List, Matt:
Thank you for articulating your views.
I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple
term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical
generalizations.
To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between
Howard wrote:
Quantum physics runs directly into this conceptual(5995-1)
problem with the (discrete) particle-(continuous)
wave complementarity. Matter cannot be described
without using both concepts in an unintuitive relation.
I think physicists are ahead of biologists by at least
I don't see how anyone can avoid choosing, either consciously or
subconsciously, either monism or dualism. You can switch, but I don't see a way
out.
I'm not sure if there's a real philosophical difference between the two
monistic philosophies or if one is just a more convenient view from
7.
If Triadic Philosophy has any claim to originality it might be in the third
term in its root triad which is Aesthetics. What in heaven's name is
aesthetics doing in what bids to be the upper limit of a universal
philosophy that will create a sea change in our troubled earth? The simple
answer
I dont think, that materialism and idealism are monisms, but, that monism is a hypothesis, that says, that both, ideas and matter, are derivates of the same thing (genotype or so), of which none is more fundamental than the other. What makes them different derivates on one hand, and combines them
Matt wrote:
Just like 'standing still' is a special case of (062014-1)
motion, matter is a special case of mind.
Do you mean by (062014-1) that Matter is a necessary condition for mind ?
Would you agree that
Just as 'standing still' is assocaited with a zero(062014-2)
Thank you, Kees. I'll admit that the work that I did would add up to a
solid day's work if done in a single sitting and inclusive of various
arrangements and suchlike that I tried out.
Best, Ben
On 6/20/2014 7:19 AM, Cornelis de Waal wrote:
Dear Ben,
This is indeed most impressive and
Hi Sung,
On Jun 20, 2014, at 6:34 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote:
Matt wrote:
Just like 'standing still' is a special case of (062014-1)
motion, matter is a special case of mind.
Do you mean by (062014-1) that Matter is a necessary condition for mind ?
I didn't
Søren thank you for the reply. I'm very sorry to hear that your paper was
not accepted to the Peirce Congress. I know that I would have liked to hear
it. There were so many papers submitted to the conference that there was no
way the refereeing committee could all look at all of them, which
