Jon, List,
Thank you for the correction, I remember it now too. And for your hint to the distinction between classes and individual signs: An individual sign is something new, that has not existed before, so it is hard to speak of a relation in the mathematical sense, because there relations are parts of the structure. A structure is something permanent, pre-existed. Therefore, I guess it might be ok to say, that the relations exist between the variables sign, object, interpretant, forming new variables (like "legisign", "icon", "rheme", and so on), and not between the individuals the variables stand for. At least, if we are talking about the sign classes table. Otherwise, if we say, that real individual signs have relations with real objects and interpretants, these relations would be parts of the structure of a somehow all- encompassing realm of possibilities, about which it is hard or useless to talk.
So, maybe (in the sign classes table) the relations are process variables, because they are not distinct, but parts. In the vertical direction, you might call the distinctions (e.g. between legisign and sinsign) relations too, which are state variables. Well, maybe. And what kind of variables are the connections between the relations` relations (such as "rhematic indexical legisign")? On one hand, real signs are continuous, on the other, these variables are distinct, each showing an irreducible triad. Perhaps you cannot easily transfer thermodynamics to semiotics.
Best Regards
Helmut
Gesendet: Montag, 03. Juli 2023 um 01:03 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes
Helmut, List:
One correction--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, the three trichotomies are not for the sign, the object, and the interpretant. They are for the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), the relation of the sign to its object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument). He later clarifies that they are for the sign itself (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its dynamical object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its final interpretant (seme/pheme/delome).
The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate). However, their relations are in accordance with Gary Richmond's vector of determination--the two objects (2ns) determine the one sign (1ns) to determine the three interpretants (3ns). Likewise, the flow of time is from the accomplished past (2ns) through the nascent present (1ns) toward the contingent future (3ns).
I agree that real semiosis is a continuous process, such that our demarcation of individual signs with their objects and interpretants is at least somewhat arbitrary. In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing attention to something else.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 2:22 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
List,in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument.Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes.The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic.As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of interest has not been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it?Best Regards!Helmut
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