subject:"Re\: Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Re\: Representamen Discussion"

Jerry R., List:

Thanks for your input, which I think has helped the conversation along.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 7:51 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> What I see you doing in your last post is giving reasons for valuing
> quiddity for Mind in triadic relation.
>
>
>
> What I also see you doing is giving reasons to avoid valuing hecceity in
> Quasi-mind contra Mind.
>
>
>
> So long as you do the former (valuation for quiddity) and divest yourself
> of paying attention to the latter (valuation for hecceity), I find it
> unsurprising that you find it *‘not a fast-rule’ that the individual mind
> is described as a ‘quasi-mind’*.
>
>
>
> For "I persuade myself" is a phrase that suggests a state which is immune
> to outside tampering.
>
>
>
> All the best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 7:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - I don't see that the individual mind is necessarily referenced as
>> 'quasi-mind.
>>
>> "A sign is in s conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind'.
>> 3.360
>>
>> "But if the triple relation between the sign, its object and the
>> mind'...3.361
>>
>> and he refers to "the mind using the sign' 3.361.
>>
>> [NOTE: by 'sign' I understand the mediate term in the triad, the
>> representamen].
>>
>> And in 8.315, he references "No event that occurs to any mind, no action
>> of any mind'...etc.
>>
>> My point is that it is not a 'fast rule' that the individual mind is
>> described as a 'quasi-mind'. Peirce uses the term 'mind' to refer to
>> individual's and their mental interactions with the world. He rarely uses
>> the term 'quasi-mind'...and more often then, to refer to non-human actions
>> of 'mind'
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Fri 09/02/18 5:06 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina list,
>>
>>
>>
>> As per your objection,
>>
>> “I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is
>> an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
>> mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept is not Peirce's
>> alone.  It belongs to the river of pragmaticism.):
>>
>>
>>
>> Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to
>> be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that
>> this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not
>> extend to that of other men.
>>
>>
>>
>> ..and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant,
>> which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and
>> interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take
>> place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is,
>> and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
>> outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.
>>
>>
>>
>> I take “have to be fused” as “must be fused” in order than any
>> communication should take place.
>>
>>
>>
>> Hth,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:59 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina,
>>>
>>> I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
>>> contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
>>> possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
>>> are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.
>>>
>>> Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
>>> quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
>>> the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
>>> Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
>>> That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
>>> what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
>>> say, 'forget it', it's not even necessary.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
 judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
 certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
 individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
 about the term 'subset'.

 Edwina

 On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:

 Edwina, list,


 Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:



 When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
 fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will
 appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, List:

I think that we continue to make real progress in understanding each
other.  As I see it, our remaining differences mostly boil down to
Representamen vs. Quasi-mind, and the related issue of whether a Sign can
be external as well as internal.

Peirce frequently appended the prefix "quasi-" to a term when he wanted to
use it in a way that was close to, but not identical with, its usual
meaning.  Hence a Dicisign is a "quasi-proposition" (CP 2.250 and 2.309), a
photograph has the print as its "quasi-predicate" and the section of rays
projected from what appears in it as its "quasi-object" (CP 2.320), a
Jacquard loom is a "quasi-sign" (CP 5.473), searching out a state of things
to evaluate a hypothesis rather than intentionally bringing about those
conditions is "quasi-experimentation" (CP 7.115n27), the final cause of an
animal's instinctive behavior is a "quasi-purpose" (CP 7.381n19), and seeing
something beyond the ken of sense is "quasi-vision" (CP 7.615).

Most people think of an individual *human *mind when they read the word
"mind," so my guess is that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.536,
4.550-551, and 4.553 to emphasize what you often remind us from the very
same passage--"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that
the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there."  I also think
that Jerry R. is right to highlight (as I previously did) the continuity
aspect of "welding" individual Quasi-minds together, such that they are "at
one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself."

Peirce never defined "Representamen" as a "mediative process," any more
than he defined it as a "knowledge base."  In his usage, it was always
either a generalization of "Sign" that can have a non-mental Interpretant,
like a sunflower that turns toward the sun (CP 2.274), or essentially a
synonym for "Sign."  He apparently abandoned it altogether by 1905--"I use
'sign' in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an
almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the
scientific definition ... I formerly preferred the word representamen. But
there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193).

>From that standpoint, I confess that my own usage is not quite consistent
with his, either.  Basically, I have latched onto the fact that the IO and
II are *internal to* the Sign--i.e., *parts of* the Sign--and proposed
assigning the term "Representamen" to whatever *else *constitutes the
Sign.  Again, in light of the four bulleted definitions that I quoted
below, it seems to be something along the lines of what others call the
"sign-vehicle," and maybe I will end up reluctantly embracing that label
after all.

DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI is the series of six Correlates that are involved in
Sign-action.  Quasi-minds are bundles of Collateral Experience and Habits
of Interpretation--i.e., reacting substances with "scientific
intelligence," including but not limited to human beings, that are thus
"capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227).  They serve as the
Quasi-utterer and Quasi-interpreter(s) of the Sign.

The only reason why *I* "say that the same proverb in two different
languages is one Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes"
is because *Peirce *said it himself, quite clearly.  "Every time this is
written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time
it is thought of it is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138).  Hence
whatever you identify as "uniquely different in each individual" *cannot *be
the Representamen.  Unless and until we agree on this, we have probably
come about as far as we possibly can toward reconciling our views.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon -
>
> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>
> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the mediative
> process of the Representamen.
>
> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>
> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>
> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
> subsets.
>
> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the rules,
> the common habits of the system. I see that two different people will each
> have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of unshared
>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Dear Edwina, list,



What I see you doing in your last post is giving reasons for valuing
quiddity for Mind in triadic relation.



What I also see you doing is giving reasons to avoid valuing hecceity in
Quasi-mind contra Mind.



So long as you do the former (valuation for quiddity) and divest yourself
of paying attention to the latter (valuation for hecceity), I find it
unsurprising that you find it *‘not a fast-rule’ that the individual mind
is described as a ‘quasi-mind’*.



For "I persuade myself" is a phrase that suggests a state which is immune
to outside tampering.



All the best,
Jerry R


On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 7:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Jerry - I don't see that the individual mind is necessarily referenced as
> 'quasi-mind.
>
> "A sign is in s conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind'.
> 3.360
>
> "But if the triple relation between the sign, its object and the
> mind'...3.361
>
> and he refers to "the mind using the sign' 3.361.
>
> [NOTE: by 'sign' I understand the mediate term in the triad, the
> representamen].
>
> And in 8.315, he references "No event that occurs to any mind, no action
> of any mind'...etc.
>
> My point is that it is not a 'fast rule' that the individual mind is
> described as a 'quasi-mind'. Peirce uses the term 'mind' to refer to
> individual's and their mental interactions with the world. He rarely uses
> the term 'quasi-mind'...and more often then, to refer to non-human actions
> of 'mind'
>
> Edwina
>
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 5:06 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina list,
>
>
>
> As per your objection,
>
> “I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is
> an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'.”
>
>
>
> Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
> mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept is not Peirce's
> alone.  It belongs to the river of pragmaticism.):
>
>
>
> Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
> proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this
> satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to
> that of other men.
>
>
>
> ..and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which
> is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and
> interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take
> place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is,
> and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
> outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.
>
>
>
> I take “have to be fused” as “must be fused” in order than any
> communication should take place.
>
>
>
> Hth,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:59 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
>> contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
>> possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
>> are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.
>>
>> Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
>> quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
>> the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
>> Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
>> That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
>> what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
>> say, 'forget it', it's not even necessary.
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
>>> judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
>>> certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
>>> individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
>>> about the term 'subset'.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>> Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
>>> fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will
>>> appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that
>>> he is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
>>> experience is nothing if it stands alone.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
>>> experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
>>> has indefinite possibilities..
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jerry - I don't see that the individual mind is necessarily
referenced as 'quasi-mind. 

"A sign is in s conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the
mind'. 3.360

"But if the triple relation between the sign, its object and the
mind'...3.361

and he refers to "the mind using the sign' 3.361.

[NOTE: by 'sign' I understand the mediate term in the triad, the
representamen]. 

And in 8.315, he references "No event that occurs to any mind, no
action of any mind'...etc.

My point is that it is not a 'fast rule' that the individual mind is
described as a 'quasi-mind'. Peirce uses the term 'mind' to refer to
individual's and their mental interactions with the world. He rarely
uses the term 'quasi-mind'...and more often then, to refer to
non-human actions of 'mind'

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  5:06 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Edwina list, 
As per your objection,  

“I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual
mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the
term 'subset'.” 
Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept is not
Peirce's alone.  It belongs to the river of pragmaticism.): 
Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself
to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe
that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does
not extend to that of other men. 
..and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant,
which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer
and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication
should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists
of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and
interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should
fulfill its function. 
I take “have to be fused” as “must be fused” in order than
any communication should take place.  
Hth,  

Jerry R 
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:59 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
 Edwina,
 I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also
the possibility that what you contribute are the good and right
things and you are supposed to let go of the things that are not good
and/or right.   
 Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference
in the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason
for Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?  That is, why even
make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So, what is the
reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just say,
'forget it', it's not even necessary.   
 Best,Jerry R
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make
individuals judges of truth...and that we function within a
'community'...and I certainly agree with that. I would prefer to
somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of
Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'. 

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com [3] sent:
Edwina, list, 
 Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind: 
When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it
will appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.  
Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single,
that he is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one
man’s experience is nothing if it stands alone.   
If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not
‘my’ experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought
of; and this ‘us’ has indefinite possibilities.. 
Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid
sense.  Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual
pleasure is not our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the
wheel for an end that none of us can catch more than a glimpse at-
that which the generations are working out.  But we can see that the
development of embodied ideas is what it will consist in.- 
Best, 

Jerry R 
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - 

I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?

This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
mediative process of the Representamen.

I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but-
this

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina list,



As per your objection,

“I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is an
aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'.”



Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept is not Peirce's
alone.  It belongs to the river of pragmaticism.):



Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this
satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to
that of other men.



