Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

There's a lot beyond what you have said that is suggestive. But I will say
just two things. If I was starting from scratch I would recognize a
division between any contrived or explicit or mathematical or scientific
language that is logically consistent and what I would call normal language
or some such phrase. This is all the stuff that goes on between us all. It
is imprecise, vague, comprehended, doomed to miss and otherwise as slippery
as a handful of minnows. Even here when not dealing or referring to some
specific logical unity within the whole of language we talk past one
another and as often as not are saying something entirely different than
what is set down. As Isaiah (poet one) said: "See and see but do not
perceive". Now I am probably close to being a musical prodigy but I could
never master the lingo so when I was commissioned to do choral work I sang
into a tape recorder and passed words and tape on to a fellow who knew how
to finish the job. My inabilities in the entire area of what I would call
contrived or explicit languages amount to much more of a disability than
Peirce's lamented left-handedness. My entire project has to do with how we
can communicate better in normal language to the point that we achieve a
slight tilt in our inherited modes of communication which I see as binary.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Stephen, John:
>
> On Apr 14, 2018, at 11:57 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
> Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose.
>
>
> This is a very clever phrase; I like it very much.
>
> Do you think that all of academic philosophy (not just the ones that post
> here) uses all words in this sense?
>
> That being said (with a bit of sarcasm :-) ), I think you missed the
> intent of my message so I would ask that you broaden the scope of your
> considerations.
> I start from my lifelong experience that human communication is an
> extraordinarily difficult topic to discuss, in part because the huge
> variety of experiences of individuals with different educational
> backgrounds.
>
> The point is that human cultures have constructed *many many many* symbol
> systems.
> Semiotics applies to BOTH natural external signs and to symbols
> externalized by purposeful human intent.
>
> Consider the notation for music.
> This symbol system is a very important to many individuals in our cultural.
> One reference system for a musical notation is often an mathematical
> object, an octave and repetitions of octaves.
> Another reference system is a measure. Compositions into phrases, etc.
> *Both* reference systems invoke the notion of time.
> I think that most would agree that this is a very effective symbol systems
> for communicating information.
> It is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic ambiguity of the two
> temporal reference systems in the notation.
> Are Inferences from the musical notation to mathematics, physics, sound
> perception and emotions logical?  If so, how is the temporal ambiguity
> interpreted?
>
> Since so many different symbol systems are used in so many different
> disciplines, an interpreter of a symbolic message must have some knowledge
> of the symbol system before one can make propositions or sorites that are
> consistent within the symbol system.
>
> In other words, the notation for a particular symbol system is internally
> logically consistent as a whole, not merely a few strings of symbols (that
> is, parts of whole.)  A symphonic score makes sense *to the composer* as
> whole, even though it may be gibberish to an engineer or philosopher or
> theologian!
>
> Numerous other examples of the part-whole (mereological) relationships in
> symbolic meanings are readily apparent.
> But, part-whole relationships are only meaningful *IF the interpreter is
> competent in that species of symbols (language*.)
>
> I hope this has some meaning to you…
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Stephen, list,



Your words are lovely.



But pray tell, would you accept the following assertion as one that
pragmaticists would boast themselves to be?



*'the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the
principles of justice in acquisition and transfer .. .'?*



