Jonathan - a very nice outline and analysis. Thanks.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jonathan Griffin
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce List
Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 12:58 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6779] Re: Physics & Semiosis: the
I would deign to speak, though I am not sure that I am qualified among these
voices or that what I say will be perceived as useful. Nevertheless, I will
send the words out and let them fall where they might.
I confess that I do not see why a physiosemiotic way of understanding must
serve material sciences or contribute to understanding in the way that is
proper to physical investigation. Indeed, I am often at a loss to see an
apparent perspective that semiotic thinking and inquiry should retain the same
focus, commitments, aims, and other outward modes proper to the physical
sciences as conceived in the last several centuries. It seems there is an
assumption that semiotics should generate the same kind of knowledge aimed
toward the same kind of results for the same exact purposes as the "physical
sciences". I don't see any real reason to import that assumption into
semiotics. It seems like a kind of commitment to an old idol to hold that a
semiotic framework has to contribute new knowledge in the mode of physical
science in order to be valid, true, and beneficial.
Besides, in order to even do so, it must retain the same metaphysical
commitments and conceptual abstractions. We never encounter "pure matter". We
always encounter complexes of "matter" and "thought". In fact, "matter" in and
of itself only exists in the abstract thought of the one conceiving of it. [I
think John Deely has articulated this multiples times in his works.] This is
similar to perfect geometric forms, which are a logical extrapolation from what
we encounter of the complex real universe. As such, we find a dimension of
truth that such abstractions exhibit, which is why praxis based on those
abstractions yield real results in the actual universe. But those abstractions
are themselves secondary. The same is the case with "matter".
I don't see any reason why semiotics must dogmatically import these
abstractions, or focus on them as its proper object of study, or import the
epistemological mode that arises through the choosing of this particular
abstraction and object.
As such, I have always understood physiosemiosis as contributing primarily to
our organizational structures of what we have encountered within the universe
as we are able to experience it, especially uncovering some underlying
dimension of logic and intelligibility which IS NOT magically projected into
the world or universe by the creatures that live in it. It gives us an
organizational ground to avoid what ends up being essentially idealism or
solipsism, this time occurring not at the horizon of the human individual or of
the human species but at the level of BIOSEMIOSIS itself. To deny any dimension
of logical continuity between life and non-life in this universe sets us up to
simply find the same destructive problems of idealism/solipsism extending
throughout the biosemiotic realm. We only buy ourselves a short time of
reprieve from facing these problems by expanding the conceptual boundaries, but
the same problem has been preserved in the same broken formulation.
'Pansemiotics' seems, to me, fetishistic, rendering everything as a sign but
no more. Physiosemiosis, as Deely has intended to describe (I think),
approaches from the opposite end. It identifies that the logical dimension of
semiosis does not magically appear with life, even if semiosis proper only
takes place within living beings. Rather, the logical dimension of semiosis
actually extends throughout all that exists in the universe, bringing clarity,
intelligibility, and the possibility of being understood in a definite way. It
extends throughout all that is without being all that there is. This logical
dimension may not be the fullness of semiosis, nor is it necessarily enough to
define the fullness of semiosis in the way proper to itself. NEVERTHELESS, it
is a dimension fundamental to what semiosis is (a dimension which is NOT
"physical") in a central way. It involves both identity and relation.
Hopefully I have represented Deely's views in a sound way. I think this is
much clearer to understanding what is actually behind 'physiosemiosis' as a
concept, which is important to both discuss it properly and to articulate why
it is different from 'pansemiosis'.
Jonathan
On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
John, I don't think that these opposing views - whether semiosic actions
take place within the physico-chemical realm or only begin in the biological
realm - can be definitively resolved.
I, for one, like Stan, firmly believe that semiosis operates within the
physico-chemical realm; that is, that even an atom emerges within a triadic
relation - even if such atom has nil capacity for adaptation within that
semiosis - as in the biological realm.
As for 'all of science is conducted in signs'...I think this is vague.
Science is a human activity. Or, is this statement meant to refer to
matter...i.e., all that is material is conducted in signs'. I agree with
Frederik that studying semiosic functions within the physico-chemical realm
probably does little to provide new knowledge about that realm, but, I agree
with Stan that it could examine the emergence of life from that realm.
And I'm afraid that my intellectual dimness means that I can't see much
difference between your pansemiosis and physiosemiosis...in that both
acknowledge that semiosis operates within the physico-chemical realm. After
all, physiosemiosis, in order to explore 'where and how', first has to
acknowledge that semiosis actually exists in that realm.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Deely, John N.
To: Frederik Stjernfelt ; Peirce List ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:28 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Physics & Semiosis: the limited realm of
physiosemiosis respecting physics
Frederik says below: “nature has levels of organization, that the higher
ones emerge from the lower ones, and the higher ones add new, organizational
objects, relations, processes, combined of entities from the lower ones, but
irreducible to them.
You could say this implies that the possibility of semiosis lies in
physics - but again that does not imply that those possibilities are realized
in all physical processes.”
This is exactly the point of the difference between the term
“physiosemiosis”, which explores the question of exactly where and how “the
possibility of semiosis lies in physics”, and the term “pansemiosis”, which
implies that even in physics semiosis is everywhere to be found.
And this is related to another of Frederik’s well-made points: “all of
science, no exception, is conducted IN signs. But this does not imply that all
those sciences are ABOUT signs.” Pansemiotics as a term bears connotation which
miss this distinction entirely. This term has the fairly inevitable result, as
Frederik puts the matter in another post, to “make the project of semiotics
seem overblown and irrelevant to a scientific worldview.”
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 07:54
To: Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics & Semiosis
Dear Clark, lists,
Sorry I may not answer to postings chronologically - I have been busy for
a couple of days so now there's a whole bundle of postings waiting.