..and the *Communicational* Interpretant, or say the *Cominterpretant*,
which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and
interpreter *have to be fused* *in order that any communication should take
place*. This mind may be called the *commens*. It consists of all that is,
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.



I take “have to be fused” as “must be fused” in order than *any*
communication should take place.



Hth,

Jerry R


On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:59 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
> contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
> possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
> are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.
>
> Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
> quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
> the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
> Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
> That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
> what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
> say, 'forget it', it's not *even* necessary.
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
>> judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
>> certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
>> individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
>> about the term 'subset'.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>> Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
>>
>>
>>
>> When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
>> fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will
>> appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.
>>
>>
>>
>> Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he
>> is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
>> experience is nothing if it stands alone.
>>
>>
>>
>> If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
>> experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
>> has indefinite possibilities..
>>
>>
>>
>> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense.
>> Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual pleasure is not
>> our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none
>> of us can catch more than a glimpse at- that which the generations are
>> working out.  But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what
>> it will consist in.-
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon -
>>>
>>> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
>>> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>>>
>>> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
>>> mediative process of the Representamen.
>>>
>>> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
>>> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
>>> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
>>> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>>>
>>> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>>>
>>> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
>>> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
>>> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
>>> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
>>> subsets.
>>>
>>> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
>>> rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different people
>>> will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of
>>> unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of
>>> the same proverb in two

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina,

I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.

Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
say, 'forget it', it's not *even* necessary.

Best,
Jerry R

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
> judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
> certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
> individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
> about the term 'subset'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
>
> Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
>
>
>
> When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid
> and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear
> that individualism and falsity are one and the same.
>
>
>
> Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he
> is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
> experience is nothing if it stands alone.
>
>
>
> If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
> experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
> has indefinite possibilities..
>
>
>
> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense.
> Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual pleasure is not
> our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none
> of us can catch more than a glimpse at- that which the generations are
> working out.  But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what
> it will consist in.-
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon -
>>
>> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
>> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>>
>> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the mediative
>> process of the Representamen.
>>
>> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
>> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
>> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
>> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>>
>> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>>
>> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
>> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
>> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
>> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
>> subsets.
>>
>> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
>> rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different people
>> will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of
>> unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of
>> the same proverb in two different languages must reflect these differences.
>> The point of semiosis is that it provides for BOTH stability of information
>> AND deviation from this stability.
>>
>> You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
>> Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
>> Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of this
>> proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely different
>> in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and is articulated
>> in all individual instances. But - within each instance, each individual
>> articulation - the Representamen functions within that individual semiosis.
>> Again, semiosis provides for both stability and continuity of information -
>> AND - diversity and variance of information.
>>
>> Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>>
>> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
>> see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
>> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is " the
>> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make
individuals judges of truth...and that we function within a
'community'...and I certainly agree with that. I would prefer to
somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of
Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'. 

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Edwina, list, 
 Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind: 
When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it
will appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.  
Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single,
that he is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one
man’s experience is nothing if it stands alone.   
If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not
‘my’ experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought
of; and this ‘us’ has indefinite possibilities.. 
Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid
sense.  Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual
pleasure is not our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the
wheel for an end that none of us can catch more than a glimpse at-
that which the generations are working out.  But we can see that the
development of embodied ideas is what it will consist in.- 
Best, 

Jerry R 
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - 

I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?

This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
mediative process of the Representamen.

I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but-
this 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process
of the Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did
not include this quasi-mind, but - included: 

DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.

No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call
'Quasi-Mind' the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind
and quasi-mind both as a process of habit formation and laws. The
reason for my hesitation in this - is that I am concerned about your
setting up an aggregate and subsets. 

The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different
people will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information -
and a set of unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their
interpretation of the same proverb in two different languages must
reflect these differences. The point of semiosis is that it provides
for BOTH stability of information AND deviation from this stability. 


You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of
this proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely
different in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and
is articulated in all individual instances. But - within each
instance, each individual articulation - the Representamen functions
within that individual semiosis. Again, semiosis provides for both
stability and continuity of information - AND - diversity and
variance of information. 

Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional
detail.
 What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly)
what I see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the
Quasi-interpreter (CP 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system
of Signs is " the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the
Sign," and its Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with
what the Sign denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the
aggregate of previous IOs that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits
of Interpretation are the aggregate of previous FIs that influence
(but do not necessitate) which DI the Sign actually produces from
among the possibilities of the II.  Habit-change--i.e., learning from
experience--occurs when a new FI supplements or replaces a previous
Habit of Interpretation. 
 What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds;
i.e., the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP
1:293; 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are
practically (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is
any subset of MIND in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds
is possible due to sufficient overlap

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, list,


Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:



*When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid
and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear
that individualism and falsity are one and the same. *



*Meantime, **we know that man is not whole as long as he is single**, that
he is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
experience is nothing if it stands alone.  *



*If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
has indefinite possibilities..*



*Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense.
Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual pleasure is not
our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none
of us can catch more than a glimpse at- that which the generations are
working out.  But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what
it will consist in.-*



Best,

Jerry R


On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon -
>
> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>
> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the mediative
> process of the Representamen.
>
> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>
> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>
> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
> subsets.
>
> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the rules,
> the common habits of the system. I see that two different people will each
> have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of unshared
> values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of the same
> proverb in two different languages must reflect these differences. The
> point of semiosis is that it provides for BOTH stability of information AND
> deviation from this stability.
>
> You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
> Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
> Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of this
> proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely different
> in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and is articulated
> in all individual instances. But - within each instance, each individual
> articulation - the Representamen functions within that individual semiosis.
> Again, semiosis provides for both stability and continuity of information -
> AND - diversity and variance of information.
>
> Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>
> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
> see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is " the
> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
> Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign
> denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs
> that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the
> aggregate of previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) which DI
> the Sign actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
> supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.
>
> What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds; i.e.,
> the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293;
> 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are practically
> (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any subset of MIND
> in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is possible due to
> sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral Experience, and
> Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to enhance the 
> continuity
> of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are finally (at the ideal
> limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what Peirce considered to be the 
> summum
> bonum--"the development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP
> 5.3-4; 1902).
>
> As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - 

I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?

This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
mediative process of the Representamen.

I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but-
this 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process
of the Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did
not include this quasi-mind, but - included:

DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.

No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call
'Quasi-Mind' the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind
and quasi-mind both as a process of habit formation and laws. The
reason for my hesitation in this - is that I am concerned about your
setting up an aggregate and subsets. 

The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different
people will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information -
and a set of unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their
interpretation of the same proverb in two different languages must
reflect these differences. The point of semiosis is that it provides
for BOTH stability of information AND deviation from this stability. 

You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of
this proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely
different in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and
is articulated in all individual instances. But - within each
instance, each individual articulation - the Representamen functions
within that individual semiosis. Again, semiosis provides for both
stability and continuity of information - AND - diversity and
variance of information.

Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional
detail.
 What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly)
what I see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the
Quasi-interpreter (CP 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system
of Signs is " the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the
Sign," and its Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with
what the Sign denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the
aggregate of previous IOs that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits
of Interpretation are the aggregate of previous FIs that influence
(but do not necessitate) which DI the Sign actually produces from
among the possibilities of the II.  Habit-change--i.e., learning from
experience--occurs when a new FI supplements or replaces a previous
Habit of Interpretation. 
 What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds;
i.e., the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP
1:293; 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are
practically (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is
any subset of MIND in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds
is possible due to sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs,
Collateral Experience, and Habits of Interpretation.  The employment
of Sign-action to enhance the  continuity of individual Quasi-minds,
until all of them are finally (at the ideal limit) "welded" together,
is one aspect of what Peirce considered to be the summum bonum--"the
development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4; 1902).
  As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion
below is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a
"knowledge base."  The same proverb in two different languages is 
one Representamen embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The
people who write or speak and read or hear it are not two individual
Representamens, they are two individual Quasi-minds who are "welded"
in the Sign.  Each is acquainted with the system of Signs to a
different extent, has different Collateral Experience for associating
the IO with the DO, and has different Habits of Intepretation; but
there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this particular Sign to
serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between them. 
  In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is
much more consistent with all of the other places where Peirce
defined the Representamen. 
*"something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
*something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may
stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c.

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, Jon, list,



Thank you for that nice response.



Now, if the commens is quasi-minds welded together, where is the
representamen that represents the commens?  How can we know of it unless
unnoticed nuances of that internal representation are brought to our
attention through some explicit/external representation?



Consider, for example, the ten cartoon panels.

There are nine panels that externally represents the representamens of nine
quasi-minds, each with some defect.  The final panel is the only one that
appears satisfactory, does not leave us frustrated, is prescriptive of an
*ought*.  That is the only representation that purports to be
representative of a fused mind.



But it is only a cartoon.  There are lots more to object regarding cartoons.


For instance, why not purple lawn when purple mountains majesty?

Why, then, does frustration go away?



Hth,
Jerry R


On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>
> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
> see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is "the
> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
> Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign
> denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs
> that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the
> aggregate of previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) *which *DI
> the Sign actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
> supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.
>
> What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds; i.e.,
> the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293;
> 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are practically
> (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any subset of MIND
> in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is possible due to
> sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral Experience, and
> Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to enhance the 
> *continuity
> *of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are finally (at the ideal
> limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what Peirce considered to be the 
> *summum
> bonum*--"the development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP
> 5.3-4; 1902).
>
> As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion below
> is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a "knowledge
> base."  The same proverb in two different languages is *one Representamen*
> embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people who write or speak
> and read or hear it are not two individual *Representamens*, they are two
> individual *Quasi-minds* who are "welded" in the Sign.  Each is
> acquainted with the system of Signs to a different extent, has different
> Collateral Experience for associating the IO with the DO, and has different
> Habits of Intepretation; but there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this
> particular Sign to serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between
> them.
>
> In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much
> more consistent with all of the *other *places where Peirce defined the
> Representamen.
>
>- "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
>capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
>- something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
>production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in
>place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
>- "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
>- "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)
>
> As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce *holistically*, taking
> all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again, and I
> mean it sincerely--"Different people have such wonderfully different ways
> of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters the
>> semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>>
>>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
>> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
>> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>>
>> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
>> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>>
>> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
>> differently from you.
>>
>> CSP:  The mode of

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, List:

Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.