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
> Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
> which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
> what happened.
>
> Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.
>
> Reality is all.
>
> All is the case.
>
> The world is a case.
>
> A case is a sign.
>
> +
>
> Facts are claims as well as true.
>
> Things are what they are.
>
> Ultimately, what is good is what is true.
>
> +
>
> Sometime is time to come.
>
> Future is here in
>
> The world is determined as we go.
>
> Things change and remain the same.
>
> +
>
> There is no end to all.
>
>  Continuity and movement reign.
>
>  Days are units of progress.
>
> +
>
> The case is what is true.
>
> The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.
>
> Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
> disposition of choices.
>
> Our world is where we are in reality.
>
> +
>
> Logic tends toward good.
>
> The world tends toward good.
>
> +
>
> The world is not divided by any mental gyration.
>
> The world is what it is.
>
> +
>
> Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
> knowing.
>
> No one has a final answer.
>
> Most mystery we cannot fathom.
>
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Edwina and Stephen,
>>
>> ET
>>
>>> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
>>> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>>>
>>
>> A sentence is just one move in a language game.
>>
>> For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
>> to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
>> Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf
>>
>> See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
>> games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.
>>
>> And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
>> The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
>> 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
>> that involve competition.
>>
>> It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
>> "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement
>>
>> SCR
>>
>>> I claim logic is good.
>>>
>>
>> Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
>> the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.
>>
>> But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
>> is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
>> philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
>> As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
>> prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.
>>
>> When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
>> historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
>> been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.
>>
>> I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
>> In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
>> study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
>> natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.
>>
>> Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
>> makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
>> of inference, which preserve truth.
>>
>> Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
>> constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
>> a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.
>>
>> To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
>> (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
>> (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
>> Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.
>>
>> If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
>> they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
>> further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
>> cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
what happened.

Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.

Reality is all.

All is the case.

The world is a case.

A case is a sign.

+

Facts are claims as well as true.

Things are what they are.

Ultimately, what is good is what is true.

+

Sometime is time to come.

Future is here in

The world is determined as we go.

Things change and remain the same.

+

There is no end to all.

 Continuity and movement reign.

 Days are units of progress.

+

The case is what is true.

The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.

Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
disposition of choices.

Our world is where we are in reality.

+

Logic tends toward good.

The world tends toward good.

+

The world is not divided by any mental gyration.

The world is what it is.

+

Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
knowing.

No one has a final answer.

Most mystery we cannot fathom.



amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Stephen,
>
> ET
>
>> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
>> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>>
>
> A sentence is just one move in a language game.
>
> For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
> to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
> Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf
>
> See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
> games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.
>
> And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
> The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
> 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
> that involve competition.
>
> It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
> "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement
>
> SCR
>
>> I claim logic is good.
>>
>
> Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
> the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.
>
> But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
> is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
> philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
> As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
> prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.
>
> When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
> historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
> been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.
>
> I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
> In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
> study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
> natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.
>
> Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
> makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
> of inference, which preserve truth.
>
> Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
> constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
> a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.
>
> To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
> (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
> (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
> Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.
>
> If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
> they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
> further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
> cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John - what's the difference between a 'language game' and a
'grammatical sentence'?

Thanks

Edwina
 On Mon 16/04/18 12:05 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut, 
 In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language 
 as the totality of all the language games that can be played with 
 a given syntax and vocabulary. 
 He did not state that point in those terms because he died several 
 years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided 
 claim:  A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical 
 sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary. 
 If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with 
 rage.  I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career 
 spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view: 
 http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf [1] ) 
 >> JFS:  every artificial language, which includes all the
artificial 
 >> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer
programming... 
 >  
 > JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.  In today’s

 > terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial
notations”, 
 > but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans
to 
 > express human thought or intent or meaning. 
 Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game 
 that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter 
 among themselves.  When designing that notation, they discuss every 
 definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions 
 for the corresponding words in their preferred NL. 
 JRLC 
 > Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms
originate 
 > within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time,
or 
 > incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise. 
 > A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”. 
 DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the

 first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.

 The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it

 express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with 
 exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and 
 notations of chemistry. 
 > Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally. 
 There is no such thing as "common spoken language".  Every sentence 
 anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which
is 
 as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment. 
 It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up 
 and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it

 in very loose analogies.  I believe that's what you mean by "flow 
 into the spoken language with time".  But the scientists themselves 
 still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever. 
 JLRC 
 > Units must be defined!  The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol
varies 
 > with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)

 > the author is communicating with. 
 Yes.  When precision is required for some language game, the
speakers 
 express exactly the same precision in their NL and in other
notations. 
 And the symbol '+' varies with different language games for
different 
 kinds of numbers.  See Figure 2 of "What is the source of
fuzziness?": 
 http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf [2] 
 SCR 
 > Logic is in my view good...  Words are a sort of utility by which
we 
 > can perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give
them 
 > more than their due is an error. 
 When a logician, mathematician, or scientist in any field uses
special 
 symbols in any formal notation, those symbols have *exactly* the
same 
 meaning as the NL words that they use in talking with their
colleagues 
 or students when they're explaining those symbols. 
 SCR 
 > Logic is definitely prior to words through words are the
instruments 
 > for expressing it.  
 No!  Every version of logic or any other artificial notation is 
 nothing more nor less than some NL language game expressed in 
 a notation that is specially designed just for that purpose. 
 HR 
 > graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize

 > time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by 
 > inventing symbols for time and its flow? 
 Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in 
 mathematics.  They also use equivalent words when they talk about 
 the same subjects in their preferred NLs. 
 But the discrete words and symbols of any language, natural or 
 artificial, can't express the full continuity of their experience. 
 A photograph or movie is better.  And systems of virtual reality 
 are even better.  But nothing expresses the full continuity. 
 HR 
 > What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"? 
 > Is it the same as logic? 
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[John F Sowa]

Edwina and Stephen,

ET

what's the difference between a 'language game' and
a 'grammatical sentence'?


A sentence is just one move in a language game.

For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf

See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.

And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
that involve competition.

It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
"pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement

SCR

I claim logic is good.


Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.

But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.

When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.

I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.

Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
of inference, which preserve truth.

Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.

To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
(generalization from particular instances) and abduction
(forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.

If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Stephen, John:

> On Apr 14, 2018, at 11:57 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose.

This is a very clever phrase; I like it very much.

Do you think that all of academic philosophy (not just the ones that post here) 
uses all words in this sense?

That being said (with a bit of sarcasm :-) ), I think you missed the intent of 
my message so I would ask that you broaden the scope of your considerations.
I start from my lifelong experience that human communication is an 
extraordinarily difficult topic to discuss, in part because the huge variety of 
experiences of individuals with different educational backgrounds.

The point is that human cultures have constructed many many many symbol 
systems.  
Semiotics applies to BOTH natural external signs and to symbols externalized by 
purposeful human intent.

Consider the notation for music. 
This symbol system is a very important to many individuals in our cultural.
One reference system for a musical notation is often an mathematical object, an 
octave and repetitions of octaves.
Another reference system is a measure. Compositions into phrases, etc.
Both reference systems invoke the notion of time.
I think that most would agree that this is a very effective symbol systems for 
communicating information.
It is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic ambiguity of the two 
temporal reference systems in the notation.
Are Inferences from the musical notation to mathematics, physics, sound 
perception and emotions logical?  If so, how is the temporal ambiguity 
interpreted?

Since so many different symbol systems are used in so many different 
disciplines, an interpreter of a symbolic message must have some knowledge of 
the symbol system before one can make propositions or sorites that are 
consistent within the symbol system.

In other words, the notation for a particular symbol system is internally 
logically consistent as a whole, not merely a few strings of symbols (that is, 
parts of whole.)  A symphonic score makes sense to the composer as whole, even 
though it may be gibberish to an engineer or philosopher or theologian!

Numerous other examples of the part-whole (mereological) relationships in 
symbolic meanings are readily apparent.
But, part-whole relationships are only meaningful IF the interpreter is 
competent in that species of symbols (language.)

I hope this has some meaning to you…

Cheers

Jerry
  






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Stephen, list,

Thanks for that clear response,

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 1:47 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Absolutely. The words are from my Kindle book Tractatus which is clearly
> related to Wittgenstein.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 2:21 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Dear Stephen, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Your words are lovely.
>>
>>
>>
>> But pray tell, would you accept the following assertion as one that
>> pragmaticists would boast themselves to be?
>>
>>
>>
>> *'the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the
>> principles of justice in acquisition and transfer .. .'?*
>>
>>
>>
>> With best wishes,
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
>>> Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
>>> which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
>>> what happened.
>>>
>>> Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.
>>>
>>> Reality is all.
>>>
>>> All is the case.
>>>
>>> The world is a case.
>>>
>>> A case is a sign.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Facts are claims as well as true.
>>>
>>> Things are what they are.
>>>
>>> Ultimately, what is good is what is true.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Sometime is time to come.
>>>
>>> Future is here in
>>>
>>> The world is determined as we go.
>>>
>>> Things change and remain the same.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> There is no end to all.
>>>
>>>  Continuity and movement reign.
>>>
>>>  Days are units of progress.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> The case is what is true.
>>>
>>> The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.
>>>
>>> Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
>>> disposition of choices.
>>>
>>> Our world is where we are in reality.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Logic tends toward good.
>>>
>>> The world tends toward good.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> The world is not divided by any mental gyration.
>>>
>>> The world is what it is.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
>>> knowing.
>>>
>>> No one has a final answer.
>>>
>>> Most mystery we cannot fathom.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>>
 Edwina and Stephen,

