Jack,
My criticisms have nothing to do with logic, yours or anybody else's. They are
based solely on the history of science from the 18th century (Hume and Kant) to
the enormous progress in the late 19th c. and the revolutionary developments in
the 20th and 21st. I'm cc'ing note to Peirce List, since it's important to
emphasize this issue in a broader forum.
As Kant himself said, Hume's critique of causality awakened him from his
"dogmatic slumber" and inspired his desire to establish an "a priori"
foundation for causality. That was Kan't fundamental error. The progress of
science for the past two centuries provides overwhelming evidence for (a) the
existence of laws of nature and (b) the success of the experimental methods in
discovering closer and closer approximations to those laws. There are many
laws for which the known approximations are inadequate, but there is no reason
for assuming that any of them are inherently unknowable.
As for the logic, I suggest that you replace all the complexity below with just
two predicates: Observable(x) and HasPropery(x,y). For all the things below,
there is no need to make define all those terms and write all those axioms.
With just these two predicates, you can translate the following sentence to the
logical notation of your choice:
1. For any object x, If x is observable and x has some property y, science
will eventually be able to observe y.
This is, in essence, Peirce's belief in the progress of science. And the
developments in the sciences in the past century have provided abundant
evidence for that belief. There is zero evidence that any particular feature
of any observable object will forever be unknowable.
Suggestion: There is no reason why you need to discard your research on these
issues or the 58 pages that you have already written for the thesis. You can
just begin with sentence #1, discuss the reasons why Hume and Kant may have not
realized its importance, show why scientists today believe it, and why Peirce
was justified in using that assumption to reject Kant's attempt to answer Hume.
Please show this note to your thesis adviser, and let us the response.
John
_______________________________________________________
From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Hi John,
Apologies for formatting, but the thesis statements are consistent in a variety
of logics. Can we know an ant's experience of concrete? No.
But we do know that it has an experience, beyond all infinite human inquiry,
for that refers to human sensate capacity, with an element, or elemental
quality which is not as we experience it. And no relational schema - semeiotic
- can understand that without what Kant calls "ding an sich".
Below are some easy ways of understanding it:
Ontological Relata 1
Let's define the following predicates:
- SelfExistence(S): Predicate indicating the existence of the self.
- ThingExistence(T): Predicate indicating the existence of things.
- ExistWith(Self, Thing): Predicate indicating the relationship between the
self and things, denoting that the self exists with the thing.
- Definition(Self, Thing): Predicate indicating that the existence with things
defines the self or the things.
- Revised predicate structure:
∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T)
Ontological Relata 2:
Let's define the following predicates:
- SelfExistence(S): Predicate indicating the existence of the self.
- ThingExistence(T): Predicate indicating the existence of things.
- ExistWith(S, T): Predicate indicating the relationship between the self and
things, denoting that the self exists with the thing.
- Essence(Self): Predicate indicating the essence of the self.
- Essence(Thing): Predicate indicating the essence of things.
- Revised predicate structure:
∀S ∃T ∃E: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ ¬Essence(S)
∧ ¬Essence(T) ∧ (E ∈ S) ∧ (E ∈ T) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T))
Decision Tree
Does Self Exist? / \ Yes* \
*Descartes: Cogito
/ \
Does Self exist with 'things'? / \ \ Yes* No \
*HUME CONTIGUITY/FACT/FEELING/IDEAS. / \ \ Yes
Terminate \ / \ Is the self’s existence with things the
definition of the self, in itself, or the things with which it exists?
/ \ \ Yes* No** GODEL: YES/NO.*** (Truth which breaks
the formal decision tree system: consubstantial self, cannot be binary). / \
\ Terminal \ \
1. ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T)
\
No (Godel (not true), but :
\
Godelresolved:
- ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧ TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E
∉ ExistWith(S, T))
Differentially:
To express the given decision tree in a consistent logic and incorporate
paraconsistent logic at the specified point, we can modify the formulation as
follows:
- Does Self Exist?
- Yes:
- Does Self exist with 'things'?
- Yes: Proceed to Step 3
- No: Terminate
- Does Self exist with 'things'?
- Yes: Proceed to Step 3
- No: Terminate
- Is the self's existence with things the definition of the self or the things
with which it exists?
- Yes*: Proceed to Step 4
- No**: Proceed to Step 5
- Terminal: ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T)
- Yes/No***: At this point, the decision tree breaks into paraconsistent logic,
allowing for the handling of contradictory options. We retain the ontological
form and proceed with the following formulation:
- No Godel (not true), but:
- Godelresolved: ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧
ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧
TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T))
In this modified formulation, the decision tree remains consistent until Step
5, where paraconsistent logic is introduced to handle contradictory options.
Step 4 represents the ontological form in consistent logic, while Step 6
formalizes the ontological assertions within paraconsistent logic while
retaining the ontological structure.
Peirce's semeiotic is great but he is wrong to say the "ding an sich" is
meaningless. I can explain Godel a hundred different ways by the necessary
acceptance of it. I accomodate Godel and then explain, elsewhere, the entire
premise of incompleteness within the Kantian framework and beyond it. It is a
KnownIncognizable (we know such a thing, in itself, exists, but cannot
represent or feel/think it as it is in itself). This is just the now easily
proven truth (though the argument will take longer).
My thesis advisor has access to enormous amounts of data which aren't shared
here and knows the consistency is perfect (though that much of my logical
formulation will alter to eliminate natural language ambiguity and various
small errors which you note).
Best
Jack
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