What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is "the
prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign denotes"
(CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs that it
associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the aggregate of
previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) *which *DI the Sign
actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.

What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds; i.e.,
the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293;
1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are practically
(though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any subset of MIND
in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is possible due to
sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral Experience, and
Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to enhance
the *continuity
*of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are finally (at the ideal
limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what Peirce considered to
be the *summum
bonum*--"the development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4;
1902).

As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion below is
consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a "knowledge
base."  The same proverb in two different languages is *one Representamen*
embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people who write or speak
and read or hear it are not two individual *Representamens*, they are two
individual *Quasi-minds* who are "welded" in the Sign.  Each is acquainted
with the system of Signs to a different extent, has different Collateral
Experience for associating the IO with the DO, and has different Habits of
Intepretation; but there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this
particular Sign to serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between
them.

In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much more
consistent with all of the *other *places where Peirce defined the
Representamen.

   - "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
   capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
   - something having the character "by virtue of which, for the production
   of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of
   another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
   - "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
   - "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)

As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce *holistically*, taking
all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again, and I
mean it sincerely--"Different people have such wonderfully different ways
of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters the
> semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>
>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>
> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>
> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
> differently from you.
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>
> My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common habit, as
> a generality - is most certainly capable of being transformed
> and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of INDIVIDUAL Dynamic
> Interpretants.
>
> The Representamen is not an individual proverb/diagram/picture...etc. It
> is the generality of this proverb, diagram/picture... that is capable of
> being expressed at any other

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina,

I would say, the knowledge brought with the representamen is the immediate object, the common knowledge (which not necessarily includes all existing relevant rules/laws) is part of the dynamical object, and the complete knowledge (including all relevant rules/laws) is the final interpretant. Though the representamen has been an interpretant before! So you are right, I think: Because the interpretant consists of the final interpretant too, the representamen does so too, and contains the knowledge base. Am I getting close?

Best, Helmut

09. Februar 2018 um 21:01 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - no, I'll disagree. Knowledge, as a commonality, as general rules/laws, is Thirdness. It can be compared to Arisotle and Plato's 'Form'. In Aristotle it is an integral part of matter; it is 'how' matter is organized. Peirce was an Aristotelian.

Edwina

On Fri 09/02/18 2:28 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

I think, the knowledge base belongs to the dynamical object, being its firstness part, the immaterial part, while the secondness of the dynamical object is its material/energetic part. Both parts are the object denoted by and part of the sign/representamen.

Best, Helmut

09. Februar 2018 um 19:36 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set, as I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI

I think that what is at issue for many is where the laws, the rules, i.e., the general, non-local, common information, which I refer to as the Knowledge Base, moves into action within the semiosic interaction. I see this as the Representamen. So far- I haven't heard from anyone where this Knowledge Base comes into action.

Edwina

On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote:

JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it. It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility. It does not itself predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said) its association with the DO. Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it. What do you think?

I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it. Collateral Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.

JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else. For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign. It seems to me that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of her mother.

As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO) 'determining' the R which 'determines' the DI, her crying out.

JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same. In that sense, I am constructing a diagram that embodies what I discern to be the significant relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation. Again, what do you think?

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

Helmut - no, I'll disagree. Knowledge, as a commonality, as general
rules/laws, is Thirdness. It can be compared to Arisotle and Plato's
'Form'. In Aristotle it is an integral part of matter; it is 'how'
matter is organized. Peirce was an Aristotelian. 

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  2:28 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, I think, the knowledge base belongs to the dynamical
object, being its firstness part, the immaterial part, while the
secondness of the dynamical object is its material/energetic part.
Both parts are the object denoted by and part of the
sign/representamen. Best, Helmut 09. Februar 2018 um 19:36 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

  Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set,
as I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI 

I think that what is at issue for many is where the laws, the rules,
i.e., the general, non-local, common information, which I refer to as
the Knowledge Base,  moves into action within the semiosic
interaction. I see this as the Representamen. So far- I haven't heard
from anyone where this Knowledge Base comes into action. 

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent: Jon, Edwina, list,   Jon wrote:  JAS: I am currently
trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as  the
partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the
Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO
in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not  itself predicate
anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in
its own right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that
it must somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to  ground (as
you said) its association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would
then be the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already
acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it. 
What do you think?  I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the
partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the
Sign denotes  it. Collateral Experience: the aggregate of  previous
IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus
recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  JAS: As for your thought
experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis should begin by
identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that will
affect how we classify everything else.  For example, consider the
girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the burning
of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound
that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this
might have, and its DI is the response of her mother.As I
remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a
sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce
employs this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she
has not had collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the
moment tend to agree with you that the DO is the burning of her hand
(but I'm still unclear on this). In any event, I agree that the IO is
her feeling of pain, but not the the R is the sound she makes. Rather
I see the feeling of pain (IO) 'determining' the R which 'determines'
the DI, her crying out.  JAS: All of these assignments are
somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also
happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant
a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological
definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a
diagram  that embodies what I discern to be the  significant relations
among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again,
what do you think?  I would agree that our several "assignments
are somewhat arbitrary. . . because various other things are also
happening. . . that would warrant a different yet equally valid
analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the
same." But if each of our "diagrams" is different, while some of them
may be congruent, some may not be, may even be quite wrong. So this
arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers to my mind. So I
again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis in such
cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be
helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs
involved). In a word, these various types of Signs   may be
occurring, but the may also be as aggregate much too complex to
analyze adequately except, perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign
types (pretty much all that Peirce attempts even in the James letter)
which classes, after all, are abstractions from existential reality.  
Edwina wrote:  ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I
understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic
format. 

 Did you perhaps mean

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, list,

You said:
'And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?'

Yes, why so?  Does someone have a response to this question?

Best,
Jerry R

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I appreciate your positive feedback on my proposed definitions for the
> Immediate Object and Collateral Experience.  I included additional ones for
> Habits of Interpretation and the Commens in my latest reply to Edwina, and
> will be elaborating on all of that eventually, probably in a new thread.
> Rediscovering Peirce's notion of a Quasi-mind was a bit of a breakthrough
> for me, and serendipitous in that it only happened because I looked up the
> bees and crystals passage when Helmut could not find it.
>
> I had to laugh when you referred to "flaming burners," because I was
> thinking the whole time of an electric stove.  I suspect that was due to a
> childhood experience of my own, when my mother had just turned off such a
> burner, so it was no longer glowing red when I casually set my arm down on
> it to hand her a popsicle that I wanted her to unwrap for me.  I still
> vividly remember the stripes of singed flesh that resulted.  I guess this
> is another helpful reminder of the context-dependence of any concrete
> Sign-action.
>
> If the DO is the hot burner, and the IO is the girl's sensation (not
> feeling) of pain, and the DI is her scream, then what is the R?  It would
> have to be something internal to the girl as a Quasi-mind, presumably some
> kind of mental Token that associates the pain with the burner as a new
> addition to her Collateral Experience.  This particular DI is likely
> prompted by her established Habit of Interpretation for responding to pain
> in general--mostly instinctive, rather than learned, except perhaps that
> the specific form of the sound itself (as you originally suggested) has
> been picked up from her French-speaking environment.  The FI might very
> well be produced by just this one Sign, rather than repetition--namely, the
> habit of not touching hot burners, or perhaps not touching burners at all,
> just to be safe.  This addition of the new FI to her previous stock of
> Habits of Interpretation constitutes a Habit-change--i.e., an instance of
> genuine learning.
>
> I agree that diagrammatic analyses are not all created equal--as in
> engineering, while there is rarely only one *right *answer, there are
> certainly many *wrong *ones.  I see the main benefit of insisting on
> consistent terminology as bringing greater clarity to *each *analysis,
> such that different ones can then be evaluated on a level playing field;
> apples-to-apples, so to speak.  And I definitely agree that what we are
> trying to do here is an oversimplification--abstracting and idealizing a
> situation that is both complicated and complex--but nevertheless believe
> that there are valuable insights to be gained from the effort.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Jon, Edwina, list,
>>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
>> Object as  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object
>> by which the Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said)
>> knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not itself 
>> predicate
>> anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own
>> right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must
>> somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said)
>> its association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be the
>> aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with
>> the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
>>
>>
>> I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of
>> attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes  it. Collateral
>> Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already
>> acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.
>>
>> JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
>> semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest,
>> because that will affect how we classify everything else.  For example,
>> consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the
>> burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound
>> that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might
>> have, and its DI is the response of her mother.
>>
>>
>> As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a
>> sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs
>> this example, i.e., re: how

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Gary R., List:

I appreciate your positive feedback on my proposed definitions for the
Immediate Object and Collateral Experience.  I included additional ones for
Habits of Interpretation and the Commens in my latest reply to Edwina, and
will be elaborating on all of that eventually, probably in a new thread.
Rediscovering Peirce's notion of a Quasi-mind was a bit of a breakthrough
for me, and serendipitous in that it only happened because I looked up the
bees and crystals passage when Helmut could not find it.

I had to laugh when you referred to "flaming burners," because I was
thinking the whole time of an electric stove.  I suspect that was due to a
childhood experience of my own, when my mother had just turned off such a
burner, so it was no longer glowing red when I casually set my arm down on
it to hand her a popsicle that I wanted her to unwrap for me.  I still
vividly remember the stripes of singed flesh that resulted.  I guess this
is another helpful reminder of the context-dependence of any concrete
Sign-action.

If the DO is the hot burner, and the IO is the girl's sensation (not
feeling) of pain, and the DI is her scream, then what is the R?  It would
have to be something internal to the girl as a Quasi-mind, presumably some
kind of mental Token that associates the pain with the burner as a new
addition to her Collateral Experience.  This particular DI is likely
prompted by her established Habit of Interpretation for responding to pain
in general--mostly instinctive, rather than learned, except perhaps that
the specific form of the sound itself (as you originally suggested) has
been picked up from her French-speaking environment.  The FI might very
well be produced by just this one Sign, rather than repetition--namely, the
habit of not touching hot burners, or perhaps not touching burners at all,
just to be safe.  This addition of the new FI to her previous stock of
Habits of Interpretation constitutes a Habit-change--i.e., an instance of
genuine learning.