 ET

> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>

 A sentence is just one move in a language game.

 For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
 to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
 Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf

 See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
 games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.

 And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
 The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
 that involve competition.

 It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
 "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement

 SCR

> I claim logic is good.
>

 Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
 the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.

 But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
 is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
 philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
 As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
 prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.

 When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
 historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
 been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.

 I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
 In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
 study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
 natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.

 Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
 makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
 of inference, which preserve truth.

 Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
 constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
 a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.

 To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
 (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
 (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
 Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.

 If you 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and Musement

[John F Sowa]

Stephen and Jerry LRC,

I changed the subject line of this note to replace "related systems"
with "Musement", which is closer to the word 'Spiel' in Wittgenstein's
'Sprachspiel' than to the word 'game' in 'language game'.

Stephen, if you lost my previous note, just look at the copy that is
included at the end of your note.  But your poem raises some issues:

SCR

The words are from my Kindle book Tractatus which is clearly related
to Wittgenstein.


Yes. But in the preface to his _Logical Investigations_, Wittgenstein
himself apologized for the "grave mistakes" (schwere Irrtümer) in the
Tractatus.  He also credited Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce,
with helping him realize those mistakes.  See Nubiola's article:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM

At the end of his article, Nubiola wrote

Hookway was able to show that Peirce, Ramsey, and the later
Wittgenstein not only agreed that the vagueness and indeterminacy
of the meaning of predicates is benign and tolerable, but all three
are to be found defending vagueness, which "is, rather, a virtue--
something in the absence of which we would simply be unable to say,
or think, or do the things we want."


SCR

I would recognize a division between any contrived or explicit or
mathematical or scientific language that is logically consistent
and what I would call normal language or some such phrase.


Frege and Russell might say that, but definitely not Peirce. First,
it makes a sharp distinction where Peirce insisted on continuity.
Second, it denigrates ordinary language and privileges formal logic
in a way that he never did and never would.  For example, "Logicians
have too much neglected the study of vagueness, not suspecting the
important part it plays in mathematical thought."  (CP 5.505)

In fact, Peirce explicitly said "logical analysis" has "moderate
fertility", and he called musement "open conversation with yourself...
illustrated, like a lecture, with diagrams and with experiments":

There is no kind of reasoning that I should wish to discourage in
Musement; and I should lament to find anybody confining it to a
method of such moderate fertility as logical analysis. Only, the
Player should bear in mind that the higher weapons in the arsenal
of thought are not playthings but edge-tools... It is, however,
not a conversation in words alone, but is illustrated, like a
lecture, with diagrams and with experiments.

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement
In another passage on that web page, he compared musement to science:

If one’s observations and reflections are allowed to specialize
themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific
study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half hours.


In 1908, after he had long experience in defining words for the
Century Dictionary and Baldwin's encyclopedia, Peirce wrote

Men who are given to defining too much inevitably run themselves
into confusion in dealing with the vague concepts of common sense.
They generally make the matter worse by erroneous, not to say
absurd, notions of the function of reasoning.  (CP 6.496-497)


Clarence Irving Lewis, who had studied Peirce's manuscripts in detail,
wrote the following comment in a letter to Hao Wang in 1960:

It is so easy... to get impressive "results" by replacing the vaguer
concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by
pseudo precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods —
the trouble being that nobody any longer knows whether anything
actual or of practical import is being discussed.

For discussion and references, see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf

JLRC

[Music notation] is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic
ambiguity of the two temporal reference systems in the notation.


