Nice catch, Jeff. Perhaps there is a textual basis for my difference with Gary
(and Søren).
John
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: April 26, 2015 2:11 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural
Jeff, Lists:
Excellent post!
To me, these distinctions reveal aspects of CSP's thought that are oft ignored
and which probably arise from his training is chemistry as well as other
disciplines.
Before I comment, however, it is important to note that at first blush, I
presumed that the
Gary R., John, Lists,
Here is what Peirce says in his essay on Telepathy (CP 7.604) as he tries to
clarify the division he is drawing between percept and perceptual judgment:
Analysis of the experience of the chair as it appears before me now.
a. The chair I appear to see makes no
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16298
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16299
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16300
Exactamundo! that's the very tag I had in mind.
Jon
On 4/25/2015 1:50 PM, Gary
Gary R., Jeff, lists, note that Peirce wrote more than one essay with a
title beginning with the words The Logic of Mathematics.
The one in question is (circa 1896), The Logic of Mathematics; An
Attempt to Develop My Categories from Within. CP 1.417–519.
http://www.textlog.de/4267.html
Two
Jon, Frederik, lists,
Jon, please see the last paragraph of my just posted excerpt from one of
Nathan Houser's papers--exactly to your point, I'd say.
Best,
Gary
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City
]
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2015 10:20 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8399] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions,
Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Jeff, Jon, lists,
Jeff, I think your response to Jon's concerns about
Jon, list
On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Tommi, List,
The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations
does not mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions
and representations.
Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to
Tommi, List,
Not in the least. The à priori is a category of logic and methodology — it
refers to the axiomatic method of constructing representations — not a category
of metaphysics or ontology. This is the meaning of fallibilism and the point
of hypostatic abstractions.
Peirce had no
[jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 6:56 AM
To: Tommi Vehkavaara
Cc: biosemiotics at lists.ut.ee; peirce-l at list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and
Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Tommi, List,
Not in the least. The à priori
Edwina wrote:
Tommi- that's an interesting conclusion of yours - which is, to me,
puzzling. To my understanding, Thirdness, which is the domain of
generals, is not directly accessible by the senses; we cannot 'observe
generals directly'. And these generals are, in addition, evolving from
the
Frederick, Gary, List,
In all three cases the order of the first two premisses
is variable and can be switched without affecting the
their relationship to the inferred Fact, Case, or Rule.
There is an extended discussion of the three types of
reasoning in Aristotle and Peirce, with diagrams and
, 2015 10:06 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and
Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Edwina wrote:
Tommi- that's an interesting conclusion of yours - which is, to me, puzzling.
To my understanding, Thirdness, which is the domain of generals
Sorry Jeff, and all
I did not meant to say anything about Kant's views, my comments were
just too fast reactions of the misunderstanding of Jons comment that
was a response to my query how the talk about fallible a priori
structures could be compatible with Peirce's idea that all the
elements
Tommi, List,
No, I didn't follow that part of the debate as it seemed to take place mostly
on the bisemiotics list. Not sure I get that sense of à priori either. Vague
reminder of things I used to read in Claude Levi-Strauss or even Jung is about
all I got out of it.
Regards,
Jon
Jon
ok, my hypothesis what you meant was false, and you can forgot my too
fast associations with Ding an sich selbst.
But then I just did not get what was your point, because I was just
quesstioning asking the about Fredrik's idea of food as 'biological a
priori', if I did not get even that
]
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2015 10:20 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8399] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.
10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Jeff, Jon, lists,
Jeff, I think your response to Jon's concerns about Ketner's
If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality,
I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the
general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in
our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2015 2:12 PM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and
Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Cathy, Jon, Frederik, Lists,
I agree that CP 2.227 is a most extraordinary passage, one which Ken Ketner
has referred to as one of the most remarkable theoretical passages ever
written (Ketner, *A Thief of Peirce,* 276).
Just before quoting it he remarks that in it Peirce brought together the
Department of Philosophy
NAU
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From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2015 2:12 PM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and
Theorematic
Re: Gary Richmond
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16249
Gary, List,
There are many problems here that I see right off.