I agree that diagrammatic analyses are not all created equal--as in
engineering, while there is rarely only one *right *answer, there are
certainly many *wrong *ones.  I see the main benefit of insisting on
consistent terminology as bringing greater clarity to *each *analysis, such
that different ones can then be evaluated on a level playing field;
apples-to-apples, so to speak.  And I definitely agree that what we are
trying to do here is an oversimplification--abstracting and idealizing a
situation that is both complicated and complex--but nevertheless believe
that there are valuable insights to be gained from the effort.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
> Object as  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by
> which the Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing
> the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not itself predicate
> anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own
> right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must
> somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said) its
> association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate
> of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and
> thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
>
>
> I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of
> attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes  it. Collateral
> Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already
> acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.
>
> JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
> semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest,
> because that will affect how we classify everything else.  For example,
> consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the
> burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound
> that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might
> have, and its DI is the response of her mother.
>
>
> As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a
> sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs
> this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had
> collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree
> with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on
> this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not
> the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO)
> 'determining' the

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind
enters the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not
MIND?

 When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the
semiosic interaction? My view is that this is the function of the
Representamen.

I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.

Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
differently from you.

CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A  representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)

My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common
habit, as a generality - is most certainly capable of being
transformed and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of
INDIVIDUAL Dynamic Interpretants.

The Representamen is not an individual
proverb/diagram/picture...etc. It is the generality of this proverb,
diagram/picture... that is capable of being expressed at any other
time - as an individual Dynamic Interpretant. 

So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the
laws-of-measles. As such, when the disease is activated within the
individual person, these general laws will be expressed, as
individual articulations of measles...as the Dynamic Interpretants.

Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but
is instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a
Representamen. It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic
Interpretant. 

And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather
than specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the
mediative actions of the Representamen. 

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina:
 It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and
relational as yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way
that is much more consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is
telling that I am constantly going back to revisit Peirce's writings
about this subject, and then offering multiple citations to support
my position, while you simply  assert yours over and over.
 I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of
Signs, Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate
Objects, and Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous
Final Interpretants.  The Commens is then the overlapping  system of
Signs, Collateral Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which
the Sign serves as a medium of communication between multiple
individual Quasi-minds.
 Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms,
and weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what
I quoted directly from Peirce about this.
  CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A  representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
  Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
here, nor in any of the  other passages that I referenced below; and
all of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in
Peirce's own usage of that term. 
 Regards,
 Jon S.
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List,

Best, Helmut

09. Februar 2018 um 19:36 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set, as I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI

Edwina

On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote:

I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary. . . because various other things are also happening. . . that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our "diagrams" is different, while some of them may be congruent, some may not be, may even be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers to my mind. So I again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis in such cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs involved). In a word, these various types of Signs may be occurring, but the may also be as aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except, perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are abstractions from existential reality.

Edwina wrote:

ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format.

Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II]...and often DI"?

ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot]. DO is the stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding' of the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set, as
I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI

I think that what is at issue for many is where the laws, the rules,
i.e., the general, non-local, common information, which I refer to as
the Knowledge Base,  moves into action within the semiosic
interaction. I see this as the Representamen. So far- I haven't heard
from anyone where this Knowledge Base comes into action.

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon, Edwina, list,
 Jon wrote:
 JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
Object as  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object
by which the Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said)
knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not
itself predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would
make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but
it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the DO's
attributes to ground (as you said) its association with the DO. 
Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate of previous IOs by
which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes
the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think? 
 I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of
attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes  it.
Collateral Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone
is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as
denoting it. 
 JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of
interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else. 
For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me
that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she
feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of
possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of
her mother.  
 As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners,
a sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce
employs this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she
has not had collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the
moment tend to agree with you that the DO is the burning of her hand
(but I'm still unclear on this). In any event, I agree that the IO is
her feeling of pain, but not the the R is the sound she makes. Rather
I see the feeling of pain (IO) 'determining' the R which 'determines'
the DI, her crying out. 
 JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though,
because various other things are also happening--both internal and
external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally
valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly
the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a diagram  that embodies
what I discern to be the significant relations among the parts of the
(in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think?
 I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary.
. . because various other things are also happening. . . that would
warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the
terminological definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our
"diagrams" is different, while some of them may be congruent, some
may not be, may even be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up
more questions than answers to my mind. So I again wonder if the
focus on exact terminological analysis in such cases (hypothetical or
existential) can lead to much that would be helpful (that is, towards
are mutual understanding of the Signs involved). In a word, these
various types of Signs  may be occurring, but the may also be as
aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except, perhaps, as
exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce
attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are
abstractions from existential reality.
 Edwina wrote: ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I
understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic
format.
 Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II]...and often DI"?
ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding'
of the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry,
which as I see it is the DI. 

ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat. 

I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list

And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
[DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved
in a view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations. 

You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action. 

I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens".
Each one of these functions only within a full triad and is not and
cannot be simply the Representamen. 

A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
weathercock within an interaction with another Sign ,
DO-[IO-R-II]..in this case, the wind and within an observer [also
operative in the full Sign set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is
not simply a Representamen. What is the Representamen in the
situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves in the wind? The
Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the wind, which will
move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the DO? The
wind.

Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18 10:06 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat
arbitrary, since semiosis is continuous.
 While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of
your model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly
because, in my reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage
where he defines or uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge
base."  Instead, he writes about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a
Sign, eventually generalizing this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a
"Quasi-interpreter," which are both "Quasi-minds" that become
"welded" in the Sign  (CP 4.551; 1906) when it serves as a medium for
communication of an idea or form between them (EP 2:391 and EP
2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two Quasi-minds
are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into which
yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906). 
 The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have
called a "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a
fan of that particular term.  It is "something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c.
1897); something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may
stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899);
"that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and "[t]he concrete subject
that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed, representation
necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or 
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an
object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
added).  Furthermore ...
 CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903) 
 Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the same Representamen
whenever it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is
part of a different Sign when the Immediate Object or Immediate
Interpretant is different.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple
Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often
DI. That's the basic format.

1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling. 

2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-08 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as
the *partial *combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the
Sign *denotes *it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in
its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not *itself *predicate anything
of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own right,
rather than a *part *of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow
involve enough of the DO's attributes to *ground *(as you said) its
association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate
of *previous *IOs by which someone is already *acquainted *with the DO, and
thus *recognizes *the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?

As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis
should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that
will affect how we classify everything else.  For example, consider the
girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the burning of
her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she
makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and
its DI is the response of her mother.  All of these assignments are
somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also
happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a
different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological
definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a
*diagram* that embodies what I discern to be the *significant *relations
among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what
do you think?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
>
> I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as practical
> (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more generally. While, as
> I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would seem that we have been
> concentrating on the theoretical much more than the practical for the last
> several months, while there is surely a place for discussions of both on
> the list. Still, I hope Mary's questions and Dan's comments will encourage
> forum members to initiate threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical.
>
> But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial post,
> Jeff. You concluded:
>
> JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how inner
> and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to their
> objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it applies to
> an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then to
> a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal to
> thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience of
> inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being
> explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of
> these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
> greater clarity can be achieved.
>
>
> I'm interested in this matter of *outer-inner* from several standpoint
> including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an expression he
> introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in a letter to
> Victoria Welby.
>
> I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the Immediate
> Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a continuing bone
> of contention for some. I would, however, note that Gary f has already
> given us as a springboard for discussion by offering a rather useful quote
> of Peirce's from a letter to William James in one of the Lowell threads. I
> think that quotation still needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in
> addition, in an off-list note Gary f commented:
>
> Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. . . make
> Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term *immediate object* very
> clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or represents the
> dynamic object” (but does not *predicate* anything of that object, such
> as recognizing it as a member of a general class would do).
>
>
> The IO is that “part of the sign which indicates or represents the
> dynamic object” (but does not *predicate* anything of that object)." But,
> again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it indicates the *Ground*
> of the Object, not the Object in its fullness, an impossibility. But I can
> imagine that some might argue that it indeed does indicates the DO itself,
> known through collateral observation.
>
> But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
> example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."
>
> So,

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-08 Thread Gary Richmond

e Concepts of Reflection in the first *Critique
> [B322-3]*. There, he notes that these conceptions have a legitimate
> employment in logic, but they tend to lead us into confusion elsewhere
> (e.g., metaphysics). More to the point, the explanations of these
> conceptions given by other philosophers (Aristotle and Leibniz are Kant's
> primary targets in this section) needs to be re-conceived in order to
> avoid problems in constructing philosophical explanations of the central
> problem which Kant is trying to grapple with, which is the synthesis in our
> cognitive judgments. Leibniz, for example, made assumptions about this
> distinction between inner and outer and its application to such things as
> monads that made it impossible to understand how the *composition* of
> relations is possible.
>
>
> Given the fact that the speculative grammar is meant to provide a richer
> account of the natural classes of signs and their relationships to objects
> and interpretants, and this is supposed to put us in a position to better
> explain how synthetic reasoning is possible, it seems clear to me that
> Peirce and Kant are trying to answer similar philosophical questions in
> logic and the theory of cognition. Ultimately, Kant suggests, the logical
> distinction between inner and outer (as with the distinctions between
> identity and difference and between agreement and opposition) must be
> understood in terms of the division between matter and form because this
> latter distinction underlies all the others--and this latter distinction
> between matter and form is the basis of something, such as a
> representation, being the "determinable in general...and its determination."
>
>
> If one traces the development of Peirce's views in the speculative grammar
> back to his earlier works (such as the Lowell Lectures of 1866), then it is
> clear Peirce has been trying, quite systematically I think, to work out the
> conditions necessary for making comparisons based on agreement and
> opposition and the account of richer sorts of logical distinctions is being
> evolved from those humble starting points. Hence the value of working with
> an account of relations that starts with an equiparance (e.g., similarity
> as the basis of class relations) and then working to ordered relations
> (e.g., disquiparance) of progressively richer kinds.
>
>
> Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how inner and
> outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to their
> objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it applies to
> an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then to
> a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal to
> thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience of
> inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being
> explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of
> these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
> greater clarity can be achieved.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 7, 2018 3:05:40 PM
> *To:* Helmut Raulien
> *Cc:* Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re:
> Representamen Discussion
>
> Helmut:
>
> Thanks for clarifying that.  It sounds like by "the epistemic cut" you
> mean Peirce's distinction between "the inner world" and "the outer world."
> Indeed, Edwina's model (as I understand it now) is that all Signs (IO-R-II)
> are *internal to an individual agent*--although it need not be a human
> mind, as her own frequent citation of that passage about bees and crystals
> (CP 4.551; 1906) emphasizes--while mine is that IO, R, and II are *internal
> to the Sign*, but some Signs are external in the sense that they serve as
> media for the communication of ideas/forms *between different agents*.
> For example, I would identify this message as a Sign, while Edwina (I
> believe, but oversimplified) would identify it as my Representamen's DI
> when I send it, which then becomes your Representamen's DO when you read it.
>
> Interestingly, upon looking up Peirce's remark on bees and crystals, I
> discovered that he wrote the following later in the same paragraph.
>
> CSP:  We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too
> wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs
> must have a Quasi-mind, it may further

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, List:

Thanks for the additional explication of your model.  I knew that I was
oversimplifying it (again), so this is helpful.

Regards,

Jon S

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 5:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - there's still quite a bit of disagreement.
>
> You are saying that I say that "all Signs [IO-R-II] are internal to an
> individual agent. But remember - I don't consider that this internal triad
> can exist without a relation to the external world - to the DO of some
> other 'Sign'. So- to me, the triad of IO-R-II MUST be in a relational
> interaction with another entity, which interacts with it - as a DO.
>
> BUT - that DO of course carries with it, its own internal triad
> [IO-R-II]...
>
> That is - my outline requires an external relationship with another Sign.
> Even if one Sign entity is simply a rock; it is in semiosic interaction
> with the sand on which it sits, with the sunlight on it, with the air.
>
> So- this message that you wrote is - TO ME - a DO. To YOU, it's a DI. All
> together - it's an interaction of two Sign interactions:
>
> Jon: IO-R-II-DIin interaction with Edwina: DO-IO-R-II-DI..[which I am
> now writing/expressing].
>
> That is - the DI and DO don't exist all by themselves but are nested
> within the triad..
>
> And there is no such thing as an external Representamen, for the
> Representamen functions within commonalities, generals - rather than
> specifics - and thus, there cannot be an external existential
> Representamen.
>
> I consider that there would be two different Representamens between Person
> A and Person B. They have much in common, they must share various rules and
> beliefs, so to speak - but- the whole point of individualism - is that
> knowledge can change, adapt and evolve - and this would be impossible if
> the Representamen were The Same For Everyone.  It has to be different - ...
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 07/02/18 5:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Helmut:
>
> Thanks for clarifying that.  It sounds like by "the epistemic cut" you
> mean Peirce's distinction between "the inner world" and "the outer world."
> Indeed, Edwina's model (as I understand it now) is that all Signs (IO-R-II)
> are internal to an individual agent--although it need not be a human
> mind, as her own frequent citation of that passage about bees and crystals
> (CP 4.551; 1906) emphasizes--while mine is that IO, R, and II are internal
> to the Sign, but some Signs are external in the sense that they serve as
> media for the communication of ideas/forms between different agents.  For
> example, I would identify this message as a Sign, while Edwina (I believe,
> but oversimplified) would identify it as my Representamen's DI when I send
> it, which then becomes your Representamen's DO when you read it.
>
> Interestingly, upon looking up Peirce's remark on bees and crystals, I
> discovered that he wrote the following later in the same paragraph.
>
> CSP:  We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too
> wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs
> must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no
> isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a
> Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (
> i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be
> distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. (CP 4.551; 1906)
>
>
> His suggestion that the two communicating agents "are at one (i.e., are
> one mind) in the sign itself," such that "In the Sign they are, so to say,
> welded," is intriguing in that it somewhat blurs (but does not eliminate)
> the internal/external distinction that we have been discussing.  Naturally,
> I read this as more consistent with my model, because what one agent utters
> and the other interprets is  the same Sign--i.e., there is only one
> Representamen, not two different ones.  For Edwina's model, perhaps it
> would correspond to Jerry R.'s proposal of an "external representamen of
> the commens" that encompasses both the utterer's Representamen and the
> receiver's Representamen.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>> I took the epistemic cut for the boundary of one´s mind (is that
>> correct?), and taking it into account means to have to mention which parts
>> of a sign are internal and which are external to it, as Edwina did. A
>> representamen then is internal to a certain person´s mind. If you do not
>> take the epistemic cut or what I took for it into account, like Peirce in
>> the quote about the phaneron, then you see the phaneron as the totality of
>> all mind. This phaneron does not only include the minds of persons, but
>> also the work of "crystals, bees" (quote not found), and the word "vase",
>> which then may be a representamen in this model, which I thought might have
>> been

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-07 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

List,


Looking at Peirce's account of the distinction between what is internal and 
external--and how the distinction seems to apply in different areas of inquiry 
(e.g., math,, phenomenology, speculative grammar, critical logic, metaphysics, 
etc.)--might shed some light on these matters.


Kant provides an account of the distinction between the inner and outer in the 
Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection in the first Critique [B322-3]. There, 
he notes that these conceptions have a legitimate employment in logic, but they 
tend to lead us into confusion elsewhere (e.g., metaphysics). More to the 
point, the explanations of these conceptions given by other philosophers 
(Aristotle and Leibniz are Kant's primary targets in this section) needs to be 
re-conceived in order to avoid problems in constructing philosophical 
explanations of the central problem which Kant is trying to grapple with, which 
is the synthesis in our cognitive judgments. Leibniz, for example, made 
assumptions about this distinction between inner and outer and its application 
to such things as monads that made it impossible to understand how the 
composition of relations is possible.


Given the fact that the speculative grammar is meant to provide a richer 
account of the natural classes of signs and their relationships to objects and 
interpretants, and this is supposed to put us in a position to better explain 
how synthetic reasoning is possible, it seems clear to me that Peirce and Kant 
are trying to answer similar philosophical questions in logic and the theory of 
cognition. Ultimately, Kant suggests, the logical distinction between inner and 
outer (as with the distinctions between identity and difference and between 
agreement and opposition) must be understood in terms of the division between 
matter and form because this latter distinction underlies all the others--and 
this latter distinction between matter and form is the basis of something, such 
as a representation, being the "determinable in general...and its 
determination."


If one traces the development of Peirce's views in the speculative grammar back 
to his earlier works (such as the Lowell Lectures of 1866), then it is clear 
Peirce has been trying, quite systematically I think, to work out the 
conditions necessary for making comparisons based on agreement and opposition 
and the account of richer sorts of logical distinctions is being evolved from 
those humble starting points. Hence the value of working with an account of 
relations that starts with an equiparance (e.g., similarity as the basis of 
class relations) and then working to ordered relations (e.g., disquiparance) of 
progressively richer kinds.


Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how inner and 
outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to their objects 
(e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it applies to an individual 
substantial object, a general conception--and then to a thinking being like us 
who sees the world in terms of what is internal to thought and what is external 
to thought. The phenomena in our experience of inner (e.g., subjective) and 
outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being explained in terms of the way the 
distinction is applied in the cases of these relatively simpler kinds of 
things--largely because that is how greater clarity can be achieved.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 7, 2018 3:05:40 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen 
Discussion

Helmut:

Thanks for clarifying that.  It sounds like by "the epistemic cut" you mean 
Peirce's distinction between "the inner world" and "the outer world."  Indeed, 
Edwina's model (as I understand it now) is that all Signs (IO-R-II) are 
internal to an individual agent--although it need not be a human mind, as her 
own frequent citation of that passage about bees and crystals (CP 4.551; 1906) 
emphasizes--while mine is that IO, R, and II are internal to the Sign, but some 
Signs are external in the sense that they serve as media for the communication 
of ideas/forms between different agents.  For example, I would identify this 
message as a Sign, while Edwina (I believe, but oversimplified) would identify 
it as my Representamen's DI when I send it, which then becomes your 
Representamen's DO when you read it.

Interestingly, upon looking up Peirce's remark on bees and crystals, I 
discovered that he wrote the following later in the same paragraph.

CSP:  We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a 
sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a 
Quasi-mind, it may further be decla

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list - there's still quite a bit of disagreement.

You are saying that I say that "all Signs [IO-R-II] are internal to
an individual agent. But remember - I don't consider that this
internal triad can exist without a relation to the external world -
to the DO of some other 'Sign'. So- to me, the triad of IO-R-II MUST
be in a relational interaction with another entity, which interacts
with it - as a DO. 

BUT - that DO of course carries with it, its own internal triad
[IO-R-II]...

That is - my outline requires an external relationship with another
Sign. Even if one Sign entity is simply a rock; it is in semiosic
interaction with the sand on which it sits, with the sunlight on it,
with the air. 

So- this message that you wrote is - TO ME - a DO. To YOU, it's a
DI. All together - it's an interaction of two Sign interactions:

Jon: IO-R-II-DIin interaction with Edwina: DO-IO-R-II-DI..[which
I am now writing/expressing].

That is - the DI and DO don't exist all by themselves but are nested
within the triad..

And there is no such thing as an external Representamen, for the
Representamen functions within commonalities, generals - rather than
specifics - and thus, there cannot be an external existential
Representamen. 

I consider that there would be two different Representamens between
Person A and Person B. They have much in common, they must share
various rules and beliefs, so to speak - but- the whole point of
individualism - is that knowledge can change, adapt and evolve - and
this would be impossible if the Representamen were The Same For
Everyone.  It has to be different - ...