The only vagueness in music notation (when written carefully) is
in the words that refer to continuously variable quantities, such
as speed (allegro moderato, andante cantabile...) or volume (forte,
fortissimo, pianissimo...).

In ordinary language, musicians talk about music notation in ordinary
language with their colleagues and students.  And what they say is
sufficiently precise that it can be translated to any notation for
logic.  For example, see page 27 of http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eg2cg.pdf

At the top of that page is a passage in the traditional notation.
Beneath it is a translation to a conceptual graph.  A good musician
can read and play the top diagram at sight, but even with a great
deal of practice, the CG would be much harder to read and play.
But if the CG were translated to predicate calculus, it would be
impossible to play without a great deal of analysis.  And any
musician who did that analysis would probably translate it to
the notation at the top before playing it

John

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Helmut Raulien]

John, list,

 

You wrote:

 


"
HR
> graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize
> time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by
> inventing symbols for time and its flow?

 

Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in
mathematics. They also use equivalent words when they talk about
the same subjects in their preferred NLs.

But the discrete words and symbols of any language, natural or
artificial, can't express the full continuity of their experience.
A photograph or movie is better. And systems of virtual reality
are even better. But nothing expresses the full continuity.



".

 

I am not a mathematician, but I guess, that in mathematical equations, e.g. differential equations, the dimension "t" is used and treated like any other dimension, e.g. a spatial dimension. In mathematics there are iterations. Iterations are processes in time. I guess, in mathematics there are also symbols for observations of iterations, like the Ljapunov-exponent in chaos theory. But I guess, to mathematically get a grip at the concept of "presence", one has to be a pretty advanced mathematician.

"Presence" seems to be a very complex thing, like a layer in time-space, connecting all availabe layer-increments/points of temporal actuality to one observer.

But in words-language we have many terms that take "presence" for granted and use it, due to its being part of everyday experience. So, what mathematically is very complex and takes a set of edge conditions to define it, in words-language seems, but is not, trivial. Most terms of reflection contain it, such as "game" or "history".

Maybe "presence" seems to have a double-meaning: A mind´s attention, and a point or a spatial layer connecting points in time. In fact though, perhaps this meaning is not double. In this case, logic is an action of a mind, because logic needs the concept of presence. Maybe temporality, that what distinguishes "t" from "x,y,z", is the essence of mind?

 

Best, Helmut


 16. April 2018 um 06:05 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
 

Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
a given syntax and vocabulary.

He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided
claim: A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical
sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary.

If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with
rage. I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career
spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view:
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf )

>> JFS: every artificial language, which includes all the artificial
>> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming...
>
> JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John. In today’s
> terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial notations”,
> but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans to
> express human thought or intent or meaning.

Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game
that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter
among themselves. When designing that notation, they discuss every
definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions
for the corresponding words in their preferred NL.

JRLC
> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise.
> A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.

DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the
first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.
The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it
express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with
exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and
notations of chemistry.

> Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally.

There is no such thing as "common spoken language". Every sentence
anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which is
as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment.

It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up
and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it
in very loose analogies. I believe that's what you mean by "flow
into the spoken language with time". But the scientists themselves
still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever.

JLRC
> Units must be defined! The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies
> with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)
> the author is communicating with.

Yes. When precision is required for some language game, the speakers
express 

[PEIRCE-L] 6th School on Universal Logic - Vichy, June 16-20, 2018

[jean-yves beziau]

In exactly two months will start in Vichy, France the
6th School on Universal Logic
http://www.uni-log.org/ULS6

This is a 5-day school with 30 tutorials on all aspects of logic
(historical, philosophical, mathematical, computational)
given by scholars from all over the world.
The school will start by a round table "why study logic?" and will end with
a round table "how to publish?"
There also will be a poster session and the school will be followed by a
6-day congress.



