in the same way as a good habit.
The only difference is that the goal of the bad habit is some
short-term gratification, which happens to conflict with a
more important long-term good.

An example would be procrastination.  The short-term goal of
avoiding some onerous task can cause the long-term loss of
something more important.

Kirsti,

But Peirce did write on cyclical arithmetics. With detailed
instructions on how demonstrate the rules by experimenting with
a pack of cards.


Yes.  But he used that cycle for a different purpose.  That
cycle represents patterns in a particular mathematical subject.

The cycle in the logic of pragmatism is a cycle among the
steps of reasoning.  It's not a cycle in the subject matter.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .