Edwina, Gary F, lists,
You wrote : "I think that 'mode of being' is comparable to 'organization of
matter'.
I would agree with Gary F that we should clearly distinguish between "mode
of being" (Peirce's idea) and "mode of organizing matter" or "organization
of matter" (Edwina's idea).
It is my understanding that there are three modes of being -- Firstness,
Secondness, and Thirdness. The concept of 'organization' may not apply to
Firstness, since organization entails comparing at least two entities, one
that is organized and the other disorganized (If everything is organized,
how can we tell whether or not it is organized in the first place ?), and
there is no such comparison possible in Firstness, because there is no
second in Firstness.
To me, Secondness includes both *organized* and *disorganized* actualities,
in agreement with Weaver
Concerning Thirdness, again there are both "organized" and "disorganized"
complexities or patterns in the Universe, the examples of the former
including the spiral patterns of many galaxies, and those of the latter
including the lawful average behaviors of physical systems with n
components, where n is comparable to Avogadro's number, in agreement with
Weaver [Science and Complexity, American Scientist, vol. 36, pp. 536-xx,
1948]. As pointed out by Weaver, the observable regularities in the
average behaviors of many-component systems are studied successfully in
statistical mechanics.
All the best.
Sung
On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 2:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Well, I disagree, Gary F - I think that 'mode of being' is comparable to
> 'organization of matter'. Each to his own, I guess. I think that the
> organization of that matter defines the 'mode of being'. After all - what
> else would define it?
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 28, 2015 9:23 AM
> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8917] Re: Peirce's categories
>
> I have to confess that I don't see the problem here, or the need for an
> elaborate explanation. Peirce's sentence seems to me perfectly clear in its
> context (CP 8.328):
>
>
>
> [[ The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are simple enough.
> Giving to being the broadest possible sense, to include ideas as well as
> things, and ideas that we fancy we have just as much as ideas we do have, I
> should define Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness thus:
>
> Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively
> and without reference to anything else.
>
> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with
> respect to a second but regardless of any third.
>
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing
> a second and third into relation to each other.
>
> I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. ]]
>
>
>
> Each of these "ideas" is the *mode of being* of a thing or idea ("that
> which is"). I think Edwina also confuses the issue by saying that Thirdness
> is a "mode of organization of matter". Peirce never says that about any of
> his "categories."
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that
> counts can be counted. [William Bruce Cameron] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: 28-Oct-15 08:02
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:8914] RE: Peirce's categories
>
>
>
> Hello Kobus,
>
>
>
> I happen to think that is a very good question, and one that is not
> adequately explained in the secondary literature. Having spent some time
> digging through Peirce's works for clearer answers, I think the answers can
> be found in the texts--but I sure wish Peirce had made things clearer
> himself. One thing we need, I think, is a clear explanation of how the key
> ideas that are being worked out in the phenomenological account of the
> formal categories are being developed and refined in a diagrammatical
> manner in the graphical systems of logic. That isn't much of a response,
> but I look forward to seeing what others have to say.
>
>
>
> If you are interested in seeing a bit more of an answer, I have a short
> paper that was presented at the Congress last summer and would be happy to
> share it with you. Bill McCurdy has also worked on this problem, and he has
> come to similar kinds of conclusions about how we should picture the
> connections that are being formed between un-bonded monadic, dyadic and
> triadic relations.
>
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeff Downard
>
> Associate Professor
>
> Department of Philosophy
>
> NAU
>
> (o) 523-8354
>
> ________________________________________
>
> From: Kobus Marais [jmar...@ufs.ac.za]
>
> Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:15 AM
>
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:8913] Peirce's categories
>
>
>
> Dear List
>
> I hope that you will have patience with what may be a very ignorant
> question. In CP8.328, Perice defines thirdness as follows:
>
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing
> a second and third into relation to each other.
>
>
>
> Now, I would have thought that thirdness brings a first and a second into
> relation to each other. Why would Peirce say that thirdness brings a second
> and a third into relation to each other? In which sense could thirdness
> bring a second into relation with itself? Or what am I missing here?
>
>
>
> Thanks.
>
> K
>
>
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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