U N I L O G -  World Congress and School on Universal Logic - U N I LO G
Montreux 2005, Xi'an 2007, Lisbon 2010, Rio 2013, Istanbul 2015, Vichy 2018

---

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry

[Jon Awbrey]

Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry : 13
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/04/16/theme-one-%e2%80%a2-a-program-of-inquiry-13/

Peircers,

The abstract character of the cactus language relative
to its logical interpretations makes it possible to give
abstract rules of equivalence for transforming one cactus
into another that partition the space of cacti into formal
equivalence classes.  These transformation rules and the
resulting equivalence classes are “purely formal” in the
sense of being indifferent to the logical interpretation,
entitative or existential, one happens to choose.

Two definitions are useful here:

• A “reduction” is an equivalence transformation that applies
  in the direction of decreasing graphical complexity.

• A “basic reduction” is a reduction that applies to a basic
  connective, either a node connective or a lobe connective.

The two kinds of basic reductions are described as follows:

• A “node reduction” is permitted if and only if
  every component cactus joined to a node
  itself reduces to a node.

  [see figure, attached]

• A “lobe reduction” is permitted if and only if
  exactly one component cactus listed in a lobe
  reduces to an edge.

  [see figure, attached]

That is roughly the gist of the rules.  More formal definitions
can wait for the day when we have to explain all this to a computer.

Resources
=

• Theme One Program • Documentation
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Theme_One_Program

• Theme One Program • Exposition
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Theme_One_Program_%E2%80%A2_Exposition

• Theme One Program • Expository Note 14
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Theme_One_Program_%E2%80%A2_Exposition#Expository_Note_14

• Theme One Program • User Guide
https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

--

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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[John F Sowa]

On 4/16/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Maybe temporality, that what distinguishes "t" from "x,y,z",
is the essence of mind?


I think we've exhausted most of the issues.

If you want one word, I'd say semeiotic.

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

To speak of good as prior to logic is perhaps wrong. I claim logic is good.
Good is only prior to logic in the sense that it represents what
metaphysics used to see as the end of things. I see dualisms as eliminated
by triadic thought. So, for example, metaphysics and logic coexist
triadically. Deridda was not shy about saying our century requires the
unprecedented to avoid repeating the past. Everyone is metaphysical I
sense. Reality is all. Good being prior to logic in that context probably
does deserve a no!

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 12:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,
>
> In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
> as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
> a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
> years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided
> claim:  A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical
> sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with
> rage.  I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career
> spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf )
>
> JFS:  every artificial language, which includes all the artificial
>>> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming...
>>>
>>
>> JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.  In today’s
>> terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial notations”,
>> but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans to
>> express human thought or intent or meaning.
>>
>
> Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game
> that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter
> among themselves.  When designing that notation, they discuss every
> definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions
> for the corresponding words in their preferred NL.
>
> JRLC
>
>> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
>> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
>> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise.
>> A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.
>>
>
> DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the
> first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.
> The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it
> express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with
> exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and
> notations of chemistry.
>
> Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally.
>>
>
> There is no such thing as "common spoken language".  Every sentence
> anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which is
> as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment.
>
> It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up
> and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it
> in very loose analogies.  I believe that's what you mean by "flow
> into the spoken language with time".  But the scientists themselves
> still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever.
>
> JLRC
>
>> Units must be defined!  The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies
>> with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)
>> the author is communicating with.
>>
>
> Yes.  When precision is required for some language game, the speakers
> express exactly the same precision in their NL and in other notations.
> And the symbol '+' varies with different language games for different
> kinds of numbers.  See Figure 2 of "What is the source of fuzziness?":
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
>
> SCR
>
>> Logic is in my view good...  Words are a sort of utility by which we
>> can perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give them
>> more than their due is an error.
>>
>
> When a logician, mathematician, or scientist in any field uses special
> symbols in any formal notation, those symbols have *exactly* the same
> meaning as the NL words that they use in talking with their colleagues
> or students when they're explaining those symbols.
>
> SCR
>
>> Logic is definitely prior to words through words are the instruments
>> for expressing it.
>>
>
> No!  Every version of logic or any other artificial notation is
> nothing more nor less than some NL language game expressed in
> a notation that is specially designed just for that purpose.
>
> HR
>
>> graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize
>> time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by
>> inventing symbols for time and its flow?
>>
>
> Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in
> mathematics.  They also use equivalent words when they talk about
> the same