Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Helmut, List: It occurred to me today that another way in which the real process of semiosis is continuous is that it always takes time. There is no such thing as an instantaneous sign--uttering any actual sign token requires a finite lapse of time, and interpreting any actual sign token requires a subsequent finite lapse of time, even when these two steps are happening sequentially (perhaps overlapping a bit) within the same mind as a train of thought. That is why I am inclined to maintain that the intentional interpretant in the mind of the utterer must precede the uttered sign itself and serve as a constituent of its object, while that uttered sign including the communicational (immediate) interpretant in the commind must precede the effectual (dynamical) interpretant in the mind of the interpreter--not just logically, but also temporally. In Peirce's words, "the essential difference ... between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant ... is that the former antecedes, while the latter succeeds the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 4:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Helmut, List: > > What I have been suggesting is that the entire universe is *one sign* in > the sense that it is a vast, ongoing process of *continuous *semiosis. > Any "individual" sign within it that we mark off for analysis, such that we > can then attempt to sort out its two objects and three interpretants, has > boundaries that are at least somewhat arbitrary. > > For example, this post as a whole seems like a straightforward example of > an individual sign. However, we could divide it into multiple individual > sentences, which we could divide into multiple individual phrases, which we > could divide into multiple individual words, which we could divide into > multiple individual letters, and so on. Moreover, we could instead connect > it with your post below to constitute one exchange, which we could connect > with other exchanges to constitute one thread, which we could connect with > other threads to constitute one List archive, and so on. > > My point here is that at each "level" in both directions, we could (at > least theoretically) demarcate and analyze *one sign* that has its two > objects and three interpretants. Accordingly, I see no good reason to treat > any one of those subsidiary signs as *the *real sign. Instead, it is the > *whole > *that is the real sign, the entire universe as a semiosic continuum; > while its *parts*, all those constituent signs, are *entia rationis*. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 2:17 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > >> Jon, Gary, List, >> >> I do not understand, how analysis is arbitrary. Neither do I understand, >> what the continuity-claim is, besides a mantra. It e.g. has been agreed >> some time, that induction is based on rational numbers, whose row is not a >> continuum. To say, that discontinuous individual signs are not real, but >> merely artefacts of arbitrary analysis, to me seems esoteric. In >> electronics, discontinuity is produced by a schmitt-trigger. I am quite >> sure, that in semiosis there also are schmitt-trigger-like elements. Of >> course you can say, that if you look at the sharp edge of a step with a >> microscope, you can see, that it is a bit rounded, at least with the radius >> of an atom. But that is a red herring, because for every item, which is >> bigger than this atom, it is sharp, and therefore a discontinuity. "Real" >> means being valid independently of instantiation, not being valid for >> atoms, quarks, or strings too. So the individual sign and discontinuities >> are real, not arbitrary, is my opinion. >> >> Best, helmut >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Gary F., List: GF: I was referring not to the metaphysical priorities but to the methodical focus on “individual signs” as opposed to the sign-systems made of “connected signs.” As I see it, any sign-system comprised of connected signs must be treated as *one sign* in order to talk meaningfully about *its *two objects and three interpretants. That is all I mean by an "individual sign" from a methodological standpoint. GF: In your final paragraph here, I notice a terminological change from “individual” to “particular” and “quasi-individual,” and I don’t think you’ve confirmed my assumption that an “individual sign” must be a sinsign (e.g. the “embodiment” or “replica” of a proposition, as opposed to the proposition itself). Yes, I am still trying to figure out the best terminology here because you are correct that a truly *individual *sign technically must be a *token*, "A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does" (CP 4.537, 1906). GF: Anyway I’m still inclined to think that the interpretant of a proposition is really *of the proposition itself* rather than being an interpretant of the existent sinsign which embodies it. Again, I tend to think of an immediate interpretant as an interpretant of a type, each dynamical interpretant as an interpretant of a token, and the final interpretant as the interpretant of the sign. Any given proposition (sign) has a certain final interpretant, formulations of it in different languages and other systems of signs such as EGs (types) have somewhat different immediate interpretants, and each utterance of it (token) can have very different dynamical interpretants in the minds of different interpreters. GF: A proposition as defined by Peirce is *translatable *as well as replicable. A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not translatable, and an interpretant is a kind of translation, in my view. How are you (and Peirce) defining "translatable" and "replicable" here? When someone reads or hears a printed, written, or uttered text, is the resulting dynamical interpretant in that person's mind a translation or a replication? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Oct 30, 2021 at 8:25 AM wrote: > Jon, > > JAS: In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be > "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any > *individual > *sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, > since we arbitrarily mark it off within the *real *process of semiosis, > which is always continuous. > > I was referring not to the metaphysical priorities but to the methodical > focus on “individual signs” as opposed to the sign-systems made of > “connected signs.” > > In your final paragraph here, I notice a terminological change from > “individual” to “particular” and “quasi-individual,” and I don’t think > you’ve confirmed my assumption that an “individual sign” must be a > *sinsign* (e.g. the “embodiment” or “replica” of a proposition, as > opposed to the proposition itself). That doesn’t change my description of > your method as “bottom-up.” > > Anyway I’m still inclined to think that the interpretant of a proposition > is really *of the proposition itself* rather than being an interpretant > of the existent sinsign which embodies it. A *proposition* as defined by > Peirce is *translatable* as well as replicable. A printed, written or > uttered text is only replicable, not translatable, and an interpretant is a > kind of translation, in my view. But maybe this is nothing but a > terminological quibble. > > Gary f. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts
Jon, JAS: In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any individual sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of semiosis, which is always continuous. I was referring not to the metaphysical priorities but to the methodical focus on “individual signs” as opposed to the sign-systems made of “connected signs.” In your final paragraph here, I notice a terminological change from “individual” to “particular” and “quasi-individual,” and I don’t think you’ve confirmed my assumption that an “individual sign” must be a sinsign (e.g. the “embodiment” or “replica” of a proposition, as opposed to the proposition itself). That doesn’t change my description of your method as “bottom-up.” Anyway I’m still inclined to think that the interpretant of a proposition is really of the proposition itself rather than being an interpretant of the existent sinsign which embodies it. A proposition as defined by Peirce is translatable as well as replicable. A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not translatable, and an interpretant is a kind of translation, in my view. But maybe this is nothing but a terminological quibble. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 29-Oct-21 13:59 To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts Gary F., List: GF: I was thinking that my top-down approach to these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs theorem” and your post on “Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be complementary to your bottom-up approach in this thread, analogous to the complementary views of light as waves and/or particles, but I guess that doesn’t work. In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any individual sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of semiosis, which is always continuous. GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an individual sign (i.e. a discrete and existing sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants? Which three interpretants do you have in mind? Again, I see the communicational and effectual interpretants respectively as the immediate and dynamical interpretants of the uttered sign, determinations of the commind and the interpreter's mind; and I see the intentional interpretant as a dynamical interpretant of previous signs, determinations of the utterer's mind that are connected such that they can have that one actual interpretant (CP 4.550). More generally, I have suggested in the past that the immediate interpretant pertains to each type of a sign, the dynamical interpretant to each token of a type, and the final interpretant to the sign itself--the idea being that one sign can have different types within different sign systems, such as "man" in English vs. "homme" in French--but I might need to rethink that theoretical scheme in light of recent discussions. GF: That would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one interpretant of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no matter how.” Is this another consequence of the connected signs theorem? If so, could we also say that only an individual sign has two objects (immediate and dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect continuum" has only one? No, I believe that every sign--including the entire universe, conceived as "a vast representamen" that "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"--has two objects and three interpretants, but I did not attempt to sort them out in that post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00204.html). The immediate object is internal to the sign, the object as represented in that sign, while the dynamical object is external to the sign, the object as it is in itself. The immediate interpretant is internal to the sign, the interpretant as represented in that sign, while the dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of that sign and the final interpretant is the ideal effect of that sign. I have my own opinions about the external correlates in the case of the entire universe, but they tend to be controversial and are not essential to the topic of this thread. GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication. At the risk of belaboring the point, the most salient general principle here is that we can only discuss objects and interpretants in relation to a particular sign. In other words, the first step of semeiotic analysis is always demarcating the sign of