(1) A major problem is that icons are not the most
general types of signs and so the leap to signs in
general falls a bit short.
(2) A minor
Thread (just the part I've able to follow so far):
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16188
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16189
BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16190
It is a great quote, thanks Jon.
In the quote Peirce is describing experimenting on diagrams, and this is
how we need to understand his mature account of the a priori I think, thus
as also some form of 'empiricism' - also seconding Jeff's important
observation that we need to beware of the
Re: Franklin Ransom
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16188
Franklin, List,
I will need to approach this point of inquiry a bit circuitously.
For basic orientation I always begin with a canonical statement
from Peirce, along with the figure that I drew to illustrate
Dear Jon -
Another great quote from the canon.
It distinguishes between two dimensions of necessity in the investigation of
signs:
that of the result of the investigation (which is there) and that of the
process of investigation (which needs not be there, as all processes are
fallible).
Lists,
A correction or two in the last post. It should have read:
I am working on the assumption that Peirce is actively considering all three
positions as hypotheses--but he is worried that (a) and (b) will leave us with
residual phenomena that can't, as a matter of principle, be explained
Yogi, Cathy L., lists,
This is quite an admirable and thought-provoking summary of the
concluding chapters of NP. I think Stjernfelt has opened some new doors
to the fuller comprehension of Peircean semiotics and its contribution
to cenoscopy, and your post in turn opens some doors to the
Hi Frederik, Gary F., Lists
I've been thinking a bit more about Frederik's account of optimal iconicity.
One point I'd like to note is that Peirce does not appear to use optimal when
talking about iconicity, at least not in the CP. He does, however, use
perfect as a modifier of iconicity.
Howard, lists,
My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals
are real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a
variation of sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual,
the existent, etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course
corollarial and theorematic deduction.
Eternal conceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically
meaningful concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM
To: Howard Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary
List, Ben:
On Jan 17, 2015, at 11:59 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are
real.
Thanks, Ben. This is a critical thought, at least to me. It is of substantial
importance for interpreting the relations between CSP's notion of a
Howard, lists,
The following is Peirce's nearest approach that I've found him making to
an affirmation of the reality of mathematicals. Peirce does not identify
himself as the 'metaphysician' whom he mentions, but that metaphysician
makes a specifically Peircean kind of argument for the
List, Jon:
On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
But I can assure you that mathematicians as a rule, including Peirce, regard
mathematical objects as “having properties”, which makes them “real”
according to the technical Scholastic definition of “real” that Peirce always
uses
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405
But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Jan 16, 2015, at 9:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:
Howard,
There has historically been a lot of
be no difference between
corollarial and theorematic deduction. Eternal conceivability is not a
pragmatic or pragmaticistically meaningful concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM
To: Howard Pattee
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To: Howard
Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405
But we have no conception
:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405
But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.
Jon
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY
At 12:44 AM 1/17/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:
Howard wrote: I agree with
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/SEP
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/Realism:
Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed
that Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even
or pragmaticistically meaningful
concept.
gary f.
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To:
Howard Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce
Not really a sin. More like self-deception.
Go in peace ...
Jon
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Howard wrote: I agree with SEP http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/
Realism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/:
Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed that
Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even mentioned in it.
Gary
[image: Gary Richmond]
Gary, List,
We've been through these issues so many times before
that I can't think of anything new to say right off.
Pragmatic Maxim (PORT, Ontology, Peirce, SemioCom Lists : April-June 2002)
☞
http://web.archive.org/web/20070705085032/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd25.html#04226
☞
Re: Gary Richmond
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15362
Gary, List,
Just off-hand I would have to say that the most important criterion in regard
to iconicity is
relevant iconicity. The analogy, the icon, and the morphism are of
imagination all compact.
The
Gary R, lists,
Regarding your point about simplicity, which is well taken: What I had in
mind was the tendency of people (unaccustomed to Peircean perspectives on
iconicity) to think of the typical icon as something like a stop sign, or
the sign on a washroom door, or the mini-graphics on our
John,
I have no idea what you might mean by “firsts and seconds in biology”, or how
dicent signs could “precede” them. Perhaps Frederik does, since you attribute
that opinion to him … But maybe this will be clarified by your concluding post
on Chapter 6 of NP. (We’ll wait for that before we
Re: Ben Udell
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14908
Thanks a Billion, Ben,
I was really hoping ''someone'' would still remember the Real Peirce
well enough to make those well-taken appreciations of his Real POV.