Edwina
 On Wed 07/02/18  5:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Helmut:
 Thanks for clarifying that.  It sounds like by "the epistemic cut"
you mean Peirce's distinction between "the inner world" and "the
outer world."  Indeed, Edwina's model (as I understand it now) is
that all Signs (IO-R-II) are internal to an individual
agent--although it need not be a human mind, as her own frequent
citation of that passage about bees and crystals (CP 4.551; 1906)
emphasizes--while mine is that IO, R, and II are  internal to the
Sign, but some Signs are external in the sense that they serve as
media for the communication of ideas/forms between different agents. 
For example, I would identify this message as a Sign, while Edwina (I
believe, but oversimplified) would identify it as my Representamen's
DI when I send it, which then becomes your Representamen's DO when
you read it.
 Interestingly, upon looking up Peirce's remark on bees and crystals,
I discovered that he wrote the following later in the same paragraph.
 CSP:  We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not
too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that
connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared
that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least
two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and
although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign
itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so
to say,  welded. (CP 4.551; 1906)
 His suggestion that the two communicating agents "are at one (i.e.,
are one mind) in the sign itself," such that "In the Sign they are,
so to say, welded," is intriguing in that it somewhat blurs (but does
not eliminate) the internal/external distinction that we have been
discussing.  Naturally, I read this as more consistent with my model,
because what one agent utters and the other interprets is  the same
Sign--i.e., there is only one Representamen, not two different ones. 
For Edwina's model, perhaps it would correspond to Jerry R.'s proposal
of an "external representamen of the commens" that encompasses both
the utterer's Representamen and the receiver's Representamen.
 Regards,
 Jon S.  
 On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
  Jon, List, I took the epistemic cut for the boundary of one´s mind
(is that correct?), and taking it into account means to have to
mention which parts of a sign are internal and which are external to
it, as Edwina did. A representamen then is internal to a certain
person´s mind. If you do not take the epistemic cut or what I took
for it into account, like Peirce in the quote about the phaneron,
then you see the phaneron as the totality of all mind. This phaneron
does not only include the minds of persons, but also the work of
"crystals, bees" (quote not found), and the word "vase", which then
may be a representamen in this model, which I thought might have been
your model. But I don´t know if I have got it all wrong, because a
more elaborated model delivering completely different answers than a
more general model is funny. Best, Helmut  07. Februar 2018 um 20:04
Uhr
  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
   Helmut, List:   I am not sure

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Helmut:

Thanks for clarifying that.  It sounds like by "the epistemic cut" you mean
Peirce's distinction between "the inner world" and "the outer world."
Indeed, Edwina's model (as I understand it now) is that all Signs (IO-R-II)
are *internal to an individual agent*--although it need not be a human
mind, as her own frequent citation of that passage about bees and crystals
(CP 4.551; 1906) emphasizes--while mine is that IO, R, and II are *internal
to the Sign*, but some Signs are external in the sense that they serve as
media for the communication of ideas/forms *between different agents*.  For
example, I would identify this message as a Sign, while Edwina (I believe,
but oversimplified) would identify it as my Representamen's DI when I send
it, which then becomes your Representamen's DO when you read it.

Interestingly, upon looking up Peirce's remark on bees and crystals, I
discovered that he wrote the following later in the same paragraph.

CSP:  We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too
wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs
must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no
isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a
*Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at
one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be
distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*. (CP 4.551; 1906)

His suggestion that the two communicating agents "are at one (*i.e., *are
one mind) in the sign itself," such that "In the Sign they are, so to say,
*welded*," is intriguing in that it somewhat blurs (but does not eliminate)
the internal/external distinction that we have been discussing.  Naturally,
I read this as more consistent with my model, because what one agent utters
and the other interprets is *the same Sign*--i.e., there is only one
Representamen, not two different ones.  For Edwina's model, perhaps it
would correspond to Jerry R.'s proposal of an "external representamen of
the commens" that *encompasses *both the utterer's Representamen and the
receiver's Representamen.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> I took the epistemic cut for the boundary of one´s mind (is that
> correct?), and taking it into account means to have to mention which parts
> of a sign are internal and which are external to it, as Edwina did. A
> representamen then is internal to a certain person´s mind. If you do not
> take the epistemic cut or what I took for it into account, like Peirce in
> the quote about the phaneron, then you see the phaneron as the totality of
> all mind. This phaneron does not only include the minds of persons, but
> also the work of "crystals, bees" (quote not found), and the word "vase",
> which then may be a representamen in this model, which I thought might have
> been your model. But I don´t know if I have got it all wrong, because a
> more elaborated model delivering completely different answers than a more
> general model is funny.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  07. Februar 2018 um 20:04 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> Helmut, List:
>
> I am not sure exactly what you mean in this context by "the epistemic
> cut," and hence which model (Edwina's or mine) you see as taking it into
> account vs. ignoring it.  Could you please clarify?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 12:41 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, Jon, List,
>> I guess there are two models, which are different, but either of them may
>> justifiedly be chosen: One model is taking the epistemic cut in regard, and
>> the other is ignoring it. When Peirce writes: "*If you ask present when,
>> and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never
>> having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have
>> found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds*. (CP
>> 1.284)", he has chosen the model that ignores the epistemic cut. But it is
>> also possible and justified to use the other model, to illustrate the
>> separatedness of one mind to another and to the environment. I hope I have
>> got the concept of the epistemic cut right.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

I took the epistemic cut for the boundary of one´s mind (is that correct?), and taking it into account means to have to mention which parts of a sign are internal and which are external to it, as Edwina did. A representamen then is internal to a certain person´s mind. If you do not take the epistemic cut or what I took for it into account, like Peirce in the quote about the phaneron, then you see the phaneron as the totality of all mind. This phaneron does not only include the minds of persons, but also the work of "crystals, bees" (quote not found), and the word "vase", which then may be a representamen in this model, which I thought might have been your model. But I don´t know if I have got it all wrong, because a more elaborated model delivering completely different answers than a more general model is funny.

Best,

Helmut

07. Februar 2018 um 20:04 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

I am not sure exactly what you mean in this context by "the epistemic cut," and hence which model (Edwina's or mine) you see as taking it into account vs. ignoring it. Could you please clarify?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 12:41 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, Jon, List,

I guess there are two models, which are different, but either of them may justifiedly be chosen: One model is taking the epistemic cut in regard, and the other is ignoring it. When Peirce writes: "If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. (CP 1.284)", he has chosen the model that ignores the epistemic cut. But it is also possible and justified to use the other model, to illustrate the separatedness of one mind to another and to the environment. I hope I have got the concept of the epistemic cut right.

Best,

Helmut

- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Helmut, List:

I am not sure exactly what you mean in this context by "the epistemic cut,"
and hence which model (Edwina's or mine) you see as taking it into account
vs. ignoring it.  Could you please clarify?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 12:41 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon, List,
> I guess there are two models, which are different, but either of them may
> justifiedly be chosen: One model is taking the epistemic cut in regard, and
> the other is ignoring it. When Peirce writes: "*If you ask present when,
> and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never
> having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have
> found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds*. (CP 1.284)",
> he has chosen the model that ignores the epistemic cut. But it is also
> possible and justified to use the other model, to illustrate the
> separatedness of one mind to another and to the environment. I hope I have
> got the concept of the epistemic cut right.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

2018-02-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, Jon, List,

Best,

Helmut

07. Februar 2018 um 17:34 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Edwina, List:

Understood, thanks again.

Jon S.

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Jon - you only partly get my view...but..I acknowledge that you are getting most of it!

I consider that the Dynamic Interpretant from Person A - since it is articulated, has a Form; which is to say, it is now in itself, capable of a triadic interaction. In an interaction, this DI becomes a DOand interacts with Person B's internal triad. BUT - to me, the triad only exists when in interaction with other Sign-triads. Left on its own, that original DI would dissolve in the air. Just as a dream can dissolve

But - interacting with Person B, it functions as a full Sign, ..carrying with it, in its form, an internal Representamen. So- that loud sound, those typed words are NOT, ever...signs..unless they are in a relational interaction with another form/Sign.

No triadic Sign, whether functioning within only Person A's mind or within an interaction between Person A and Person B - can exist 'per se' except within the interaction. Nothing exists in isolation.

Now - I'm busy for a few hours - making 10 jars of yam/squash/onion/garlic /carrots//tomatoessoup. Rather labour intensive but family like it..

Edwina

On Wed 07/02/18 11:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

Thank you for confirming and elaborating on that. I knew that I was oversimplifying, but it is helping me get a much better handle on how you are using the terminology, which (needless to say) has been a major obstacle for me. I also recognize that the process is not as "linear" as your description might suggest. Now that I (finally) understand it, I find your model of semiosis interesting.

However ... you knew this was coming ... it still differs substantially from my reading of how Peirce used the same terminology. In particular, he affirmed that Signs (ID-R-II) can be both internal to agents (e.g., neural patterns and thoughts) and external to agents (e.g., loud sounds and typed words), which I also think is more consistent with vernacular usage.

CSP: What are signs for, anyhow? They are to communicate ideas, are they not? Even the imaginary signs called thoughts convey ideas from the mind of yesterday to the mind of tomorrow into which yesterday's has grown. Of course, then, these "ideas" are not themselves "thoughts," or imaginary signs. They are some potentiality, some form, which may be embodied in external or in internal signs. (EP 2:388; 1906, emphasis added)

The final cause of all Signs is "to communicate ideas," which "are some potentiality, some form." The ideas are "embodied" in external Signs that convey them from one mind to another, as well as internal Signs that convey them within the same mind over time. In other words, "mental judgments" are not the only kind of Signs; there are also "external signs" (CP 5.569; 1901). In particular, t he "outward significant word or mark" that delivers an assertion from one person to another is itself a Sign, rather than the utterer's Dynamic Interpretant that becomes the receiver's Dynamic Object; and this (external) Sign "is expected [by the utterer] to excite in the mind of the receiver" another (internal) Sign (CP 3.433; 1896). Peirce even explicitly called a Sign "a medium of communication" (EP 2:391; 1906) and "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Obviously you strongly disagree, so please do not feel obligated to post a rebuttal. Again, I believe that it is beneficial for future conversations that we have now zeroed in on where the divergence in our views is primarily rooted. I will keep your alternative interpretation in mind (no pun intended) as I continue reading and thinking about these matters going forward.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Jon - yes/no/ but. ...I think one has to be careful. It isn't as reductionist as it might sound from the words...

