I know that the late Adolf Grunbaum, my former colleague at Pitt wrote on Z’s paradox: https://www.amazon.com/Modern-science-Zenos-paradoxes-Grünbaum/dp/B0006E038EI am sure you know of this, but send a link just in case. I haven’t thought much about whether a Peircean account would be
Jon, i have a question about your slides 20 and 23.
On #20, under the heading of Objective Idealism, your proposal is that
“Continuous/triadic semiosis is real and primordial (3ns).”
On #23, under “Defining Continuity,” you cite the “Categorial Vector:
3ns→1ns→2ns,” (the vector of
Thank you, Gary, Gary, and Jon!
Jon, you hit a lot of interesting points in your talk, and brought out many
of the most puzzling aspects of Peirce's thought to me. In "Questions
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" he leaves us with a
promissory note to solve Zeno's paradox with regard
Jon, (Gary, List)
Sorry to miss your talks, but I looked at the slides posted by Jon.
I have a couple of worries about this topic that I have been puzzling over.
The first is that there seems to be a tension between Peirce's late account of
continuity and the requirement -- from the logic of
Gary F,
I too won't say much about the matter of primal 3ns, that is ur-continuity,
being at the origins of the cosmos (or not) except to briefly comment on a
snippet of a Peirce quote you gave from Kaina Stoicheia
CSP: [At the beginning there was "[u]tter indetermination. But a symbol
alone is
Folks,
All these issues that are being discussed are important. But I believe that we
should also consider the following questions::
1. How did Peirce's positions on these issues develop at various points in his
career?
2. How did they relate to what he learned from his own research and from
John
In my new ms submitted to OUP (Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of
Linguistics) and in several recent talks I argue for the superiority of
Peircean inferentialism over Fregean compositionality, titling one chapter
Frege’s Error. This goes against many decades of work in linguistics (and
Hello Jon S, Gary R and Gary F, all,
I want to think the three of you for giving presentations at the 10-minute
discussion on Zoom. I found each of the presentations and following discussion
helpful.
I'd like to respond to some of the points Gary F makes in his discussion of
"Nonlinear
Jon, Gary F, List,
One of the most revelatory passages -- at least for me -- relating to the
origin of the cosmos is the following (from *Reasoning and the Logic of
Things*, CP 6.191 - 198, emphasis added). Reading it supported my growing
sense at the time, several decades ago, that not only was
Gary F., Gary R., List:
I agree with Gary F. that we should always try to harmonize what Peirce
writes about the same subject at different times, and I agree with Gary
R.'s brief response that seeks to do just that. For Peirce, indeterminacy
is characteristic of generality, which he equates with
Harris, List:
As I understand it, Peirce's solution to Zeno's paradox is summarized in
the passage that I partially quoted on slide 19. Here is what it says
without the later ellipses.
CSP: Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact
Position (except instantaneously,
Vittorio, List:
Regarding your first worry, Peirce defines three different kinds of
*sequences*, which correspond to three different kinds of
philosophy--elliptical, where there is no definite starting point or
stopping point; parabolic, where the starting point and stopping point are
the same;
Jeff,
I believe that Peirce's 1903 classification provides a simpler basis for
explaining his comments about continuity.
JBD> I think Peirce's semiotic theory moves from an initial classification of
signs to a physiological account of the functioning and growth of a systems of
signs in their
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