It's a dirty job, but somebody's gotta do it ...
Re:Tyler Bennet
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14779
Peircers,
The Peirce I have known for nigh unto the last 50 years is not much in evidence
on the Peirce List anymore, so I'll just limit myself to one general observation
that I've made before and then hope
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 9:19 PM
To: Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9
Lists,
Several comments have been
Tom, my response is interleaved:
From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com]
Sent: 14-Oct-14 7:58 PM
I have to say, I just don't get this idea of real facts from reading Peirce.
On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem
to agree on. On the other
Gary, you asked:
What other ways to you have in mind?
I would have to say I think any logical relationship can link an index and
icon. Thus, myself and my fingerprints might even be a better example
for the point I'm trying to make. Instead of the implicative relationship
associated with
I have to say, I just don't get this idea of real facts from reading
Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something
we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the
signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:
If it [an
: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 4:57 PM
To: Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9
I have to say, I just don't get this idea of real facts from reading Peirce.
On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all
Hi everyone,
I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.
Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up
with the
List:
(N.B.: This post includes abstract technical rhetoric which may be
incomprehensible to non-technical readers.)
Sung's suggestion (copied below) is far to simple (in my opinion).
The triadic triad requires triple and higher order articulations of the
metaphysical forms of inquiry into
Cathy, lists,
Cathy wrote: Re. 3.9: Love the 'top-down' functional analysis of arguments
whereby they are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the
latter are prescinded after the fact.
Closely related to this in 3.9 is something which might be of particular
interest to
...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: 10-Oct-14 12:36 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Gary F., Jon,
I think that Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating in a
terminological tradition including the fields that we now call probability
theory
Gary All,
Just off-hand, you might look into the way the term event is used in
probability and statistics, and the technical distinction that is made between
event and occurrence. I'm pretty sure the terms have been used that way
since Boole, at least, if not since the time of Fermat and
: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Gary All,
Just off-hand, you might look into the way the term event is used in
probability and statistics, and the technical distinction that is made
between event and occurrence. I'm pretty sure the terms have been used
that way since Boole, at least
the dialogue, we can *learn* that they are wrong, and guess again.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 10-Oct-14 9:10 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Gary All,
Just off
...@att.net]
Sent: 10-Oct-14 9:10 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Gary All,
Just off-hand, you might look into the way the term event is used in
probability and statistics, and the technical distinction
Chapter 3.7
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14615
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14618
Gary, List,
Of course, we could try our own hands at sketching an Existential Graph of what
Peirce is saying here, whether we read it as assertion
Gary,
FYSMI, because when I was pondering that portion of the Syllabus I was going to
remark that I considered it an exemplary text -- exemplary of a style that gives
me a headache! -- and that the only excuse I could make for it would be that it
read like an English paraphrase of some
As per Sung's request, here's the defining text on Dicisigns, from
EP2:275-83. The usual warnings about taking a text out of context apply here
too: the reader who hasn't read the whole of selection 20 in EP2, Sundry
Logical Conceptions, is unlikely to fully understand this; and the Dicisign
Gary, Howard,
It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes Shannon's.
A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is to
read what he rewrites about it in his 1865 1866
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544
Gary, Howard, All,
Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and the
Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the information in
my last message got more than a
Jon wrote:
It is necessary to distinguish information (100614-1)
from measures of information.
Is this because information has three aspects/properties -- i) quantity,
ii) meaning, and iii) value, and yest Shannon's information theory and
other similar quantitative approaches to
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14548
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14554
Sung, List,
It is not the purpose of a measure to replace the thing measured.
Whether a measure serves any given purpose depends on many factors:
its à priori
Excuse me,
The following quotations were from Gary F, not from Jon.