The external Dynamic Interpretant of Person A, is his interpretation of an

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, List:

Understood, thanks again.

Jon S.

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Jon - you only partly get my view...but..I acknowledge that you are
> getting most of it!
>
> I consider that the Dynamic Interpretant from Person A - since it is
> articulated, has a Form; which is to say, it is now in itself, capable of a
> triadic interaction. In an interaction, this DI becomes a DOand
> interacts with Person B's internal triad.  BUT - to me, the triad only
> exists when in interaction with other Sign-triads.   Left on its own,
> that original DI would dissolve in the air. Just as a dream can dissolve
>
> But - interacting with Person B, it functions as a full Sign, ..carrying
> with it, in its form, an internal Representamen. So- that loud sound, those
> typed words are NOT, ever...signs..unless they are in a relational
> interaction with another form/Sign.
>
> No triadic Sign, whether functioning within only Person A's mind or within
> an interaction between Person A and Person B - can exist 'per se' except
> within the interaction. Nothing exists in isolation.
>
> Now - I'm busy for a few hours - making 10 jars of yam/squash/onion/garlic
> /carrots//tomatoessoup. Rather labour intensive but family like it..
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 07/02/18 11:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Thank you for confirming and elaborating on that.  I knew that I was
> oversimplifying, but it is helping me get a much better handle on how you
> are using the terminology, which (needless to say) has been a major
> obstacle for me.  I also recognize that the process is not as "linear" as
> your description might suggest.  Now that I (finally) understand it, I find
> your model of semiosis interesting.
>
> However ... you knew this was coming ... it still differs substantially
> from my reading of how Peirce used the same terminology.  In particular, he
> affirmed that Signs (ID-R-II) can be both internal to agents (e.g., neural
> patterns and thoughts) and external to agents (e.g., loud sounds and typed
> words), which I also think is more consistent with vernacular usage.
>
> CSP:  What are signs for, anyhow? They are to communicate ideas, are they
> not? Even the imaginary signs called thoughts convey ideas from the mind of
> yesterday to the mind of tomorrow into which yesterday's has grown. Of
> course, then, these "ideas" are not themselves "thoughts," or imaginary
> signs. They are some potentiality, some form, which may be embodied in
> external or in internal signs. (EP 2:388; 1906, emphasis added)
>
>
> The final cause of all Signs is "to communicate ideas," which "are some
> potentiality, some form."  The ideas are "embodied" in external Signs
> that convey them from one mind to another, as well as internal Signs that
> convey them within the same mind over time.  In other words,  "mental
> judgments" are not the only kind of Signs; there are also "external signs"
> (CP 5.569; 1901).  In particular, t he "outward significant word or mark"
> that delivers an assertion from one person to another is itself a Sign,
> rather than  the utterer's Dynamic Interpretant that becomes the
> receiver's Dynamic Object; and this (external) Sign "is expected [by the
> utterer] to excite in the mind of the receiver"  another  (internal) Sign
> (CP 3.433; 1896).  Peirce even explicitly called a Sign "a medium of
> communication" (EP 2:391; 1906) and "a Medium for the communication of a
> Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>
> Obviously you strongly disagree, so please do not feel obligated to post
> a rebuttal.  Again, I believe that it is beneficial for future
> conversations that we have now zeroed in on where the divergence in our
> views is primarily rooted.  I will keep your alternative interpretation in
> mind (no pun intended) as I continue reading and thinking about these
> matters going forward.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - yes/no/ but. ...I think one has to be careful. It isn't as
>> reductionist as it might sound from the words...
>>
>> The external Dynamic Interpretant of Person A, is his interpretation of
>> an external Dynamic Object..as transformed by the knowledge base of his own
>> internal Representamen]. But this has to be looked at within the whole
>> triadic semiosic process.
>>
>> This DI becomes capable,  with this NEW information [from Person A's
>> internal Representamen]of operating as a new triadic SIGN. So- Person
>> A's Dynamic Interpretant isn't JUST a single subjective interpretation.
>> It's full-of-itself, so to speak. It's filled with information from Person
>> A's internal Representamen.
>>
>> This DI should be understood, as itself, capable of operating as a full
>> triadic Sign to the world. That is, to Person A, the DI is simply his
>> Interpretation as honed/constrained/and informed by his own internal
>>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon - you only partly get my view...but..I acknowledge that you are
getting most of it!

I consider that the Dynamic Interpretant from Person A - since it is
articulated, has a Form; which is to say, it is now in itself, capable
of a triadic interaction. In an interaction, this DI becomes a
DOand interacts with Person B's internal triad.  BUT - to me, the
triad only exists when in interaction with other Sign-triads.   Left
on its own, that original DI would dissolve in the air. Just as a
dream can dissolve

But - interacting with Person B, it functions as a full Sign,
..carrying with it, in its form, an internal Representamen. So- that
loud sound, those typed words are NOT, ever...signs..unless they are
in a relational interaction with another form/Sign. 

No triadic Sign, whether functioning within only Person A's mind or
within an interaction between Person A and Person B - can exist 'per
se' except within the interaction. Nothing exists in isolation.

Now - I'm busy for a few hours - making 10 jars of
yam/squash/onion/garlic /carrots//tomatoessoup. Rather labour
intensive but family like it..

Edwina
 On Wed 07/02/18 11:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Thank you for confirming and elaborating on that.  I knew that I was
oversimplifying, but it is helping me get a much better handle on how
you are using the terminology, which (needless to say) has been a
major obstacle for me.  I also recognize that the process is not as
"linear" as your description might suggest.  Now that I (finally)
understand it, I find your model of semiosis interesting.
 However ... you knew this was coming ... it still differs
substantially from my reading of how Peirce used the same
terminology.  In particular, he affirmed that Signs (ID-R-II) can be
both internal to agents (e.g., neural patterns and thoughts) and
external to agents (e.g., loud sounds and typed words), which I also
think is more consistent with vernacular usage.
  CSP:  What are signs for, anyhow? They are to communicate ideas,
are they not? Even the imaginary signs called thoughts convey ideas
from the mind of yesterday to the mind of tomorrow into which
yesterday's has grown. Of course, then, these "ideas" are not
themselves "thoughts," or imaginary signs. They are some
potentiality, some form,  which may be embodied in external or in
internal signs. (EP 2:388; 1906, emphasis added)
  The final cause of all Signs is "to communicate ideas," which "are
some potentiality, some form."  The ideas are "embodied" in external
Signs that convey them from one mind to another, as well as internal
Signs that convey them within the same mind over time.  In other
words,  "mental judgments" are not the only kind of Signs; there are
also "external signs"  (CP 5.569; 1901).  In particular, t he
"outward significant word or mark" that delivers an assertion from
one person to another is itself a Sign, rather than  the utterer's
Dynamic Interpretant that becomes the receiver's Dynamic Object; and
this (external) Sign "is expected [by the utterer] to excite in the
mind of the receiver"  another  (internal) Sign (CP 3.433; 1896). 
Peirce even explicitly called a Sign "a medium of communication" (EP
2:391; 1906) and "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP
2:544n22; 1906). 
  Obviously you strongly disagree, so please do not feel obligated to
post a rebuttal.  Again, I believe that it is beneficial for future
conversations that we have now zeroed in on where the divergence in
our views is primarily rooted.  I will keep your alternative
interpretation in mind (no pun intended) as I continue reading and
thinking about these matters going forward. 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - yes/no/ but. ...I think one has to be careful. It isn't as
reductionist as it might sound from the words...

The external Dynamic Interpretant of Person A, is his interpretation
of an external Dynamic Object..as transformed by the knowledge base of
his own internal Representamen]. But this has to be looked at within
the whole triadic semiosic process. 

This DI becomes capable,  with this NEW information [from Person
A's internal Representamen]of operating as a new triadic SIGN. So-
Person A's Dynamic Interpretant isn't JUST a single subjective
interpretation. It's full-of-itself, so to speak. It's filled with
information from Person A's internal Representamen. 

This DI should be understood, as itself, capable of operating as a
full triadic Sign to the world. That is, to Person A, the DI is
simply his Interpretation as honed/constrained/and informed by his
own internal Representamen. BUT - it's now external and can operate
within a full triad - and it is received as such by Person B. 

Person B relates to this new form...by interacting with

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, List:

Thank you for confirming and elaborating on that.  I knew that I was
oversimplifying, but it is helping me get a much better handle on how you
are using the terminology, which (needless to say) has been a major
obstacle for me.  I also recognize that the process is not as "linear" as
your description might suggest.  Now that I (finally) understand it, I find
your model of semiosis interesting.

However ... you knew this was coming ... it still differs substantially
from my reading of how Peirce used the same terminology.  In particular, he
affirmed that Signs (ID-R-II) can be both internal to agents (e.g., neural
patterns and thoughts) and external to agents (e.g., loud sounds and typed
words), which I also think is more consistent with vernacular usage.