Den 11/09/2014 kl. 04.42 skrev Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>:
(Sorry for the length, but it’s a subtle point I’m after)
On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:31 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
According to Edwina, all well-formed formulas of the form y = f (x)
implicates semiosis. So my question is
"Does entropy or entropy change implicate semiosis ?" (091014-4)
If I understand Frederick correctly (and I thank him for his
explanations), he is more interested in the sort of “z stands for X for Y."
Examples of that sort aren’t in physics as normally done. I agree with
Frederick there. And again, I agree with Frederick that explanations of that
form are rather common in biology. Teleological explanations being the most
common example.
Now it’s true that in the 50’s and 60’s there was a strong reductionist
move to make biology reducible to physics. (Although clearly it goes back long
before then) While this movement ultimately failed, I think it did make
biologists more careful about their explanations. Especially in evolution. So
while biologists will still say things like eyes evolved for mammals to see,
when pressed they’ll give an explanation in terms of chance, selection and
efficient causation.
I agree that reduction is impossible. Of course, it is locally possible,
but a central issue of biology seems to be that the non-local structures of
metabolism and procreation are irreducible.
This then leads one to the question of when we are simply using sign-like
explanations and when we think they are in the phenomena itself. (The
distinction Frederick makes in his last reply to me) I confess that this seems
a rather blurry distinction at best. Further it seems a distinction to which
we’ll give different answers depending upon whether we are descriptive or
prescriptive in our pronouncements.
I am not sure it is blurry. All thought is in signs, as old P would have
it - this implies that all of science, no exception, is conducted IN signs. But
this does not imply that all those sciences are ABOUT signs.
I am an emergentist - I think nature has levels of organization, that the
higher ones emerge from the lower ones, and the higher ones add new,
organizational objects, relations, processes, combined of entities from the
lower ones, but irreducible to them.
You could say this implies that the possibility of semiosis lies in
physics - but again that does not imply that those possibilities are realized
in all physical processes. Just like hot dogs, wars, and cellphones are
possibilities of physics but not realized in the pre-biological universe in any
non-trivial sense of the word.
It seems undeniable that physicists use teleological language, albeit far
less frequently than biologists. (The exception perhaps being cosmology and
astronomy) However I’d also say that most physicists would quickly say such
language is metaphoric. That is they’d say it is purely pedagogical and not a
real description of the physics. On the other hand biologists are quite a bit
more willing to say such descriptions are unavoidable in biology. Not just as a
shorthand to say things like, “the peacock shows its tail features to attract a
mate” but in deeper ways.
But that is an example from biology (and I agree that biology can never
avoid semiotic and teleological issues) - not from physics. What would be the
example from physics?
I’ll confess a certain sympathy for those who still think biology could
use a bit more reductionist fervor. On the other hand it also seems undeniable
that when talking about humans or things like human, signs are unavoidable.
While it’s an article of faith among physicalists that things can be reduced to
something like physics, I also confess I’m very skeptical of most forms of
physicalism’s description of mind. Peirce’s view seems the most reasonable to
my mind, adopting a position at least somewhat similar to property dualism.
(Not properly of course - rather than a dualism Peirce would see a continuum)
However I think he sees mind as an irreducible facet of the universe and thus
any higher order type of mind would be emergent in more simple says from
physical stuff with quasi-mental like properties.
That said, if mind or at least quasi-mind is an irreducible facet of the
universe, what does that say about physics? I suspect it’ll mean that
eventually some future physics will have to deal with mind, and thereby signs.
Even if, as Frederick correctly recognizes, it looks askance at such notions
now. (To say the least)
In some sense, I agree with this. Biology (including semiotics) could be
said to be a very specialized department of physics. But this will be physics
used in another sense of the word. Signs and purposes do exist in nature - they
are not human inventions - but it is a pretty special department of nature.
The question then becomes whether elements of this quasi-mind are in
existing physical descriptions. That’s much more controversial. And considering
how Frederick is carefully using semiotics, I’d say that right now it’s not
required. That’s not to say it isn’t there. I think the observer in some
formulations of quantum mechanics and arguably the same in relativity are
usually seen as artifacts of thought experiments. The question is, however,
given that they seem unavoidable in physical description, aren’t they like the
teleology in biology? The difference being only that physicists when they use
them don’t take them seriously? Much like a biologist seeing “the eye is for
seeing” as a shorthand for a complex evolutionary process due to efficient
causation.
Are you referring here to "the observer" in the different interpretations
of QM? Most often, "the observer" here just means "instrument of measurement",
not any teleological being - the issue is the collapse of the wave function
when passing from the QM level to the classic level. I tend to agree with
Penrose that this should be seen as a perfectly physical, real process - not
something which is connected to "observation" or even "measurement" as anything
having to do with human beings or intentions. It is not us who make the wave
function collapse …
I bring this up since while I can now understand why Frederick makes the
point he does, I think it ends up being more about how common a particular
stance is within each science. So psychologists, for instance, clearly take
signs seriously and physicists tend to see it as an artifact. This means,
however, that the ambiguity Frederick raised between “whether there is a sign
process going on when we’re not looking,” and “we use sign-like concepts in
shaping our knowledge” hinges upon a perspective about what the final truth of
the matter in physics is. Which seems problematic.
I do not think it hinges on the supposed final truth. None of us can use
that as an argument. My argument is based on the simple observation that
physicists do not study cognition and communication processes (or, when they
do, it is as auxiliary specialists in other disciplines), while biologists deal
with such processes all of the time. That is the best argument, btw, for
biosemiotics: as there is so much spontaneous semiotic vocabolary in all of
biology, why not take it seriously as technical notions?
Best
F
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