Sung
Original Message
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
From:Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu
Date:Mon, October 6, 2014 3:35 pm
/Rehabit.htm
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 6-Oct-14 8:54 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Re: Gary Fuhrman
At:http://permalink.gmane.org
Sung, you need to read the EP passages cited (and/or Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3) on dicisigns and propositions. They do not have icons as objects;
rather their *relation to* their object is iconic as well as indexical (and
sometimes symbolic). There is no other way for an indexical sign to
] Re: Natural Propositions ââ¬Â¢ Selected Passages
Ben_10042014.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu
Re: Jeffrey Brian Downard
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14434
Jeff, List,
I had a faint memory of discussing the relation between k-adic and k-tomic with
Tom Gollier in my early days on the Peirce List, and for once my memory serves
me well. I found this link
Gary, List,
Pragmatic objects are intentional objects.
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Oct 3, 2014, at 11:48 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Section 3.5 of NP takes up “The Indexical Side of Dicisigns” by first showing
the importance of (and
Jon,
So?
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 3-Oct-14 12:21 PM
Gary, List,
Pragmatic objects are intentional objects.
Jon
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L
Jon
Trying to comprehend triadic relations by
means of their projective trichotomies is a project
ultimately doomed to fail.
A couple of concrete examples would help in understanding what you mean by
the doomed failure you are referring to.
With all the best.
Sung
Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM
To: Peirce List 1
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions ⢠Selected Passages
, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM
To: Peirce List 1
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions • Selected Passages
-
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350
] Re: Natural Propositions ââ¬Â¢ Selected Passages
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
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Jon,
I am afraid your answer is as incomprehensible to me as was your original
remark that prompted my question.
With all the best.
Sung
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
Peircers,
The more I pondered the first two quotations from the Syllabus that Frederik
cited in Chapter 3.4, the more I felt compelled to study that part of the text
in detail, and I eventually copied out a longer extract from EP 2, 275–277,
taking that over the comparable but editorially
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.1
Gary F., Jon, Lists,
Looking back on my own struggles to find coherence in Peirce's published and
unpublished writings, I now think
Dear Clark, lists -
Mathematics certainly deals in propositions according to P.
P's general philosophy of math claims that math is about forms of relations,
and that those abstract objects are addressed by the help of diagrams.
Existing, particular, physical diagram tokens permit the access to
Dear Clark, lists,
Den 25/09/2014 kl. 19.22 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com:
On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move
towards an
Peircers,
Another passage from ''Natural Propositions'' that appeared to light up before
my mind's eye — I'm guessing because of all the time I whiled away wrestling
with divergent views of assertion when I first began studying the history of
logic — is this selection from Chapter 3.
quote
On Oct 2, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
Mathematics certainly deals in propositions according to P.
P's general philosophy of math claims that math is about forms of relations,
and that those abstract objects are addressed by the help of diagrams.
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350
, 2014 7:44 PM
To: Peirce List 1
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions • Selected Passages
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org
From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM
To: Peirce List 1
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions • Selected Passages
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
other forms.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2014 10:03 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7030] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Jeff, I was leaving
.
-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 27-Sep-14 11:09 PM
To: Frederik Stjernfelt
Cc: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu; Gary Fuhrman; Gary Richmond; Benjamin Udell
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions . Selected Passages
Gary F, Gary R, List,
It has long been my
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350
grasp of Peirce's
philosophy as a whole without getting at least a basic grip on his philosophy
of mathematics.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: 24-Sep-14 1:18 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural
Jon, I think it would be better if you would combine the quotes from NP and
your comments in a single message. It would also be better if you (and
everyone) would send posts only to the list(s), i.e. delete the addresses of
individuals from your address field before you send, as that would avoid
Dear Clark, lists,
Den 24/09/2014 kl. 22.17 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond
gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote:
In any event, I'm finding section 4. of New Elements of especial interest and
want
Frederik, Lists,
You say: Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were
propositions.
For the sake of sorting through some of the disagreements that have been voiced
about what kinds of signs or representamens may be found in the physical,
chemical, biological or social
On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the
move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in
Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more
'on the
road' in Germany this week and may not have time to post.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 23-Sep-14 6:05 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions
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