CSP:  What are signs for, anyhow? They are to communicate ideas, are they
not? Even the imaginary signs called thoughts convey ideas from the mind of
yesterday to the mind of tomorrow into which yesterday's has grown. Of
course, then, these "ideas" are not themselves "thoughts," or imaginary
signs. They are some potentiality, some form, *which may be embodied in
external or in internal signs*. (EP 2:388; 1906, emphasis added)

The final cause of *all *Signs is "to communicate ideas," which "are some
potentiality, some form."  The ideas are "embodied" in *external *Signs
that convey them from one mind to another, as well as *internal *Signs that
convey them within the same mind over time.  In other words, "mental
judgments" are not the only kind of Signs; there are also "external signs" (CP
5.569; 1901).  In particular, the "outward significant word or mark" that
delivers an assertion from one person to another is itself a Sign, rather
than the utterer's Dynamic Interpretant that becomes the receiver's Dynamic
Object; and this (external) Sign "is expected [by the utterer] to excite in
the mind of the receiver" *another *(internal) Sign (CP 3.433; 1896).
Peirce even explicitly called a Sign "a medium of communication" (EP 2:391;
1906) and "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Obviously you strongly disagree, so please do not feel obligated to post a
rebuttal.  Again, I believe that it is beneficial for future conversations
that we have now zeroed in on where the divergence in our views is
primarily rooted.  I will keep your alternative interpretation in mind (no
pun intended) as I continue reading and thinking about these matters going
forward.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - yes/no/ but. ...I think one has to be careful. It isn't as
> reductionist as it might sound from the words...
>
> The external Dynamic Interpretant of Person A, is his interpretation of an
> external Dynamic Object..as transformed by the knowledge base of his own
> internal Representamen]. But this has to be looked at within the whole
> triadic semiosic process.
>
> This DI becomes capable,  with this NEW information [from Person A's
> internal Representamen]of operating as a new triadic SIGN. So- Person
> A's Dynamic Interpretant isn't JUST a single subjective interpretation.
> It's full-of-itself, so to speak. It's filled with information from Person
> A's internal Representamen.
>
> This DI should be understood, as itself, capable of operating as a full
> triadic Sign to the world. That is, to Person A, the DI is simply his
> Interpretation as honed/constrained/and informed by his own internal
> Representamen. BUT - it's now external and can operate within a full triad
> - and it is received as such by Person B.
>
> Person B relates to this new form...by interacting with it within the DO
> relation. ..He goes through the same set of relational interactions...with
> his own Immediate Object data...transformed by his own internal
> Representamen...to his own internal Immediate Interpretantwhich is then
> 'released' to the external world as a new Form, capable of interacting with
> others within a semiosic triadic action.
>
> So- Person B's DI can be understood as carrying embedded information from
> both Person A and Person B's representamens. And Person C picks up
> this..and adds his own...In this way, the commonality of information
> spreads - and yet, diversity is maintained by the internal and therefore
> local interpretations of this commonality. [the commonality is held within
> the Representamen which maintains generality].
>
> It's complex but I don't think it's as hard as I'm making it sound.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 07/02/18 9:21 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common
> information of the Representamen as expressed within the Dynamic
> Interpretant will then act as a Dynamic Object from Person A to Person B.
>
>
> This is what I was seeking to confirm--in your view, the (external)
> Dynamic Interpretant of the utterer's (internal) Representamen becomes

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - yes/no/ but. ...I think one has to be careful. It isn't as
reductionist as it might sound from the words...

The external Dynamic Interpretant of Person A, is his interpretation
of an external Dynamic Object..as transformed by the knowledge base of
his own internal Representamen]. But this has to be looked at within
the whole triadic semiosic process. 

This DI becomes capable,  with this NEW information [from Person
A's internal Representamen]of operating as a new triadic SIGN. So-
Person A's Dynamic Interpretant isn't JUST a single subjective
interpretation. It's full-of-itself, so to speak. It's filled with
information from Person A's internal Representamen.

This DI should be understood, as itself, capable of operating as a
full triadic Sign to the world. That is, to Person A, the DI is
simply his Interpretation as honed/constrained/and informed by his
own internal Representamen. BUT - it's now external and can operate
within a full triad - and it is received as such by Person B. 

Person B relates to this new form...by interacting with it within
the DO relation. ..He goes through the same set of relational
interactions...with his own Immediate Object data...transformed by
his own internal Representamen...to his own internal Immediate
Interpretantwhich is then 'released' to the external world as a
new Form, capable of interacting with others within a semiosic
triadic action. 

So- Person B's DI can be understood as carrying embedded information
from both Person A and Person B's representamens. And Person C picks
up this..and adds his own...In this way, the commonality of
information spreads - and yet, diversity is maintained by the
internal and therefore local interpretations of this commonality.
[the commonality is held within the Representamen which maintains
generality].

It's complex but I don't think it's as hard as I'm making it sound.

Edwina
 On Wed 07/02/18  9:21 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common
information of the Representamen as expressed within the Dynamic
Interpretant will then act as a Dynamic Object from Person A to
Person B.
 This is what I was seeking to confirm--in your view, the (external)
Dynamic Interpretant of the utterer's (internal) Representamen
becomes the (external) Dynamic Object of the receiver's (internal)
Representamen.  Is that right? 
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - there isn't any 'gap'. There isn't any free-standing Sign that
zips between two people, carrying all information in his postal bag.

The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common
information of the Representamen as expressed within the Dynamic
Interpretant will then act as a Dynamic Object from Person A to
Person B. IF Person B reads/hears this full Sign/triad...he will do
so first as it being a Dynamic Object...which he will then interpret
within his own Representamen...and transform that data as his own
Dynamic Interpretant. It will then - as a full triad, function as a
Dynamic Object to be received by Person C.  Person C will accept that
DO...will then interpret its data within his own Representamen..and
transform that data as his own Dynamic Interpretant. And so on. 

 It's a full triad that moves but it relates within the singular
interactions; that is the full triad, carrying information, is
expressed as a Dynamic Interpretant and will relate to Person B as a
Dynamic ObjectBut it has been already transformed by A's
Representamen's knowledge base.

During these interactions -  the Representamen of each person MAY
change, MAY accept the information, the new interpretation, carried
by the other People. So, his knowledge of that Original Dynamic
Object may change. This is how information becomes both more...and
less..valid. 

Edwina
 On Tue 06/02/18  9:57 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Hmm, no, that is not what I mean.  The "medium of communication"
that I have in mind is whatever conveys an idea or form from one
agent to another--certainly not mere air waves or screen pixels or
light reflections.  In your semiotic terminology, what bridges the
external gap between the internal Representamen of the utterer and
the internal Representamen of the receiver? 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 8:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon  - I don't quite understand the point of your question. 

When you are speaking of 'something external to convey the content
from one person to another personthat is the medium of
communication. That is not the Dynamic Object. 

When I hear a sound - the medium which is conveying that sound is
air waves. The Dynamic Object is the sound; the medium is the

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Edwina, List:

ET:  The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common
information of the Representamen as expressed within the Dynamic
Interpretant will then act as a Dynamic Object from Person A to Person B.


This is what I was seeking to confirm--in your view, the (external) Dynamic
Interpretant of the utterer's (internal) Representamen becomes the
(external) Dynamic Object of the receiver's (internal) Representamen.  Is
that right?

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - there isn't any 'gap'. There isn't any free-standing Sign that zips
> between two people, carrying all information in his postal bag.
>
> The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common information of
> the Representamen as expressed within the Dynamic Interpretant will then
> act as a Dynamic Object from Person A to Person B. IF Person B reads/hears
> this full Sign/triad...he will do so first as it being a Dynamic
> Object...which he will then interpret within his own Representamen...and
> transform that data as his own Dynamic Interpretant. It will then - as a
> full triad, function as a Dynamic Object to be received by Person C.
> Person C will accept that DO...will then interpret its data within his own
> Representamen..and transform that data as his own Dynamic Interpretant. And
> so on.
>
>  It's a full triad that moves but it relates within the singular
> interactions; that is the full triad, carrying information, is expressed as
> a Dynamic Interpretant and will relate to Person B as a Dynamic
> ObjectBut it has been already transformed by A's Representamen's
> knowledge base.
>
> During these interactions -  the Representamen of each person MAY change,
> MAY accept the information, the new interpretation, carried by the other
> People. So, his knowledge of that Original Dynamic Object may change. This
> is how information becomes both more...and less..valid.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Tue 06/02/18 9:57 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Hmm, no, that is not what I mean.  The "medium of communication" that I
> have in mind is whatever conveys an idea or form from one agent to
> another--certainly not mere air waves or screen pixels or light
> reflections.  In your semiotic terminology, what bridges the external gap
> between the internal Representamen of the utterer and the internal
> Representamen of the receiver?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 8:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon  - I don't quite understand the point of your question.
>>
>> When you are speaking of 'something external to convey the content from
>> one person to another personthat is the medium of communication. That
>> is not the Dynamic Object.
>>
>> When I hear a sound - the medium which is conveying that sound is air
>> waves. The Dynamic Object is the sound; the medium is the air waves.
>>
>> When I read what you have typed, the medium which is conveying the images
>> on my computer screen to my eyes .. is...heck...I don't know what it is.
>> But the Dynamic Object is what you have written. HOW it is conveyed is not
>> the same thing.
>>
>> When I see a vase - it is a Dynamic Object. But how that image is
>> conveyed to me..the medium of that image coming into my eyesagain..I
>> don't know enough about the physiology of sight and vision to saybut
>> the Dynamic Object and the medium of communication are not the same
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Tue 06/02/18 8:23 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Let me try asking my question in a slightly different way.  If I am
>> understanding you correctly, the [IO-R-II] triad is strictly internal to
>> each individual agent.  It seems to me that for communication to occur
>> between two different agents, something external is required to convey
>> the content from one to the other.  That being the case, is it your view
>> that this role is performed by the Dynamic Object?  For example, is this
>> typed message a Dynamic Object, just like (in your analysis) the typed word
>> "vase"?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 7:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - the triad is: O-R-I.
>>>
>>> Therefore, all semiosic interaction between agents takes place within
>>> this triad. That means:
>>>
>>> DO[IO-R-II] DI
>>>
>>> The DO and DI are external. The Relations within the brackets are
>>> internal.
>>>
>>> So it isn't the DO or the Representamen. It has to be both.
>>>
>>> The Representamen is the nodal site [and don't get all hot and bothered
>>> because Peirce didn't use this term] where MIND enters the interaction, and
>>> transforms the incoming sensate data from the external DO...as received as
>>> an Immediate Object [IO]and interprets it into various Interpretants.
>>>
>>> The Representamen can be in three categorical modes: 1stness, 2ndness,

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

Jerry R., List:

My question was prompted by the fact that Edwina's definition of the
Representamen requires it always to be *internal *to an agent; i.e., in her
view, there is no such thing as an *external *Representamen.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 9:09 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> You said:
> In your *semiotic *terminology, *what* bridges the external gap between
> the internal Representamen of the utterer and the internal Representamen of
> the receiver?
>
> mind if I try?
>
> the external representamen of the commens?
>
> Best,
> J
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion